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ABSTRACT 
The main aim of this research is to analyse the CSR disclosure and examine its 
determinants and consequences among Islamic banks in the GCC (Gulf Countries 
Council). In fulfilling the research aims, annual reports of GCC Islamic banks for the 
period 2010- 2014 are analysed using manual content analysis, which involves 195 
observations of 39 Islamic banks. The CSR disclosure index is constructed based on 
11 dimensions using AAOIFI standard no 7, 2010. An ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression is used to examine the determinants and consequences of CSR 
disclosure in the sample Islamic banks. The analysis shows a very low level of CSR 
disclosure (39.9%) among the sample Islamic banks. Using CG (corporate 
governance) mechanisms to measure the determinant of CSR disclosure, this 
current study finds a significant positive association between CSR disclosure and the 
size of the boards of directors of the sample Islamic banks. It provides evidence that 
stronger corporate governance is associated with a higher level of CSR disclosure. 
This current study finds a negative significant relationship of CEO. Duality and AC 
Size and CSR disclosure. However, the results show no significant association 
between CSR disclosure and other corporate governance variables. To examine the 
economic consequences of CSR disclosure, the study uses three different proxies of 
firm value (MTBV, Market Capitalization and Tobin Q). Using market capitalization 
proxies, this current study finds that there is a negative significant relationship 
between CSR disclosure and firm value. The study did not find any significant 
relationship between other proxies. This current study suggests that there is a need 
to improve the current CSR disclosure practice in GCC Islamic banks by imposing 
additional constraints on the board of directors‟ characteristics. The results inform 
the global debate on the need for corporate governance reform in Islamic banks, by 
providing insights on the role played by corporate governance mechanisms in 
encouraging and enhancing CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks. 
Keywords: AAOIFI, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Content Analysis, 
Disclosure Level, Determinants, GCC, Islamic banks 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Islamic banking has grown rapidly since its inception in 19751 and it is believed to 
have doubled the growth rate of the conventional finance industry. According to the 
figures released by the banks in 2013, the number of Shariah2-compliant financial 
institutions and the number of Shariah-compliant mutual funds reached 349 and 800, 
respectively. Furthermore, the global Islamic assets held by commercial banks 
exceeded USD $1.8 trillion in 2013 and is predict to exceed USD $2 trillion in 2014 
(Ernst & Young, 2013).  Despite its growth, it is believed that Islamic banking 
represents the absolute ethical codes of Islamic religion. According to Maali et al. 
(2003), the Islamic codes impose strong social obligations on Muslim individuals and 
organisations.  
From the Islamic perspective, CSR (corporate social responsibility) represents one‟s 
accountability to Allah and encompasses one‟s accountability to society; therefore, 
they can be interpreted as an institution, which promote social justice and social 
responsibility (Maliah, 2000). As Muslims entities, Islamic banks are accountable 
towards Allah (God), as stated in the Quran: “And fear a Day when you will be 
returned to Allah. Then every soul will be compensated for what it earned, and they 
will not be treated unjustly” (Quran, 2:281). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
general shows how the companies meet their obligation to their employees and 
                                            
1
 Institutions offering Islamic financial services started emerging in 1960 in isolation, the real momentum of 
Islamic banking and finance started in 1975 with establishment of Dubai Islamic Bank and the Jeddah Islamic 
Development Bank(Ayub, 23:2007). 
2
 Shariah in general term is Islamic Jurisprudence or Islamic Law 
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community (Luan, 2005). In the Islamic context, social responsibilities represent the 
concept of brotherhood “ukhuwah” from one to another. Thus, the social role is very 
important for Islamic banks and they can be described as banks who have a social 
face towards the society (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Al-Mubarak & Osmani, 
2010;Hasan, 2011). This role is mainly a reflection of the importance of upholding 
the Islamic principles upon which these banks operate and how they address these 
social issues (Maali et al., 2003).  
Consequently, as banks that operate in Islamic surroundings, it expected that they 
are aware of the impact of their activities on the community. In other words, Islamic 
banks should be more active on promoting CSR, rather than just focusing on profit 
maximisation. Islamic banks are also accountable towards stakeholders and society 
in general. These accountabilities can be proven through disclosure and full 
transparency, as stated in the Holy Quran: “And O my people, give full measure and 
weight in justice and do not deprive the people of their due and do not commit abuse 
on the earth, spreading corruption” (Quran, 11:85).  
Disclosure is a crucial aspect of the accountability between Islamic Banks and its 
stakeholders. Therefore, it is expected that Islamic Banks disclose CSR information 
in a succinct, truthful and comprehensible method to meet their stakeholder‟s needs 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). On the other hand, communities are expecting Islamic 
banks to enhance their transparency, and have greater involvement in solving social 
issues and improved ethical behaviour from the Islamic banks (Case & Al-qadi, 
2012). 
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According to the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI, 2010), Islamic banks should disclose all information necessary 
to inform the community about their operations. It is related to the concept of 
accountability, which means that the community has the right to know how the 
organisations‟ activities are affecting their wellbeing. Therefore, the content of 
Islamic banks‟ annual reports is expected to provide social information, focusing in 
detail on the aspects of CSR, such as zakat, Qard al-Hasan funds, and employee 
information, which have particular relevance to the social accountability principle 
(Baydoun & Willett, 2000).  
In recent years, a sizeable body of literature indicates a major increase in interest in 
disclosure studies (e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2006, Hussainey and Walker, 2009; 
Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Moumen et al., 2015). It contains studies focused on 
disclosure level, as well as its determinants and consequences (Maali et al., 2006; 
Hussainey and Mouselli, 2010; Farook et al., 2011; Farag et al., 2014; Elzahar et al., 
2015). Prior studies show that disclosure reporting plays an important role in 
improving communication with stakeholders. It also shows that disclosure practice 
has a positive impact on the firm‟s value (FV) (Uyar and Kilic, 2012; Anam et al., 
2011; Wang et al., 2008; Schwaiger, 2004).  
Generally, most of the prior studies examined the determinants and economic 
consequences of either overall disclosure or particular types of disclosure. 
Numerous studies that examined the factors affecting disclosure suggested that 
corporate governance (CG) and firm characteristics are the key drivers for corporate 
disclosure level, either as a whole (e.g., Samaha et al., 2015; Gisbert and Navallas, 
2013; Farook et al., 2011; Elshandidy et al., 2011; Bhatti and Bhatti, 2009) or for 
different types of disclosure (e.g. Elshandidy et al., 2013; Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
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Other streams of research have shown the usefulness of corporate disclosure on 
stock market participants‟ decisions. For instance, several studies test the effect of 
corporate disclosure on the cost of capital (e.g., Beyer et al., 2010; Kothari et al., 
2009), firm value (e.g. Hassan et al., 2009; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013), share price 
anticipation of earnings (e.g. Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Hussainey and Walker, 
2009), and analysts‟ forecast accuracy (e.g. Yu, 2010). Notably, the majority of 
previous studies have focused on specific perspectives, such as firms or country-
specific perspectives in measuring disclosure and used data for non-Islamic banks. 
However, prior studies have not provided evidence on the factors determining CSR 
disclosure for Islamic banks in a specific region such as the GCC (Gulf Countries 
Council).  
To the best of the author‟s knowledge, there is limited study that has explored the 
CSR disclosure among GCC Islamic banks from 2010-2014, and which provides 
variations of CSR disclosure practices between banks and countries after the 
issuance of AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institution) Governance standards no. 7, 2010. There is also a limited studies that 
adopts AAOIFI as a best practice for CSR reporting for Islamic Banks, based on the 
latest AAOIFI governance standards versions, 20103. Previous studies (e.g. Case & 
Al-qadi, 2012; Maali et al., 2006; Mosaid & Boutti, 2012) have not clearly examined 
how CSR reporting could influence a firm‟s value for GCC Islamic banks. Overall, 
this research will contribute to the existing disclosure literature by exploring the CSR 
disclosure practice among GCC Islamic banks and then examine its determinants 
and consequences (firm value). This study differs from previous studies, which also 
                                            
3
 From the researcher knowledge there is no updated of governance standards which relate to CSR disclosure 
practice in AAOIFI, 2014. 
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discuss the issue of CSR disclosure (Maali et al., 2003; Thompson and Zarina, 2004; 
Ramasamy and Ting, 2004; Hussainey, 2011; Mallin, Farag & Ow-Yong, 2014; 
Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Platonova, 2013) by narrowly focusing on GCC 
perspectives. Therefore, using a comprehensive disclosure index developed using 
AAOIFI standards and supported by prior research (such as: Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; 
Platonova, 2014; Maali et al., 2006; Ullah, 2013), the study will provide an insight of 
CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks in the GCC region. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: 1.2) the need for CSR disclosure, 1.3) 
the nature of the research problem, 1.4) gaps and motivations, 1.5) research aims 
and objectives, 1.6) research questions, 1.7) potential contribution of the study, and 
1.8) the organization of study. 
1.2 The Need for CSR Disclosure 
The recent development of corporate social responsibility has a significant impact on 
the role of business, and has resulted in the change of accounting practices (Aribi & 
Gao, 2010). Nowadays, banks are not only focused on generating profit for their 
shareholders, but they have to also be more accountable and concerned with CSR 
issues in their business activity (Zain, 1999a; Morsing & Perrini, 2009). There is a 
growing concern within the business community with the significance of the key 
stakeholders attached to socially, environmentally, and ethically responsible 
behaviour by business enterprises (Zadek et al., 1997). The pressure on companies 
to be accountable to a wider audience of stakeholders is coming from a number of 
resources, such as the ethical investors, a growing number of pressure groups, 
consumer associations, and the growing number of United Nations and European 
Community Directives (Gray et al., 1988).As a result, public expectations of CSR 
have increased, and have forced companies to become more concerned about their 
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relationship with societal interest groups and their corporate social responsibility 
(Held, 1970). 
The rising importance of CSR disclosure in practical applications is also reflected in 
academic research (e.g., O‟Dwyer et al,2005; Plumlee et al, 2008; Nichols and 
Wieland, 2009; Simnett et al, 2009; Johansen, 2010; Dhaliwal, Dhaliwal et al., 2012). 
Companies are no longer seen by society as institutions which give a mutual benefit 
to their shareholders only, but as organisations that operate within society which has 
a responsibility to ensure socio-economic justice and, at the same time give benefit 
to the stakeholders (McDonald & Puxty, 1979; Mohammed, 2007). As the banks 
realise the significance of stakeholders financial anticipation, the role of CSR 
disclosure has become more important as a means of discharging accountability 
(Gray et al., 1996; Park & Ghauri, 2014). In this sense, Haniffa (2002) argues that 
social responsibility reporting can be seen as a response by companies to the 
changing expectations of the society in which they operate. Nevertheless, it could be 
argued that social reporting is used as a tool to change perception without changing 
the fact. 
When a firm discloses its corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, it declares 
its accountability to a broader spectrum of stakeholders than its shareholders alone. 
Such disclosures provide insight beyond those conveyed in financial disclosures. In 
recent years, CSR disclosures have surged in popularity and are now widely used by 
professionals in the capital market. According to Dhaliwal et al, (2012), the number 
of firms issuing CSR reports in their sample of 31 countries increased from fewer 
than 100 in the early 1990s to over 1,000 in 2007. In a 2003 survey of 400 fund 
managers and financial analysts in nine European countries, around 80 percent of 
participants believed CSR activities were relevant to a firm‟s long-term value, and 
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approximately 50 percent acknowledged using information from CSR disclosures 
(Sofres, 2003). 
While public concern over the social and environmental consequences of corporate 
activities has increased, this has resulted in a situation in which two essentially new 
factors have been introduced into investment decision-making (Spicer, 1978). First, 
the public interest on the side effects of corporate activities has led to new and 
increasingly stringent sanctions against certain types of these activities such as 
charitable activities. Secondly, the growth of numbers of investors who are 
concerned with the moral and ethical predictions of corporate activities and with the 
disclosure of all relevant information pertaining to a company‟s activities, may 
influence an investor‟s investment decision; it refers to a revelation of knowledge, 
free from secrecy or ignorance; Lanam, 2007). Therefore, CSR disclosure plays an 
important role in business, including enhancing corporate transparency, developing 
corporate image, and providing useful information for investment decision-making 
(see, for example, Gray et al., 1988; Friedman and Miles, 2001; O'Dwyer, 2005). In 
addition, it has been asserted that CSR disclosure is seen as a means by which 
business enterprises may attempt to manage their stakeholders in order to gain their 
support and approval (Deegan, 2000; Parker, 2005). 
In terms of the relation between CSR and accounting, previous research (such as: 
Zainal et al., 2013; Aribi, 2009; Dong et al., 2015) finds that there is a natural link 
between CSR and accounting. An accounting scope has a general responsibility for 
the measurement, disclosure, and assurance of information, including CSR-related 
information. As CSR has become nearly ubiquitous in modern business over the last 
few decades, periodic CSR reporting became popular for larger businesses 
(Pederson, 2006). Accounting professionals have the opportunity to participate in the 
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creation, assurance, issuance, and analysis of CSR reports. Therefore, accounting 
professionals play an important role in enhancing corporate social responsibility 
disclosure practice among financial institutions, such as Islamic banks. 
1.3 The Nature of the Research Problem 
Based on the accountability principles, Islamic banks are required to disclose all 
information that reflect their identity (Bayoud et al., 2012). Accountability from an 
Islamic perspective is wider than in the Western context, as it involves accountability 
to the God (Allah) as a main priority, then accountability toward its stakeholders (El-
Halaby & Hussainey, 2015a). Accountability can be measured for Islamic banks 
through reporting, which shows the extent to which the disclosure practices of these 
banks reflect their accountability towards Allah and their stakeholders. Maali et al. 
(2006), categorise three broad objectives that are used as the basis for 
accountability disclosures by Islamic banks: a) to show compliance with Shariah, b) 
to show how the operations of the business have affected the wellbeing of the 
Islamic community, and c) to help Muslims perform their religious duties. According 
to Belal et al. (2014), Islamic banks have a similar responsibility to other financial 
institutions; they are expected to provide the best quality services without neglecting 
the social needs of their stakeholders. 
Islamic banks represent a part of Islamic society and may consider their 
accountability towards the society as such: to be involved in charity activities and 
provide a Waqf (endowment) fund for the benefit of the society. CSR reporting, 
based on Gray et al (1995, p. 35), in this sense “extends the accountability of 
organisations, beyond the traditional role of providing a financial account to owners 
of capital, in particular shareholders”. The objective of the establishment of Islamic 
banks is to promote a social and ethical justice towards society, and the promotion of 
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social welfare and justice are significant to Islamic banks as part of their CSR 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). In the context of Islam, the key aim of Islamic banks‟ 
reporting is to disclose that all their activities are in compliance with Shariah 
principles (Baydoun and Willet, 2000). Hasan and Siti-Nabiha (2010) argue that 
issues regarding transparency and accountability in Islamic banks need further 
research. Therefore, the compliance of CSR disclosure can be considering as a way 
of Islamic banks to show their transparency and accountability towards society in 
conjunction with their compliance with the Shariah.  
In an attempt to distinguish between CSR disclosures, this study will add to the 
existing literature by exploring the CSR disclosure practice among GCC Islamic 
banks. CSR information may be of a high quality if this information is useful for the 
users of annual reports. Therefore, the starting point of this study is to measure the 
CSR disclosure level. Prior research has attempted to measure disclosure levels 
using self-constructed indices (e.g. Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; 
Volkov and Smith, 2015; Moumen et al., 2015). Therefore, this study will adopt the 
method used by prior studies in examining the level of CSR disclosure among 
sample GCC Islamic banks.  
The study uses CSR reporting scores to explore the variation among GCC Islamic 
banks‟ disclosure practices. Then, this score will be used to examine its 
determinants and consequences. Prior studies on the CSR disclosure determinants 
were either conducted based on a single bank or specific country perspectives, such 
as those of Bahrain or Malaysia (e.g. Abdul Rahman et al., 2013; Aribi and Gao, 
2012). In fulfilling the gap, this study will be conducted across 6 GCC countries using 
a large sample of data from 2010-2014, which may provide a better insight of CSR 
disclosure practice in that region. The limited disclosure about the CSR information 
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draws and reflects a negative and unclear image about the true and core disclosure 
practice of Islamic banks (Haji, 2013). It also increases the negative attitudes from 
stakeholders about these institutions and increases the negative criticism towards 
Islamic banks (Basah & Yusuf, 2013). Therefore, this study will identify the CSR 
disclosure level and examine the main determinates and consequences of the CSR 
disclosure level in GCC Islamic banks. It is a critical issue for Islamic banks, which 
can assist and support them to enhance their image and construct a competitive 
advantage, differentiating them from the conventional banks.  
1.4 Gaps and Motivations  
From an Islamic perspective, the key purpose of corporate reporting that overrides 
other objectives is to allow Islamic institutions to show their compliance with Shariah 
(Baydoun and Willett, 2000). The consequence of this objective is that Islamic banks 
have a responsibility to disclose all information essential to its stakeholders about 
their operations (Maali et al., 2006). Full disclosure about all social information of 
Islamic banks is derived from the divine duty of accountability that each Muslim 
bears. Islamic banks have a duty to disclose their compliance with the Shariah to 
stakeholders. Maali et al. (2006, p. 27) explain “the requirement for Muslims to 
uncover the truth is intended to help the community to know the effect of a person or 
a business on its wellbeing”. Therefore, the first motivation of the study is to discuss 
the concept of CSR from an Islamic point of view, and to get a clear view of the 
extent to which Islam enhances CSR practice in business. As far as the researcher 
is aware, there are limited of studies that focus on the concept of CSR disclosure 
from the Islamic point of view. From the researcher‟s knowledge, the researchers 
who discussed the disclosure from an Islamic point of view are Zakaria (2009) and 
Helfaya et al,(2016).Therefore, to get a better insight of CSR disclosure in Islam, the 
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researcher will narrowly discuss the Islamic ethical principle in promoting CSR and a 
discussion of CSR in Islam in Chapter 3. 
The existing body of literature on disclosure can be divided into three strands. The 
first strand adopts content analysis to measure the corporate disclosure level as 
described in the annual reports (e.g., Moumen et al., 2015). The second strand 
explores the determinants of disclosure (e.g., Farag et al., 2014; Farook et al., 2011). 
The third strand explores the economic consequences of disclosure (Elzahar et al., 
2015; Hussainey and Mouselli, 2010). In spite of the richness of corporate disclosure 
studies, there is no study that provides a clear picture of CSR reporting practices 
regarding Islamic banks, especially from the GCC perspective. The closest studies to 
this research either focus only at the level of disclosure on one single year, country 
or institution (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006; Belal et al., 2014; 
Kamla and Rammal, 2013), where this current study involve cross countries data. 
Therefore, the second motivation for conducting this study is to address this 
research gap by looking at the level of CSR reporting disclosure in 6 GCC Islamic 
banks, based on the most recent data and a comprehensive index. This current 
study is conducted from 2010 due to the latest Governance Standards Issued by 
AAOIFI in 2010; it attempts to measure the CSR disclosure practice among GCC 
Islamic banks after the issuance of that standard. At the time of this study, the most 
recent available annual report produced by the sample Islamic banks is from 2014 
but there is no update of AAOIFI CSR conduct in this version; therefore, for the 
purpose of the study, AAOIFI, 2010 is used as a main standard. 
The third motivation for the researcher to narrowly focus on GCC Islamic banks are 
due to their active contribution in Islamic banking development and its rapid growth. 
According to the figure by The Banker, 2014, GCC Islamic banking assets growth is 
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over US$640 billion compared to $269 billion in the Asian regions (Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Thailand). The Islamic banking industry has advanced from niche to 
critical mass in the last 30 years, since the establishment of the Islamic Development 
Bank in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in 1974, and “it is one of the fastest 
growing industries, having posted „double-digit‟ annual growth rates” (Munawar, 
2005). Without denying the growth and contribution of GCC countries in the Islamic 
banking industry, the researcher tries to explore their awareness of the CSR issue 
through an examination of their CSR disclosure practice. 
A rapid growth in Islamic banking, a number of self-regulating and standards bodies 
have been formed to help in the consolidation of the established industry and to 
guide the operations of the industry around the world. These include the Bahrain 
based Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI), which was established in 1991 to provide accounting, auditing, and 
Shariah standards for financial reporting in Islamic financial institutions4.  Due to the 
establishment of the AAOIFI in Bahrain, which issued several standards for Islamic 
banks, such as Governance Standard No. 7, 2010, it motivates the researcher to 
investigate whether the establishment of the AAOIFI in Bahrain influences GCC 
countries in their CSR disclosure practice. 
Fourthly, the number of sample banks used in the prior literature was limited, as 
acknowledged by Haniffa and Hudaib (2007). In this current study, the sample is 
relatively large, involving 195 observations from 2010-2014, compared to the largest 
study so far (90 in Mallinb et al., 2014). Moreover, this study intends to bridge a gap 
                                            
4
 As of March 2016, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) has issued 88 Shariah, accounting and governance standards for Islamic institutions. 
Similarly, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has issued 17 regulatory and prudential 
standards and six guidance notes. 
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of prior research by developing a comprehensive index, based on AAOIFI No. 7, 
2010 and supported by prior research (such as: Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2007; Platonova, 2014;) in measuring the CSR disclosure level. By conducting this 
study, the researcher will explore and provide a clear picture of the CSR disclosure 
practice among the sample Islamic banks. The current study is motivated by the 
question about the difference between the required information that may be 
published in the annual reports, based on the Islamic perspective based on AAOIFI 
standards, and what is presently being practised by these banks (e.g., Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006; Lewis, 2001).  
The fifth motivation is related to the index created in measuring the CSR disclosure 
practice among sample Islamic banks. The study of AAOFI accounting standards 
has grown in recent years with substantial contributions from scholars, such as 
Ahmed and Khatun (2013), Hassan and Harahap (2010), and Vinnicombe (2010). 
There have been very few studies that measure the compliance with AAOIFI and 
determinants of disclosure for Islamic banks. Most of the existing research has 
focused on exploring the compliance level with International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) (e.g., Aljifri, 2008; Akhtaruddin, 2005) or with national financial 
standards (e.g., Fekete et al., 2008). Little is known about the compliance level with 
AAOIFI standards (Ullah, 2013; Vinnicombe, 2010) especially regarding the CSR 
related issue.  
In addition, the existing body of CSR literature in Islamic banks focuses on either the 
level of CSR disclosure (e.g., Aribi and Gao, 2012; Abdul Rahman et al., 2010) or 
the determinants of CSR disclosure (e.g., Farook et al., 2011) are conducted before 
the issuance of AAOIFI governance standard No.7 that represents a benchmark of 
CSRD in Islamic banks. Therefore, this study is motivated to explore the compliance 
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levels of this standard by GCC Islamic banks and their potential determinants. It is 
notable that the focus of most of these studies is descriptive or analytical in nature, 
emphasising the compliance level with AAOIFI without extending their study to 
explore the main factors behind the disclosure level. Most of the literature that tested 
disclosure for Islamic banks focused mainly on measuring the disclosure levels with 
limited studies exploring the determinants of CSR disclosure (e.g., Sarea and 
Hanefah, 2013; Ousama and Fatima, 2010), therefore the current study will fulfil the 
gap. 
The sixth motivation is to examine the determinants of corporate CSR disclosure. To 
the best of researcher‟s knowledge, prior studies that explore the determinants of 
corporate disclosure are still in the early stage and there is a scarcity of empirical 
studies testing this issue (e.g., Farag et al., 2014; Farook et al., 2011). A limited 
number of studies have examined the determinants of CSR reporting (e.g., Farag et 
al., 2014; Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Farook et al., 2011; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 
2011). The closest studies to this study, which analyse the social disclosure practice 
among Islamic banks, have either a limited number of variables, sample (e.g., Belal 
et al., 2014; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Bukhari et al., 2013; Gisbert and Navallas, 
2013; El-Halaby & Hussaney, 2015), or have ignored the majority of CG(corporate 
governance) variables, (e.g., Samaha et al.,2015; Elshandidy et al., 2013) 
particularly those related to board and SSB(shariah supervisory bord)-related 
variables.  
Moreover, this study is also motivated by incentive research, which only focuses on 
corporate governance CG with board-related variables as a main category in the CG 
structure and ignores SSB, which represents one of the main components in the CG 
for Islamic banks. Most of the previous studies, which explore corporate governance 
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as a factor behind the disclosure level, have mainly focused on CG variables related 
to board-related variables (e.g., Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Bokpin, 2013; Samaha et 
al., 2012; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). There are a limited number of studies that 
explore CG related to SSB as a unique mechanism of Islamic banks (e.g., Abdul 
Rahman and Bukair, 2013; Farook et al., 2011). Therefore, this study aims to fill this 
gap by exploring the impacts of CG related to board, SSB, audit, and ownership-
related variables for Islamic banks and measuring the extent to which these 
variables affect CSR disclosure levels of the sample banks. The current study will 
provide evidence on whether CSR disclosure practice among the sample countries is 
derived from the same or different factors. 
The seventh motivation for this study arises from the need to examine the extent to 
which CSR reporting could affect firm value (FV). More specifically, the study 
investigates whether CSR reporting has different effects on market-to-book value 
(MTBV), market capitalization (MC), and Tobin Q. CSR information involves different 
categories of information that might be attractive to annual report users. It 
incorporates important information that refers to financial and non-financial 
information concerned with Shariah and society. Although previous research has 
shown the impact of different types of reporting in different contexts (e.g., Hussainey 
and Walker, 2009; Hassan et al., 2009), these studies have not provided strong 
evidence on the potential impact on the firm value. One of the main explanations for 
the mixed results in previous research is the lack of a comprehensive and objective 
measure of disclosure (Beattie et al., 2004). This would add to the existing literature, 
to examine the value relevance of CSR reporting in terms of firm value (FV).  
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The final motivation of this research is to examine the impact of disclosure on firm 
value (FV). As pointed out by Al-Akra et al. (2010), there is little empirical evidence 
to support that association. Therefore, this research is motivated to conduct an 
empirical study on Islamic banks to show the extent to which CSR disclosure can 
influence the firm value of these banks. This current study is also motivated by rare 
studies that explore the impacts of different kinds of proxies in measuring the firm 
value (FV). Vogel (2005) argues that results related to the link between disclosure 
and firm value (FV) remain inconclusive. Elzahar (2013) argued that the link between 
firm value (FV) and disclosure is sensitive to the type of disclosure and the proxy 
employed for firm value (FV). This argument is asking for further research for Islamic 
banks. Astonishingly, there is a general absence of academic research that 
investigates the prospective economic consequences and valuation implications of 
social disclosure for Islamic banks. This study is motivated by a lack of research on 
reporting disclosures and by calls for research on the valuation implications of CSR 
disclosures (e.g., Hassan et al., 2009; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). 
1.5 Research Aim and Research Objectives (RO) 
The main aim of this research is to analytically explore the extent of CSR disclosure 
practices in GCC Islamic banks. Further, this study will examine its determinants and 
consequences.  
There are a number of objectives through which the aim of this study will be fulfilled, 
which are as follows: 
RO 1: To measure the CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks in GCC 
countries. 
RO 2: To examine the impact of CG as determinants of CSR disclosure in the 
sample GCC Islamic banks. 
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RO 3: To examine the consequences (firm value) of CSR disclosure in the sample 
GCC Islamic banks. 
1.6 Research Questions (RQ) 
The study aims to respond and answer the following formulated research questions, 
which are derived from the identified research gap and problem: 
RQ 1: What is the CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks in GCC countries? 
1.1 Has the CSR disclosure level of Islamic banks in GCC increased after the 
issuance of AAOIFI, No. 7, 2010 standards?  
1.2 What types of CSR information are disclosed by Islamic banks in the 
sample countries? 
1.3 Which GCC countries have higher levels of CSRD? 
RQ 2: What are the determinants of CSR disclosure in the sample Islamic banks? 
2.1 To what extent does the CG (corporate governance) affect the CSR 
disclosure practice among Islamic banks in GCC countries? 
RQ 3: What are the consequences of CSR disclosure in the sample Islamic banks? 
3.1 Does association exist between CSR disclosure and firm value? 
Analytical responses to each of these questions are provided through empirical 
analysis in the following chapters (Chapters 4 and 7). Table 1 provides a summary of 
the research aims objectives, questions, and methods used in this study. 
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Table 1: Summary of the research aims, research objectives, research questions 
(RQ), and research methods/tools. 
No Aim and Objectives 
(RO) 
RQ Method/Tools Source of data 
1 To measure the CSR 
disclosure practice 
among Islamic banks in 
GCC countries. 
What is the CSR 
disclosure 
practice among 
Islamic banks in 
GCC countries?  
-Content 
analysis 
-Disclosure 
index 
-Annual reports 
2 To examine the impact 
of CG as determinants 
of CSR disclosure in 
the sample GCC 
Islamic banks. 
 
What are the 
determinants of 
CSR disclosure 
in the sample 
Islamic banks? 
 
-Content 
analysis 
-Disclosure 
index 
-Regression 
analysis/OLS 
-Annual reports 
3 To examine the 
consequences (firm 
value) of CSR 
disclosure in the 
sample GCC Islamic 
banks. 
What are the 
consequences 
of CSR 
disclosure in the 
sample Islamic 
banks?  
-Content 
analysis 
-Disclosure 
index 
-Regression 
analysis/OLS 
-Annual reports 
-DataStream 
 
1.7 Potential Contributions of the Study 
Based on the originality of this study, the current study contributes to the existing 
disclosure literature as follows:  
Firstly, this current study contributes to disclosure literature by measuring CSR 
disclosure, rather than other types of disclosure. It differs from Elzahar & Hussainey 
(2012), Moumen et al. (2015), and Journal & Birkbeck (2016), as they mainly 
measure narrative and risk disclosure. 
Secondly, previous studies, which investigated CSR disclosure, measure using an 
index based on prior research (e.g., Farook et al., 2011), while limited research 
explores AAOIFI governance standards on compliance with social disclosure. 
Therefore, this study contributes to the disclosure literature by being the first that 
uses AAOIFI, No. 7, 2010, and prior research to measure the CSR disclosure 
practice among sample Islamic banks. It then measures the factors behind the 
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variances of disclosure levels. This current study‟s index contains 11 main 
dimensions of CSR areas, whereas previous studies covered fewer dimensions (e.g., 
Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013; Hassan and Harahap, 2010). The model is a 
unique and comprehensive means of measuring CSR disclosure. Whereas previous 
studies tend to only adopt prior suggested indices such as those adopted by Maali et 
al. (2006) and Haniffa & Hudaib (2007), this research differs based on the number of 
Islamic banks that are contained in the sample (Hassan et al., 2012 (13 banks); 
Sobhani et al., 2009 (29 banks)). This research sample is 39 Islamic banks and 
contains 195 observations from 2010-2014.  
Thirdly, previous work has applied manual content analysis to a one-year period, or 
within one country, in addition to its limited samples (e.g., Hassan et al., 2012 (13 
banks); Sobhani et al., 2009 (29 banks)). This study contains a larger sample size 
(39 Islamic banks) spread across GCC countries from 2010-2014, and involves 195 
observations. This study covers Islamic banks that are located in 6 different GCC 
countries, whereas previous studies just focused on one country (e.g., Belal et al., 
2014). The cross-countries level analysis permits the researcher to construct a 
holistic picture of social disclosure reporting for Islamic banks. Also, it provides a 
better picture of CSR disclosure practice in GCC countries. 
Fourthly, the study of AAOIFI standards has grown in recent years with substantial 
contributions from scholars such as Ahmed and Khatun (2013), and Hassan and 
Harahap (2010). It is notable that the focus of most of these studies is descriptive in 
nature, emphasising in particular the compliance level with AAOIFI without extending 
their study to explore the main factors behind the disclosure level. This study 
contributes to the disclosure literature by exploring the determinants of disclosure 
concerned with CG for GCC Islamic banks. 
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Fifthly, the present study used CG mechanism in exploring the determinants of CSR 
disclosure. The study used board, SSB, audit, and ownership-related variables in 
measuring the CSR disclosure determinants. Previous literature provides mixed 
empirical evidence for variables related to CG characteristics; limited studies (e.g., 
Farook et al., 2011; Safieddine, 2009; Farag et al., 2014) have examined the 
existence of an in-house SSB and auditing committee, which can potentially 
influence the CSR disclosure practice. This study, therefore, is advanced by 
considering the existence of SSB and auditing committees and their influence to 
CSR disclosure practice in GCC Islamic banks. 
Sixthly, this study contributes to the disclosure literature by developing a large 
number of CG variables in its model. The research model contains 12 CG variables, 
whereas previous research, such as Hidalgo et al. (2011), focused only on two CG 
variables, which are board-independence and ownership structure. Gisbert and 
Navallas (2013), and Samaha et al. (2012) measured determinants of disclosure for 
banks that were located in one single country (Egypt and Spain, respectively). On 
the other hand, this research explores this relationship for banks located in 6 
different countries. Moreover, this study is focused on Islamic banks, whereas other 
previous studies are testing this association either for non-Islamic institutions (Liang 
et al., 2012; Tsamenyi et al., 2007) or non-financial companies (Alotaibi and 
Hussainey, 2016).  
Last, but not least, there has been limited studies that measured the association 
between disclosure and firm value (FV) (Uyar and Kilic, 2012). This strand is located 
in the early research stage for Islamic banks. Yet, exploring the consequences of 
CSR disclosure and firm value (FV) has not yet been investigated empirically in the 
context of Islamic banks. The study is concerned with the work of Dhaliwal et al. 
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(2011) in its examination of the impact of social disclosure on firm value, but differs 
in the proxies used in measuring the economic consequences of CSRD and firm 
value. This current study also differs from Richardson and Welker (2001), who 
examine the economic consequences of social and financial disclosure using the 
cost of capital. This current study contributes to the disclosure literature by 
examining the economic consequences of CSRD using firm value. 
1.8 Organisation of the Study 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters, as follows: 
Chapter One: Introduction  
This chapter provides an introductory outline of the nature of study, gaps and 
motivations, research aims and objectives, research questions, thesis statement, 
originality, significance and contribution of the study, and the organization of study. It 
outlines the whole research direction and the essence of the study in the area of 
CSR disclosure.  
Chapter Two: The Development and Growth of Islamic Banking in GCC 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the development and growth of Islamic 
banking and finance in GCC, which motivated the researcher to conduct this study in 
this region. This chapter also provides a historical and current development of 
Islamic banking in GCC countries. 
Chapter Three: CSR Disclosure: An Islamic Perspective 
The chapter will which discusses the concept of CSR and CSRD from an Islamic 
perspective. This chapter also provides a discussion of Islamic ethical principles in 
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enhancing CSR practice among Islamic banks, supported by the Quran and Hadith. 
A brief discussion about AAOIFI is also presented in this chapter. 
Chapter Four: Theoretical Framework 
This chapter provides a theoretical discussion, which relates to the CSR disclosure 
discussion. In this chapter, the researcher briefly discusses several theories, such as 
agency, stakeholder, legitimacy, accountability, signalling, and economic theory. 
Chapter Five: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
This chapter will discuss all relevant literature to explain the CSR disclosure practice 
in Islamic banks, as well as its determinants and consequences. The hypothesis of 
this current study has been developed in this section supported by theoretical 
evidence. 
Chapter Six: Research Methodology and Methods 
This chapter will discuss research methodology and the methods used in this study 
to achieve RO 1, RO 2, and RO 3. The discussion of validity and reliability of the 
disclosure index develops is also discussed in this chapter. This chapter also 
discusses in detail the process of examining the CSR disclosure level, its 
determinants, and consequences. 
Chapter 7: Findings 
This chapter provides an empirical finding to answer RQ 1, RQ 2, and RQ 3. The 
discussion of the results is also presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This chapter provides the concluding remarks of the thesis. It presents a summary of 
the key findings of the research and discusses their implications. The remainder of 
the chapter shows a summary of the limitations of this research and highlights 
several avenues for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF ISLAMIC BANKING IN 
GULF COUNTRIES COUNCIL (GCC) 
2.1 Overview 
Modern Islamic banking originated with the establishment of the Dubai Islamic Bank 
in 1975. It might, therefore, be expected that the GCC states 5 would be at the centre 
of the rapidly expanding Islamic finance industry, which encompasses retail and 
investment banking, insurance, fund management, and the issuance and trading of 
Shariah-compliant securities, known as sukuk or Islamic bond (Wilson, 2009). The 
IFIs (Islamic Financial Institutions), which conduct their business according to Islamic 
principles, are expected to reflect the socio-economic objectives of Islam, such as 
CSR activities. In this regard, Lewis (2001) noted that Islam has provided a 
comprehensive list of ethics that governs how business should be conducted, how 
banking and finance are to be arranged, and, alternatively, how accounting ought to 
be undertaken. Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) are considered as having ethical 
identity and they have different social and economic objectives, since the foundation 
of their business is based on religion (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007).  
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief justification of conducting a 
study of CSR disclosure in the GCC region; it is due to its positive growth of Islamic 
banking industry in this region, which then becomes an Islamic banking hub. With 
the key roles of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia, the GCC becomes 
an active player in promoting and enhancing Islamic banking products and services 
around the world (Wilson, 2002). While Oman are slightly passive in participation 
with the Islamic banking industry due its unstable political condition (Alam, 2006). 
                                            
5
 The GCC member states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
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Therefore, the discussion of this chapter will begin with: 2.2) the history and 
development of Islamic banking in GCC, then 2.3) the global Islamic finance growth, 
2.4) the size of the Islamic finance industry in the GCC, and 2.5) government policy 
and legislative provision on Islamic banks in the GCC. Last, but not least, is 2.6) the 
summary of the chapter. 
2.2 History and Development of Islamic Banking Industry in GCC 
It is a reality that the Islamic banking industry has advanced from niche to critical 
mass in the last 30 years, since the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). While the principles and notions of Islamic 
economic have existed for centuries, the institutionalization of these principles in the 
form of Islamic banking institutions is relatively new, compared to the conventional 
banking system.  
Historically, the Mitghamr Saving Associations was established as the first Islamic 
bank in Egypt, in 1963, in the form of an Islamic social banking institution aimed at 
providing credit to small artisans and entrepreneurs (Anne,1985). Due to changing 
political circumstances, this experiment did not last long, though it did pave the way 
for the Nasser Social Bank in 1971. Another experiment was launched in Malaysia in 
1967, in the form of the saving associations of pilgrim fund (known as Lembaga 
Tabung Haji Malaysia), which, since then, aims to invest the savings of potential 
Muslim pilgrims to help them finance their pilgrimages to Makkah.  
In later years, Islamic banking and finance (IBF) institutions managed to penetrate 
other financial systems by taking advantage of the opportunities created through 
economic restructuring and liberalization of the financial system in most Muslim 
countries. In addition, due to the impetus provided by globalization, Islamic banking 
and finance institutions were internationalized and managed to enter the 
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international financial systems by providing Shariah-compliant financial products. 
The major institutionalization came with the establishment of the Islamic 
Development Bank in 1974, as a result of the political mandate provided by the 
Organization of Islamic Conference, which aimed to act as the development-oriented 
„World Bank‟ of the Muslim world (Molyneux,2007). This was followed by the 
establishment of the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975, which remains the biggest Islamic 
bank in the world (apart from the entirely Islamized banking system of Iran), and the 
Kuwait Finance House in 1977(Wilson, 2009). 
Institutionalization, the financing capacity, and the asset base of IBFs(Islamic 
Banking and Finance) have shown unprecedented growth since the 1990s. 
According to The Banker (2015), there were 176 IBFs operating around the globe 
since 1997(Latiffa,2001), these increased to 261 in 2006. By 2009, the number of 
IBF institutions had increased to about 500, operating in 75 countries. Southeast 
Asia (consists of: Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Brunei) has the highest number of 
IBF institutions, followed by Africa, and the GCC region. However, in terms of asset 
base, the share of the GCC IBFs is over 70 percent of the entire sector. Thus, “what 
started as a small, rural banking experiment in the remote villages of Egypt has now 
reached a level where many mega-international banks are offering Islamic banking 
products” (Iqbal,2010). With around a 15-20 percent growth rate per annum, the 
asset base of the IBFs(Islamic Banking and Finance) has reached about $822 billion, 
globally6. It is estimated that within a decade, the IBF industry will capture half of the 
savings of the Muslim world (Khan, 2006). In this market-driven industry with global 
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opportunities, the GCC and Malaysia remain the leading region and country in the 
world.7  
Due to rapid growth in the IBF sector, a number of self-regulating and standards 
bodies have also been formed to help in the consolidation of the established industry 
and to guide the operations of the industry around the world. These include the 
Bahrain-based Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), which was established in 1991 to provide accounting, auditing, 
and Shariah standards for financial reporting at Islamic financial institutions8. In 2001, 
the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) in Bahrain was mandated to develop 
guidelines for the issuance of Islamic financial instruments and to encourage active 
secondary-market trading.  
2.3 Global Islamic Banking and Finance (IBF) Growth 
Islamic banking and finance (IBF) has grown rapidly over the past several years and 
it is expected to continue to grow for the foreseeable future. In many markets in the 
Middle East and Asia, IBF has evolved into part of the mainstream financial services 
landscape. With this steady increase, the market has become increasingly 
competitive with more Islamic financial service institutions in the marketplace than 
ever before. Islamic banks need to innovative and develop their products beyond 
Shariah-compliance to attract and keep customers in this competitive environment 
(Zarqa, 1983; Khan, 1986; El-Gamal, 2001). Islamic banking products and services 
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 As of March 2016, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) has issued 88 Shariah, accounting and governance standards for Islamic institutions. 
Similarly, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has issued 17 regulatory and prudential 
standards and six guidance notes. 
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not only satisfy the needs of the 2.08 billion9 Muslims in the world, but may also 
attract ethically motivated customers. The importance of Shariah-compliant assets is 
significant in the Gulf as complete assets are about $262.6 billion, when the data for 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain are consolidated, contrasted with 
the $235.3 billion in Iran (Chapra, 2008).  
Global Islamic banking and finance assets were valued at US$1.6 trillion at the end 
of 2012 and the growth rate is 20.4 percent a year (KFH, 2013). The consensus is 
that by 2020, total Islamic financial assets will reach US$6.5 trillion (World Islamic 
Economic Forum, 2013). Islamic banking offers a global opportunity for growth and 
profitability; it is predicted that Islamic finance will probably exceed US$2.5 trillion in 
2014 (Mughal, 2014). Global Islamic finance assets reached $1.9 trillion by mid-2014 
(ADB and IFSB, 2015), with about 75 percent of the industry concentrated in the 
Middle East and North African (MENA) region (excluding Iran), where GCC countries 
accounted for 96 percent. Moreover, these assets are estimated to have surpassed 
the $2 trillion milestone at end of 2014. In terms of growth, the Islamic finance 
industry, including Islamic capital markets, grew, on average, by 17.5 percent since 
the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 (Ernst and Young, 2015). The bulk of 
growth happened in countries outside of the MENA region, in countries with more 
Muslim populations, but the industry‟s growth in the MENA region was led by the 
GCC countries. In particular, the Islamic finance industry grew, on average, by 43 
percent in Indonesia, and by 19 percent in Turkey between 2009 and 2013. Figure 2 
presents the details of the growth of conventional and Islamic assets from 2009 to 
2013. 
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Figure 1: Growth of Conventional and Islamic Assets from 2009-2013.Source:Ernst 
and Young(2015)-online. 
Islamic banks dominate the Islamic financial industry despite continued growth in 
Sukuk (Islamic bond) and other Shariah-compliant financial assets, such as Islamic 
funds and Islamic insurance (takaful). Islamic banking assets account for about 80 
percent of total assets of the Islamic finance industry; it represents less than 1 
percent of global banking assets10. In 2013, Iran held the largest share of Islamic 
banking assets (about 38 percent), Saudi Arabia and Malaysia accounted for nearly 
29 percent of the banking assets.  
In mid-2013, Islamic banking had reached a systemic stage in nine countries11. 
According to IFSB‟s banking assets data (2015), these countries include Iran and 
Sudan (both with 100 percent Islamic banking), Bahrain, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, 
                                            
10
 IFSB stability report 2014 
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  The IFSB considers the Islamic financial sector as systemically important when the total Islamic banking 
assets in a country comprise more than 15 percent of its total domestic banking sector assets, or the country’s 
Islamic banking assets are at least 5 percent of the global portfolio of Islamic banking assets. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) refrains from setting a specific threshold. 
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Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. In a 2013 survey of central 
banks by the IFSB and the Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), similar 
countries reported that Islamic banking assets comprised 10 percent, or more, of 
their overall banking assets12. According to the survey, of the institutions offering 
Islamic banking services, nearly 70 percent are “standalone” Islamic banks, while the 
remaining 30 percent are conventional banks offering Islamic-banking services 
through “windows”. Except for those in Iran and Sudan, Islamic banks operate side-
by-side with conventional banks, increasing the competitive intensity in the banking 
industry. Despite the wide reach of Islamic banking, industry assets remain highly 
concentrated in a small number of countries: Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates account for 80 percent of all Islamic banking assets 
worldwide. 
At the end of 2013, there were about 410 Islamic banking institutions worldwide, 
including the fully Shariah-compliant banking systems in Iran and Sudan13. Most of 
these Islamic banks were established in the 1980s and 1990s. In recent years, 
Islamic banking has spread to Africa, Europe, and North America; Islamic banks are 
in operation in countries such as Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In addition, a number of large 
European and American banks (such as Citibank and HSBC) are operating Islamic 
banking windows to take advantage of this fast-growing sector. The Islamic banking 
sector has grown at an annual rate of about 17 percent in the period of 2009–2013, 
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even allowing for the post 2008 global crisis period14. This sustained growth is seen 
as a sign of the resilience of the industry. Figure 2, presents the composition of 
banking assets as-end of June 2013. 
 
Figure 2: Composition of banking assets.Source: Islamic Financial Stability Report, 
2014(online) 
2.4 The Size of the Islamic Finance Industry in the GCC 
From 2010 to 2014, liquid wealth in the GCC grew at an average of 17.5% per 
annum, doubling from US$1.1 trillion to US$2.2 trillion (Diemers & Khalil, 2015). This 
is partly explained by the high oil prices during that period, local government 
spending on infrastructure, an increasing effort to diversify, along with the general 
global rebound. In total, Shariah-compliant assets worldwide amounted to around 
$2,252 billion at the end of 2015; this implies that the GCC countries accounted for 
                                            
14
 Ernst & Young (2015) 
32 
 
around 28 percent of the total. Furthermore, there is positive growth of Shariah-
compliant assets in the GCC in 2015, compared to other regions, as shown in table 2. 
Although most of the positive growth in 2014 was due to rapidly rising oil and gas 
prices, which feed through to government spending in the GCC and, consequently, a 
buoyant level of economic activity. 
Table 2: Regional asset growth (USD ($) billion) 
Regions + / - 2015 2014 
GCC 14.19% $640 $561 
Non-GCC MENA -36.97% $339 $537 
MENA -10.83% $979 $1098 
Sub-Saharan Africa -22.21% $8 $11 
Asia 3.69% $269 $259 
Australia/Europe/America -26.52% $17 $24 
Source: The Banker Database, 2015(online) 
A review of Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report (2015) shows that 
global Shariah-compliant assets represent a significant portion of total banking 
assets of the GCC. While in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region Islamic 
banking assets represent 14 percent of total banking assets, in the GCC the market 
share of Islamic banking has crossed to 25 percent threshold, which suggests that 
Islamic banks have become systemically important in these countries. GCC Islamic 
banking assets reached $490 billion at end-June 2013, with Saudi Arabia dominating 
the region with a 49 percent share, followed by the United Arab Emirates (19 
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percent), Kuwait (16 percent), Qatar (11 percent), and Bahrain (5 percent), while this 
segment is still nascent in Oman15.   
Islamic banking has acquired systemic proportions in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates16. Retail Islamic banking in Bahrain has reached 
systemic proportions with a 27 percent asset share in retail banking, and a 13 
percent asset share in total retail and wholesale banking17. Oman‟s entry into Islamic 
banking was in late 2012. The Central Bank of Oman developed a comprehensive 
set of regulations for IB (Islamic Banks) from the following: (1) the existing 
conventional banking framework, based on Omani Banking Law and Basel II 
guidelines (where these do not contradict Shariah); (2) Shariah governance and 
accounting standards of AAOIFI; (3) Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 
guidelines on capital adequacy and risk management; and (4) leading practices on 
Shariah governance from around the world. At the end of August 2015, the 
combined assets of Islamic banks and windows in Oman represented 6 percent of its 
total banking system assets. 
The Islamic finance industry‟s strong growth continued. The global industry‟s CAGR 
(compound annual asset growth) between 2009 and the end of 2014 sits at 12.68%. 
This performance has largely been driven by the dominant markets of the GCC and 
Malaysia. For its part, the GCC registered a CAGR of 17.49 percent over this period, 
while in Asia, this number hit 10.55 percent followed by sub-Saharan Africa at 
10.46%. The growth of Islamic finance in the Gulf region was underpinned by the 
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 See, IFSB, Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report, 2015, p.9. 
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 Systemic is defined as at least 15 percent of banking system assets. 
17
 Shares based on 2013 data provided by Bahrain authorities. Islamic wholesale assets as a share of assets in 
wholesale segment amounted to 32 percent. Islamic bank assets (retail and wholesale) amounted to 30 
percent of total assets in Bahrain’s banking system. 
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gains of fully Shariah compliant Qatari banks. Between 2009 and 2014, these 
lenders posted a CAGR of 21.09 percent, vastly outperforming their regional peers. 
Qatari Islamic banks have also been putting these assets to good use, over the 
same ROA (return on assets) of 2.28%. Meanwhile, the aggregate ROC (return on 
capital) hit 16.93 percent, a notable figure given the high capitalisation levels of 
Qatari lenders. 
These achievements were mirrored, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the GCC. Fully 
Shariah-compliant lenders in the United Arab Emirates achieved a CAGR of 10.64% 
over this period, while aggregate ROA came in at 1.5%. In particular, the 
performance of the Dubai Islamic bank, which entered the top 10 commercial banks 
by ROA in this year‟s report, was the standout contribution from the UAE. Meanwhile, 
the return on capital for fully Shariah-compliant banks was 11.39%. 
The GCC regions‟ other key market, Saudi Arabia, enjoyed a CAGR of 13.39%, 
accompanied by the highest ROA 2.4% - of any market over the 2009 to 2014-time 
period. Saudi banks also achieved an ROC of 16.6% behind Iran, Malaysia, and 
Qatar. Meanwhile, 5 of the 10 fastest-growing financial institutions, with Islamic 
windows with more than $500m in assets, hail from Saudi Arabia. Table 3 shows a 
summary of the Islamic banking sector‟s compound annual assets growth rate 
(CAGR), aggregate return on assets (ROA) and aggregate return on capital (ROC).  
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Table 3: Summary of CAGR, ROA, and ROC from 2009 to 2014. 
Country CAGR ROA ROC 
Qatar 21.9% 2.28% 16.93% 
Saudi Arabia 13.39% 2.41% 16.6% 
UAE 10.64% 1.5% 11.39% 
Bahrain 9.2% 0.62% 4% 
Malaysia 7.32% 1.75% 17% 
Turkey 6.4% 1.3% 12% 
Kuwait 6.4% 0.8% 6% 
Iran 1.3% 1.4% 18% 
Source: The Banker database, 2014(online). 
2.5 Government Policy and Legislative Provision on Islamic banks in GCC 
Historically, in the countries that now comprise the GCC, there was no Islamic 
banking model that could be applied to meet the financial needs of the region before 
the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank in 1952. In the absence of this, 
conventional banking filled the vacuum, although few local citizens opened savings 
accounts which paid interest, instead they simply maintained current accounts which 
paid no return (Wilson, 2002). 
The Royal Decree of 1952, establishing the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 
was similar to other central banking laws, the main distinguishing feature being the 
designation „monetary agency‟, rather than „central bank‟. The Saudi Arabian 
Banking Control Law of 1966, which still governs regulation in the kingdom, 
specifically mentions bank lending under Articles 8 and 9, which is not permitted 
under Shariah. Article 10 prohibits banks from engaging in wholesale or retail trade, 
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which could be interpreted as ruling out Murabaha (cost-plus) transactions. Much of 
the emphasis during the oil boom years of the 1970s was on building up a modern 
banking system to serve the kingdom‟s financial needs, but the sensitive issue of 
Shariah compliance was not really addressed by SAMA. There was, nevertheless, 
support for international Islamic finance initiatives, notably, the establishment of the 
Islamic Development Bank. This opened in Jeddah in 1975, its aim being to serve as 
a development assistance agency for the Islamic world (Wilson, 2002). 
Elsewhere in the GCC, there was a more supportive attitude from the authorities for 
those who wished to establish Islamic banks; the Emir of Dubai passed a decree on 
12 March, 1975, authorizing the establishment of the Dubai Islamic Bank and Kuwait 
passed legislation on 23 March, 1977, to allow the establishment of KFH (Kuwait 
Finance House). These were, for over two decades, the only Islamic banks in these 
states (Saeed, 1999). Bahrain and Qatar followed, establishing Islamic banks in 
1979 and 1982, respectively (their active contribution in Islamic banking will be 
discussed in the next section).  
The establishment of Islamic banks in Dubai and Kuwait might have been expected 
to influence the attitude of the Saudi authorities to Islamic banking, but they 
remained surprisingly cautious. Indeed, there was a reluctance to provide Al-Rajhi 
Bank, today the world‟s largest listed Islamic bank, with a banking licence; the 
concern being that this might highlight the interest transactions of the conventional 
banks in the kingdom (Wilson, 2002). Al-Rajhi Bank was finally given a banking 
licence in 1987, largely because it already had significant deposits, and it was felt 
that it would be preferable to have it regulated by the SAMA. The danger was that if 
there had been a run on its deposits, this could have severely damaged confidence 
in the whole banking system, including the regulated banks. With the launch of Al-
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Rajhi Bank, five out of the six GCC states had Islamic banks, the exception being 
Oman, which refused to award any Islamic banking licences, due its unstable 
political conditions (Alam, 2006).  
Other governments have been much more supportive in recent years, notably Kuwait, 
which, in 2004, passed an amendment to the Central Bank Law 32 of 1968, bringing 
KFH under the regulatory authority of the Central Bank of Kuwait. The new 
legislative framework aimed to ensure that competition within the Islamic financial 
sector was opened up with other banks permitted to apply for Islamic banking 
licences18. As a result, the Kuwait Real Estate Bank converted to being an Islamic 
bank, changing its name to the Kuwait International Bank. A new Islamic financial 
institution, Boubyan Bank, was also awarded an Islamic banking licence. The 
legislation also contained provisions on Islamic financial governance, especially 
Articles 86, 87, 93, and 96, including a stipulation that each institution should have a 
Shariah board with at least three members. Although Kuwait‟s legislative provision is 
only part of its wider banking law, there is more detail on specific Islamic banking 
issues than in Malaysia‟s dedicated Islamic banking law that created its dual system 
(Malaysia Islamic Banking Act,1983). 
In sum, the smaller GCC states, apart from Oman, have passed legislation which 
has facilitated the development of Islamic finance, and Kuwait in particular has 
updated and augmented its banking legislation to ensure healthy competition 
between Islamic banks in its domestic market. Bahrain‟s regional support for Islamic 
financial growth in the GCC will be discussed in detail in the next section. Ironically, it 
is Saudi Arabia, which has been the laggard, as far as specific laws governing 
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Islamic finance are concerned with no mention of Islamic banking in its banking 
legislation, or even in the Capital Markets Law of 2003. Although, there have been 
sukuk issuances in the kingdom and all the mutual funds governed by the law are 
Shariah compliant. SAMA and the Capital Markets Authority have yet to issue a 
single document pertaining to Islamic finance, in contrast to Bank Negara and the 
Securities Commission of Malaysia, or even the Financial Services Authority in the 
United Kingdom, which have issued numerous documents and guidelines. SAMA is 
involved in the deliberations of the Kuala Lumpur-based Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB).  
2.5.1 The Regional Role of Bahrain in IBF 
Among the active GCC members in enhancing Islamic banking is Bahrain. Bahrain 
has functioned as a regional financial centre since 1976, keeping its market open to 
foreign banks, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait licensed only majority-locally-owned 
institutions. Bahrain has more Islamic financial institutions than any other centre, with 
twenty-four Islamic banks and eleven Islamic insurance (takaful) companies, most of 
which serve the regional, rather than the local market. It is very dependent on Saudi 
business, however, and as the latter opens up its financial sector, there are 
competitive challenges to Bahrain, including in Islamic banking. 
The Bahrain Monetary Agency, now renamed the Central Bank of Bahrain, has been 
very active in promoting Bahrain as an Islamic financial centre. The island has been 
the headquarters, since its foundation in 1991, of AAOIFI, which serves as a 
standard-setting body for financial reporting (AAOIFI, 2015). Most Islamic financial 
institutions worldwide are members of AAOIFI and many adhere to its standards, 
which build on, rather than replace, the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) used by the most conventional banks in Europe and Asia. 
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Bahrain also hosts the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), whose remit is 
to help Islamic capital and money markets through promoting common trading 
standards19. Its work is at an early stage, but it has support from the central banks of 
Bahrain, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sudan, as well as from the Jeddah-based 
Islamic Development Bank. However, the central banks of other GCC countries are 
not members, preferring to focus their efforts on their own markets and institutions. 
The Bahrain-based Liquidity Management Centre20 has also been slow to take off. 
Its aim is to facilitate the placing of the surplus funds of Islamic financial institutions 
in profitable traded instruments. The capital was subscribed by the KFH, the Bahrain 
and Dubai Islamic Banks, and the Islamic Development Bank, but they used 
international investment banks for much of their own sukuk issuance, rather than the 
Liquidity Management Centre. The other major role of the Liquidity Management 
Centre is to promote secondary-market trading of sukuk. Trading volumes have been 
limited however, with eleven buying and selling transactions in 2005, twenty-five in 
2006, and only fifteen in 2007. 
The Central Bank of Bahrain has a detailed rulebook, which governs all financial 
activity on the island, including Islamic banking. However, there are only two 
additional specific requirements for Islamic banks: each Islamic bank must have an 
independent Shariah supervisory committee, and Islamic banks should adopt the 
AAOIFI standards for their financial reporting21. It is debatable how far Bahrain‟s 
relative success in attracting Islamic financial institutions is due to a pull factor – the 
encouragement of the Central Bank of Bahrain – or a push factor – the past 
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unwillingness of its neighbours to grant new licences to Islamic banks and takaful 
operators. Nowadays, there are more than 15 Islamic retail banks catering to the 
local market in Bahrain; it is expected that with a full support from The Central Bank 
of Bahrain, it can enhance the growth of Islamic banks in the Bahrain market. 
2.5.2 The Regional Role of Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Islamic 
Banking and Finance (IBF)  
Unlike Bahrain, Qatar and UAE have established financial centres in free zones, 
governed by their own laws and regulations, which are based on English common 
law, as applied to finance (Wilson, 2004). Both the Qatar Financial Centre and the 
Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) are separate jurisdictions, with disputes 
not subject to the civil law, which applies outside the zones in Qatar and the UAE. 
Institutions functioning in the free zones are also outside of the jurisdiction of the 
local Shariah courts. However, admittedly, Shariah arbitration is rarely used in 
banking disputes, the Shariah court remit being largely confined to disputes within 
families over matters such as inheritance. 
The Qatar Financial Centre has a detailed rulebook covering Islamic finance, 
including criteria for Shariah supervision22. In Qatar, a higher proportion of bank 
deposits are Shariah compliant than in any other GCC state but institutions, such as 
the Qatar Islamic Bank, Masraf Al Rayan and the Qatar International Islamic Bank 
are narrowly focused on the domestic market and, despite the international 
designation of the last-named, it is regulated by the Central Bank of Qatar, rather 
than by the financial centre authority.  
The major commercial banks in Qatar have established Islamic affiliates, most 
notably: the Qatar National Bank, which has an Islamic subsidiary, the Commercial 
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Bank of Qatar, with its Al-Safa Islamic Banking subsidiary, and Doha Bank, with its 
subsidiary Doha Bank Islamic23. This increasing competition in a relatively small 
market is encouraging Qatar‟s Islamic banks to look overseas for diversification and 
expansion. The Qatar Islamic Bank owns the London-based European Finance 
House and the Kuala Lumpur-based Asian Finance Bank. It also has subsidiaries in 
Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Kazakhstan operating under its own name, and is 
undertaking feasibility studies of the Turkish, Egyptian and Indonesian markets. 
Masraf Al-Rayan has established a consumer-financing operation in Saudi Arabia 
and is seeking permission to open a branch in Libya. 
The introduction of a single regulatory system in the UAE is unlikely, as the country 
is a federation in which each emirate enjoys considerable autonomy, although the 
Central Bank oversees the entire banking system with the exception of banks 
registered with the DIFC. The latter has the highest international profile in the region, 
but Islamic finance is somewhat marginal to its interests. As in Qatar, the major 
Islamic banks in the UAE are focused on the domestic market. Indeed, the Dubai 
Islamic Bank and the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank largely concentrate on their native 
emirates, although they have branch networks throughout the UAE24. 
The UAE market for Islamic banking has become overcrowded with new entrants. 
The National Bank of Sharjah converted to being Sharjah Islamic Bank and, in Dubai, 
Noor Islamic Bank was established in 2008, with one quarter of its capital subscribed 
by the government of Dubai and a further quarter by the ruler himself, Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. Noor means „light‟ in Arabic, the aim being to 
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be a high-profile regional force in Islamic finance at the centre of attention25. Its main 
focus is on personal finance and credit cards, indicating that it is yet another 
consumer-finance institution. Its most distinctive plan to date was to establish a 
subsidiary in the Maldives through a joint venture. 
2.6 Summary 
Islamic banks are novel financing institutions with a particular value and operational 
proposition, which has existed in its modern form in the GCC region since the mid- 
1970s. Since the 1990s, it has become an important partner in the global financial 
system, and, currently, Islamic banks have proved that it is a sustainable reality, 
evidenced by its resilience and growth, even during a period of financial crisis. Thus, 
they provide alternative opportunities for all countries regardless of their religious 
nature, as, in its modern version, it represents „commercial banking‟ with a specific 
legal method, namely Shariah compliance. It is apparent from this study that Islamic 
financial institutions in the GCC are significant sources of capital and are contributing 
to the development of Islamic finance worldwide, especially in Asia. The GCC is well 
positioned at the heart of the Muslim world to serve as an Islamic finance hub linking 
Europe, Asia, and Africa; the spread of subsidiaries of GCC-based Islamic banks 
illustrates that this is starting to happen. 
The popular preference for Islamic banking in the GCC indicates that it is more of a 
bottom-up than a top-down movement. Al-Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia has more 
branches than any other bank in the kingdom, and despite the reluctance to grant it a 
licence in the 1980s, it has become the largest stock-market-listed Islamic bank in 
the world. Like the Dubai Islamic Bank – the oldest Islamic commercial bank – Al-
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Rajhi has successfully developed a range of deposit and financing products that 
have attracted millions of clients. The aim of these institutions is to provide as wide a 
range of facilities as conventional banks, but through Shariah-compliant products. 
As the major international banks have been weakened by the financial crisis of 
2008–2009, this undoubtedly presents an opportunity for GCC Islamic banks, which 
have been less adversely affected. In contrast, the value of the Al-Rajhi Bank and 
Kuwait Finance House (KFH) investments in retail Islamic banking affiliates in Asia 
has been much more resilient. There are already proven synergies between the 
GCC and its Asian and African neighbours in Islamic finance, and these provide a 
platform for future developments. 
Although the financial crisis has resulted in a large decline in oil prices and has 
reduced the profitability of all financial institutions in the GCC, including Islamic 
banks, it may also present opportunities. There has been much questioning of the 
values underpinning the Islamic financial system and the search for alternatives 
means that Islamic banks are likely to receive more attention, especially as their 
purpose is morality in financial transactions, based on religious teaching. The 
increasing international respect for Islamic banking is noted in the GCC, and it 
encourages local acceptance by both governments and bank customers, not least 
because no Islamic bank has failed in the crisis and required a substantial 
government bailout. Furthermore, a global economic recovery is likely to benefit the 
GCC, as oil and gas prices rebound, resulting in fresh liquidity being pumped into 
Islamic banks to fuel further expansion.  
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Without denying its positive growth and contribution to the IBF industry, in line with 
its establishment objective, Islamic banks are considered as having an ethical 
identity and they have different social and economic objectives to fulfil since the 
foundation of their business is based on religion (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Within 
the range of Shariah (Islamic law), Islamic banks are expected to be guided by an 
Islamic economic worldview, which is based on the principle of social justice and the 
wellbeing of society (Dusuki and Dar, 2005). Therefore, the researcher will conduct a 
study in measuring how far the Islamic banks in the GCC disclose their CSR 
information and its determinants and consequences.  
The main motivations for researcher to specifically focus on GCC Islamic banks are: 
a) most of the GCC countries have, to some extent, similar economic, political, and 
social environments; b) all the GCC countries are members of the Accounting and 
Auditing Organizations for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI); c) its positive 
growth and contribution in Islamic banking industry, such as Shariah-compliant 
assets, government policy and support in enhancing the development of Islamic 
banks; d) most of the “giant” Islamic banks, such as Al-Rajhi and KFH, are mainly 
located in the GCC; e) the GCC Islamic finance industry represents almost half of 
the global IBF assets, they hold a 70 percent share of IBF assets; f) GCC hold 
almost half of the world IBF Shariah-compliant assets; g) all GCC countries are very 
supportive in enhancing the development and growth of the Islamic banking industry 
with the establishment of a standard and research; h) last but not least, due the first 
idea of establishment of the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia, who are 
also a GCC member. Due to all these reasons, the researcher is highly motivated to 
conduct a study narrowly focused on this region.   
 
45 
 
CHAPTER 3: CSR DISCLOSURE-AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE 
3.1  Overview  
This chapter will outline the main concepts that emerge from the literature and the 
practices that are to be examined in this study, such as the concept of CSR from an 
Islamic point of view, the Islamic ethical principles in promoting CSR, AAOIFI, and 
CSR disclosure in Islamic banks. Islamic banks aim to conduct their activities based 
on Islamic principles; therefore, it is important to discuss the concept of CSR from an 
Islamic perspective. It will provide a clear view of why Islamic banks have to be 
socially responsible to the community at the same time as achieving their firm‟s 
objective. 
The review of the previous CSR disclosure literature tends to focus on the 
responsibility of business toward its wider stakeholders, including customers, 
suppliers, employees, communities, and other stakeholders (Aribi, 2009). This 
responsibility is seen to extend beyond the statutory obligation to comply with 
legislation, and voluntarily take care and disclose information to those stakeholders 
and to a wider society. Nowadays, these issues become key topics for academics, 
organisations, and policy makers (Capron and Gray, 2000; Aribi, 2009; Platonova, 
2014). To respond to this issue, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institution (AAOIFI) takes the responsibility of issuing the governance 
standards for Islamic Financial Institutions (GSIFI), which provide clear guidance on 
the disclosure of CSR for Islamic banks (AAOIFI, 2010, p38). 
This chapter is divided into nine sections: 2.1) an overview of the outlining concept in 
this study; 2.2) a brief discussion of CSR in Islam; 2.3) Islamic ethical principles in 
promoting CSR; 2.4) the discussion about AAOIF as a regulatory standard in 
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enhancing CSR disclosure among Islamic banks; 2.5) a discussion of collective 
religious duty of IFIs (in this study it refer to Islamic banks); 2.6) the CSR disclosure; 
2.7) the discussion about CSR disclosure either it is mandatory or voluntary; 2.8) a 
summary of the chapter. The Islamic ethical values in promoting CSR discussed in 
this chapter consist of 10 Islamic ethical principles: 1) the Shariah (Islamic law), 2) 
Justice, 3) Zakah26, 4) Riba (usury), 5) Maslahah (public interest), 6) Tawhid (unity), 
and Khalifah (Vicegerent), 7) Ihsan (benevolence), 9) transparency and, last but not 
least, accountability. These values should be reflected in Islamic organisations, such 
as Islamic banks, which are theoretically distinguished from conventional banks. 
3.2  Corporate Social Responsibility in Islam 
“The Islamic perspective on social responsibility is that the activities must directly 
assist individuals or societies to enhance their living or environmental conditions or 
assist them to better comply with religious rules and norms” (AAOIFI, 2010, p42). 
Islam provides clear guidance to its followers in all aspects of life, which are based 
on the Quran and Sunnah (Hamidullah, 2005; Kreinath, 2011). It is recognised that 
being responsible in business is more valuable than what is done with the profits 
made from business activities; therefore, the existence of activities that are regarded 
in Islam as haram (prohibited) have been clearly stated in the Quran to ensure that 
the community practice social and economic justice among them. Islam also 
provides a complete code of conduct for its followers and it embraces every aspect 
of life.  
                                            
26
 Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam. The payment of zakat is a religious obligation and must be 
fulfilled by Muslims who own wealth above the threshold (i.e 2.5%) (Jehle, 1994; Kamali, 2003; Ali 
and Myles, 2010,Basah 2012). Zakat can be divided into two types, zakat-al-fitr and zakat-al-mal. 
Zakat-al-fitr must be paid for charity at the end of Ramadan (fasting month in the Islamic Calendar), 
while zakat-al-mal is the zakat on wealth (Ali and Myles, 2010, pp.838). 
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Islamic banks are described as having a "social face" (Mashhour, 1996). From the 
Islamic perspective, CSR revolves around the concept of ultimate accountability to 
God; human beings are a vicegerent (khalifah) and are expected to relate with other 
humans in order to take care of the natural environment entrusted to them (e.g., 
Abbasi et al., 2012). Siwar and Hossain (2009) indicated that Islam is not just a 
religion, but a holistic way of life. Muwazir et al. (2006) highlighted that, as a 
vicegerent, leaders in Islamic business corporations are required to practice CSR 
fundamentally from the principle of unity (Tawhid). Kamla et al. (2007) identified that, 
as a vicegerent, mankind needs to take care of the earth and the environment. 
Therefore, CSR is not isolated in the Islamic view and is one of the main concepts in 
Islamic teaching. Zainal et al. (2013) stated that the concept of CSR is deeply 
inscribed in the Shariah and any institutions, such as an Islamic bank, who claims to 
follow the Shariah-based principles, should naturally practise CSR, as it enshrines 
Islam‟s true spirit. Williams and Zinkin (2010) conducted a study on the compatibility 
between the tenets of Islam and the United Nations‟ Global Compact (UNGC), they 
find that the teachings of Islam do not only appear to be in close conformity with the 
Ten Principles of the United Nations‟ Global Compact but, in many respects, Islamic 
values go further than the minimum standards of that framework. They also find that 
Islamic teachings exceed the requirements of the UN Global Compact in a number of 
ways: 
1. Islam appears to be wider in scope: for example, in the development of human 
capital and transparency requirements in business transactions.  
2. Islam has a clear codification defining what is permissible, or halal, and what is 
forbidden, or haram. 
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 3. Islam also has an explicit enforcement mechanism in the Shariah, as well as in 
the community, and there is the final accountability of the individual for unethical 
behaviour on the day of judgement. 
In Islam, the prohibitions on certain types of business activities come from the 
concern to protect the community. Products and services which can give a negative 
impact to human life are strictly prohibited such as: alcohol and gambling (Kreinath, 
2011b). The justification for the prohibition is best explained in the words of the 
Quran: „„they question thee about strong drink and games of chance. Say: In both is 
great sin and (some) utility for men; but the sin of them is greater than their 
usefulness. And they ask thee what they ought to spend. Say: that which is 
superfluous. Thus Allah makes them plain to you (His) revelations that haply ye may 
reflect‟‟ (Quran, 2, p. 219). Gambling, in particular, is strictly forbidden in Islam, which 
can cause social problems among the community and interfere with life functioning 
properly (Potenza, 2013). CSR is a moral and religious initiative, based on the belief 
that a company may be 'good' regardless of its financial consequences, whether they 
are positive or negative. This is not to suggest that Islam is against profitmaking. 
Rather, it is seen as a necessary condition, though not the sole purpose, of their 
existence (Hasan, 2002). 
Islam is intensely concerned with the problem of economic development. Therefore, 
the primary objective of Islamic economics is a social and economic justice, 
equitable distribution of wealth, and the elimination of exploitation in business 
activities by banning all sources of unfair enrichment (Asutay, 2012; Sarker, 1999). 
The emphasis on the welfare of the community is very significant from an Islamic 
perspective. Accordingly, working for the welfare of others is the best way of 
extending one's usefulness in pleasing Allah (Suliman and Willett, 2003). In line with 
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this argument, the Holy Quran states, “Ye will not attain unto piety until ye spend of 
that which ye love. And whatsoever ye spend, Allah is Aware thereof” (Quran S3: 92), 
and “Ah, what will convey unto thee what the Ascent is: (it is) to free a slave, and to 
feed in the day of hunger an orphan, near of kin or some poor wretch in misery” 
(Qur'an: S90: 12-16). The next section will discuss the ethical values in CSR from 
the Islamic point of view, which is integrated into Islamic banking conduct. 
3.3 Islamic Ethical Principles in Promoting CSR 
Islamic ethical principles provide a broader framework for CSR. In terms of 
responsibility and accountability, Muslims believe that they will be accountable for 
whatever they do in this world and hereafter. Thus, it requires that every deed and 
word in this world must be in line with Islamic teachings. The importance of 
accountability to the man‟s life has also been manifested by the Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH) as Abdullah bin Umar, Allah's Apostle, said, “Surely! Every one of you is a 
guardian and is responsible for his charges: The Imam (ruler) of the people is a 
guardian and is responsible for his subjects; a man is the guardian of his family 
(household) and is responsible for his subjects; a woman is the guardian of her 
husband's home and of his children and is responsible for them; and the slave of a 
man is a guardian of his master's property and is responsible for it. Surely, every one 
of you is a guardian and responsible for his charges” (Shahih Bukhari: Volume 
9,252). Individuals are expected to feel socially responsible for others in the 
community. In general, the aim of the Islamic economic system is to allow people to 
earn their living in a fair and profitable way on the basis of Shariah, without the 
exploitation of others so the whole society may benefit. Islam also emphasizes the 
welfare of the community over individual rights (Shamim & Karim, 2010). 
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Prior research supports the idea that religious people have a wider notion of CSR 
than non-religious people (Williams & Zinkin, 2009; Brammer et al., 2005; Weaver 
and Agle, 2002). Given that Islam, like Judaism, is concerned with orthopraxy as well 
as orthodoxy, in Islam, the proper development of human life requires two things: (1) 
the resources needed to maintain life and fulfil the material needs of both the 
individual and society; (2) the individual‟s knowledge of the principles of individual 
and social behaviour to allow individual self-fulfilment, on the one hand, and the 
maintenance of social justice and tranquillity on the other (Ahmad, 1971). Unlike in 
some societies, where there is a separation between religion and state, which led to 
the consideration of religion as a private matter in a "so called value-free society" 
(Rice, 1999, p. 345), Islam influences the decision making of its followers in every 
context, including business. Perhaps more important is the need for balance 
between the demands of this world and the demands of the afterlife (Chapra, 1992). 
The importance and special nature of worship (Ibadah) are fundamental elements of 
Islam; worship is the main reason for the creation of mankind (Ali, 2006).  
The influence of Islam on business practices is well documented in the Holy Quran 
and Sunnah. Islamic business values, such as justice, socio-economic measure, 
human wellbeing, and honesty are considered to be the core of CSR in Islam. 
Islamic banks are considered as having an ethical identity and they have different 
social and economic objectives, since the foundation of their business is based on 
religion (Aribi & Arun, 2014; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Maali, et al, 2006). The general 
objective of Islamic banks is to contribute to the development of the economy within 
the boundary of Islam. Within the range of Shariah (Islamic law), Islamic banks are 
expected to be guided by an Islamic economic worldview, which is based on the 
principle of social justice and the wellbeing of society (Dusuki, 2008).  
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In general, Muslims are expected to conduct their business activities in accordance 
with the requirement of Shariah, which is fair and honest toward others (Rahman, 
1994; Hussain, 1999). The issue of CSR has been clearly highlighted in the Quran 
and Hadith, and it has been practiced since the era of the Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH). Appendices 1, presents the example of evidence from Quran and Hadith in 
promoting CSR. The next sections will review general Islamic ethical principles in 
promoting CSR, which is integrated into Islamic business conduct. 
3.3.1 The Shariah (Islamic Law)  
In Islam, the Shariah or „Islamic Law‟ is the foundational basis in understanding CSR. 
The concept of the Shariah in Islam consists of ethics and values covering all 
aspects of life (personal, social, political, economic, and intellectual). Dusuki and 
Abdullah (2007a) stated that the concept of the Shariah reflects the holistic view of 
Islam, which is a complete and integrated code of life. It encompasses all aspects of 
life, either individual or social, both in this world and hereafter. Zinkin (2007) stated 
that the Shariah is not just a legal, but it also functions as a moral framework.  
Shariah has grown within the guidelines set by the objective (Maqasid Al-Shariah), 
which aims to promote the well-being of mankind. According to Al-Ghazali (cited in 
Dusuki and Abdullah 2007a, p. 31), “the main objective of the Shariah is to promote 
the well-being of all mankind, which lies in safeguarding their religion (ad-din), their 
human-self (nafs), their intellect (aql), their family (nasl), and their wealth (mal)”. For 
example, to achieve the objective of Shariah in protecting wealth, Islamic banks 
provide an alternative to conventional banks, which operate based on interest that 
gives a negative impact on the distribution of income and economic fairness (Basah, 
2012). There is not just focus on the elimination of interest in transactions, the 
activities of Islamic banks should also be in line with the objective of the Shariah and 
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they are expected to be more concerned on the CSR issue that conventional banks. 
According to Mohammad & Shahwan (2013), there are three main elements in 
Shariah: (1) the Aqidah that discusses belief and faith; (2) the Akhlaq that discusses 
morality and ethics; and (3) the Fiqh, or legal rulings, governing the acts of human 
beings. The fundamental aspects, such as the Aqidah and Akhlaq, are not subject to 
change, however, the Fiqh, or legal rulings, may change and vary according to time 
(Siwar and Hossain, 2009). Mankind is responsible for their actions to God (Allah); 
therefore, they should act responsibly and strive to do well and avoid doing evil.  
In addition, Dusuki and Abdullah (2007a) stated that the concept of Shariah has 
three implications on the concept of corporate social responsibility. First, in Islam, 
corporate social responsibility is an initiative of the religious and moral, based on the 
belief that the corporation should be good despite the financial impact. Based on this 
concept, business is not driven by profit maximisation alone, but alongside the 
pursuit of ultimate happiness in this world and hereafter. Secondly, the guidelines set 
out by the Islamic principles of bringing out a balance between individual rights and 
duties, responsibilities towards other people, and between personal interest and 
altruism. Finally, the concept of reward is developed to incorporate within its reward 
in this world and the hereafter. This provides a strong motivation and self-propelling 
motivation, without denying a person's natural instinct for personal gain. The 
principles above act as guidelines and an added value of Islamic banks in the 
financial industry. The Shariah acts as an internal control over Islamic banks 
alongside secular legislation. It is supposed to act as an internal control, which 
makes an Islamic bank more sensitive towards CSR than conventional banks. 
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3.3.2 Justice 
Islam is a religion that emphasises justice in society. Graafland et al. (2006) divided 
the principles of justice in Islam to several types of business activity, such as justice 
including the fulfilment of promises, pacts, and contracts. Therefore, Muslims should 
be honest, sincere, and truthful in their business dealings, and ensure accuracy in 
terms of promised products and specifications. Second, it encourages equal 
treatment in labour management. Hiring people and wage payment should be based 
on merit and competencies. Finally, justice in Islam also includes the equitable 
distribution of wealth. In the Holy Quran, there are several verses, which discuss the 
concept of justice, such as:  
“We have indeed sent our messengers with clear proofs, and sent down with them 
the Book and the Balance, so that people may uphold equity. And we sent down iron 
in which there is strong power, and benefits for the people; and (We did it) so that 
Allah knows the one who helps Him and His messengers without seeing (Him). 
Surely Allah is Strong, Mighty.” (Quran 57:25). 
 “Allah enjoins to do justice and to adopt good behaviour and to give relatives (their 
due rights), and forbids shameful acts, evil deeds and oppressive attitude. He 
exhorts you, so that you may be mindful” (Quran 16:90).  
Besides the above, Islam also promotes justice and the equal treatment of all living 
beings. Based on the principles of justice, Muslims have to be fair, not only among 
themselves, but also in their dealings with others and even with their enemies (Zinkin, 
2007). The concept of justice implies that human beings are equal, except on the 
basis of piety and good character (Dusuki, 2008). As vicegerents in this world, the 
concept of justice is important, as humans are not only responsible to God, but also 
to the society. Rather than fulfil their self-interest, they should also have concern 
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about society and the natural environment. Kamla et al. (2006) indicated that human 
beings‟ responsibility towards nature is not only related to benefits for themselves, it 
is a comprehensive responsibility, which includes society and future generations. 
According to AAOIFI (2010) Islamic banks are voluntarily encouraged to disclose 
their internal environmental preservation policy in their annual report. They are 
expected to be more concerned and proactive in promoting socio-economic justice 
and apply all the Islamic values and principles in their CSR practice. Dusuki (2008) 
discusses that the human interactions should be based on trust, equity and justice. 
The right attitude of human beings is not to serve only one‟s own, or the national 
„self-interest‟, but to cooperate with others to fulfil basic needs, to develop the entire 
human potential, and to enrich human life as a whole.  
In economic activities, in order to achieve social justice in society, Islam provides a 
foundation for establishing socioeconomic justice to society. For example, Islam 
imposes an obligatory payment of income and wealth (zakah), philanthropic trusts 
(waqf), alms and charity (sadaqah), and interest free loans (Qard al Hassan). 
Another important aspect in economic activities is socio-economic justice. Socio-
economic justice is an essential element in Islam; the objective of Islam is the 
formation of a justice to the society (Ibrahim, 1998). Ibin Al Qayim al-Jawziyyah 
contends, "The Shariah‟s basis is wisdom and welfare of the people in this world as 
well as the Hereafter, which lies in the complete justice, mercy, well-being and 
wisdom. Anything which operates from justice to oppression, mercy to harshness, 
welfare to misery and from wisdom to folly, has nothing to do with the Shariah" (cited 
in Aris et al. 2013; Ibrahim, 2000, p. 57).  
Social responsibility and justice are based on the Islamic concept of human well-
being and a good life; to strengthen brotherhood and sisterhood among Muslims, 
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then promote socioeconomic justice, which requires a balanced satisfaction of both 
the material and spiritual needs of all humans (Chapra, 1992). The significance to 
pay Zakah, the encouragement of charity, the prohibition of Riba (usury), and the 
encouragement of Al-qard hassan (interest-free loan) are clear examples of the 
Islamic emphasis on social justice (Maali et al., 2006). With regard to Qard Al-
Hassan, the Holy Quran states, "He who will give Allah Qard al-hassan, which Allah 
will double into his credit and multiply many times" (Quran, S1: 245). 
3.3.3 Zakah 
One of main pillars of Islam is Zakah, it literally means purification (Mohammed, 
2007; Saheeh, 2000). Zakah is enunciated in many verses in the Holy Quran and 
Sunnah (Hadith). Ibrahim and Yaya (2005, p. 10) define Zakah as "a religious 
obligation and a levy accepted by Islam on a Muslim income and wealth to be 
distributed to the defined beneficiaries, such as the poor and indigent". While AAOIFI 
(2010) defines Zakah as a fixed religious obligation calculated by reference to net 
assets that have appreciated or have the capacity to appreciate in value over a 
specific period of time, except for assets that have been acquired for consumption or 
use in the production of revenues. It is collected from Muslim individuals and 
businesses (which meet net assets liable for Zakah) and distributed to the poor, 
needy, and for the interest and welfare of the community. Therefore, the main 
purpose of Zakah is the redistribution of wealth and to eradicate poverty in society 
(Lewis, 2001; Ibrahimet al, 2014). Muslims consider Zakah as one of their main 
duties to show their responsibility towards society, the poor and the needy (Bjorklund, 
2004).  
The significance of Zakah in Islam is slightly different from a normal welfare 
programme and it is different from general tax, as it is understood today by some 
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people (Lewis, 2001). It is a specific type of fund that is compulsorily paid to the 
treasury (Amil), whether there is a need for it or not (Belal et al, 1997). The Islamic 
state may take the responsibility for collecting and distributing Zakah, but where this 
is not the case, individuals and businesses are still obliged to pay it directly for the 
interest and welfare of the community (Maali, 2005). Not all Muslims are obligated to 
pay Zakah, the payment is obligatory to individuals and businesses subject to the 
fulfilment of certain conditions and after deducting debts and needs (Nabhani, 1997). 
Zakah is payable once a year at the end of the Zakah period (i.e., one lunar year). 
According to Clark et al. (1996), it is payable on a productive asset that has been 
possessed for a full year. However, assets, which are being used or consumed, are 
exempted, provided they are not being used for trade purposes (Rahman, 1999). 
Zakah is considered as an act of worship; therefore, Islam really encourages its 
followers to seek for wealth, as it does not contradict the Shariah. The wealthier they 
are, the more they can contribute to the community by paying Zakah.  
From an institutional point of view, Islamic banks are involved in Zakah, either by 
setting aside a percentage of their profits for charitable activities or through the 
administration of Zakah funds (Bjorklund, 2004). Islamic banks are expected to be 
more concerned with their Zakah management to ensure that all groups of needy 
(Asnaf) benefit from their Zakah contribution. According to AAOIFI (2010), all Islamic 
banks have to disclose Zakah information in annual reports as part of their CSR 
obligation to the stakeholders. Another aspect of ethical value in CSR from Islamic 
perspective is the elimination of Riba (usury) in the Islamic banking activities. This 
will be discussed in details in the next point. 
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3.3.4 Riba (usury 
Generally, the word, Riba (usury), comes from the Arabic language and means an 
increase or a growth. The linguistic meaning of Riba, in this context, is an increase or 
a gain on a capital loan at a predetermined rate, which a lender charges a specific 
rate to a borrower for deferred financing facilities (Amjad, 1999). In the same vein, 
EI-Ashker (1987, p. 38) defines Riba as the difference between the amount 
borrowed and the payment amount, which is normally higher than the principle 
amount, and is strictly prohibited in Islam. The prohibition of Riba is clearly stated in 
many verses in the Holy Quran, such as: 
a) “That which ye lay out for increase through the property of (other) people, will 
have no increase with Allah: But that which ye lay out for charity, seeking the 
countenance of Allah (will increase): it is these who will get a recompense multiplied” 
(Quran 30:39). 
b) “That they took Riba (usury), though they were forbidden and that they devoured 
men‟s substance wrongfully – We have prepared for those among men who reject 
faith a grievous punishment” (Quran 4:161). 
c) “O ye who believe! Devour not usury doubled and multiplied; but fear Allah, that ye 
may (really) prosper” (Quran 3:140). 
d) “Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom the evil one 
by his touch hath driven to madness. That is because they say: „Trade is like usury.‟ 
But Allah hath permitted trade and forbidden usury. Those who after receiving 
direction from their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for the past; their case is for Allah 
(to judge). But those who repeat (the offence) are companions of the fire, they will 
abide therein (forever)” (Quran 2:275). 
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e) “O you who have attained faith! Remain conscious of God, and give up all 
outstanding gains from Usury, if you are (truly) believers” (Quran 2: 278). 
Theoretically, in Islam, Riba is regarded as a prominent source of unjustified 
advantage, where the business activities are operating using an interest-based 
system (Sarker, 2000). Therefore, the prohibition of Riba is a solution of establishing 
a fair economic system in which there are no forms of exploitation or unjustified 
enrichment (Bjorklund, 2004). This is known as an Islamic economic system, which 
is based on Shariah. Among the main points of the prohibition of Riba are: it causes 
unfair distribution of income in favour of the rich (financiers), who have the capital as 
interest guaranteed in return for the lender without taking any risk, while the borrower 
or the entrepreneur pays interest irrespective of the result of the business or 
investment (Attiah, 1989). Therefore, the prohibition of Riba is the best solution to 
establish socio-economic justice between the financers and the entrepreneurs 
(Bjorklund, 2004).  
Most Islamic scholars state that the prohibition of interest, or usury, (Riba) in Islam is 
not because the religion does not see it as a way to turn excess capital into profit, 
but because of a deeper concern for the moral, social, and economic well-being of 
society.  A Riba system creates profit without doing any work and it does not share 
the risk between the lender and borrower (Al-Qaradawi, 1985). The vast majority of 
Islamic schools of thought agree that Riba stands for interest in all types and forms 
(Chapra, 1992). However, the Islamic Research Centre (IRC) announced in 1996 
that all banking interest charge is the same as Riba and is prohibited (cited in Maali, 
2005). Islamic scholars have clearly explained that Riba, as mentioned in the Holy 
Quran, refers to all excessive rates of interest charged by banks (e.g., Ahmad, 1989; 
Hindi, 1996). Riba-free banking is a key advantage of Islamic banks; nowadays, 
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Islamic banks are well accepted in all parts of the world and hold well over US $700 
billion in assets and are growing at over 15% p.a (Khan, 2010). The Islamic banking 
industry involves wider ethical and moral issues with its Riba-free transactions. This 
factor makes it more economically efficient than conventional banking and promotes 
greater economic equity and justice. 
3.3.5 Maslahah (Public Interest) 
Dusuki (2008) stated that the Maslahah (public interest) is a juristic device used in 
Islamic legal theory. On the other hand, Laldin (2010) stated that the Maslahah is a 
second source of the Shariah in Islam. The Shariah gives consideration to the 
Maslahah as a source of law in order to accommodate natural development and 
social changes. It represents one of the essential sources for dealing with issues and 
matters, for which there is no explicit indication in the Quran or the Sunnah. 
Laldin (2010) stated that the objective of enacting Shariah rules, based on the 
Maslahah, is to achieve fairness and justice by achieving benefits and removing 
hardships. It is important in order to promote public good and prevent societal evil or 
corruption. In the Islamic banking context, diligence (ijtihad) based on the Maslahah 
is essential, especially for regulators and corporate governance organs, since it 
requires them to provide standards, parameters, regulations, and policies for the 
benefit of society. He also explained that the Maslahah in Islam could be 
differentiated into two main categories. First is the public Maslahah, which is 
anything that benefits the whole society or the majority: for instance, saving property 
from any form of harm or transgression, including flood, theft, or unfair contracts. In 
contrast, the private Maslahah is anything that benefits individuals and the society to 
which they belong. 
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Besides being public and private, the Maslahah can be differentiated based on its 
priorities. Al-Shatibi (1997, cited in Dusuki (2010) and Laldin (2010)) stated that 
Maslahah could be classified into three main categories or priorities: (1) dharuriyat 
(basic essentials), (2) hajiyat (supplementary needs), and (3) tahsiniyat 
(complementary). 
Dharuriyat is an essential basic need in life, which is a very important element for 
individuals and society to survive. It must be protected as it is fundamental for life 
(Al-Mubarak & Osmani, 2010). For example, the basic needs in life are electricity, 
water, and food. It is an important element for survival in today‟s world and any 
disruption to them will lead to total disruption. 
Hajiyat is a supplementary need after the individual or society gets dharuriyat (basic 
needs). If hajiyat is neglected, this will not lead to total disruption but may lead to 
hardship and distress in human life (Cebeci, 2012). For example, the Shariah 
validates forward buying (bai‟ salam) in business transactions because these 
transactions are important to facilitate business transactions and, if neglected, may 
lead to hardship in business. 
Tahsiniyat (complementary) refers to those interests that, if realised, would lead to 
refinement and perfection in the customs and conduct of people at all levels of 
achievement (Laldin, 2010). It is important, as it will lead to a peaceful life and 
harmony in human society. For example, Islam makes Zakah payment compulsory 
to Muslims individuals and organizations as a complementary element for social and 
economic justice in the society. At the same time, Islam also encourages Muslims to 
do charity as complementary activity to improve social life of the community. 
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2.4.5.1 The Pyramid of Maslahah (Public Interest) in CSR 
Dusuki and Abdullah (2007) viewed the concept of the weight in the Maslahah as a 
guide for moral judgement of managers and other stakeholders, particularly in 
solving conflicts that may arise when pursuing CSR. The concept of weight in the 
Maslahah is depicted in a pyramid form. It functions as a framework to provide 
managers with three levels of judgement to resolve the ethical conflicts that 
inadvertently emerge while applying CSR programmes and initiatives. Every level 
constitutes a different degree of importance. The bottom level (dharuriyat) is the 
most fundamental responsibility to be fulfilled, then the second level (hajiyat), 
followed by the top level (tahsiniyat). The pyramid moves upward and the degree of 
decision-making will be less fundamental as the level rises. The pyramids of 
Maslahah levels are not mutually exclusive; all levels are inter-related and mutually 
dependent. 
The pyramid of Maslahah can be applied to the decision making process in CSR. In 
the first level (dharuriyyat), Islamic banks are expected to strive to preserve and 
protect their stakeholders‟ essential needs (Basah & Yusuf, 2013). For example, in 
order to obtain a high profit, it must ensure that all activities comply with Islamic 
principles. Any activities that may endanger people‟s lives and causes environmental 
degradation must be avoided. In regards to the employer-employee relationship, 
businesses must protect employee welfare by paying salaries on time and provide a 
safe working environment. 
After fulfilling the fundamental level (dharuriyyat), Islamic banks may strive for the 
second level, the complementary (hajiyat). In this stage, the provision of continuous 
training and development, bonuses, and promotions is considered to be an 
extension of the fundamental responsibility.  For the highest level of embellishment 
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(tahsiniyat), Islamic banks are expected to be involved in CSR activities that lead to 
improving and attaining perfection in public life. For example, involvement in 
activities that are encouraged in Islam, such as donations, charitable activities, and 
philanthropic trusts (waqf), may contribute to a better social development of society. 
The embellishment will lead to the perfection of the community and society. Overall, 
the Maslahah pyramid provides a basic guide for Islamic banks to manage their CSR 
activities, based on prioritisation in developing their CSR management strategy. The 
weight of the Maslahah also provides guiding principles and strategy development 
for CSR management, based on its priorities. 
Caroll (1979, cited in Cebeci, 2012) discussed that CSR pyramid also provides a 
comprehensive view of a framework for how businesses should act towards CSR. 
She develops her own CSR pyramid, which is divided into four main categories, 
namely: (1) economic, (2) legal, (3) ethical, and (4) philanthropic responsibilities. The 
main characteristics of her CSR pyramid is: 1) these four categories are not mutually 
exclusive; 2) it is not a continuum with economic concerns at one end and social 
concerns at the other; 3) they are neither cumulative nor additive; and 4) they are 
ordered in the figure only to suggest their fundamental role in the evaluation of 
importance (see: figure 3). 
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Figure 3: The Pyramid of Maslahah. 
                            
Caroll (1979): CSR pyramid                Dusuki & Abdullah (2010): Weight of Maslahah 
The pyramid of Maslahah, above, provides a comprehensive framework on how 
Islamic banks should view CSR from the Islamic perspective and it is parallel with 
the general CSR pyramid, as proposed by Caroll (1979). Both models are not 
mutually exclusive; all levels are inter-related and mutually dependent (Carroll, 1979; 
Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007a). Dusuki (2010) stated that the weight of the Maslahah 
can be useful for CSR in three ways: (1) it provides a framework for making 
decisions and a mechanism for adapting to change; (2) it delineates the role of 
Islamic banks in terms of their CSR; (3) it offers guidelines for moral judgement for 
Islamic banks in solving conflicts that may arise when pursuing CSR. It is depicted 
based on a pyramid with three levels of judgement (dharuriyat, hajiyat and 
tahsaniyat).  
Carroll (1979) pointed out that the CSR pyramid does not identify the degree of 
specific responsibility in each category; it provides a classification scheme for the 
kinds of social responsibility businesses are expected to have. The CSR pyramid 
provides a comprehensive CSR framework for businesses, since it presents various 
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responsibilities that society expects businesses to assume. Each of the CSR 
categories deserves the same consideration and can be used to justify why CSR is 
important (Carroll, 1991). On the other hand, the weight of the Maslahah pyramid 
implies that Islamic banks need to engage in, and manage their, CSR activities 
according to their priority. Islamic banks must not just focus on attaining the 
embellishments while jeopardising the essentials of their stakeholders (Dusuki and 
Abdullah, 2007). 
Finally, the weight of the Maslahah pyramid is based on the Shariah. It reflects the 
holistic view of Islam, which presents a complete and integrated code of life, 
encompassing all of its aspects (Aris et al., 2013; Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007a). The 
Maslahah is one of the elements to achieve the objective of the Shariah and, 
therefore, it must always be discussed and understood within the Shariah‟s 
framework and parameters (Laldin, 2010). The CSR pyramid is the main model, 
since it describes how businesses should react to CSR issues and has received 
more attention in CSR studies (Basah, 2012).  
3.3.6 Tawhid (Unity) & Khalifah (Vicegerent)  
In Islam, the concept of CSR is also consistent with the concept of unity (Tawhid). 
According to this concept, God is the Creator, Owner, and Source of all things, and 
has entrusted mankind as a khalifah (vicegerent) to use and manage the assets in 
this world (Ali, 2006). In return for the use of the physical universe, mankind has to 
be accountable for what they use and manage in this world, all aspects will be 
accountable in front of God (Allah) in hereafter. (Farook and Lanis, 2007).  
Islamic economics take the midway between the two extremes of capitalism and 
communism (Al Banna Choiruzzad & Nugroho, 2013). Islam recognises that it is a 
human nature to possess property in order to satisfy one's needs, and ensures free 
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trade. In this sense, ownership of private property is encouraged in Islam, and its 
usage, which is not contradicted with Shariah, is permitted (Lewis, 2001). It is clearly 
stated in the Holy Quran that all wealth belongs to Allah and He has put human 
beings in charge of this wealth. Islam accepts disparity in wealth within a rational 
limit but does not tolerate this difference arising so that some people spend their life 
in luxury, while the majority of people are left to lead a life of misery and hunger 
(Taheri, 2003). As a vicegerent, mankind has to manage their wealth in accordance 
with the commands and guidance of Allah (Rahman, 1999). 
As a trustee of God (Allah), all actions must be based on His rules and regulations, 
namely the Shariah. The concept of vicegerency is inter-related with the concept of 
Tawhid (unity) in Islam. The concept of Tawhid states that all possessions, wealth, 
expertise, abilities, positions and power belong to Allah. The human being is only a 
trustee of them. The accumulation of wealth is not the key objective of landowners in 
Islam, but their ability to sustain and bring benefit to themself and others from the 
land (Kamla et. al., 2006). This concept is different from the conventional point of 
view. In Islam, the management of all resources must be in accordance with religious 
requirements.  
The concept of Khalifah (vicegerency) defines the person's responsibility to Allah, to 
the community, and to himself. According to Chapra (1992), the implication of arising 
from the concept of Khalifah is that the individual is regarded as the trustee of God's 
resources and should ensure that the resources are well managed in a proper 
manner, which is in line with the Shariah (Islamic law). The underlying concept of the 
vicegerent is one of representation or stewardship; the real ownership of the assets 
remains vested in their owner, and not their steward or administrator, who simply 
manages them in accordance with the owner‟s instructions, within the limits of 
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authority prescribed, to do the will of the owner, as opposed to his own (Williams & 
Zinkin, 2009). This leads to different meanings of private ownership as understood in 
a conventional perspective (Suliman and Willett, 2003). Allah empowered individuals 
to possess, enjoy, and transfer what He has granted to them. Therefore, Islam 
perceives wealth as a grant, which has been given as a trust from Allah into the 
hands of human beings. Therefore, it should be utilized in an efficient way to produce 
the maximum output and to fulfil Allah's guidance (Metwally, 1997). It is stated in the 
holy Quran: “And recall what time thine Lord said unto the angels: „verily I am going 
to place a vicegerent on the earth.‟ They said: „wilt Thou place therein one who will 
act corruptly therein and shed blood, while we hallow Thine praise and glorify Thee!‟ 
Allah said: verily I know that which ye know not” (Al Quran 2:30). 
Based on the vicegerency concept, there are no inhibitions attached to economic 
enterprise and people are encouraged to avail themselves of all opportunities 
available, which is in line with the Shariah (Rice, 1999). There is no conflict between 
the moral and socio-economic requirements. People can enjoy profit and wealth, but 
they must pay Zakah. Moreover, the right to accumulate wealth and profit is not 
negated in Islam as long as it does not contradict the Islamic principles (Ullah & 
Jamali, 2010). Resources are for the benefit of all and not just a few, everyone has 
the right to acquire and utilize the resources (Rice, 1999).  
In summary, worship to Allah is not only restricted to the five pillars of Islam. It 
involves all aspects of life. Williams and Zinkin (2005) stated that in Islam, there is no 
separation between the individual‟s public and private life. Thus, every decision and 
act in life and business must be based on Islamic teachings. This principle does not 
only apply among Muslims, but also in their relationship with non-Muslims, society, 
and the environment.  
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3.3.7 Benevolence (Ihsan)  
The concept of benevolence in Islam complements the concept of justice. The Holy 
Quran clearly states the requirement of justice and benevolence: “Verily Allah 
Enjoins justice and worshipping none but Allah alone and Al-Ihsan and giving help to 
kith and kin (i.e. all that Allah has ordered you to give them such as wealth, visiting, 
looking after) and forbids Al-Fahsha (i.e. all evil deeds, such as illegal sexual acts, 
disobedience to parents, to take a life without right) and Al-Munkar (all that is 
prohibited by Islamic law) and Al-Baghy (All kinds of oppression). He admonishes 
you, that you may take heed” (16:90). 
Al Qurtubi (cited in Basah, 2012) classified justice as mandatory and benevolence as 
being beyond the mandatory. To adhere to the concept of justice, a person‟s inner 
intentions and feelings should be consistent with his words and actions. The concept 
of benevolence is beyond the concept of justice, which requires the person‟s inner 
intentions and feeling to be better than his or her outward actions. Benevolence 
reflects the importance of protecting and promoting the wellbeing of others with 
whom one is in regular personal contact (Schwartz, 1992). Research by Schwartz & 
Bardi (2001) indicates that benevolence is among the most important values in 
society. It plays a crucial role in endorsing social harmony and predicting pro-social 
behaviours (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). Previous studies have indicated that 
benevolence is positively associated with behaviours, such as helping others, voicing 
constructive suggestions, donating money, and volunteering (Grant & Mayer, 2009; 
Arieli et al., 2014), demonstrating social sensitivity (Mumford, Connelly, Helton, Van 
Doorn, & Osburn, 2002), with awareness concerning moral dilemmas (Myyry & 
Helkama, 2002), and expressing readiness for social contact with others (Sagiv & 
Schwartz, 1995).  
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To alleviate poverty in the community, Islamic banks offer several mechanisms, such 
as a benevolent loan (Qard Hassan)27, a charity (Sadaqa) fund, and a Waqf fund 
(endowment fund) (Bhuiyan et al., 2012) . Qard Hasan is an implied loan, which is 
free from any benefit or return to the lender, and it is more commonly referred to as 
an interest-free loan (Obaidullah, 2008). Practically, Qard Hassan facilities are 
provided by the Islamic banks to support and enhance the development of small and 
medium enterprises (SME). It is also known as an interest-free loan, which is given 
for either welfare purposes or for fulfilling short-term funding requirements. The Qard 
Hassan is a loan, which granted by the lender without expectation of any return on 
the principal, but the borrower is obligated to make a principal repayment. The 
following verses from the holy Quran reveal the importance of Qard Hassan in Islam: 
“Who is it that will lend Allah a qard hasan which He will multiply for him (the lender) 
many times and for him shall be a generous recompense” (Al-Quran 18:18). 
“Verily, those who give sadaqa, men and women and lend to Allah a qard hasan, it 
shall be increased manifold (to their credit) and theirs shall be an honourable good 
reward” (Al-Quran 11: 57). 
“If you lend Allah a qard hasan, He will multiply it for you. Allah is the most 
appreciating, the most forbearing” (Al-Quran 64:64). 
 
                                            
27
 AAOIFI, 2010 define Qard Hasan as a non-interest bearing loan intended to allow the borrower to use the 
loaned funds for a period of time with the understanding that the same amount of the loaned funds would be 
repaid at the end of the period. 
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3.3.8 Transparency  
When it comes to transparency in business, Islam goes much further than the UN 
Global Compact transparency standards (Williams & Zinkin, 2009). For example, 
clear written contracts are required for all business transactions, as stated in the 
Holy Quran (Quran, 2, p. 282). Also, in Islam, as in Judaism, the principle of caveat 
emptor does not apply. Many Hadiths outline that principles, such as, „„it is not 
permissible to sell items without making everything about it clear, nor is it permissible 
for anyone who knows about its defects to refrain from mentioning it‟‟ (Hadith, 
narrated by Al Hakim and Al-Baihaqi). Muslim businesses are, therefore, expected to 
ensure high quality standards in performing their job and to be transparent in their 
transactions. The issue of quality standards can also be seen in Quranic teaching on 
weights and measures (Quran, 6, p. 152; 17, p. 35; 83, pp. 1–6). For example: „„Give 
just measure and cause no loss (to others by fraud). And weigh with scales true and 
upright. And withhold not things justly due to men, nor do evil in the land working 
mischief‟‟ (Quran, 26, pp. 181–183). Whilst this does not of itself imply that the same 
standard should be applied everywhere, it does require that full information is 
provided on the standards used, which requires greater transparency and 
accountability. Therefore, Islamic banks are expected to promote a greater 
transparency in conducting their business, in line with Islamic business code of 
conduct. 
3.3.9 Accountability 
According to Haniffa (2001), under Western accountability models, companies are 
accountable to their stakeholders. In this model, the responsibility and accountability 
are not considered to extend beyond human society and the frameworks do not 
envisage any accountability to God (Allah). From an Islamic perspective, the 
perceived relationship of individuals and firms with God (Allah) affects the concept of 
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accountability (Maali, 2006). Muslims, as required by Islam, have to question their 
actions or hold themselves accountable before being held accountable by Allah on 
the Day of Judgment for what they have done in their life (Abdul-Rahman and 
Goddard, 1998). As a vicegerent and trustee of Allah, every human act in this world 
will be questioned on the day of judgement. Farook (2007) called this concept „divine 
accountability‟, and it is the basis for all actions of Muslims and, in turn, organisations 
representative of Islam. The concept of divine accountability is clearly stated in the 
holy Quran, in such verses as: “When you are greeted with a greeting, greet in return 
with what is better than it or (at least) return it equally. Certainly, Allah is Ever a 
Careful Account Taker of all things” (Quran 4:86). 
The word Hisab in Arabic, which is synonymous with account or accountability, is 
repeated more than eight times in different verses in the Holy Quran (Askary and 
Clarke, 1997). It shows importance of accountability in Islam. According to Lewis 
(2006), the basic similarity between Hisab, or account and accountability, lies in the 
responsibility of individuals and businesses to carry out duties as prescribed by Islam. 
Accountability, in this context, means accountability to the Islamic community at 
large, which has the right to know about the effects of the operations of organisations 
on its wellbeing (Lewis, 2006). Ibrahim (2000, p 23) elaborates this aspect of 
accountability, as follows: "accountability is the duty of an entity to use (and prevent 
the misuse of) the resources entrusted to it in an effective, efficient and economical 
manner, within the boundaries of the moral and legal framework of the society and to 
provide an account of its actions to accountees, who are not only the person(s) who 
provided it with the financial resources, but to groups within society and society at 
large". 
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The concept of accountability is derived from the Quran and is powerful in the 
Islamic system of business, which means accountability in front of Allah (SWT) not 
only in this world, but also in the hereafter. Accountability to Allah reflects 
trustworthiness, which includes both instruments and goals. Abbasi et al. (2012) 
argue that the instrument is that which is started with to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness, then in time is transferred to be a goal itself (p.233). As the Quran 
plainly explains: “Then shall anyone who has done an atom‟s weight of good, see it, 
and anyone who has done an atom‟s weight of evil, shall see it” (Quran, 99:7-8). 
Allah (SWT) said “Nor can bearers of burdens bear another‟s burden. If one heavily 
laden may call another to bear his load, not the least portion of it can be carried by 
the other, even though he is nearly related” (Quran, 35:18). 
Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) emphasises responsibilities and clarifies the 
intertwined responsibilities of applying real accountability. He said, “Beware that 
every one of you is a shepherd and everyone is answerable with regard to his folk. 
The caliph is a shepherd over the people and shall be questioned about them. A 
woman is a guardian over the household of her husband and his children and has to 
be questioned about them. A slave is a shepherd over the property of his master and 
shall be questioned about it”. Then, He (PBUH) adds: “beware that every one of you 
is a guardian and every one of you shall be questioned with regard to his trust” 
(Sahih Bukhari, 1967; Sahih Muslim, 1829). Afifuddin and Siti-Nabiha (2010) add 
that these verses apply to all organizations, not just personal accountability. 
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3.4 AAOIFI 
The development of accounting in the Islamic state between 624 and 1500 AD was 
religiously motivated and associated with the imposition of Zakah (Zaid, 2004). 
According to Napier (2009), the historical evidence on Islamic accounting is 
becoming increasingly available and is reflecting research into the main archives that 
have survived, as well as many treatises and other secondary material on 
accounting. Hayashi (1989, p. 71) suggested, "Islamic accounting thinks of the 
society before the business enterprise, whereas conventional accounting thinks of 
individual profit before the social profit". Baydoun and Willett (2000, p. 81) stated, 
"private accountability and limited disclosure (western accounting criteria) are 
insufficient criteria to reflect the ethical precepts of Islamic law”. Islamic accounting 
can be described as “a system of information that communicates the economic 
position and result of operation of an entity, and ensures that the information 
presented is correct, complies with Shariah, and is free from any misleading 
information" (Harahap, 2003, p. 70). Consistency of disclosure practices with Islamic 
law requires application of the all-embracing criteria of social accountability and full 
disclosure. Since the inception of the IFIs 28 , there has been a call for the 
development of special accounting standards for IFIs (Karim, 1990; Omar, 1997). 
The study of Islamic accounting has grown in recent years with substantive 
contributions from scholars, such as Baydoun and Willet (1995, 1997), Gambling and 
Karim (1986), Lewis and Algaoud (2001), and Vinnicombe (2010). It is notable; that 
the focus of most of these studies is descriptive or analytical in nature, emphasizing 
in particular the implications of Islam for accounting principles and practices, and the 
                                            
28
 According to AAOIFI, 2010, IFIs referred to any institutions that role of a financial intermediary that strictly 
abides by the provisions of Shariah. In this study, IFIs refer to Islamic banks. 
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theoretical framework from which accounting standards for Islamic entities could 
potentially be derived (Baydoun and Willett, 2000; Lewis, 2001; Perera, 1989). There 
is little recognition that a practical response to the need for Islamic accounting 
standards has emerged in the form of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). This organization was established in Bahrain 
in 1991 to develop and disseminate accounting and auditing standards for 
implementation by Islamic financial institutions worldwide (AAOIFI, 2003/1421H1 p. 
ix; Lewis and Algaoud, 2001, p. 171).  
From an Islamic perspective, it is critical that the accounting principles applied in 
Islamic organisations conform to Sharia (Al-Hajjai, 2003). The Shariah clearly 
specifies when the revenue should be recognised and when the asset should be 
transferred. The nature of financial instruments and transactions in IFIs are not 
addressed in the conventional General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Al-
Mehmadi, 2004). This is because the functions of IFIs (Islamic Financial Institutions) 
are different from those of their counterparts, who have adopted the Western model 
of banking (AAOIFI, 2005). The relationship between investors and IFIs is based 
mostly on profit and loss sharing, which is different from CFIs (Conventional 
Financial Institutions). According to the AAOIFI (2005), conventional financial 
accounting does not offer all the information required by those who need to make 
decisions concerning business. This is because of the nature of financial accounting 
processes29 and those related to cost and benefit30. 
                                            
29
 The limitation owing to the nature of the financial accounting process are as follows: (1) financial accounting 
is concerned mainly with measuring the financial effect of the transactions and other events on the entity's 
financial position, results of operation and cash flow. Therefore, financial accounting is not always able to 
provide information to help in the evaluation of the business ability to achieve its objectives that are not 
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Thus, accounting standards developed for CFIs may not be relevant for IFIs. Some 
new accounting regulations need to be designed to cater to the uniqueness of IFIs‟ 
financial instruments and contracts. Therefore, AAOIFI standards have been 
developed to overcome the limitation of conventional accounting standards for IFIs.  
In April 2009, the AAOIFI issued an updated standard, which focus on CSR practice 
among IFIs (known as Governance Standards No. 7: Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Conduct and Disclosure for IFIs). According to the AAOIFI (2010), corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) for IFIs refers to all activities carried out by an IFI (the “IFI” 
referred to any institution that plays the role of a financial intermediary that strictly 
abides by the provisions of the Shariah; these include, but are not limited to Islamic 
banks and Islamic Insurance companies) to fulfil its religious, economic, legal, ethical, 
and discretionary responsibilities as financial intermediaries for individuals and 
institutions. Religious responsibility refers to the overarching obligation of IFIs to 
obey the laws of Islam in all their dealings and operations. Economic responsibility 
refers to the obligation for Islamic banks to be financially viable, profitable and 
efficient. Legal responsibility refers to the obligation of IFIs to respect and obey the 
laws and regulations of the country of operation. Ethical responsibility refers to the 
obligation of IFIs to respect the mass of societal, religious and customary norms, 
which are not codified in law. Discretionary responsibility refers to the expectation 
                                                                                                                                       
capable of financial measurement. (2) Financial accounting does not differentiate between business 
performance and management performance; (3) financial accounting relies to a great extent on estimation, 
which is based on management assumption when measuring the financial effect of its transactions (for 
example, depreciation) (AAOIFI, 2005). 
30
 Cost consideration affects the information, which financial accounting produces. This results in the emphasis 
on the production of general-purpose financial reports to serve the common information needs of several 
external users (AAOIFI, 2005). 
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from stakeholders that IFIs will perform a social role in implementing Islamic ideals 
over and above the religious, economic, legal and ethical responsibilities (AAOIFI, 
2010). Over two decades, the AAOIFI operated as a body of Islamic accounting 
organizations, which prepare standards for Islamic financial institutions. To date, 
there is still limited literature discussions about the CSR compliance of IFIs and the 
updated AAOIFI standards No.7, 2010 (Vinnicombe, 2010; Vinnicombe, 2012; 
Zakaria and Arun, 2014; Farag, Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2014). 
3.4.1 Historical Discussion of AAOIFI 
This section explains the history of the AAOIFI, its approach to developing 
accounting standards, and the problems and challenges it faced in the early stages 
of its establishment. The pragmatic approach taken by the AAOIFI in developing its 
standards has been criticised in the context of the conceptual framework debate, 
which asks whether accounting standards for Islamic entities can be adapted from 
conventional Western standards, or whether they should proceed from an Islamic 
framework (Sarea & Hanefah, 2013). The AAOIFI chose the former approach, 
believing that the efficiencies gained from previous work will facilitate a timely 
implementation of standards, without compromising Shariah law (AAOIFI, 
2003/1424H, pp. xxiv–xxv). 
The AAOIFI commenced operations in Bahrain in March 1991 (11 Ramadan 1411H) 
(AAOIFI, 2003/1424H, p. ix). Initially known as the Financial Accounting Organization 
for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (FAOIBFI), the name was changed to the 
AAOIFI in 1995 to reflect a broadening of the brief for the organization to include 
auditing, and other standards, in response to demands from the Islamic financial 
community. The AAOIFI has a two-tiered organizational structure, paralleling that of 
the IASB and other similar organizations, such as the Financial Accounting 
76 
 
Standards Board in the United States (Vinnicombe, 2010). The purpose of the two 
tiers is to separate the standard-setting function from financing the organization, so 
that the standard-setters are not subject to a conflict of interest. 
The aims of the AAOIFI have evolved since its formation. Today, they include the 
preparation and publicising of accounting, auditing and governance standards for 
Islamic financial institutions, with the goal of achieving harmonization in the 
“accounting adopted by Islamic financial institutions in the preparation of their 
financial statements” (AAOIFI, 2003/1424H, p. ix). The AAOIFI also provides 
guidelines for Islamic financial institutions in a number of areas where they may 
experience difficulties in finding appropriate accounting treatments or interpretations, 
such as issues relating to Islamic insurance and new financial products. Finally, it is 
the goal of the AAOIFI to promote the adoption of its standards by Islamic financial 
institutions through the support of the relevant regulatory authorities in countries 
where these institutions operate. To this end, both national and transnational bodies, 
including central banks, accounting organizations and the IASB are encouraged to 
become AAOIFI members. 
In 1993, the FAOIBFI issued Financial Accounting Statements 1 and 2 (FAS1 and 
FAS2) (Karim, 1996, p. 119). These two statements represented the finalization of 
the FAOIBFI's initial task to develop objectives and concepts of financial accounting 
for Islamic banks. FAS1 outlined the objectives and FAS2 the concepts (Karim, 1995, 
p. 289). Taken together, the two statements are often described as providing a 
framework for the further development of Islamic accounting standards (Karim, 1996, 
p. 119). The two statements were followed by Financial Accounting Standard 
Number 1 (FAST1), which detailed requirements for the general presentation and 
disclosure for financial statements of Islamic banks. 
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The AAOIFI has now published twenty-three Financial Accounting Standards (FAST 
1–23), as well as standards for Islamic insurance companies, auditing standards, 
governance standards, and codes of ethics for accountants, auditors, and 
employees of Islamic financial institutions. This constitutes a substantial body of 
work in a relatively short period of time. In common with all accounting standard-
setting bodies, however, the AAOIFI faces a number of challenges. Its task is 
comparable to that of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in that, 
unlike national accounting bodies, it must set standards for banks located in vastly 
different parts of the world. The standards, therefore, need to be acceptable to a 
variety of regulatory regimes and a range of political, economic, and social 
circumstances. The AAOIFI has no power of enforcement, and must therefore 
proceed by gaining the support of national regulatory bodies and the major Islamic 
banks (Karim, 1995, p. 289). Despite these problems, the AAOIFI has experienced 
considerable success, in terms of the standards it has produced, growing 
membership, and what appears to be increasing acceptance by the regulatory 
authorities in many Islamic countries, such as the GCC. It seems timely, therefore, to 
test the extent to which the standards published by the AAOIFI are implemented by 
Islamic banks. 
3.4.2 The need of AAOIFI Accounting Standards 
Due to globalization, increased competition, communication revolution, new 
regulations and the strong growth in the IFIs, the AAOIFI move ahead in formulated 
and prepared accounting, auditing, and corporate governance, as well as ethics and 
Shariah standards for IFIs to ensure they are competitive with the global financial 
market (Vinnicombe, 2012). 
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The need for Islamic accounting standards also coincides with the development of 
Islamic financial products. New financial products require commensurate accounting 
treatments, especially where institutions are required to produce annual financial 
statements. However, the rapid growth of Islamic financial institutions, from the 
1970s onwards, outstripped the ability of accounting standard development to keep 
pace (Pomeranz, 1997, p. 124). Moreover, the emphasis on the Islamization of 
financial products focused on developing financial institutions and financial products, 
rather than a corresponding regulatory framework. The AAOIFI is an independent 
international organization, which is supported by institutional members (200 
members from 45 countries) including central banks, IFIs, and other participants 
from the international Islamic banking and finance industry. It published its first set of 
accounting and governance standards in 2004. Then, they were updated in 2008 
and the latest updated was in 2010.31 The 2010 edition is considered the most 
appropriate standard for this study, which covers the years between 2010 and 2014 
inclusive.  
Financial accounting plays an important role in providing the information, which 
users of the financial statements of Islamic banks depend on in assessing the bank's 
compliance with the precepts of Shariah. However, to perform this role effectively, 
accounting standards need to be developed and complied with by Islamic banks. 
The development of such standards must be based on clear objectives of financial 
accounting and agreed upon definitions of its concepts. In parallel with the positive 
growth of the IFI industry, the AAOIFI has published 85 standards that are comprised 
of 26 accounting standards, 5 auditing standards, 7 governance standards, 2 ethics 
                                            
31
 The updated standards were adopted by the AAOIFI standards board meeting no. 35 on 2 April, 2009. This 
updated standard effective was to be implementing for financial period beginning 1 January, 2010. 
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standards, and 45 Shariah standards (AAOIFI, 2010). The AAOIFI has been 
recognized and mandated to develop accounting, auditing, governance, and ethics 
standards to ensure that IFIs operate in line with Shariah principles in order to 
promote comparable, transparent, and reliable accounting information for the 
stakeholders. Thus, it can be concluding that the AAOIFI standards are important 
tools in enhancing the growth of the IFI industry. 
There have been many studies examining the appropriateness of conventional 
accounting for an Islamic economy. Scholars such as Haniffa (2002), Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2001), Baydoun and Willett (1995), Hamid et al. (1993), and Karim and 
Tomkins (1987) have suggested that Islam must influence the approach and the 
manner in which accounting is practised. Hameed (2001) calls for a strong support 
among Muslim accountants and accounting academics for applying Islamic 
accounting, as well as accountability framework instead of using the decision-
usefulness framework of conventional accounting, and the need for developing 
specific accounting that helps Muslims to fulfil their objectives and achieve God's 
consent. Mirza and Baydounl (1999) found that Islamic societies need accounting 
and reporting standards that support them in obeying Allah and satisfying other 
stakeholders. Moreover, annual reports of IFIs may include a comprehensive 
disclosure about the firm's operations, financial compliance with Shariah, as well as 
social information. Al-Mehmadi (2004) concluded that Islamic banks need special 
accounting standards. In addition, International Accounting Standards (IASs) based 
on such techniques would create difficulties for Muslims (Shadia, 2007). 
Hameed (2001) explains that the worldview, principles, objectives, and values of 
Islam are different from secular, Western society. As such, the particular obligations 
and prohibitions in the economic and social arena under Shariah, and the 
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establishment of Islamic organisations, require a different accounting framework. 
Therefore, conventional accounting may be an inappropriate tool for the task. 
Hameed considers that an Islamic economy needs a different accounting system 
that corresponds to Islamic values and provides appropriate information for the 
Muslim users to help them achieve their religious objectives. Obviously, many 
studies have investigated different issues and aspects that affect the nature of 
accounting in Islam, such as Zakat, Riba, Islamic reporting scheme, disclosure, 
Islamic financial instruments, Mudarabah, and other issues (e.g., Ayub, 2007; Lewis, 
2006; Maali et al., 2006; Siddiqi, 2005). Haniffa and Hudaib (2001) criticise 
conventional accounting, as well as international accounting standards like IFRS, as 
being inappropriate for Muslims and for IFIs. They assert that Islamic accounting 
helps Muslims to achieve the consent of Allah. They criticise conventional 
accounting as being barred from religion, as well as failing to ensure society's long-
term wellbeing. 
Ullah (2013) stated that, compared to other general or banking companies, Islamic 
banks are required to comply with Shariah standards, such as the AAOIFI standards. 
Moreover, Hossain (2010) stated that the Islamic banks are to abide by more rules 
and regulations than conventional banks, that is, conventional banks do not comply 
with the AAOIFI standards. As the activities of Islamic banks are different than those 
of their counter parts, their accounting and reporting is also different. These Islamic 
banks need to disclose some information; which conventional banks are not required 
to disclose. The AAOIFI has been recognized and mandated to develop standards 
that are in line with Shariah principles in order to promote comparable, transparent, 
and reliable accounting information for users. Thus, the main objective of the AAOIFI 
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is to prepare and develop accounting, auditing, governance, and ethical standards 
relating to the activities of IFIs (Sarea and Hanefah, 2013). 
However, Hameed (2001) argues that IFRS is inappropriate for IFIs because of the 
uniqueness of the transactions of Islamic banks. Also, IFRSs are not compatible with 
Islamic banks (Maali and Napier, 2010). To enhanced the disclosure level among 
Islamic banks. IFIs need Islamic accounting and Islamic standards, such as the 
AAOIFI standards, that complies with Shariah and support these institutions to 
achieve accountability towards Allah, as well as all stakeholders. Consequently, this 
research looks for the AAOIFI as a benchmark; the ideal models and best practices 
for all IFIs are those that could support them to disclose full information about CSR 
information and assist Islamic banks to fulfil the contract between themselves and 
Allah first, then towards stockholders, stakeholders, society, and others. 
3.4.3 AAOIFI and CSR 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) for IFIs refers to all activities carried out by an 
IFI to fulfil its religious, economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities, as 
financial intermediaries for individuals and institutions (AAOIFI, 2010). The AAOIFI 
issued Governance Standard No.7 (2010) to organise the activities related to CSR. 
The primary objective for this standard is to ensure that CSR activities and the 
compliance of IFIs is communicated in a truthful, transparent, and comprehensible 
manner to relevant stakeholders (AAOIFI, 2010). The accountability for CSR 
disclosure under this standard is divided between 5 mandatory disclosures (such as 
earnings and expenditure prohibited by Shariah and Zakat) and 6 voluntary 
disclosures (such as Qard Hassan, charitable activities and Waqf management) 
(AAOIFI, 2010). The CSR literature on Islamic banks has revealed an expectation 
gap between actual/communicated disclosures and ideal disclosures.  
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Haniffa and Hudaib (2001) state that disclosure in Islamic banks is a vital factor that 
helps Muslims to fulfil their religious duties. They add that Islamic banks are 
supposed to disclose any information concerning forbidden transactions they make, 
information related to Zakat obligation, and the bank's social responsibility, such as 
charities, and environmental protection. This shows us that financial reports in IFIs 
are likely to be more detailed than the financial reports in conventional institutions. 
Maali et al. (2006) found that the level of social disclosure by the sample banks was 
well below their benchmark index. Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) found a significant gap 
between the communicated and ideal ethical disclosures for 7 Islamic banks. Belal et 
al. (2014) found an overall increase in both particular and universal disclosures 
during their study period. Hassan and Harahap (2010) concluded that some Islamic 
banks pay scant attention to disclosing their social activities and, thus, argued for a 
standard on CSR disclosure relevant to IFIs. Farook et al. (2011) found substantial 
variation in CSR disclosures and this variation is best explained by the presence of 
SSB governance and the preponderance of Muslims in their sample countries. From 
the above discussion, it can be concluding that‟s are several factor/determinants in 
influence the CSR dislcosure level practice among Islamic banks such example the 
existance of SSB who provide an advice to Islamic banks manager. 
3.5 Collective Religious Duty of Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
According to the AAOIFI (2010), IFIs came into existence as a collective religious 
obligation (Fard Kifayah)32 on the larger Muslim community. The obligation is to 
operate as a financial intermediary for individuals in the larger community wishing to 
                                            
32
 Fard Kifayah refers to a collective religious duty, which, if performed by some, would exempt others from 
performing it. However, if it’s not performed by any, the entire community is sinful. 
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comply with Islamic law (Shariah). In this special position, IFIs are therefore 
representatives for individuals who: 
a) Invest their money as shareholders or investment account holders. 
b) Have co-operative, partnership, or borrowing relations with the IFIs. 
c) Are employed by the IFIs. 
d) Have other explicit contractual relations with the IFIs. 
e) Have an implicit social contract with the IFIs as part of the larger Muslim 
community. 
IFIs hold a position of significant responsibility in society as financial intermediaries, 
which source and allocate funds. The example set by IFIs has an impact on other 
individuals and organizations. These two points denote that IFIs are a fard kifayah It 
is therefore pertinent that IFIs play a role in encouraging the right type of behaviour 
and activities, while discouraging the wrong type of behaviour and activities. 
Religiously, IFIs have a responsibility to comply with the form and substance of 
Islamic law (Shariah) in all aspects of their operations. This is because they are in an 
exemplary position. This means that all aspects of its operations should be 
conducted in a permissible or recommended manner, while no respect of the 
operations should be conducted in an impermissible, or not recommended, manner. 
If business is conducted in an impermissible, or not recommended, manner, it is an 
obligation to disclose to the stakeholders the reasons for that particular conduct 
(AAOIFI, 2010). 
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3.6 Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) 
The last few decades have witnessed increased interest in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). The interest in corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) 
has increased with time (Taha, 2010). Today, as ranges of stakeholder groups starts 
to demand information about social and environmental issues from the financial 
companies, the companies have to justify all their activities to a wider public by 
increasing their communications on a range of issues and not just confine 
themselves to communicating about the economic dimensions of their operations 
(Daub, 2007). CSRD is a key tool for communicating with stakeholders regarding a 
company‟s social responsibility activities. It forms a central charter for public relations 
in communicating and creating mutual understanding, managing potential conflicts, 
and achieving legitimacy (Golob & Bartlett, 2007). 
There are several views of CSR disclosure defined by previous scholars (Huang, 
2015) McWilliams and Siegel (2006) define corporate social responsibility as firms‟ 
efforts to surpass compliance by voluntarily engaging in “actions that appear to 
further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required 
by law”. This means incorporating economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic 
responsibilities into corporate decision making (Carroll, 1979), and it represents a 
potential departure from shareholder theory, in which firms strive to maximize 
shareholder wealth within legal constraints and basic social norms (Friedman, 1970). 
Shareholder theory has been a dominant assumption throughout research in 
economics, finance, and accounting. Corporate social responsibility is intriguing 
because it suggests that firms are motivated to make decisions that do not always 
obviously maximize wealth for the shareholders. Under stakeholder theory, as 
suggested by some CSR scholars, firms strike a balance between shareholder 
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interests and the interests of other stakeholders (Carroll, 1991). This tension 
generates important questions that accounting researchers have a voice in 
answering. 
CSR disclosure, in general, can be defined as the provision of financial and non-
financial information relating to a company‟s interaction with its physical and social 
environment, as stated in corporate annual reports or corporate social reports, and it 
can be either mandatory or voluntary (Hackston & Milne, 1996). Social and 
environmental disclosure can typically be thought of as providing information relating 
to a company‟s activities, aspirations, and public image, with regard to environmental, 
community, employee, and consumer issues (Gray, et al. 2001). Haron et al. (2004) 
indicate that social disclosure can provide either positive information, which presents 
the company as operating in harmony with the environment, such as stating that the 
company is conducting training programmes for employees or that waste-
management policies are being undertaken, or negative information which presents 
the company as operating to the detriment of environment, such as the inability to 
control or reduce pollution, or failure to solve a social problem. From the researcher‟s 
perspective, CSRD can be defined as an ability of the companies to provide relevant 
and suitable information in the financial report, or on the website, of the business 
activities, which meet the shareholders‟ and stakeholders‟ needs, such as an 
information of charity activities to the society. 
Aaronson & Reeves (2002) argue that there is public pressure to develop corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) policies arising from the failure of voluntary disclosure as 
suggested by the authorities‟ body. This public pressure acts as a driver for 
governments, as well as other institutions, such as the AAOIFI, to provide different 
guidelines and standards for CSR disclosure practices and reporting. However, 
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these efforts do not attempt to make CSRD mandatory by law, but seek to find the 
middle way, by which companies are held accountable for their actions. Van der 
Lann (2004) indicates an emerging form of CSR disclosure, the solicited disclosure, 
in which companies are increasingly asked to account, in various forms, about their 
interactions with, and impacts on, society. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
regulatory agencies, ethical or socially responsible fund managers, ratings agencies, 
and other interested parties are requesting social information from companies. The 
difference between voluntary and solicited disclosure is the motive to provide the 
information. The motive for voluntary CSR disclosure comes from the management 
of companies, either in response to a threat to their legitimacy or a need to account, 
while the motive for solicited CSR disclosure is a direct request from the identified 
stakeholders (Van der Lann, 2004). 
3.7 CSR disclosure: Mandatory vs Voluntary 
Financial disclosure is an issue of whether information was intended by the 
corporate finance or not, compulsory or voluntary, through formal or other channels, 
it includes special reports covering social responsibility, environment, intellectual 
capital, and other corporate initiatives (Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse, 1990). 
Williams (2008) described the financial disclosure as providing quantitative 
information in the financial statements, business segment information, the research 
information, foreign information, and pricing information. On the other hand, it 
includes the non-financial information details, such as directors, staff, or intangible 
assets disclosure (Williams, 2008).  
The discussion of disclosure in financial reporting can be divided into two main 
sections: voluntary or mandatory disclosure. In general, voluntary disclosure can be 
defined as “any disclosure by companies not mandated by law and/or self-regulatory 
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bodies” (Owusu-Ansah, 1998, p. 154). In other words, voluntary disclosure is the 
situation when the companies disclose information that is not required by law or 
regulations, and it exceeds the minimum requirement of mandatory financial 
reporting disclosure. Schipper (2007, p. 303) pointed out that voluntary disclosure is 
needed, as the objective is to maximize a firm‟s value or its manager utility.  
On the other hand, mandatory disclosure is the minimum information, which 
accounting standards or other promulgations require from a reporting entity (Dye, 
2001: p. 184). According to Owusu-Ansah (1998), mandatory disclosure is limited 
disclosure to provide the financial information or is not a material complying with the 
disclosure guideline. Mandatory disclosure is needed for the following reasons: a) to 
describe recognized and unrecognized items; b) to provide a useful measure of 
unrecognized items; c) to provide alternative measures of recognized items; d) to 
provide information useful for assessing risks; e) to provide information, temporarily, 
while other solutions are being studied (SFAS, No. 105, cited in Schipper, 2007, p. 
305). It could, therefore, improve the prediction level, as well as help users in making 
sound decisions.   
The demand from companies to be more transparent in financial reporting disclosure 
has gained momentum due to popular recognition approach of stakeholders rather 
than shareholders, who traditionally recognized approach of exposure (Boesso & 
Kumar, 2007; Ng & Rusticus, 2011). Companies use several ways and channels to 
disclose their information, such as annual reports, interim reports, conference call 
services, press releases, prospectuses, and websites as channels to communicate 
with their stakeholders (Laskin, 2010 cited in Wright & Hinson, 2012). Annual reports 
have become the most important medium in present companies‟ current information 
to the stakeholders and shareholders (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Arvidsson, 2011). 
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From the client's perspective, they tend to request further information, quickly and in 
a timely manner over the years. It has engraved a role for the Internet as a medium 
of exposure (Aly, Simon and Hussainey, 2010) and it has become as an alternative 
medium for timely disclosure by companies (Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008). A firm 
with greater disclosure has more analysts who follow them, a lack of dissemination 
of the analysts‟ forecast, and less volatility in the transmission prediction (Lundholm 
Lang, 1993). Piotroski (1999) found that disclosure on a voluntary basis could 
improve the accuracy of the predictions of analysts and reduce the spread of the 
forecast. 
In this study, IFIs are expected to fulfil their religious and social responsibility, which 
obeys the laws of Islam in all their dealings and operations towards society. In 
enhancing the IFIs to fulfil their religious and social responsibility, the AAOIFI have 
uniform standards on CSR activities and compliance for IFIs. The main aim of the 
standard is to ensure that the CSR activities and compliance of IFIs are 
communicated in a uniform, truthful, transparent, and comprehensive manner to 
relevant stakeholders, to whom the IFIs owe a duty of accountability. It consists of 5 
mandatory and 6 voluntary conducts, which cover all aspects of CSR, such as social 
responsibility towards employees, clients, and society.  This guideline will be used to 
develop the disclosure index in measuring the level of CSR information disclosed 
among the sample Islamic banks.  
3.8 Summary 
This chapter provided a clear insight in CSR disclosure discussion from Islamic 
perspectives and the function of AAOIFI to enhance CSR disclosure practice among 
Islamic banks. With a discussion of corporate social responsibility in Islam and 
explained the extent to which Islam influences CSR. It also explained the religious 
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duty of Islamic banks to society and to God (Allah). Corporate social responsibility 
has been defined in this chapter from the Islamic perspective, which differs from the 
Western view in five areas. First, the economy is not regarded as something 
independent; the concept of Unity (Tawhid) makes this impossible: all things in this 
world belong to Allah and mankind is a Khalifah (vicegerent) and should manage the 
property, which is not contradictory with the Shariah (Islamic law). Secondly, 
although Islam recognises the importance of market mechanisms, it regulates their 
workings to prevent market failure that is socially disruptive and in violation of the 
norms of justice and fairness. Thirdly, although self-interest is the driver, it must be 
linked to an overall concept of justice. All transaction in business should be free from 
Riba and Islamic banks are highly recommended to provide an interest-free loan 
such as Qard Hassan (benevolence loan) to alleviate poverty in the community.  
Fourthly, although private property and private enterprise are undeniable rights, the 
moral filter transforms them so that property, in all its forms, is a trust (amanah); 
mankind also should be responsible towards environment. The property rights are 
subject to moral limits and are a means to achieving an ethical Islamic way 
(Maqasid-Al-Shari‟ah), rather than ends in themselves; Islamic banks should ensure 
that they fulfil the Maslahah to society. Finally, as a vicegerent of Allah, mankind 
should be transparent and accountable in their transaction. The ethical principles in 
social justice, such as the Shariah, Justice, Zakah, Riba, Maslahah, Tawhid, 
Benevolence, Transparency, and Accountability, is evidence of how Islam really 
encourages and is concerned with social issues. Therefore, it is expected that all the 
institutions and organizations, which are established under the name of “Islam” 
should be more “Islamic” in conducting and managing their business. The next 
chapter will provide a theoretical framework of the study. 
90 
 
CHAPTER 4: THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK  
4.1 Overview 
This chapter will provide a discussion of the theoretical framework of the study. In 
general, the theoretical framework of the study will enable the researcher and reader 
to see how the findings are accurately related to the research questions and 
hypotheses. In other words, it plays a significant role in the explanation or 
justification of the link between what the researcher expects, and the findings.  
According to the Cambridge Dictionary (2009), theory can be defined as „a formal 
statement of the rules on which a subject of study is based, or of ideas, which are 
suggested to explain a fact or event or, more generally, an opinion or explanation‟. 
Gray et al. (2009, p. 13) stated, “the lens of theory enables us to evaluate practice 
and policy against criteria that we deem appropriate”. Generally, the literature 
presents many theories in order to explain the variation between entities in terms of 
their level of disclosure. Various theories have been developed to explain managers‟ 
incentives for disclosure. However, there is no general or comprehensive disclosure 
theory that can be applied (Verrecchia, 2001). 
Apparently, each theory explains different aspects of corporate disclosure or it looks 
at this phenomenon from different perspectives (Al-Htaybat, 2005). Therefore, it was 
argued that several theories could be used in an integrated framework to provide an 
explanation for managerial incentives, which affect CSR disclosure (Al-Htaybat, 
2005). Several theories could explain the disclosure phenomena, such as 
stakeholder theory, agency theory, signalling theory, and accountability theory. 
Nevertheless, explaining disclosure supported by only a single theory is not 
comprehensive enough. Alberti-Alhtaybat et al. (2012) argue that disclosure theories, 
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such as agency theory and stakeholder theory, would be of great help in explaining a 
particular phenomenon by providing clear insights in the understanding of the CSR 
disclosure practices. Further, it can be considered as a complementary aspect of 
disclosure discussions. Prior studies (Farook et al. 2011) argue that there is a 
consistency between both agency theory and stakeholder theory. Therefore, agency 
theory and stakeholder theory can be considered to be interrelated theories to 
explain the determinants of CSR disclosure. In general, agency theory concentrates 
on the relationship between the principal and the agents who are given the authority 
to manage the principal‟s interests and make beneficial decisions. Alternatively, 
according to general stakeholder theory, society expects corporations to behave in a 
manner that is beneficial in terms of their social or economic role. 
Studies in corporate disclosure have primarily focused on the effect of firm 
characteristics on the extent of corporate disclosure (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). In 
recent years, one of the most extensively discussed topics in this field has been how 
to design corporate governance mechanisms that lead to more disclosure levels 
(Cormier et al., 2005; Gul and Leung, 2004). Thus, agency theory provides a 
framework for connecting the disclosure behaviour to corporate governance through 
considering both as mechanisms used to protect stakeholders and assist them in 
reducing agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Aksu and Kosedag (2006) 
propose that disclosure practices followed by corporations are a significant element 
and a leading indicator of corporate governance quality. Beeks and Brown (2005) 
argue that businesses with high CG quality make more disclosures that are 
informative. Further discussion of agency theory will be discussed in the next section.  
The objective of this section is to present the main theories that provide a 
fundamental background with regard to the determinants and consequences of CSR 
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disclosure. This chapter begins with the discussion of agency theory and then it 
continues with stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, accountability theory, signalling 
theory, and economic theory. Last but not least, the summary of the chapter. 
4.2 Agency Theory  
The most dominant of all the disclosure studies is agency theory, which has been 
referred to widely in many disclosure studies. This theory basically refers to a 
principal-and-agent relationship. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined the agency 
relationship as a contract, under which a principal engages an agent to perform a 
service on their behalf. They also identified the three types of agency costs, which 
are associated with agency problems. Firstly, there are monitoring costs that are 
incurred by giving certain incentives to the agent, which motivates him to act for the 
principal interests. Secondly bonding costs, which occur when the agent uses 
additional resources in order to make sure that his actions will not be against the 
principal of interests. Thirdly, there is the residual loss that results in the reduction of 
the principal‟s welfare. 
Previous studies also used agency theory to explain the decision to disclose CSR 
information, such as social and environmental information (Shane and Spicer, 1983; 
Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Ness and Mirza, 1991). Agency theory suggests that 
there is a separation between the ownership and the control of a firm; the potential 
for agency costs exist from the conflicts of interest between principals and the agents 
(managers) (Hossain et al., 1995). Each party makes a decision based on its self-
determined goals (Safieddine, 2009). Therefore, agency costs, which include the 
cost of monitoring and controlling, are incurred by the principal and bonding costs 
are incurred by the agent. From the agency theory perspective, companies 
(management) are motivated to disclose more CSR information to convince the 
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stakeholders that they are behaving optimally on the stakeholder‟s behalf, their 
concern on CSR issues and, as a result, it can reduce agency cost. 
Agency theory also provides a framework for explaining disclosure practices by 
different firms, such as financial and unit-trust companies (Hill & Jones, 1992). It is 
claimed that agency theory predicts that agency costs are associated with different 
corporate characteristics, such as size, leverage, and listing status (Watson et al., 
2002). Furthermore, corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are introduced by 
shareholders in order to aligned managers‟ actions with shareholders‟ interests. As a 
result, many empirical studies used firm characteristics and CG mechanisms as 
determinants of corporate social disclosure in accordance with agency theory 
assumptions (e.g. Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Ajinkya et al., 2005; Tauringana and Mangena, 2009; Hussainey and 
Al-Najjar, 2011). The implication of this theory has given rise to several hypotheses, 
such as the influence of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB), who act as an agent on 
behalf of the banks in promoting CSR disclosure practice.  
In other perspectives, information asymmetry problem and agency conflicts could 
exist between companies‟ managers and outsider stakeholders (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Outsiders usually do not have access to the internal information about the 
company, which is only available to the manager‟s/management team. Prior 
research (i.e. Sheu et al., 2010) shows that disclosure can reduce the information 
asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (stakeholders) and, hence, 
reduce agency conflicts between both parties. As a result, it leads to increasing the 
firm value (Sheu et al., 2010). Thus, the influence of CSR disclosure on firm value 
(FV) can also be understood based on agency theory. This theory will be used to test 
both the CSR disclosure determinants (RQ 2) and consequences (RQ 3) variables. 
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4.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory focuses on the assumption that the behaviour of various 
stakeholder groups encourages management to relate corporate needs with its 
socio-environment. Freeman (1983) defines a stakeholder as any group or individual 
who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of organisations' objectives, and 
suggested that corporations should identify their direct and indirect stakeholders. 
Later, he indicated that the stakeholder theory could be used as a metaphor or a 
compilation of different narratives; thus, it cannot be described as one theory owing 
to the various interests of the stakeholders involved. It has become increasingly 
apparent that stakeholders have the ability to influence the way in which corporations 
conduct themselves, and ultimately influence their 'licence to operate' (Wilson, 1997). 
This implies that if a firm dissatisfies a relevant stakeholder, this stakeholder can 
apply pressure on the firm to meet its expectations. According to Ullman (1985), the 
greater the importance of stakeholders' resources or support for an organisation, the 
greater the probability that the stakeholders' expectations will be incorporated in an 
organisation's operation. In other words, the level of stakeholders' power increases 
as the importance of meeting stakeholders‟ demands increases (Deegan, 2000). 
Stakeholder theory also reflects "the incorporation of social responsibility into the 
corporate planning framework, attempting to develop a corporate strategy that meets 
the approval of an organisation's key stakeholder groups and also provides the 
potential explanation of social accountability disclosure in terms of corporate 
responsiveness to the intensity of stakeholder demands, corporate strategic 
orientation towards its social responsibilities, and trade-off between corporate 
economic and social objectives" (Parker, 2005, p. 845). Several studies also 
investigated the relationship between social disclosure and stakeholder theory (e.g., 
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Freeman, 1983; Adams and Harte, 1999). Adams and Harte (1999) used 
stakeholder theory to explain the decisions of managers to disclose certain social 
and environmental information in their annual report. They found that firms would not 
disclose social information if there was little demand for such information or that 
those who demand it were not considered highly prominent by the organisation. 
However, stakeholder theory was criticised as being supportive for corporate 
disclosure being primarily responsive to the most powerful and influential 
stakeholders (Deegan, 2002; Gray et al., 1995, 1997). Although there are limitations 
in stakeholder theory, it has been conceded that stakeholder theory is useful; "it 
defines the influenced groups for us and explicitly defines what accountability the 
organisation itself is willing to recognise and discharge" (Gray et al, 1997, p. 333). In 
line with stakeholder theory, it is expected that CG characteristics could affect CSR 
reporting. For instance, the size of the board would affect the CSR disclosure 
practice in Islamic banks; they will provide more CSR information to meet the 
demands of their stakeholders. This theory will be used to test the CSR disclosure 
determinants (RQ 2) variables. 
4.4 Legitimacy Theory 
This theory proposes that corporate disclosures are made as reactions to 
environmental and non-environmental factors (including social, economic, and 
political) in order to legitimise corporate actions and activities. Patten (2005) 
suggests that the theory is based upon the notion that business (Islamic banks) 
operates in society via a social contract and, as such, is monitored through the 
public-policy arena rather than the market place. Adams and Roberts (1995) also 
suggest that this theory is used by firms to legitimise its activities by seeking to 
present the company as a responsible corporate citizen. In other words, in 
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legitimizing its actions via disclosing all the CSR activities in the annual report and 
justifying its continued existence in the market. 
Legitimacy theory asserts that "organisations continually seek to ensure that they 
operate within the bounds and norms of their respective societies, which is an 
attempt to ensure that their activities are perceived by outside parties as being 
legitimate" (Deegan, 2000, p. 253). Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy 
theory as "a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of any entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially-constructed system of norms, 
value, beliefs and definitions". According to legitimacy theory, a firm which operates 
in society, such as Islamic banks, have a social contract whereby it agrees to carry 
out various socially desired actions in return for the approval of its objectives, other 
rewards, and its ultimate survival (Guthrie and Parker, 1990). Deegan (2002) argues 
that the "social contract is not easy to define but the concept is used to represent the 
multitude of implicit and explicit expectations that society has about how the 
organisation should conduct its operations". 
Lindblom (1994) suggests four ways for an organisation to legitimise its actions: first, 
educate and inform its relevant customers about changes in the company‟s 
performance and activities; secondly, change the perceptions of the relevant public 
but do not change its actual behaviour; thirdly, manipulate perception by deflecting 
attention from the issues of concern to other related issues through an appeal; and, 
lastly, change the external expectations of its performance. 
Thus, the interpretation of these studies suggests that the disclosure of social 
information seems to be proof for Islamic banks to provide information on their 
activities to legitimize their behaviours. They have to disclose enough information to 
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assess whether they represent a good corporate citizen or not (Maali et al., 2003). 
Several studies have sought to employ legitimacy theory as a drive for disclosure 
(e.g., Deegan and Rankin, 1996; O'Dwyer, 2002; Campbell et al., 2003; Staden, 
2003; Ahmad and Sulaiman, 2004; Ogden and Clark, 2005; De Villiers and Staden, 
2006; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). However, Gray et al. (1995) and Deegan (2002) 
assert that legitimacy theory overlaps with political-economy theory and institutional 
theory. In addition, legitimacy theory also has been criticised for lacking specificity 
and it is uncertain in its ability to anticipate and explain managerial behaviour (Parker, 
2005). 
Concerned with the economic consequences for social disclosure, legitimacy theory 
also argues that corporations may be enthusiastic to disclose social information to 
legitimize their position within society (Deegan et al., 2002). McDonald and Rundle-
Thiele (2008) find influences of CSR on corporate profitability through the creation of 
intangible assets such as good reputation, trust, and commitment, which drive the 
long-term success of the business. This improves the firm‟s ability to attract 
resources, enhance performance, and build competitive advantages and enhancing 
firm value (FV) (Fombrun et al., 2000). Widespread previous research proposes that 
disclosure reporting can influence positively on stakeholders‟ perceptions of firm 
performance and, thereby, on firms‟ profitability and share price (Lourenco et al., 
2012). This theory will be used to test both the CSR disclosure determinants (RQ 2) 
and consequences (RQ 3) variables. 
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4.5 Accountability Theory 
According to general accountability theory, the term „accountability‟ refers to the duty 
of accountors (agents/directors/managers) to provide an account (information/report) 
to accountees (stakeholders/users/society). It shows the managers‟ responsibility to 
fulfil a defined set of duties or tasks and for conforming the rules and standards 
applicable to their posts in companies (Jagadeesan et al., 2009). According to Gray 
et al. (1995), to be socially accountable, managers are required to provide all 
financial and non-financial information to their stakeholders. Moreover, part of 
emancipatory accounting is to render an entity‟s socio-economic activity visible. 
Making social problems visible may be seen as an emancipatory potential of 
accounting, as providing information may bring nearer a resolution. Furthermore, the 
accountability between accountee (principal) and accountor (agent) differs 
depending on the accountee. For example, managers may be accountable to 
workers for their salary and health and safety, as well as all employees‟ rights, while 
employees may be responsible for their work performance.  
From an Islamic point of view, Muslims, as well as Islamic banks, are accountable to 
Allah to obey and worship Him, as well as comply with the Shariah. It can be 
understood that accountability may be determined by the contractual relationship 
between the different parties (Gray et al., 1995). On another hand, some scholars 
have a deeper view regarding the meaning of accountability. Gallhofer and Haslam 
(1994, p.326) stated that “accountability is not so much about holding responsibility 
and judging behaviour; nor does it assume a simple agency-principal relation, but 
accountability appears equivalent to the ability to render accounts conducive to well-
being”.  
99 
 
Accountability, from an Islamic perspective, refers to a responsibility to Allah as a 
main accountee, then society and other stakeholders. Thus, accountability theory is 
applicable for this study through extending this concept to contain more than 
investors and owners for Islamic banks. In Islam, as a creator, God (Allah) has an 
absolute ownership of the resources. Human beings are merely trustees in this world, 
therefore, they are required to behave according to God‟s (Allah‟s) will, protecting 
and looking after each other and God‟s other creations, as mankind will be 
accountable for their actions in this world on the Day of Judgment (Al-Qhiamah) 
(Baydoun and Willett, 1997; Maali, Casson and Napier, 2006). Accountability in 
Islam also includes accountability towards the community; Baydoun and Willett 
(2000) argued that companies, such as Islamic banks, should disclose all information 
required by their stakeholders and society, in order to fulfil its responsibility in 
providing CSR information. This theory will be used to test the CSR disclosure 
determinants (RQ 2) variables. 
4.6 Signalling Theory 
The company‟s annual reports contain information that serves as signals required by 
investors. Investors employ signals as considerations in making a decision. 
Signalling theory is valuable for companies and investors because the information 
delivered by firms provides signals that can reduce information asymmetry. This 
study primarily makes use of agency theory; it is also worth noting that some prior 
studies use signalling theory to explain corporate disclosure decisions (e.g., Wang et 
al., 2008). Signalling theory is considered to be an extension of agency theory (e.g., 
Buskirk, 2012; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Spence (1973) introduced signalling 
theory in 1973 through his research on the information gap between employee and 
employer. It was developed to explain the information asymmetry between managers 
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and shareholders (e.g., Black et al., 2006a; Morris, 1987). Signalling theory can be 
applied in the event of information asymmetry and, hence, this problem may be 
reduced when the party who has more information signals it to other interested 
parties. Signalling is a common phenomenon, applicable in any market with 
information asymmetry (Morris, 1987). Therefore, this theory was used to explain 
managers‟ incentives to disclose more information in financial reports (e.g., Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002). Managers have to disclose adequate information in the financial 
statements to convey specific signals to potential users. Morris (1987, p. 51) claims 
that in order to ensure that information signalling from firms is effective in reducing 
the information asymmetry, the signalling costs must be borne by agent so that they 
have an incentive to signal truthfully.  
According to signalling theory, a manager discloses information in order to reduce 
information asymmetry and to signal to outsiders that a firm is performing better than 
its peers (Álvarez et al., 2008). Signalling theory posits that investors rely on the 
information delivered by firms (Abhayawansa and Abeysekera, 2009), highlighting 
that the credibility of information is crucial in ensuring less information asymmetry 
(Hughes, 1986). In this regard, “A good firm can distinguish itself from a bad firm by 
sending a credible signal about its quality to capital markets”. Bhattacharya and 
Dittmar (2004) argue that a signal will be credible only if the bad firm chooses not to 
mimic the good firm by sending the same signal. 
In this study, signalling theory is the main theoretical framework that is used to 
explain the economic consequences of disclosure through measuring association 
between CSR disclosure and FV. Based on this theory, inclusive disclosure signals 
better CG and fewer agency struggles, leading to higher FV (Sheu et al., 2010). 
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Signalling theory is the main theoretical framework that is used to explain the 
association between disclosure and firm value (FV). Based on this theory, 
comprehensive disclosure signals better CG mechanisms and fewer agency conflicts, 
therefore leading to higher firm value (FV) (Sheu et al., 2010). It is argued that 
voluntary disclosures in the annual report send signals to the marketplace that are 
expected to increase a company‟s net present value and, consequently, its stock 
market value (Gordon et al., 2010). Curado et al. (2011) point out that corporate 
disclosure influences firm value (FV) as perceived by markets. Cormier et al. (2011) 
claim that, disclosure delivers value-relevant information to stock markets. Gallego-
Alvarez et al. (2010) provided evidence that disclosure has a positive consequence 
on shareholder value creation.  
The importance of corporate disclosure arises from being a means of communication 
between management, outside investors, and market participants. Enhanced 
corporate disclosure is believed to mitigate the asymmetry problem and agency 
conflicts (Lambert et al., 2007). The consequences of increasing disclosure levels 
are often discussed in terms of reduced mispricing, cumulative profitability and 
growing firm value (FV) (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Consequent empirical studies 
provide supporting evidence about the association between disclosure and firm 
value (FV). For instance, Healy et al. (1999) find that firms with expanded disclosure 
levels experience substantial corresponding increases in firm value (FV). The direct 
effects of the corporate disclosures have the ability to change the firm value (FV) by 
affecting managers‟ decisions and, hence, varying the distribution of future cash 
flows (Lambert et al., 2007). Thus, improved corporate disclosure may increase the 
market value for firms (Elzahar et al., 2015). This theory will be used to test both the 
CSR disclosure determinants (RQ 2) and consequences (RQ 3) variables. 
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4.7 Economic Theory 
Economic theory was developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. The underlying 
assumption of the existing economic theory is that the motivation to invest in 
acquiring information is based on the expected effect of the investment on the party‟s 
share of the “contractual pie”. A party invests in acquiring information in the pre-
contractual phase on the basis of its belief that there is a high enough probability that 
some positive information will be revealed and that information may enable it to 
receive or provide an asset, whose value (costs) is higher (lower) than the price paid 
(received). When a disclosure duty is imposed, the investing party bears the costs of 
acquiring information before the contract is formed but cannot extract the benefits, 
since the price would reflect the actual value of the asset (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
In particular, this theory has been widely used by accounting researchers to explain 
and understand the voluntary disclosure phenomenon (e.g. Hossain et al., 1995; 
Meek et al., 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Chen et al., 
2008; Akhtaruddin and Hossain, 2008). A major link between economic theory and 
contemporary accounting thought is the notion that a firm's commitment to greater 
disclosure should lower the costs of capital that arise from information asymmetries 
and positively affect the firm value (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). A commitment to 
increased levels of disclosure reduces the possibility of information asymmetries 
arising between the firm and its shareholders. This, in turn, should reduce the 
discount at which firm shares are sold and, hence, lower the costs of issuing capital 
and increasing the firm value (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996).  
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The purpose of economic theory used in this study is to measure the impacts of 
increasing disclosure on the firm value. It argues that disclosure has positive impacts 
on FV (Lundholm and Van Winkle, 2006), such as: first, better quality information 
permits investors to make accurate appraisals of the parameters underlying the 
future stock returns, lessening non-diversifiable estimation risk and uncertainty about 
future cash flows as well as future profitability (Clarkson et al., 1996). Secondly, 
through enhanced disclosure, the willingness for investors to trade is increased in 
addition to increasing the shares‟ liquidity and improving firm value (FV) (Easley and 
O‟Hara, 2004). Economic theory also advocates that increased levels of voluntary 
disclosures can reduce information asymmetries between the firm and market 
participants and, as a result, increase the firm‟s stock liquidity as well as enhancing 
firm value (FV) (Beyer et al., 2010). This theory will be used to test the CSR 
disclosure consequences (RQ 3) variables. 
4.8 Summary 
The previous debate has revealed that there is no single specific theory that can 
explain the CSR practices. Each theory has its specific role in explaining the 
disclosure phenomenon from a different perspective. For instance, in accordance 
with agency theory, managers will be motivated to present particular CSR 
information that proves their acting for the interests of the stakeholder. On the other 
hand, one can argue that this is driven by their need to signal themselves as high-
quality managers (signalling theory).  
In this context, Gray et al. (1995) assert that different theoretical perspectives need 
to be seen as sources of explanation for different factors at different levels of 
resolution, not as competitors for explanation. In line with this conclusion, Beattie 
and Smith (2012) documented that adopting more than economic and managerial 
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theories will enable us to explain managers‟ incentives to disclose information. 
Therefore, it will not be suitable to use a specific theory alone to give a logical base 
for CSR reporting in practice. Variables that represent determinants and 
consequences of CSR disclosure can be explained by more than one theory. Thus, 
adopting a combination of theories will be useful for attaining greater insights to 
investigate the cause and effect of CSR disclosure in Islamic banks. This approach 
will be relevant as there are a variety of variables that are suggested in the literature 
as explanatory factors for corporate disclosure. 
To sum up, stakeholder and accountability theory are the most relevant theories to 
the research questions (RQ 3) of this study, related to disclosure and its 
determinants. While agency and legitimacy theory can be used both in the 
explanations of the determinants (RQ 2) and consequences (RQ 3) of CSR 
disclosure. On the other side, signalling, as well as economic, theory is also 
applicable to explain the economic consequences of CSR disclosure in answering 
RQ 3. The next chapter will provide a literature review, and then develop a 
hypothesis for CSR disclosure determinants and consequences. 
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CHAPTER 5: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter has seven parts, consisting of an introduction, followed by a discussion 
of Islamic banks and CSR, prior study of CSR disclosure from Islamic perspectives, 
prior studies of CSR disclosure in Islamic banks, and a prior study on CSR 
disclosure determinants. Then, the chapter discusses the CSR determinants and 
consequences, thus developing its hypothesis. All the hypotheses are developed 
based on the gaps in the prior literature and supported with a relevant theory.  
5.2 Islamic Banks and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
The establishment of Islamic banks was due to the criticism of conventional banks 
charging interest on their banking activities. The practice of interest has been 
reported to have a negative effect on the development of the socio-economic system 
(Siddiqi, 1983; Ariff, 1988; Lewis and Algaoud, 2001; Ahmad and Hassan, 2007). 
Chong and Liu (2010) stated that the prohibition of interest, or Riba, in Islam can be 
viewed as part of Islam‟s general vision for a moral economy. Thus, Islamic banking 
was introduced as an alternative to conventional banking. Islamic banks have a 
strong responsibility to society to establish a fair distribution of income, justice in the 
economy, and efficient capital mobilisation. These characteristics clearly suggest 
that Islamic banks should display a strong fundamental sense of social responsibility. 
The present study‟s examination of the corporate social responsibility of Islamic 
banks was, therefore, important in order to establish whether their CSR practice is in 
accord with the spirit of their establishment.  
 
106 
 
Islamic banks‟ commitment to CSR can be decoded through the philosophy 
underlying their establishment. According to Dusuki and Abdullah (2007b), the 
Islamic banking system is based on three main philosophies, which distinguish it 
from the conventional counterpart. First, Islamic banking strives for a just, fair and 
balanced society, as envisioned by Islamic economics. Second, Islamic banking is 
constructed upon the principles of brotherhood and cooperation, and a system of 
equity sharing and stake taking. Lastly, as a system grounded in the ethical and 
moral framework of the Islamic law of the Shariah, Islamic banking is characterised 
by ethical norms and social commitments. 
Ahmad and Hassan (2007) indicate that one of the main objectives of Islamic banks 
is to work towards the establishment of an Islamic society and to create a deepening 
of the religious spirit among the people. Islamic banks‟ existence is based on the 
religious view and spirit. Thus, Islamic banks must ensure that their activities adhere 
strictly to the rules of the Islamic law. Therefore, they must ensure that all actions 
and business activities reflect Islamic principles. For these reasons, they have 
contended that Islamic banks‟ obligations towards society are greater than those of 
conventional banks for the following three main reasons. Firstly, an Islamic bank has 
a certain philosophical mission to achieve. According to Islamic principles, Allah is 
the creator and ultimate owner of all resources. Humans and institutions have a 
vicegerent role to play in society. Therefore, Islamic banks are not free to do as they 
wish, rather they have to integrate moral values with economic action. Secondly, an 
Islamic bank has to provide credit to those who have talent and expertise, thereby 
strengthening the economic foundations of society. Thirdly, an Islamic bank should 
aim to create harmony in society, based on the Islamic concept of sharing and caring 
in order to achieve economic, financial, and political stability.  
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The activities and operations of Islamic banks are not only based on government 
rules and regulations but, at the same time, must comply with the Shariah. Therefore, 
Islamic banks‟ permissible activities are limited compared to those of conventional 
banks, which are not subject to such restrictions, instead being obliged to comply 
solely with legislation and not with additional religious obligations. Any activities that 
contradict Islamic values and principles must be avoided. Islamic banks should also 
not invest in companies that violate human rights and affect the natural environment 
(Ullah and Jamali, 2010). Moreover, Islamic banks are not allowed to finance any 
enterprise involved in activities relating to pork, pornography, tobacco, gambling, and 
alcoholic liquor (Nathan and Ribiere, 2007). As a consequence, Islamic banks bring 
ethical values and social responsibility to banking practices simply because they are 
required to abide by Islamic law and the Shariah, which is full of moral values (Kahf, 
1999; Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007b).  
While the above principles restrict Islamic banks‟ activity, they support Islamic banks‟ 
core values and activities that cultivate entrepreneurship, trade and commerce, and 
bring societal development or benefit (BNM, 2010). Khan (1987) indicates that these 
core values are one of the major principles underlying Islamic banking. Thus, the 
contribution of Islamic banks to CSR practice is very important. Thus, Islamic banks 
that are driven by religious philosophy should, theoretically, evidence more ethically-
founded CSR policies than conventional banks.  
5.3 Prior studies of CSR disclosure in Islamic perspectives. 
This section will discuss the previous studies of CSR disclosure from Islamic 
perspectives. The CSR disclosure discussion from an Islamic perspective is not 
relatively new; it has been discussed since the companions‟ era and has been 
clearly explained in the Holy Quran. Lewis (2006) emphasises that if the purpose of 
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accounting information is to serve the public interest, this implies that in an Islamic 
context, the Ummah (community) has the right to know about the effect of the 
operations or investment of the Islamic banks on its wellbeing and ensure it is in line 
with the requirements of Shariah. 
Since the values and principles that underpin Islamic teaching and philosophy are 
related to the notion of CSR, a number of studies attempted to reflect the notion of 
social and environmental responsibility to the teaching and values of Islam (e.g., 
Lewis, 2001; Kamla et al., 2006). A number of studies have investigated the practice 
of social and environmental disclosure in companies conducting their business in 
accordance with Islam (e.g., Maali et al., 2006; Haniff and Hudaib, 2007; Aribi and 
Gao, 2012; Hassan and Harahap, 2010). Williams & Zinkin (2009) look at whether 
the pillars of Islam are consistent with the „Ten Principles‟ of responsible business, 
outlined in the UN Global Compact. The paper concludes that with the possible 
exception of Islam‟s focus on personal responsibility and the non-recognition of the 
corporation as a legal person, which could undermine the concept of corporate 
responsibility, there is no divergence between the pillars of Islam and the principles 
of the UN Global Compact. Indeed, Islam often goes further and has the advantage 
of clearer codification of ethical standards, as well as a set of explicit enforcement 
mechanisms. They suggest that focusing on this convergence of values could be 
useful in the development of a new understanding of CSR in a global context and 
help avert the threatened „„clash of civilisations‟‟. Mohammed's (2007) studies on 
CSR values and principles that have been central to Islam since the time of the holy 
Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) may serve as a foundation for notions of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) similar to those in the West. This study examines the 
values of CSR in Islam, which are in line with what has been practiced in the West. 
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The study was conducted on Islamic banks in Malaysia, UAE, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA) and the UK. The finding states that Islamic banks that adhere to the 
Shariah principles are naturally bound to be socially responsible. In theory, Islamic 
banks are having to be fully compliant with the Shariah and implement all the Islamic 
values in their operation. However a few have argued against its implementation in 
reality since there is no regulatory body who ensure the level of compliance, such as 
F. Khan (2010). 
Islamic banking has been in the market for almost fifty years, since its inception 
during the 1960s. During that time, Islamic banking has rapidly developed and is no 
longer a strange concept. The products and services provided are well accepted, not 
only among Muslim countries but also in non-Muslim countries, such as European 
countries. However, there is a lack of discussion on how Islamic banks perform in 
terms of corporate social responsibility compared to conventional banks. Basah & 
Yusuf (2013) conduct a study to analyse the relationship of Islamic banks and CSR 
performance. This study examines and analyse the relevant literature, which 
develops the relationship between the Islamic banks concept and CSR. It is a 
conceptual attempt to discuss how the principles of Islamic banks can influence the 
implementation of CSR. The religious characteristics that acted as a foundation for 
the establishment of Islamic banking are expected to have an influence on corporate 
social responsibility. The finding stated that the concept of the Islamic bank that 
complies with religious provision should exhibit more proactive CSR activity and 
policies. Islamic banks‟ performance should be superior compared with the 
conventional bank counterparts. From the researcher‟s point of view, Islamic banks 
should be more responsible to harmonize the CSR practice in Islamic banking 
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industry, either local or international as a value added of their existence in the 
industry. 
The most important line corporate governance structure to implement and adopt 
Islamic ethical values in CSR is the management team of Islamic banks. Thus, Aribi 
& Arun (2014) conducted a study on how Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) in 
Bahrain are responding to the CSR needs of society. Using 18 in-depth semi-
structured interviews among 9 IFI managers and content analysis of the disclosures 
of 7 IFIs from 2006-2010. This study attempts to understand management 
perceptions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in IFIs. The finding stated that, 
based on a thorough understanding of CSR by managers as evident in the 
interviews, it has not been translated fully into practice in the institutions. The partial 
use of IFIs‟ potential role in social welfare would add further challenges in the era of 
the Islamic banking and finance industry. The Islamic banking and finance regulatory 
body is supposed to be more proactive to counter this problem and fully utilize the 
IFIs‟ values rather than just focus on profit maximization. Thus, in fulfilling the gap, 
the researcher will conduct a study to discuss the key determinants and 
consequences of CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks in GCC, which will 
be benefit to IFIs industry. 
Haniffa (2001) adopts an ethical normative approach to develop a conceptual 
framework of CSR disclosure based on the Shariah. She further argues that the use 
of this framework is to fulfil both accountability and transparency objectives by 
tackling three, interrelated dimensions: seeking God's pleasure in establishing socio-
economic justice, realising benefit to the community by fulfilling obligation, and 
pursuing wealth. As such, it addresses the relationship between Man and Allah, Man 
and Man, and also Man and Nature. This framework takes into account the material, 
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moral, and spiritual aspects. According to Haniffa (2001), Islamic social responsibility 
disclosure practice should be different from conventional social reporting because 
the underlying principles are different, although the basic concepts of social 
responsibility and accountability are addressed in both instances. She then suggests 
the two broad objectives of Islamic CSRD. Firstly, it is to demonstrate accountability 
to Allah and the community. Secondly, it is to demonstrate transparency in business 
activities. However, Haniffa (2001) does not empirically examine the impact of 
Islamic values on Islamic banks. 
Suliman and Willett (2003) point out that social responsibility and environmental 
accounting issues would be essential components that need to be disclosed in 
Islamic corporate reports. They interpret the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
sustainability reporting guidelines as a basis for providing social and environmental 
performance indicators of an Islamic corporate reporting model, since the GRI 
provides a very comprehensive list of the social and environmental issues that a 
company needs to disclose. However, they emphasise that for the specific case of 
Islamic corporate reporting, the GRI is not suitable to be used as a measurement 
guideline. Thus, further study will use the AAOIFI (2010) as a main guideline to 
measure CSR disclosure practice in Islamic banks. 
Previous studies have been conducted to examine the relationship between CSR 
disclosure and Islam, using Islamic banks annual reports (e.g., Anuar et al., 2004; 
Yahya et al., 2005; Haniffa and Hudib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006). Anuar et al. (2004) 
provide evidence that supports the view that the Islamic religion has an effect on 
corporate environmental reporting. Using content analysis, they compare the 
environmental practice of Shariah-approved companies, which conduct their 
activities in accordance with Islamic principles, with the environmental practice of 
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non-Shariah-approved companies that operate in Malaysia. The results provide 
some evidence that the Shariah-approved companies have a higher level of 
environmental reporting than non-Shariah-approved companies. The findings of this 
study, therefore, suggest that the higher extent of environmental reporting amongst 
Shariah-approved companies may be reflective of an attempt by such companies to 
practise corporate reporting that embodies the Islamic principles of full disclosure 
and social accountability. However, the study conducted by Anuar et al. (2004) was 
limited to examining the influence of Islam on environmental disclosure only, and 
their sample was based on industrial companies, excluding Islamic financial 
institutions, such as Islamic banks. It is important to study the influence of Islam on 
CSR, and CSR in Islamic banks who have to follow Shariah in their activities and 
transactions. They hold two positions in community, religious and financial (Al-
Mograbi, 1996). Stakeholders, therefore, see Islamic banks as having a social, as 
well as economic, role (Maali et al., 2006). This current study will be conducted to 
complement the finding of Anuar et al (2004). 
Farook and Lanis (2005) aim to measure the CSRD (corporate social responsibility 
disclosure) level of 47 IFIs operating in 14 countries, and ascertain the determinants 
of that disclosure. Using the disclosure index, derived from Maali et al. (2003), they 
measured CSRD in IFIs, and they further developed a model linking CSRD to socio-
political influences and corporate governance factors. Their results show differences 
in disclosure levels within the sample. The major sources for the variation are the 
socio-political contexts within which the IFIs operate, while the most significant driver 
for CSRD is the pressure from the relevant public. However, it is difficult to 
generalise about business practice across the ethnically diverse countries of the 
Islamic world, which are at very different stages of development (Mohamed, 2007). 
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The present study investigates the influence of Islamic values on CSR disclosure in 
two phases. First, it compares the extent of CSRD in IFIs with that of non-IFIs. 
Secondly, it examines the management perception of CSR and CSRD. 
Yahya et al., (2005) measured the level of CSRD in Shariah-approved companies in 
Malaysia. Of the 194 companies in their sample, only 102 companies disclose their 
social activities in the annual reports. They further investigated the relationship 
between the level of CSRD and the number of Islamic equity fund-holding shares in 
the same companies. Their results reveal that the percentage of the number of 
Islamic equity funds investing in any company is parallel to the level of social 
activities disclosed by the company. The study of Maali et al. (2003 and 2006) is one 
of the earlier empirical studies that attempted to investigate the influence of Islam on 
social reporting.  
Based on the Islamic text and relevant previous studies, Kamla et al. (2006) 
elaborate and discuss some key Islamic principles. They conclude that Islam pays 
great attention to the environment from a holistic perspective. Further, they argue 
that Islamic principles have very general relevance in respect of the concerns to 
govern our environment with its accounting implications. However, the above studies 
are mainly conceptual. It is therefore necessary to investigate empirically the 
religious influence on CSR disclosure in practice through measuring their CSR 
disclosure information of environmental issues.  
Based on Islamic principles and the Islamic code of ethics, Maali et al. (2006) 
derived a benchmark for the social disclosure, which they would expect Islamic 
banks to provide. However, their results indicate that the extent of social disclosure 
by Islamic banks falls far short of their benchmark. Their findings indicate that there 
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is a considerable variation in voluntary social reporting across Islamic banks. Maali 
et al. (2006) conclude, "With a few expectations, Islamic banks have a long way to 
go to meeting the expectations of the Islamic community" (p. 31). However, since 
corporate reporting practice, including corporate social reporting, varies across 
countries (Hope, 2003; Xiao et al., 2005; Wanderley et al., 2008), comparing the 
volume and the extent of CSR disclosure between Islamic banks operating in Islamic 
countries (developing countries) with those operating in non- Islamic countries 
(developed countries) would not be accurate. This is because such a comparison 
does not take into account the differences of environmental factors between different 
non-Islamic countries. Therefore, there is a need to replicate this study in countries 
that have similar business and social environments. The present study includes a 
sample in GCC countries where most of the countries have, to some extent, similar 
economic, political and social environments.  
Haniffa & Hudaib (2007) conducted a longitudinal study of the annual reports of 
seven IFIs in four Arabian Gulf region countries. They used content analysis to 
examine how effective Islamic banks were in communicating their ethical identity. 
They investigated whether any discrepancy exists between the communicated 
(based on information disclosed in the annual reports) and ideal disclosure of 
information (deemed vital based on the Islamic ethical business framework). 
Accordingly, they expect that IFIs must comply with the precepts of Shariah in their 
reporting. It is interesting to note that their findings fall far short of what would enable 
ethical and social communication in the context of IFIs. However, they describe the 
reports as "vary across the 3-year period, suggesting that communication is not 
static and often minimal. This may be attributed to a lack of pressure from and an 
indifferent attitude of stakeholders and also from the prevailing secretive culture in 
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the region" (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007, p. 111). Similarly, to an earlier study, their 
result was limited to content analysis with a small sample. Accordingly, increasing 
the size of the sample would provide more useful insights into the plausible reason 
for minimal information and a lack of clarity and consistency in disclosure practice by 
IFIs (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2004).  
Rahman (2010) examines the themes, locations, extent, and also trends of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) disclosure of the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) 
from 1992 to 2005. A disclosure index (checklist) and the extent of such disclosures 
were measured using content analysis, based on number of sentences. The findings 
of this study show that BIMB prefers to disclose themes associated with employees, 
products, and service contributions and community involvement. Among the most 
popular locations in disclosing such information are in the chairman‟s statement, 
financial statements, and directors‟ report. The results also reveal that the bank has 
improved, in terms of volume and the manner of presenting or disclosing CSR from 
year to year. This study is the first of its kind to be conducted on a company in a 
specific industry in Malaysia using a longitudinal approach; however, the findings did 
not represent the actual trends and practices of CSR disclosure practice in the 
Islamic banking industry, since it just focused on one single bank.  
Based on the review of previous studies on CSR disclosure, the majority of these 
studies (see Table 4) limited their research to measure the CSR disclosure level in 
single sample institutions or countries. They tended to examine the gap between the 
expectation of social disclosure and the actual disclosure practice in Islamic banks. 
In order to get a clear understanding of CSR disclosure practice in Islamic banks, it 
is important for the researcher to study the determinants and consequences of CSR 
disclosure in Islamic banks.  
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Overall, the previous studies leave scope to further extend the research of CSR 
disclosure in the context of IFIs, and provide an opportunity to further contribute to 
the knowledge of CSR and CSRD. The majority of these studies were concerned 
with the overall business practice from an Islamic perspective, and lacked in-depth 
discussion and analysis of the elements involved pertaining to CSR. Therefore, this 
study aims to investigate empirically the relationship between Islam, CSR and its 
disclosure. The researcher will replicate previous studies and extend the discussion 
to examine the determinants and consequences of CSR disclosure practice among 
sample Islamic banks in GCC countries. It will pursue this by measuring the 
disclosure levels of sample Islamic banks, and then examine the factor and the 
impact of CSR disclosures to the sample Islamic banks. Furthermore, the sample of 
this study will also look at wider perspectives, which involves 195 observations of 
GCC Islamic banks from 2010 to 2014. By doing so, it helps to get a clear view of 
CSR disclosure practice among major Islamic banks in the world. Table 4 provides 
summaries of previous CSR and CSRD studies from Islamic perspective. 
Table 4: Summaries of previous CSR and CSRD study from an Islamic perspective. 
Author(s) Objective(s) Research method Findings 
Ali Aribi & Arun 
(2014) 
-To investigate IFIs 
manager‟s 
perception on CSR 
-To examine to what 
extent IFIs practice 
CSR in the company. 
 
-18 in-depth 
interviews in 9 IFIs in 
Bahrain. 
-Content analysis  
7 IFIs (2006-2010). 
The result reveals 
that IFIs fall short 
behind the ethical 
and social objectives 
that would be implied 
by Islamic Law. 
Basah & Yusuf 
(2013) 
To analyse the 
relationship of 
Islamic banks and 
CSR performance. 
Conceptual paper. The concept of 
Islamic banks that 
comply with religious 
provision should 
exhibit more 
proactive CSR 
activity and policies. 
Islamic banks‟ 
performance should 
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be superior to 
conventional bank 
counterpart. 
 
Rahman (2010) To examine the 
themes, locations, 
extent, and also 
trends of corporate 
social responsibility 
(CSR) disclosure of 
Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad (BIMB) from 
1992 to 2005 
 
A disclosure index 
(checklist) and the 
extent of such 
disclosures were 
measured using 
content analysis 
based on number of 
sentences. 
BIMB prefers to 
disclose themes 
associated with 
employees, product, 
and service 
contributions and 
community 
involvement. 
Williams & Zinkin, 
(2009) 
To look at whether 
the tenets of 
Islam is consistent 
with the „Ten 
Principles‟ of 
responsible business 
outlined in the UN 
Global Compact 
Conceptual paper 
which discusses the 
Islamic principles. 
The result shows that 
Islam often goes 
further and has the 
advantage of clearer 
codification of ethical 
standards, as well a 
set of explicit 
enforcement 
mechanism. 
 
Siwar & Hossain 
(2009) 
To examine the 
relationship between 
the concepts of Islam 
with the Malaysian 
managers‟ opinions. 
 
-Open ended 
questionnaire 
-Study of 50 listed 
companies in 
Malaysia 
A similarity between 
the Islamic concept 
and top executives‟ 
opinion about CSR 
was found. 
Haniffa & Hudaib 
(2007) 
To explore 
discrepancy between 
the communicated 
(based on 
information disclosed 
in the annual reports) 
and ideal (disclosure 
of information 
deemed vital based 
on the Islamic ethical 
business framework) 
ethical identities and 
then measure this by 
what they have 
termed the Ethical 
Identity Index (EII). 
 
-Longitudinal survey 
of 7 Islamic banks 
Only one Islamic 
bank out of seven 
surveyed to be 
above average. The 
remaining six Islamic 
banks suffer from 
disparity between the 
communicated and 
ideal ethical 
identities. 
Mohammed (2007) To explore notions of 
Islamic philosophy 
pertaining to social 
responsibility and 
justice, which may 
give rise to a 
conceptual 
-Interview 
- Sample of 6 Islamic 
banks from Malaysia, 
UAE, Saudi Arabia 
and UK 
Islamic Banks, in 
adherence to the 
Shariah principles, 
are naturally bound 
to be socially 
responsible. 
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framework of 
corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) 
in Islam that has 
resonance with the 
prevailing notions of 
CSR. 
 
Haniffa & Hudaib 
(2007) 
To examine whether 
any discrepancy 
exists between 
communicated 
(based on the 
information disclosed 
in 7 IFIs annual 
report) and the ideal 
ethical disclosure 
based on Islamic 
business framework. 
 
Content analysis 1 out of 7 companies‟ 
annual reports were 
above average. The 
remaining 6 
companies suffered 
from disparity 
between the 
communicated and 
the ideal ethical 
disclosures. 
Kamla et al. (2006) To elaborate and 
discuss the key 
Islamic principles 
and highlight their 
implications to 
accounting for the 
environment. 
 
Conceptual paper Drawing from key 
Islamic texts and 
relevant literature, 
they delineate key 
suggestions for 
accounting for the 
environment. 
Maali et al. (2006) To develop a 
benchmark set of 
social disclosure 
appropriate for IFIs. 
Then, they compare 
the actual social 
disclosure in the 
annual report of 21 
IFIs to develop a 
benchmark. 
 
Content analysis The result indicates 
that social reporting 
by Islamic banks fall 
short of their 
expectations. 
Yahya (2005)  To investigate the 
actual practice of 
CSRD in IFIs and to 
examine the 
relationship between 
CSRD and Islamic 
unite trust 
shareholdings in 
sample companies. 
Weighted disclosure 
index 
Only 102 companies 
from 194 sample 
companies disclose 
their social activities. 
The t-test shows 
that‟s there is a 
significant difference 
in CSRD between 
companies invested 
and those that are 
not invested in the 
Islamic unit trust. 
 
Farook & Lanis 
(2005) 
To measure CSRD 
levels of 27 IFIs 
Disclosure index The results show a 
difference in 
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operating in 14 
countries and 
ascertain the 
determinants of its 
disclosure. 
disclosure levels 
within the sample, 
and it is suggested 
that a major source 
for the variation is 
the socio political 
context within which 
the IFIs operate. 
 
Anuar et al. (2004) 
 
To examine the 
difference in 
environmental 
disclosure between 
Shariah-approved 
companies and non-
Shariah-approved 
companies. 
Content analysis The results provide 
some evidence that 
the Shariah-
approved companies 
have a higher level of 
environmental 
reporting compared 
with non-Shariah-
approved 
companies. 
 
Haniff(2001) To develop a 
conceptual 
framework based on 
the Shariah for 
Islamic social and 
environmental 
disclosure 
Conceptual paper The results suggest 
that the Islamic 
social responsibility 
to disclose practice 
should be different 
from conventional 
social reporting 
because of the 
different underlying 
principles. 
 
5.4 Prior Studies on CSR Disclosure in Islamic banks 
A number of studies have investigated the level of CSR disclosure by Islamic banks 
using the technique of content analysis and disclosure index (Belal et al, 2014; Farag 
et al, 2014; Platonova, 2014; Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Rahman et al, 2010; Farook 
et al.,2011; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006).  Maali et al. (2006) 
investigate the extent of social activities disclosed by 29 Islamic banks in different 
countries. They compared the disclosures of such activities with social practices that 
Islamic banks are expected to adopt that are particularly relevant to society. The 
expected social practices were then combined into a benchmark for social reporting 
by Islamic banks. Using content analysis, they found that the corporate social 
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disclosure practice is far below the expectations of the pragmatic benchmark of 
disclosure levels, based on the Shariah principles. Therefore, they concluded that 
banks complying with mandated matters, such as paying Zakah and adopting 
AAOIFI standards, tend to provide more disclosures than non-compliant banks and 
most banks disclose CSR information to construct a positive image. From the 
analysis, they note that most Islamic banks tend to highlight CSR disclosed 
information that related to Islamic reality values, such as charitable activities.  
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) investigated the ethical identity based on the ideal Islamic 
moral business framework in 7 Islamic banks of the GCC countries by using their 
annual reports. They designed an ideal ethical disclosure benchmark, based on the 
five features that distinguish Islamic banks from conventional banks. Using content 
analysis of annual reports to determine the extent of CSR disclosure, it shows a 
significant gap between the communicated and ideal ethical disclosure in the annual 
reports of a sample of 7 Islamic banks over a 3-year period. They found that Islamic 
banks disclose additional information related to four dimensions out of eight, which 
are also being employed in this research. These dimensions are vision and mission, 
BOD (board of directors) and top management, product and services, Zakah, charity 
and benevolent loans, employees, debtors, community and society, and Shariah 
Supervisory Board (SSB). It is assumed that this expectations gap could arise from 
an indifferent attitude by stakeholders or an underlying secretive culture in the 
Arabian Gulf region, where the sample banks were based. They concluded that, for 
Islamic banks to remain competitive, they need to communicate more effectively to 
enhance their image and reputation in society. 
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Using a longitudinal case study approach, Abdul Rahman et al. (2010) investigated 
the themes, locations, extent, and trends of CSR disclosure by Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad (BIMB) during the period from 1992 to 2005. The CSR disclosure index has 
been developed consisting of nine themes: unusual supervisory restrictions, unlawful 
transactions, Zakat obligation, Qard fund, community involvement, employees, 
environment, product/service contribution, and the Shariah Supervisory Council.  
The findings showed that the highest score of disclosure is the Shariah Supervisory 
Council, followed by employees. However, BIMB does not provide any form of 
information related to the themes of unusual supervisory restrictions, unlawful 
transactions, and environment. The most common locations in disclosing information 
regarding CSR are the chairman‟s statement and the financial statements. Overall, 
the volume and quality of CSR disclosure improved over the 14-year study period 
and the banks had improved, in terms of the amount of, and way of providing, CSR 
information in the annual reports from year to year. 
Hassan and Harahap (2010) carried out a similar study to Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), 
focussing on the disclosure of social activities in the annual reports of seven Islamic 
banks. They found a significant expectations gap in all but one of the seven Islamic 
banks and surmised that CSR issues are not the main concern for most Islamic 
banks. They concluded that some Islamic banks pay scant attention to disclosing 
their social activities and, thus, argued for a standard on CSR disclosure relevant to 
IFIs.  
Farook et al. (2011) provided a prior basis for CSR disclosure in Islamic banks, and 
investigated the extent and determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure 
in the annual reports of 47 Islamic banks from 14 countries. They empirically 
analysed the level of social disclosure in 47 Islamic banks‟ annual reports, based on 
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a CSR benchmark derived from the Maali et al. (2006) index. This study found that 
the level of social and political freedom and the percentage of investment account 
deposits to total assets are important factors in determining the CSR disclosure by 
Islamic banks. From a descriptive analysis, they found significant differences in CSR 
disclosure among the banks and its substantial variation in CSR disclosure practices. 
This variation is best explained by the presence of the Shariah supervisory board 
(SSB) governance and the dominance of Muslims in their sample countries; it is a 
significant factor that explains the disclosure variations. They concluded that the 
regulatory bodies in Islamic banking should consider the SSB as being compulsory 
for all Islamic banks. 
Aribi and Gao (2012) analysed the narrative disclosures of CSR in 21 IFIs operating 
in the GCC countries to examine the influence of Islam on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) in Islamic 
financial institutions (IFIs). They found that the main CSR disclosures were 
contained in the SSB reports with less disclosure in the annual reports on other 
Islamic-based information such as Zakah, interest-free loans, and charitable 
donations.  
Rahman & Bukair (2013) empirically examines the influence of the Shariah 
supervisory board (SSB) and its characteristics on the level of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure in a sample of 53 Islamic banks operating in Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC) countries for the year 2008, based on a disclosure index 
from the Islamic perspective. Using content analysis, the descriptive statistics show 
that there is an increase in CSR information disclosed in the annual reports of 
Islamic banks. In addition, using multiple regression analysis and, after accounting 
for bank size, financial performance, and economic performance, the findings 
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indicate that the combination of SSB attributes has a significant positive influence on 
CSR disclosure. It shows that the characteristics of SSB are important factors in 
determining the level of CSR disclosure.  
Platonova (2014) analyses the CSR attitudes and practices of Islamic banks in the 
GCC region through their CSR disclosure practices. She empirically examines the 
impact of CSR disclosure practices of the GCC Islamic banks on their financial 
performance. Annual reports of GCC Islamic banks for the period 2000- 2011 are 
scored by content analysis. The CSR disclosure index is constructed based on the 
eight dimensions developed for this purpose. Despite the high expectations for full 
disclosure and accountability, the research findings do not produce encouraging 
results in terms of CSR or the social outcome of Islamic banks in the GCC region. 
The majority of GCC Islamic banks disclose significantly less than required, as CSR 
disclosure indices for all the Islamic banks remain very low in comparison to the 
overall score, but also for each of the CSR dimensions included in the indices. While 
examining the impact of CSR disclosure practices on the financial performance of 
Islamic banks in the GCC region, the results indicate the positive relationship 
between CSR disclosure and financial performance. She concludes that there is a 
positive link between corporate social and financial performance in the Islamic 
banking industry. 
Belal et al. (2014) also adopted a longitudinal study but with two notably significant 
exceptions. First, using a longer time frame of 28 years, they noted trends in CSR 
disclosure of a Bangladeshi Islamic bank over three distinguishing phases of the 
Islamic banking industry: pre 1990, 1990–2001, and post 2001. Secondly, they split 
ethical reporting requirements into two strands: „Particular‟ reporting practices, 
relating to the nature of Islamic banks and especially to Shariah compliance issues, 
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and „Universal‟ reporting practices, which are more relevant to the wider stakeholder 
groups such as community, employees, and customers. They found an overall 
increase in both „Particular‟ and „Universal‟ disclosures over the study period with a 
shift towards more „Universal‟ disclosures after 2006. They interpret their findings as 
being the bank‟s adherence to the minimalist approach, without explicitly 
contravening the wider perspective of Shariah. 
Mallin, Farag, & Ow-Yong (2014) examine the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and financial performance in Islamic banks. Using a 
comprehensive CSR index covering ten dimensions, they analyse the CSR 
disclosures in a sample of 90 Islamic banks across 13 countries. The CSR 
disclosure index shows that Islamic banks engage across a range of social activities, 
both as individual banks and as countries. However, Islamic banks seem to show 
more commitment to the vision and mission, the board and top management, and 
the financial product/services dimensions, whilst less attention is paid to the 
environment dimension. Islamic banks also show a considerable awareness of the 
mandatory disclosure recommendations of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). However, they pay less attention to the 
voluntary CSR disclosure. Moreover, they find a pronounced emphasis in Islamic 
banks‟ strategy towards more universal disclosures, suggesting the legitimacy of 
these banks is reinforced through disclosure to the wider stakeholder community. 
The empirical analysis highlights a positive association between CSR disclosure and 
financial performance. It is a positive and highly significant association between the 
Shariah supervisory board (SSB) size and the CSR disclosure index. The results of 
the three stage least square estimation shows that the causality between the two 
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endogenous variables runs from financial performance to CSR disclosure, and it can 
be conclude that the CSR disclosure is determined by financial performance. 
The prior CSR literature on Islamic banks is largely quantitative-based studies, which 
measure the volume of narrative CSR disclosures against an ideal benchmark drawn 
from Shariah-based CSR objectives and AAOIFI standards. They generally find an 
expectations gap between actual or communicated disclosures and ideal disclosures. 
However, the main limitations of these studies are their reliance on data collected 
from the annual reports to infer CSR disclosure. The annual report itself did not 
provide the true picture of CSR disclosure, as Islamic banks may disclose some of 
their CSR separately in other reports (e.g., SSB report, corporate governance report 
and on their websites). In this current study, the data was mainly collected from the 
annual reports. The number of sample banks used in the literature is limited, as 
acknowledged by Maali et al. (2006) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2007). In this current 
study, the number of observations is relatively large (195), compared to the largest 
study so far (47 in Farook et al., 2011) but also uses recent data from 2010 to 2014, 
which provides a clear picture of CSR disclosure practice in GCC Islamic banks. 
Although most of the studies referred to AAOIFI standards (e.g., Hassan and 
Harahap, 2010); Al-Ajmi et al., 2015), none of them comprehensively constructed 
using AAOIFI Standard No.7,  2010. Therefore, this current study will examine the 
extent of CSR disclosure practice among sample Islamic banks in the GCC for the 
period of 2010 to 2014. Table 5 presents the summary of prior studies on CSR 
disclosure in Islamic banks. 
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 Table 5: Summary of prior corporate social responsibility disclosures studies in 
Islamic banks.  
No Authors Periods 
CSRD 
level 
(%) 
Methods Sample 
Main focus of 
study 
CSR 
Dimension 
1 
El-Halaby and 
Hussainey, 
2015 
2013 26 
Content 
analysis 
138 Islamic 
banks across 
25 countries 
 
Determinants 
of CSRD 
12 
2 
Farag et al., 
2014 
2010-
2011 
44 
Content 
analysis 
90 Islamic 
banks across 
13 countries 
 
Determinants 
of CSRD 
10 
3 
Belal et al., 
2014 
1983-
2010 
42 
Content 
analysis 
and in-
depth 
interview 
 
11 Islamic 
banks in 
Bangladesh 
Measuring 
CSRD 
16 
4 
Platonova, 
2014  
 2000-
2011 
28 Content 
analysis 
7 GCC 
Islamic 
banks 
Measuring 
CSRD 
8 
5 
Kamla and 
Rahman, 2013 
2008 39 
Content 
analysis 
16 IFIs from 
3 regions 
 
Measuring 
CSRD 
5 
6 
Hassan et al, 
2013 
2001-
2008 
49 
Content 
analysis 
19 Islamic 
banks 
 
Measuring 
CSRD 
8 
7 
Abdul Rahman 
and Bukhair, 
2013 
2008 
83 
Content 
analysis 
53 Islamic 
banks from 3 
regions 
Measuring 
CSRD and the 
impact of SSB 
13 
8 Hassan, 2012 2011 23 
Content 
analysis 
10 Islamic 
banks 
Measuring 
CSRD 
8 
9 
Aribi et al., 
2012 
2004 40 
Content 
Analysis 
21 IFIs 
operating in 
GCC  
 
Measuring 
CSRD 
7 
10 
Farook et al., 
2011 
2007 8 
Content 
analysis 
47 banks 
across 14 
countries 
 
Determinants 
of CSRD 
3 
11 
Abdul Rahman 
et al., 2010 
1992-
2005 
38 
Content 
analysis 
1 Islamic 
bank in 
Malaysia 
 
Measuring 
CSRD 
9 
12 
Hassan and 
Harahap, 2010 
2006 - 
Content 
Analysis 
7 Islamic 
banks 
Measuring 
CSRD 
8 
13 Aribi, 2009 2004 48 
Content 
analysis 
and 
interview 
 
42 financial 
institutions in 
GCC  
Measuring 
CSRD 
8 
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14 
Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007 
2002-
2004 
13.3 
Content 
analysis 
7 Islamic 
banks in 6 
countries 
 
Measuring 
CSRD 
8 
15 
Maali et al., 
2006 
2000 13.3 
Content 
analysis 
29 Islamic 
banks across 
16 countries 
Measuring 
CSRD 
9 
 
5.5 Prior Studies on CSR Disclosure Determinants 
This section highlights the previous studies of CSR disclosure in Islamic banks, 
which examines the level and determinants of CSR information disclosure. A number 
of studies have investigated the level of CSR disclosure in Islamic banks.  
Maali et al. (2006) investigated the extent of social activities disclosed by Islamic 
banks. They compared the disclosures of such activities with social practices that 
Islamic banks are expected to adopt that are particularly relevant to society. The 
expected social practices were then combined into a benchmark for social reporting 
by Islamic banks. Using content analysis, they found that the level of social 
disclosure by the sample banks was well below their benchmark index. They 
concluded that banks complying with mandated matters, such as paying Zakah and 
adopting AAOIFI standards, tend to provide more disclosures than non-compliant 
banks. Also, Islamic banks tend to emphasize disclosures that construct a positive 
Islamic image, such as charitable activities. Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) investigated 
the disclosure of information deemed crucial to Islamic ethics in business. They 
designed an ideal ethical disclosure benchmark based on the five features that 
distinguish Islamic banks from conventional banks. Using content analysis of annual 
reports to determine the extent of CSR disclosure, they found a significant gap 
between the communicated and ideal ethical disclosure in the annual reports of a 
sample of 7 Islamic banks over a 3-year period. They surmised that this expectations 
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gap could arise from an indifferent attitude by stakeholders or an underlying 
secretive culture in the Arabian Gulf region, where the sample banks were based. 
They concluded that for Islamic banks to remain competitive, they have to 
communicate more effectively to enhance their image and reputation in society.  
Using a longitudinal case study approach, Abdul Rahman et al. (2010) examined the 
CSR disclosure of a Malaysian Islamic bank. They found that the volume and quality 
of CSR disclosure improved over the 14-year study period. Belal et al. (2014) also 
adopted a longitudinal study, but with two notably significant exceptions. First, using 
a longer time frame of 28 years, they noted trends in CSR disclosure of a 
Bangladesh Islamic bank over three distinguishing phases of the Islamic banking 
industry: pre 1990, 1990–2001, and post 2001. Secondly, they split ethical reporting 
requirements into two strands: „Particular‟ reporting practices, relating to the nature 
of Islamic banks and especially to Shariah compliance issues, and „Universal‟ 
reporting practices, which are more relevant to the wider stakeholder groups such as 
community, employees, and customers. They found an overall increase in both 
„Particular‟ and „Universal‟ disclosures over the study period, with a shift towards 
more „Universal‟ disclosures after 2006. They interpret their findings as being the 
bank‟s adherence to the minimalist approach without explicitly contravening the 
wider perspective of Shariah. 
 
Hassan and Harahap (2010) carried out a similar study to Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), 
focussing on the disclosure of social activities in the annual reports of seven Islamic 
banks. They found a significant expectations gap in all but one of the seven Islamic 
banks, and surmised that CSR issues are not the main concern for most Islamic 
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banks. They concluded that some Islamic banks pay scant attention to disclosing 
their social activities and, thus, argued for a standard on CSR disclosure relevant to 
IFIs. Farook et al. (2011) provided a prior basis for CSR disclosure in Islamic banks. 
They empirically analysed the level of social disclosure in 47 Islamic banks‟ annual 
reports, based on a CSR benchmark derived from the Maali et al. (2006) index. They 
found substantial variation in CSR disclosures and this variation is best explained by 
the presence of Shariah supervisory board (SSB) and the preponderance of Muslims 
in their sample countries. They concluded that the regulatory bodies in Islamic 
banking should consider the SSB as being compulsory for all Islamic banks. Aribi 
and Gao (2012) analysed the narrative disclosures of CSR in 21 IFIs, operating in 
the Gulf countries. They found that the main CSR disclosures were contained in the 
SSB reports with less disclosure in the annual reports on other Islamic-based 
information, such as Zakah, Qard Hassan (interest-free loans), and charitable 
donations.  
The Shariah supervisory board (SSB) is also one of the main determinants for CSR 
disclosure in Islamic banks. A study by Rahman & Bukair (2013) finds that the 
combination of SSB attributes has a significant positive influence on CSR disclosure. 
A study conducted by El-Halaby & Hussainey (2015), to examine the CSR 
determinants among Islamic banks across 25 countries, finds a positive association 
between CSR disclosure levels and accounting standards, auditor size, and the 
existence of a Shariah audit department. 
Based on a review of previous studies, there is still a lack of comprehensive studies 
that focus on examining the CG mechanism and CSR disclosure practice, especially 
among GCC Islamic banks. Previous studies tend to focus on single Islamic banks, 
such as a study conducted by Rahman (2010), which are not representative of the 
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whole picture of CSR disclosure practice in Islamic banking industries. The number 
of sample banks used in the literature was limited, as acknowledged by Maali et al. 
(2006) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2007). In this current study, the observations of 
Islamic banks are not only relatively large (195), compared to the largest study so far 
(90 in Farag et al., 2014) but also provide more recent data, which is from 2010-2014. 
From the research knowledge, there is only one study (El-Halaby & Hussainey, 2015) 
that adopted AAOIFI (2010) to develop their CSR disclosure index; other prior 
research tends to develop their index based on AAOIFI (2007). Thus, using a 
comprehensive CSR disclosure index develop based on the updated AAOIFI 
standards and prior literature, this current study is a step forward on the existing 
literature. It tries to fulfil the gap in examine the determinants of CSR disclosure 
among Islamic banks in GCC. Motivated by a prior study (e.g., Zalata & Roberts, 
2016; Huang & Zhang, 2012), exploring the determinants of CSR disclosure and 
corporate governance mechanisms has become the objective of this study. 
5.6 Determinants of CSR Disclosure and Hypothesis development 
This section will determine the CSR disclosure determinants of GCC Islamic banks, 
fulfilling the RO 2 (research objective) and providing an answer for RQ 2(research 
question). This current study is motivated by incentive research, which focuses on 
corporate governance (CG) with board-related variables as a main category in the 
CG structure and ignores SSB (SSB-related variables), which is one of the main 
components in the CG for Islamic banks. Most of the previous studies, which explore 
corporate governance as a factor behind the disclosure level, just focused on CG 
variables related to board-related variables (e.g., Taylor et al., 2010; Cong and 
Freedman, 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Bokpin, 2013; Alhazaimeh et al., 
2014). A limited number of studies explore CG related to SSB as a unique 
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mechanism for Islamic banks (e.g., Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013; Farook et al., 
2011). Thus, the study aims to fill this gap through exploring the impacts of CG-
related to board-related variables, SSB, audit, and ownership-related variables for 
Islamic banks in GCC. Following this, it measures the extent to which these variables 
affect CSR disclosure levels. This study further contributes to the CSR literature by 
examining the CG mechanisms, which contains board- and SSB-related variables, in 
order to understand more completely how these factors jointly impact on the level of 
compliance. 
The development of agency theory has resulted in the implementation of governance 
structures, whereby the control of decisions is separate from the management 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a). A number of preceding studies have used the theoretical 
framework of the agency theory to test hypotheses concerning the extent of 
disclosure to corporate governance characteristics (Xiao and Yuan, 2007). The 
governance of banking industry has caught the attention of scholars and regulators. 
Hagendorff et al. (2007) concentrate their research on the banking sector backed by 
the argument that it requires a separate agency analysis. The uniqueness of the 
agency relationships in banks stems from the managers‟ duty to safeguard the funds 
of all capital providers. Islamic banks must follow both the regulations set by the 
supervisors and principles of Shariah (Archer et al., 1998). Therefore, while agency 
problems in conventional banks arise when the board deviate from their 
accountability to maximize shareholders‟ wealth, any divergence by boards of 
Islamic banks from placing all supplied funds in Shariah-compliant investments 
creates an added source of agency problems. Corporate disclosure presents an 
opportunity to apply agency theory, as managers with better access to a company‟s 
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private information can transmit credible and reliable communication to market to 
optimize the corporation‟s value. 
Corporate governance mechanisms can be considered essential factors, illustrative 
of the decisions of corporate disclosure related to CSR from agency theory 
perspectives. Consequently, these mechanisms will be measured in this study. Very 
limited research has been undertaken to examine the link between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the CSR disclosure practice of GCC Islamic banks. To 
the best of the author‟s knowledge, there are no previous studies that explore the 
determinants of CSR disclosure among GCC Islamic banks using CG mechanism 
variables. Gul and Leung (2004) argue that the role of corporate governance on the 
agency relationship between managers and stakeholders are best examined by 
looking at several CG mechanisms.  
According to Rahman & Bukair (2015), it is expected that various factors could drive 
variances between Islamic banks and its CSR disclosure practices. Previous studies 
(Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Wan Amalina, 2009) provide strong evidence on the corporate 
governance mechanisms, which influence on the CSR information disclosure among 
the financial and non-financial companies. Thus, in developing the research 
hypothesis, by adapting Haniffa (1999) and El Zahar (2013), this current study use 
corporate governance characteristics as main explanatory variables and firm 
characteristics as a control variables in measuring the determinants of CSR 
disclosure practice in Islamic banks in GCC. The next sections will discuss the CG 
variables used in this current study. 
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5.6.1 Corporate Governance Characteristics 
This current study will examine the CG determinants (such as board size, board 
cross holding directorship, and board composition) and CSR disclosure practice 
among Islamic banks. This study takes into consideration most of the CG 
mechanisms (board-related variables and SSB-related variables) as potential 
determinants of CSR disclosure of Islamic banks. The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicated that corporate governance 
involves a set of relationships between a company‟s management, its board, its 
shareholders, and other stakeholders. 
In fact, CG mechanisms are introduced - based on the agency theory framework - to 
mitigate managers‟ opportunistic behaviours and reduce information asymmetry. CG 
mechanisms should facilitate corporate monitoring, as they lead to an improvement 
in companies‟ internal control and, consequently, extend disclosure levels (Leftwich 
et al., 1981; Welker, 1995; Ho and Wong, 2001). Accordingly, it could be predicted 
that CG mechanisms could improve CSR reporting. Most of the previous research 
has focused on CG mechanisms that are related to the monitoring role of corporate 
boards of directors. However, it has not tested the influence of the board and its sub-
committee characteristics on the amount of information disclosed, such as SSB-
related variables. Therefore, this current study will fulfil the gap by testing the board-
related and SSB-related variables as follows:  
5.6.1.1 Board Related Variables 
1. Board Size 
The board of directors consists of the total number of executive and non-executive 
directors on the board. They play an important role in the corporate governance of a 
134 
 
company, especially in Islamic banks. Healy and Palepu (2001) stated that electing a 
board of directors that acts on behalf of investors is an efficient mechanism that 
affects mangers‟ disclosure decisions and controls the agency problem. In general, 
the size of the boards in a company, such as an Islamic bank, can improve their 
efficiency in handling and solving any presence issues, such as CSR-related issues. 
However, Wang and Hussainey (2013) claimed that larger boards‟ effectiveness is 
negatively affected by the presence of problems regarding communication and 
coordination. In turn, some studies have indicated that larger boards incorporate a 
variety of expertise, which result in greater effectiveness in terms of the boards‟ 
monitoring role (e.g., Singh et al., 2004; Abdel Fattah, 2007). It can be argued that 
directors serving on larger boards would have more incentive to signal their role in 
performance improvement to various parties and increase an awareness of CSR 
information disclosure.  
Empirical evidence in corporate governance suggests that the board size impacts 
the level of controlling, monitoring, and disclosure (Rahman & Bukair, 2015). 
According to Chen and Jaggi (2000), a larger board size may decrease the 
possibility of information asymmetry. Agency theory predicts that larger boards 
incorporate a variety of expertise that result in more effectiveness in the monitoring 
role of the boards (Singh et al., 2004). Moreover, a higher number of board members 
may also reduce the uncertainty and the lack of information (Birnbaum, 1984). The 
board‟s size is likely to affect its ability to control and review all transactions to 
ensure their operations. It is argued that talented managers are motivated – by their 
desire to signal themselves – to make voluntary disclosure (Graham et al., 2005). 
This incentive is reported to be more important for managers of smaller and high-
growth firms (Graham et al., 2005). 
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Based on agency and signalling theory, this study expects that larger board sizes will 
increase board-monitoring capabilities; as a result, this gives positive influences to 
disclosure practice in Islamic banks. The benefit of having a larger board is that it 
can increase a company‟s value because they provide a firm with members from 
different fields of expertise (Khan, 2010). Based on these arguments, this current 
study sets the following hypothesis:  
H1: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and board size. 
2. Gender Composition 
It has been evidenced in the CG literature that board diversity has become a 
significant element of CG arrangement in recent years. Branco and Rodrigues (2008) 
mentioned that the theme of board diversity correctly matches into the structure of 
stakeholder theory. Prior research indicated that board diversity is associated with a 
stronger orientation towards corporate social reporting and a higher intensity of 
social performance (see Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1994; Sicilian, 1996). According to 
Amran et al. (2014), gender diversity is shown to be positively associated with 
corporate social reporting. Female boards are shown to be more sensitive to CSR 
issues than male boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2004). They also suggest that boards 
with a higher proportion of women directors tend to make more board meetings 
possible and special attendance patterns at board meetings, which make different 
boards more successful than homogenous boards. Therefore, organizations with a 
higher proportion of women directors do engage in more CSR disclosure practices 
and CSR activities, such as charitable activities (Williams, 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2007). Based on stakeholder theory, it can be hypothesized that a higher proportion 
of women directors on the board can influence the CSR disclosure in Islamic banks, 
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with greater disclosure and higher incidence of assurance reports accompanying 
such disclosures (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2012). Therefore, the second hypothesis 
is: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and gender 
composition.  
3. Board Composition 
Besides board size, board composition also reflects how much the banks are linked 
to the outside world; as a result, they will be more aware on CSR issues and improve 
their CSR disclosure practice. Board composition is defined as the proportion of 
outside directors (non-executive/independence) and inside directors (executive/non-
independence) to the total number of directors appointed in the company (Al-Saidi & 
Al-Shammari, 2013). Board composition is seen as an important indicator of board 
independence; it is states that directors‟ independence can strengthen the board by 
monitoring, advising, and counselling the top management (Anderson et al , 2004), 
protecting the investors‟ interests (Petra, 2005), as well as reducing agency cost 
(Choe and Lee, 2003). The presence of non-executive directors on the boards 
provides "additional windows on the world" (Tricker, 1984). In other words, the non-
executive directors are perceived to bring a fresh and wider view to board discussion 
and decision making, such as CSR disclosure practice.  
Tricker (1984) illustrated that the CSR reporting endeavour can be viewed as a 
strategy heading towards closing a perceived legitimacy gap between management 
and shareholders (especially foreign shareholders) via non-executive directors. Non- 
executive directors are seen as the check-and-balance mechanism, not only in 
ensuring that companies act in the best interests of the owners, but also other 
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stakeholders; advising on the public presentation of the company‟s activities and 
performance and providing additional windows on the world. Furthermore, Zahra and 
Stanton (1988) pointed out that they are likely to respond to concerns about honour 
and obligations and would generally be more interested in satisfying the social 
responsibilities of the firm because this might improve their social prestige and 
honour. Fama and Jensen (1983) explained that non-executive directors are 
regarded as a dependable method, equipped to disseminate agency conflicts 
between managers and owners. In view of the ideas derived from the above 
discussion, the standing at this point is that non-executive directors have an 
essential role to play on banking companies to take on CSR activities with a view to 
ensure similarity between organisational actions and societal values or firms‟ 
legitimacy. Based on legitimacy theory, this current study anticipates that larger 
composition of non- executive boards would improve the CSR disclosure practice in 
Islamic banks, where the non-executive directors reduce the legitimacy gap between 
the management and shareholder. Hence, the third hypothesis is: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and board 
composition. 
4. Board Meetings 
Frequent board meetings are important as a corporate governance mechanism 
because they enable the directors to control the company effectively (Tuggle et al. 
2010; Hossain, 2008). It can be argued that active boards in Islamic banks (those 
with more frequent meetings) are more likely to monitor their company‟s activities 
and financial reporting. Active boards members will tend to signal their performance 
to potential employers (Hasan, 2011). Laksamana (2008) and Taha (2010) find that 
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there is a positive association between board meetings and transparency of 
compensation disclosure. In accordance with signalling theory where frequent board 
meeting represents more proactive board, a positive association between board 
meetings and CSR disclosure is expected and active board members will tend to 
signal their performance to potential employers (Zarith,2014). Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is formulated: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and board 
meetings. 
5. CEO Duality 
Role duality in a position exists when the CEO (chief executive officer) is also the 
chairman of the board. Gul and Leung (2004) stated that firms with CEO duality are 
more likely to be associated with lower levels of disclosures, since the board is less 
likely to be effective in monitoring management and ensuring a higher level of 
transparency. Agency theory predicts that role duality creates individual power for 
the CEO that would affect the effective control exercised by the board (Zahir,2008). 
Based on agency theory, CEO duality is seen as detrimental because the agent may 
pursue their self-interest at the expense of the owners.  
One aspect of corporate governance, which has given rise to concern, is the 
'dominant personality' phenomenon and this was found to be associated with poor 
disclosure (Forker, 1992). This phenomenon also includes role duality, which is 
when the chief executive officer (CEO) or managing director is also the chair of the 
board. It has been suggested in the previous literature (Tuggle et al., 2010; Hashim 
& Devi, 2008; Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010; Peng et al,. 2007) that these two 
roles should be separated, mainly for reasons of independence. Although the 
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separation of roles is suggested, some companies are not prepared to be absolutely 
categorical about dividing the roles (Rahman & Bukair, 2015). In disclosure practice, 
the current study believes that the separation of roles between chair and chief 
executive will enhance the monitoring quality and reduce benefits from withholding 
information, which may consequently result in improved CSR disclosure practice in 
Islamic banks. Based on agency theory, Islamic banks which are free CEO duality 
issue are expected to have better CSR disclosure score. Therefore, it can be 
hypothesized that:  
H5: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and CEO duality. 
6. Cross Holding Directorship 
Other potential determinants related to the board characteristics are cross-holding 
directorships. Cross-holdings of directorships refer to the situation where directors 
(regardless of executive or non-executive) sit on more than one board. According to 
agency theory, effective control over management performance will be provided by 
the separation between the two positions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). The concentration of decision-making power resulting from dual board 
membership could result in opportunistic behaviour by that individual (Khan, 2010). 
But, from the researcher‟s point of view, it is important to investigate the impact of 
cross-holding directorship on CSR reporting because results of previous studies that 
examined the relationship between role duality and corporate disclosure are mixed. 
For instance, it has been suggested in the literature (Ahmed, 2013; Rahman & 
Bukair, 2013; Haniffa, 1999; Lee, 2009) that cross-holding directorship will help in 
making information more transparent, as well as encourage the sharing of 
experience. However, there are also researchers (Aguilera, 1998; Young et al., 2008; 
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Tan & Lee Chu, 2006) who believe that this will put the company at a competitive 
disadvantage and, in the case of executive directors; their existence on more than 
one board will make them less independent, as they will be more sympathetic with 
others who are in similar shoes.  
In developing the hypothesis on the association between cross-holdings and CSR 
disclosure, it is argued that cross-holdings will encourage companies to be 
transparent because such directors will have better knowledge of the practices in 
companies on which they sit (Lewis, 2005). Using the same line of argument, 
directors who have previously experienced a social reporting issue, and how it was 
dealt with, could share this knowledge in another company on which they sit. 
Nevertheless, it depends on how much power they have in influencing the disclosure 
policies of companies. Similarly, when the chairperson has cross-holdings, he/she 
would be in a better position to influence the boards, as they not only have relatively 
more power, but also more experience about disclosure policies in other companies 
on which they sit. But, if the demand for such information were low, then it would be 
difficult for chairs to influence management to disclose. Based on agency theory, 
Islamic banks which have no cross holding director are expected to have better 
management control and effective performance, as a result have better CSR 
disclosure score. Therefore, it can be hypothesizing that:  
H6: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and cross-holding 
directorships.  
5.6.1.2 SSB (Shariah Supervisory Board) Related Variables 
The SSB has social influence and authority in monitoring the Islamic banks‟ 
compliance with Shariah principles and provides the confidence to stakeholders 
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about the legitimacy of the business transactions. Disclosure by the SSB may see as 
a key aspect of accountability by the Islamic banks to its stakeholders. However, the 
degree to which social activities are disclosed depends on the underlying rationale of 
the SSB monitoring role on behalf of the Islamic banks‟ investors. Moreover, the 
degree to which the SSB influences the level of CSR disclosure is depending on 
SSB characteristics, such as board size. Therefore, the SSB size is expected to 
have a positive impact on CSR disclosure (Farook et al., 2011). Empirical evidence 
suggests that SSB size can affect the level of disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009).  
On the other hand, the governance literature indicates the level of disclosures could 
increase or decrease depending on whether mechanisms substitute or complement 
each other (Ho and Wong, 2001). When governance mechanisms substitute each 
other, firms may not provide additional disclosures, since the multiple governance 
mechanisms should have increased the level of monitoring. Therefore, the SSB size 
may see no need to urge for additional CSR disclosure if investors are already 
assured of the Islamic bank‟s compliance in the Shariah compliance report (Maali et 
al., 2006).  
7. SSB Size 
From AAOIFI perspectives, they are recommending that SSB board should be 
appointed by a number of different people from different professions such as: 
bankers and economists which can enhance the effectiveness of SSB (AAOIFI, 
2004). This allows for the implementation of diverse perspectives on the application 
of the Shariah. To enable this to happen, a large SSB would be required to represent 
these sectional professions. Empirical evidence suggests that board size can affect 
the level of disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). The common number of SSB 
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members in Islamic banks is between three and five members, based on AAOIFI 
Governance Standard No.1. According to Chen and Jaggi (2000), a larger board size 
may decrease the possibility of information asymmetry. Agency theory predicts that 
larger boards incorporate a variety of expertise that results in more effectiveness in 
the monitoring role of the boards (Singh et al., 2004). Moreover, a higher number of 
board members may also reduce the uncertainty and the lack of information 
(Birnbaum, 1984). The board‟s size is likely to affect its ability to control and review 
all transactions to ensure their operations. With more members, the collective 
knowledge and experience of SSB will increase, leading to greater disclosure. 
Concerned with banking sector, and especially Islamic banks, Farag et al. (2014) 
find a positive significant association between the Shariah supervisory board (SSB) 
size and disclosure index; however, the studies are limited to the specific sample of 
Islamic banks in Bahrain, where this current study will provide better insight by using 
more sample in GCC. Thus, based on agency theory, bigger size of SSB are 
expected to be more effective in monitoring disclosure practice among Islamic banks, 
therefore it can be hypothesized that: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and SSB size.  
8. Cross Membership 
Cross memberships of SSB members may also lead to higher disclosure of CSR 
information (Dahya, Lonie and Power, 1996). Farook et al. 2011, suggest that cross-
directorships will increase transparency and accountability in financial reporting for 
two reasons. Firstly, members with cross-directorships can make comparisons from 
knowledge gained in other companies. Secondly, “decisions at one board become 
part of the raw material for decisions at other boards” (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p. 
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321); SSB members with cross-memberships will be exposed to more discussions 
about the application of Islamic law in banking. This increases their knowledge about 
the application of Islamic principles to corporate reporting and in particular to CSR 
disclosure practice. As a result, they enhance their transparency and accountability 
to Allah, then towards other stakeholders. The cross-membership of SSB members 
is preferable because of their ensuing knowledge and credibility (Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989). Moreover, SSB members with cross-memberships will be able to adopt their 
tacit and explicit knowledge into their application of Shariah rulings in Islamic banks. 
Based on accountability theory cross membership of SSB members may increase 
their transparency and accountability to disclosure CSR information. Thus, it can be 
hypothesized that: 
H8: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and SSB cross 
membership.  
5.6.1.3 Audit Committee (AC) 
9. AC Size  
Barako et al. (2006) state that the audit committee should monitor the integrity of the 
financial statements and review the company‟s internal financial control system, as 
well as improving their corporate information disclosure. AC monitoring is not only 
about the financial reporting process; it extends to the reporting of non-financial 
information (Li et al., 2012) such as CSR information disclosure. Mangena and Pike 
(2005) suggest that larger audit committees give rise to more effective monitoring, 
since it is more likely to involve the essential expertise and views to do that. However, 
mixed results can be obtained from previous studies. Mangena and Pike (2005) and 
Tauringana and Mangena (2009) found no statistically significant relationship 
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between the level of disclosure and AC size. Felo et al. (2003) and Li et al. (2012) 
report a positive relationship between AC size and the quality of financial reporting. 
Using the same argument by Rahman & Bukhair (2015), it is expected that the size 
of the audit committee may give an impact to the level of controlling, monitoring, and 
disclosure. A larger audit committee size may decrease the possibility of information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts (Chen and Jaggi, 2000). 
Based on agency theory, this study expects that larger audit committee size will 
increase board-monitoring capabilities; as a result, it gives positive influences to 
disclosure level practice in Islamic banks. Therefore, the present study will 
empirically explore the relationship between AC size and the of CSR information 
disclosure practice. The following hypothesis is formulated:  
H9. There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and AC size.  
10. AC Meetings  
Amran et al. (2014) recommend that AC meetings should not be fewer than three 
meetings a year to enhance the companies sustainable reporting. An active AC with 
high frequency of meetings will have enough time to discharge its duties. Prior 
research provides evidence on a positive relationship between AC meetings and 
subcategories of financial reporting, like Internet reporting (e.g., Kelton and Yang, 
2008; Li et al., 2012). According to Gray et al. (1995), to be socially accountable, 
managers are required to provide all financial and non-financial towards their 
stakeholders; conducting frequent audit meetings enables them to perform their 
duties towards stakeholders. Therefore, it is considered that active AC meetings 
would be able to oversee and monitor CSR reporting. Based on agency theory, 
frequent AC meeting may provide monitoring to Islamic banks activities; as a result 
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provide better CSR information in their annual report. The following hypothesis is 
formulated:  
H10. There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and AC meetings.  
5.6.1.4 Ownership Structure  
11. Institutional Ownership 
Agency theory predicts that ownership structure affects the level of disclosure (Eng 
and Mak, 2003). The relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure has 
been examined in prior studies; however, the empirical evidence is mixed. Barako et 
al. (2006), and Mangena and Pike (2005), found a positive association while 
Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) found a negative association; Hannifa and Cooke 
(2002) do not find a significant association between the two variables. Hidalgo et a.l 
(2011) supported the prior studies by stated that “the results appear to corroborate 
the view that an increase in institutional investor shareholding has a negative effect 
on voluntary disclosure, supporting the hypothesis of entrenchment, whereas an 
excessive ownership by institutional investors may have adverse effects on strategic 
disclosure decisions” (p.490). Islamic banks with a concentrated ownership structure 
do not have to disseminate more information because the main shareholders can 
easily obtain it, as they usually have access to that information. Akhigbe and Martin 
(2006) found a positive association between disclosure and institutional ownership, 
based on the financial services industry. Based on agency theory, it can be 
hypothesized:  
H11: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and institutional 
ownership. 
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12. Foreign Ownership 
Foreign stockholders‟ use of disclosure is underpinned by the fact that they are 
“informational” disadvantaged compared to domestic stockholders (Choe et al., 
2005). The ownership structure of the firm may lead to legitimacy gaps. Branco and 
Rodrigues (2008) explained the involvement between the proportions of foreign 
ownership and reporting might lead to raise the issue of causality. Fields and Keys 
(2003) found that the heterogeneity of experiences, ideas, and innovations that 
individuals carry to a company tends to impact on company performance. At the 
same time, Ayuso and Argandona (2007) illustrated that foreign owners are typically 
assumed to play a key role in supporting CSR reporting strategies. However, a study 
by Branco and Rodrigues (2008) on Kenyan banks found no association between 
the ratio of foreign ownership on the board and CSR reporting initiatives. 
Based on agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that, as the number of 
shareholders increases and ownership becomes more dispersed, the demands for 
additional information increase. Several studies have found an association between 
disclosure and foreign ownership. For instance, according to Xiao et al. (2004), 
higher foreign ownership not only encourages information disclosure, but also 
motivates firms to create web pages to facilitate dissemination of financial 
information. The extent of foreign investor ownership is an important determinant of 
the demand for financial information (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). The demands for 
disclosures are usually higher when foreigners, due to the separation between board 
and owners geographically (Bradbury, 1991). Moreover, foreign stakeholders have 
diverse values and knowledge because of their foreign market exposure. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005) find a positive association between foreign ownership and disclosures. 
Concerning the banking sector, Sharma (2014) also found a significant positive 
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relationship between disclosures and foreign ownership. Using different sample and 
data from prior studies, as a compliment of prior studies this current study will test 
the association between CSR disclosure and foreign ownership. Therefore, based on 
agency theory, the final hypothesis is:  
H12: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and foreign 
ownership. 
5.6.2 Bank Characteristics and Country-Specific Characteristics as a Control 
Variable. 
As the sample contains Islamic banks from 7 GCC countries, the researcher used 
firm characteristics as a control variable, such as firm size, firm age, profitability, 
leverage, and liquidity. In this current study, the researcher also uses country-
specific characteristics, such as GDP growth and corruption rate of the sample GCC 
countries as our control variables. Olken & Pande (2012) argued that there is a 
positive association between GDP (gross domestic product) and corruption to the 
level of disclosure among countries, while Andres and Vallelado (2009) did not find 
any significant relation between those variables and disclosure practice. This current 
study also use year as a dummy variable. 
It is argued that bank size has an impact on the level of corporate social activities. A 
large strand of the literature on CSR finds an association between firm size and CSR 
activities (e.g., Mallin and Michelon, 2011; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004 and Brammer et al., 
2006).  Roberts (1992) finds a positive relationship between size and CSR; he 
argues that the bigger and older the company, the more involvement there will be in 
CSR activities, which gives a positive impact on its reputation. According to agency 
theory, larger firms need to disclose more information to different user groups, which 
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leads to a decline in agency costs and reduces information asymmetries (Inchausti, 
1997). In prior disclosure studies, the association between firm size and disclosure 
reporting is mixed. For example, while some studies found a positive association 
(e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2011; Hassan et al., 2009; Vandemele et al., 2009; Alsaeed, 
2006; Chavent et al., 2006; Mangena and Pike, 2005), others found an insignificant 
association (Rajab and Schachler, 2009). Bank size is a significant determinant of 
disclosure and accounting policy choice, and a discriminator for accounting quality 
(Goodwin et al., 2008; Rahman et al., 2002). Furthermore, large banks face higher 
demand for information from customers, analysts, and the public (Cooke, 1989). A 
few empirical studies on banking disclosure (e.g., Hossain and Taylor, 2007; 
Hossain and Reaz, 2007) have documented empirical evidence towards the positive 
relationship between bank size and extent of disclosure. 
Prior research finds that there is an association between bank age and disclosure 
practice (e.g., Akhtaruddin, 2005; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). They argue that the age 
of a corporation affects the CSR involvement of the firm, and that long-established 
firms are likely to make greater voluntary social disclosures. For example, Roberts 
(1992) reported a positive relationship between CSR and age of firms. This 
relationship may exist because long-established banks have received more support 
from the society than newly established banks and the link matures as the bank 
undertakes a greater leadership role, developing an increased sense of social 
responsibility. Hossain and Hammami (2009) found that older companies tend to 
disclose more information than young companies. Older, well-established companies 
are likely to disclose much more information in their annual reports than younger 
companies because they are less likely to suffer any competitive disadvantage. In 
addition, the cost and the ease of gathering, processing, and disseminating the 
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required information may be a contributory factor (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Many 
studies have shown that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with 
company age (e.g., Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Cormier et al., 2005), while others 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hossain, 2008; Galani et al., 2011) conclude that 
the age of the corporation has insignificant association with the level of disclosure. 
Abdul Hamid (2004) suggested that the age of a bank might influence the level of 
information disclosure. In the case of banking industries, Hossain (2008) claimed 
that no relationship exists between a banking company‟s age and the extent of 
monetary disclosure. In contrast, a significant positive association between the 
bank‟s age and the extent of disclosure has been found by Owusu-Ansah (2005). 
The influence of profitability on disclosure in previous studies received mixed 
reactions. Singhvi and Desai (1991) argued that when the rate of return is high, 
managers are motivated to disclose more detailed information to support the 
continuance of their positions and remuneration. On the other hand, when the rate of 
return is low, managers may disclose less information in order to conceal the 
reasons for the effects. Profitability is central to the discussion of corporate 
disclosure. Inchausti (1997) suggested that profitability is capable of influencing the 
extent to which companies disclose information items.  
Consistent with signalling theory, management, when in possession of good news 
due to better performance, are more likely to disclose more detailed information to 
the stock market than that provided by companies in possession of bad news to 
avoid undervaluation of their shares. Chavent et al. (2006) and Wallace and Naser 
(1995) propose that companies with higher profitability provide comparatively more 
information. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) showed that the results of prior studies 
provide mixed evidence on the association between a firm‟s profitability and the level 
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of corporate disclosure. Elshandidy et al. (2011), Othman et al. (2009), Chavent et al. 
(2006), Hossain et al. (2006), and Gray et al. (2001) report a positive association 
between both variables. Agency theory argues that corporate managers of profitable 
banks are motivated to disclose more information to increase their compensation 
(Abd El Salam, 1999). Galani et al. (2011) report an insignificant relationship 
between banks‟ profitability and level of disclosure. In a similar vein, previous 
empirical research on banking voluntary disclosure by Hossain and Taylor (2007) 
shows no significant relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of Bangladeshi commercial banks and the profitability variable. In 
contrast, a study by Hossain (2008) found a significant positive relationship between 
the aggregate disclosure levels of listed banking companies in India and their 
profitability. 
Where, legitimacy theory justifies this positive correlation by the fact that corporate 
boards of highly profitable firms are more likely to disclose more information to 
increase stockholders‟ confidence and, accordingly, to raise their compensation and 
to raise capital at the lowest cost (Marston and Polei, 2004). However, from an 
Islamic perspective, where full disclosure represented an accountability towards 
Allah before stakeholders, Haniffa (2002) argues that a corporation may provide full 
disclosure in any situation, whether it is making a profit or otherwise. 
Based on agency theory, Xiao et al. (2004) argue that increased disclosure can 
reduce debt holders‟ inclinations to price-protect against transfers from themselves 
to stockholders. Debreceny and Rahman (2005) find that increases in the debt-
equity ratio create agency costs. Therefore, corporate managers report more 
voluntary information to assist creditors to continually monitor the affairs of the 
corporation and help them evaluate the ability of the firm to pay its obligations on 
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time. Managers tend to provide more information in order to send a good signal to 
debt holders regarding the corporate ability to meet its obligations. Empirical 
evidence on the association between leverage and disclosure is mixed. While 
Elshandidy (2011), Taylor et al. (2010), Marshall and Weetman (2007), and Barako 
et al. (2006) find a positive relationship, Rajab and Schachler (2009), and Abraham 
and Cox (2007) find insignificant association. Related to the banking industry, 
Sharma (2014) find a significant positive correlation existed between disclosures and 
leverage. 
The last control variable of CSR information disclosure is liquidity and it is possible to 
argue that corporate managers of companies with low liquidity ratio may publish 
more voluntary information in their annual reports to satisfy the information required 
by the stakeholders. In addition, Ezat and El-Masry (2008) find a positive association 
between levels of corporate Internet reporting and liquidity, while Aly et al. (2010) 
find no association between the two variables. In addition, Samaha and Dahawa 
(2010) find a positive association between the overall level of voluntary disclosure 
and liquidity; however, they do not find the same results in their study in 2011, when 
they tested the association between CSR and liquidity. The study also puts in place 
a control for the macro-economic factors by using the GDP growth and corruption 
index in this study and the year effect. Table 6 presents a summary of variables used 
in this current study (independent and control variables) and their expected 
relationship with CSR disclosure, based on prior studies. 
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Table 6: Presents a summary variables used in this study and their expected 
relationship based on previous studies. 
Main Items Variables Theory &  
Association Sign  
Previous Studies 
Board Related 
Variables 
1. Board size Agency Theory 
 
+ 
 
Singh et al. (2004); 
Lakhal (2005); Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006); 
Abdel-Fattah et al. 
(2007); Laksamana 
(2008); Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) 
2. Gender Stakeholder Theory 
 
+ 
Haniffa (1999); Mazni 
(2011); Lawrence 
(2013) 
3. Board 
composition 
Legitimacy Theory 
 
+ 
Forker (1992); Ho and 
Wong (2001); Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002); 
Ajinkya et al. (2005); 
Tauringana and 
Mangena (2009); 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar 
(2011) 
4. Board meetings Signalling Theory 
 
+ 
Laksamana (2008) 
5.Role duality Agency theory 
 
+ 
Forker (1992); Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002); Ho 
and Wong (2001); 
Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006); Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006); 
Abdelsalam and Street 
(2007); Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) 
 
6. Cross Holding 
Directorship 
 
Agency theory 
 
+ 
Ahmed (2013); Rahman 
& Bukair (2013); Haniffa 
(1999); Lee (2009) 
SSB  7. SSB size Agency Theory 
 
+ 
Farook et al. (2011); 
Maali et al. (2006) 
8. SSB cross 
membership 
Accountability Theory 
 
+ 
Rahman & Bukair 
(2013); Farook, Sayd, 
M. Kabir Hassan (2011) 
 
Audit committee 
characteristics 
9. AC size Agency Theory 
+ 
Mangena and Pike 
(2005); Tauringana and 
Mangena (2009); Felo 
et al. (2003); Li et al. 
(2012) 
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10. AC meeting Agency Theory 
+ 
Kelton and Yang, 2008; 
Li et al, 2012 
Ownership 
Structure 
11. Institutional 
ownership  
 
Agency Theory 
+ 
Schadewitz and Blevins 
(1998); Eng and Mak 
(2003); Mangena and 
Pike (2005); Lakhal 
(2005); Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) 
12. Foreign 
ownership 
Agency Theory 
+ 
Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991); 
Mangel and Singh 
(1993); Haniffa 
(1999);Oh et al. (2011); 
Gamerschlag et al. 
(2010) 
Firm 
Characteristics 
13. Firm size + Hossain et al. (1995); 
Watson et al. (2002); 
Boesso and Kumar 
(2007); Tauringana and 
Mangena; (2009); Alves 
et al. (2012);  Wang and 
Hussainey (2013). 
14. Firm Age +/- Hossain (2008); 
Soliman (2013); Aljifri 
(2008); Sehar et al. 
(2013). 
15. Profitability +/- Wallace et al. (1994); 
Ahmed and Courtis 
(1999); Tauringana and 
Mangena (2009); 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar 
(2011). 
16. Leverage +/- Xiao et al. (2004); 
Elshandidy (2011); 
Taylor et al. (2010); 
Marshall and Weetman 
(2007); Barako et al. 
(2006); Rajab and 
Schachler (2009); 
Abraham and Cox 
(2007). 
17. Liquidity +/- Wallace et al. (1994); 
Watson et al. (2002); 
Mangena and Pike, 
(2005); Anis et al. 
(2012). 
Country specific 
characteristics 
18. GDP + Olken & Pande (2012) 
19.Corruption level + Olken & Pande (2012) 
Note: (+) indicates a positive relationship, where (-) indicates a negative relationship, based 
on prior studies. 
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5.7 Consequences of CSR Disclosure and Hypothesis Development  
Since investigating the effect of CSR quantity on firm value is the key part of the 
analyses to answer research questions (Q 3), this section will discuss prior studies 
regarding CSR disclosure and firm value. It will then develop a hypothesis based on 
the theoretical perspectives.  
5.7.1 CSRD and Firm Value33  
The literature on the impact of corporate disclosure on firm value is limited and with 
mixed results. To the best of the researcher‟s knowledge; there is limited prior study 
that directly tests the effects of CSR reporting on firm value, specifically among GCC 
Islamic banks from 2010-2014. Extensive literature explores the impacts of 
disclosure generally, but the number of studies that investigated the influence of 
CSR disclosure on firm value (FV) in Islamic banks is still limited. Several empirical 
studies concluded that voluntary disclosure enhances investors‟ ability to predict 
future earnings, which has consequences on firm value (FV) (e.g., Hussainey et al., 
2003). Rhodes and Soobaroyen (2010) argue that disclosure can curtail agency 
problems by decreasing information asymmetry, thus enhance firm value (FV). Al-
Akra et al. (2010) specified the existence association between disclosure and firm 
value (FV) using panel data for Jordanian listed companies.  
Sheu et al. (2010) specifies that the market only provides a higher valuation to those 
corporations that elect to disclose inclusive information. Gordon et al. (2010) 
conducted a study in the United States (US) about value relevance of information 
security disclosures, and provided strong evidence that voluntarily disclosed 
information is associated positively with the firm value (FV). Anam et al. (2011) 
                                            
33
 Firm value (FV) in this study refers to the firm’s value of Islamic banks. 
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proved that the extent of disclosure has a significant positive effect on the firm value 
(FV) based on market capitalization.  
Previous studies reveal that increasing disclosure level results in decreasing 
misevaluation of share price, hence increasing firm‟s market capitalization (Anam et 
al., 2011). Garay et al. (2013) find that an increase of 1% in the corporate disclosure 
causes an upsurge of 0.15% in the Tobin's Q34 and an increase of 0.0119% in the 
firm's ROA (return on assets). Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find a positive association 
between firm value (FV) and disclosure, based on an investigation of the link 
between the cost of equity and CSRD. Studies by Villiers (2013) examine the effect 
of a firm‟s governance measures on the relationship between CSR disclosure and 
firm value (FV). Stronger governance mechanisms could reduce the ability of 
managers to disclose CSR information opportunistically, making CSR disclosures 
more credible, and, thus, increase the weight capital market participants put on these 
disclosures. This would suggest a stronger link between CSR disclosures and firm 
value (FV) in stronger governance countries. However, financial disclosures 
themselves may be more opaque in weakly governed countries. Alotaibi and 
Hussainey (2016) find a positive relationship between CSR disclosure quality and 
market capitalization of Saudi non-financial listed companies in 2013-2014.  
However, enhanced disclosure could have adverse effects if it puts the firm at a 
competitive disadvantage compared with its rivals (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Hassan 
et al., 2009) or if it makes more noise to the investors, which affects negatively on 
their valuation (Chung et al., 2012). Therefore, the existing literature does not 
                                            
34
Tobin's Q, or the Q ratio, is the ratio of the market value of a company's assets (as measured by the 
market value of its outstanding stock and debt) divided by the replacement cost of the company's 
assets (book value). 
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present strong evidence on the positive association between corporate disclosure 
and firm value. Furthermore, it is found that the direction and magnitude of the 
relationship is associated with the disclosure score (Hassan et al., 2009) and the 
proxy that is used for firm value (Uyar and Kiliç, 2012). Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016) 
argued that they did not find the same results when using either Tobin‟s Q or Return 
on Assets (ROA) as proxies for firm value. They suggest that both CSR disclosure 
quantity and quality have the same impact on firm value (FV); the significance of this 
impact depends on the proxy used in measuring the firm value. 
Board Size 
Literature on the relationship between board size and firm value offers mixed 
findings. Jensen (1983) believes that as board size increases, decision-making 
becomes slower and with free-riding problems, it becomes less efficient, leading to 
lower corporate value. Yermack (1998), Eisenberg et al. (1998), Mak and Kusnadi 
(2005), De Andres et al. (2005), Gill and Marthur (2011), Ujunwa (2012), and Kumar 
and Singh (2013) provide evidence of such arguments and find that smaller boards 
are related to higher firm value. Jakling and Johl (2009) provide contradicting 
evidence while studying top Indian companies.  
On the other hand, Coles et al. (2007) provide evidence that both very large and very 
small board sizes affect firm value positively; he believes that this happens due to 
business complexity. Raheja (2005) supports Coles et al. (2007) by suggesting that 
there is no optimal board size, since board size tends to depend on either advising or 
monitoring needs and this changes from company to company. It is claimed that the 
collective experience and knowledge of board members is crucial in today‟s complex 
business environment (Conger et al., 1998). However, previous studies have shown 
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positive association between board size and firm value (FV) (Ujunwa, 2012). Other 
researchers, such as Lehn et al. (2009) in their research of 88 US companies 
between 1935 and 2000, found no significant relationship between size and value; 
Boone et al. (2007) found a positive relationship between board size and corporate 
size but found no relationship between board size and firm value. 
Board Composition 
Literature on board composition (characteristics) is more plentiful than literature on 
board size. There is mixed evidence on board composition and its positive influence 
on firm value. Jackling and Johl (2009), and Giraldez and Hurtado (2014) find that 
outsiders provide better monitoring of management (thus, decreasing agency costs) 
because they are independent. Barnard and Rosenstein (1996), Hermalin and 
Weisenbach (2001), De Andres et al. (2005), and Baghat and Black (1998) suggest 
that board structure does not show a positive relationship with firm value. However, 
Colombo and Baglioni (2008) provide evidence from Italy on a positive relationship, 
contradicting prior studies. As with board size, it is equally accepted that there is no 
ideal board composition; board structure should be based on corporate reality, 
especially on the company‟s priority between advice (more executive) and 
monitoring (more non-executive) (Harris and Ravis, 2005; Lehn et al., 2004; Link et 
al., 2008; Denis and Sarin, 1999). 
CEO Duality 
As with other governance variables, CEO duality literature presents mixed views on 
the relationship between CEO duality and firm value. CEO duality is supported by 
stewardship theory, since it argues for a stronger, more united leadership where 
interests are aligned and where advice, more than control, is needed (Vintila and 
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Gherghina, 2012). Other authors, such as Daily and Dalton (1992), Cho and Kim, 
(2007), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Chen et al. 
(2005), Chanie and Thome (2009), Ehikoya (2009), lam and Lee (2008), Pok and 
Sheik, (2012) and Dogan et al. (2013), support agency theory in its assessment of a 
negative relationship between CEO duality and firm value. Finally, authors, such as 
Agrawal and Knoebler (1996), Peng, Zhang and Li (2007), Yang and Zhao (2014), 
and Baptista, Klotze and Campelo de Melo (2008), support stewardship theory and 
find a positive relationship between CEO duality and firm value.  
For firm characteristics variables, Almilia (2009) found that firm size is the main 
determining of financial reporting. Ezat (2010) found that there is a positive 
association reported between firm size and firm value (FV). He also claims that 
larger firms have more resources than smaller firms. Therefore, a positive 
association is reported between firm size and firm value in several prior studies (e.g., 
Hassan et al., 2009; Ezat, 2010). With regard to profitability, firms that report higher 
profits would signal their capabilities to the investors. It might be perceived that these 
firms have competitive advantages that enable them to achieve higher profits, which 
positively affect shareholder value. Hence, in line with Hassan et al. (2009), a 
positive relationship is expected between profitability and firm value (FV). Leverage 
is associated negatively with financial performance, which is consistent with the 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke 
(2000) stated that high leverage leads to positive change in firm value (FV). In 
conducting this study, we also use GDP as our control variable, as most of the 
literature does (Coles et al., 2007; Yermack, 1996). The author used this variable to 
control for the growth that the country is having in its economy. The information from 
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this variable was taken from the World Bank database, which shows the growth of 
GDP in GCC countries in 2010-2014.  
In summary, most prior studies (Rhodes and Soobaroyen, 2010; Al-Akra et al., 2010; 
Sheu et al. 2010; Gordon et al. 2010; Anam et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Garay 
et al. 2013; and Alotaibiand Hussainey 2016) find a positive relationship between the 
level of disclosure and firm value. 
5.7.2 Hypothesis Development 
This section mainly focuses on examining whether disclosing more CSR information 
affects firm value. Outsiders usually do not have access to the internal information 
about the company, which is only available to the manager‟s/management team. 
Prior research (e.g. Sheu et al. 2010) shows that disclosure reduces the information 
asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (stakeholders) and, hence, 
reduces agency conflicts between both parties. This leads to an increase in firm 
value (Sheu et al. 2010). 
The influence of CSR disclosure on firm value (FV) can be understood based on 
agency, signalling, and economic theory. Signalling theory is the main theoretical 
framework that is used to explain the association between disclosure and firm value 
(FV). Based on this theory, comprehensive disclosure signals better CG 
mechanisms and fewer agency conflicts, thus leading to higher firm value (FV) (Sheu 
et al., 2010). It is argued that voluntary disclosures in the annual report send signals 
to the marketplace that are expected to increase a company‟s value and, 
consequently, its stock market value (Gordon et al., 2010). Curado et al. (2011) point 
out that corporate disclosure influences firm value (FV), as perceived by markets. 
Cormier et al. (2011) claim that, disclosure delivers value-relevant information to 
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stock markets. Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2010) provided evidence that disclosure has a 
positive consequence on shareholder value creation.  
Economic theory suggests that increased corporate disclosure has an influence on 
firm value (FV) (Lundholm and Van Winkle, 2006). First, better quality information 
permits investors to make accurate appraisals of the parameters underlying the 
future stock returns, lessening non-diversifiable estimation risk and uncertainty about 
future cash flows, as well as future profitability (Clarkson et al., 1996). Second, 
through enhanced disclosure, the willingness for investors to trade is increased in 
addition to increases in the shares‟ liquidity and improving firm value (FV) (Easley 
and O‟Hara, 2004). Economic theory advocates that an increased voluntary 
disclosures level reduces information asymmetries between the firm and market 
participants, which increases the firm‟s stock liquidity as well as enhances firm value 
(FV) (Beyer et al., 2010). 
The importance of corporate disclosure arises from being a means of communication 
between management and outside investors and market participants. Enhanced 
corporate disclosure is believed to mitigate the asymmetry problem and agency 
conflicts (Lambert et al., 2007). The consequences of increasing disclosure level are 
often discussed in terms of reduced mispricing, cumulative profitability, and growing 
firm value (FV) (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Consequent empirical studies provide 
supporting evidence about the association between disclosure and firm value (FV). 
For instance, Healy et al. (1999) find that firms with expanded disclosure levels 
experience substantial corresponding increases in firm value (FV). The direct effects 
of corporate disclosures have the ability to change the firm value (FV) by affecting 
managers‟ decisions and, hence, varying the distribution of future cash flows 
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(Lambert et al., 2007). Thus, improved corporate disclosure may increase the market 
value for firms (Elzahar et al., 2015). 
Concerned with the economic consequences for social disclosure, legitimacy theory 
suggests that corporations may be enthusiastic to disclose social information to 
legitimize its position within society (Deegan et al., 2002). McDonald and Rundle-
Thiele (2008) find influence of CSR on the corporate profitability through creation of 
such intangible assets as good reputation, trust, and commitment, which drive the 
long-term success of the business. This improves the firm‟s ability to attract 
resources, enhance performance, and build competitive advantages thereby 
enhancing firm value (FV) (Fombrun et al., 2000). Widespread preceding research 
proposes that disclosure reporting can influence positively on stakeholders‟ 
perceptions of firm performance and, thereby, on firms‟ profitability and share price 
(Lourenco et al., 2012). Therefore, based on the above theory, it can be 
hypothesized that: 
H13: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value 
(FV). 
5.8 CSR Media 
A variety of media can be used to disclose social and environmental information: 
annual reports, advertisements or articles published detailing companies‟ activities, 
booklets or leaflets to address the social and environmental activities of the company, 
community reports, environmental reports, labelling of products to promote 
environmental and other concerns, press releases, supplements to the annual report 
or produced at interim dates, video tapes, and websites (Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006, 
p. 273). 
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This is supported by Campbell et al. (2003) indicate that companies may use media 
other than their annual reports to disclose social and environmental information. For 
example, tobacco companies in the UK used advertising extensively until recently, 
and it is still used as a medium of corporate communications by other companies. 
Also, the Internet is a powerful tool in providing social information, as the website of 
a company has the potential to reach a much wider audience than its annual reports. 
ACCA (2001) indicates that there are three major methods to present the social, 
environmental, and sustainability information through the website: 1) Piggy back: 
replication of the paper based report in electronic form; 2) Stand-alone approach: 
complete reporting solely through the website; 3) Integrated approach: reports plus 
additional features and information (ACCA, 2001 p. 13). 
Taha (2010) stated that, it is important for companies to provide separate CSR 
reports for users; the growing trends towards CSR disclosure is matched by the 
release of increasing number of companies who provide a stand-alone CSR reports 
to fulfil the stakeholder needs. Jenkins & Yakovleva (2006) argue that the petro-
chemical industry was the first sector that issued stand-alone reports, starting in the 
1980s, while the mining sector started producing environmental reports gradually 
from the 1990s. According to KPMG‟s triennial surveys (initiated in 1993), CSR 
reporting has been steadily rising and has increased substantially in recent years. In 
2008, 79% of the G250 (global 250) companies and 45% of N100 (national 100) 
companies in 16 countries issued separate CSR reports, compared with 52% and 
33% respectively in 2005, 45% and 28% in 2002, and 35% and 24% in 1999 (KPMG, 
2002, 2005, 2008). 
Nowadays, the current trend of companies to disclose their CSR information is 
through an annual report and website. With the rapid growth of Internet access 
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around the world, stakeholders tend to find online CSR information through the 
company website. Islamic banking industry, it is rare to find a stand- alone CSR 
reports produced by the companies to disclose their CSR information. But for the 
purpose of this study, in measuring the CSR disclosure level among Islamic banks in 
the GCC, a main source of information will be collected from the companies‟ annual 
reports. The researcher neglects to use websites as a supportive source of data due 
to information consistency issue. The annual reports have widely been used as the 
main tools in measuring the level of compliance by previous researchers (e.g., Maali 
et al., 2006; Zainal et al., 2013; Platonova, 2014; Farag et al., 2014; Elzahar & 
Hussainey, 2012; Belal et al., 2014; Huang, 2015). Adopting this approach, annual 
reports will be used as a main document in measuring the CSR disclosure practice in 
the GCC Islamic banks. 
5.9 Annual Reports  
Annual reports are formal public documents produced by companies in response to 
the mandatory corporate reporting requirements existing in most Western economies 
(Santon & Santon, 2002:478). Daub (2007) stated that the annual report is 
sometimes referred to as a company business card, which reflects that it provides 
readers with a comprehensive picture of the publishing organization (Daub, 2007, p. 
75). The annual report is one of the multiple channels through which companies 
communicate with their stakeholders; in support of this choice, the literature shows 
that it is the main disclosure vehicle (Malafronte et al., 2013) and is an influential 
source of information because of its wide coverage and availability (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004). Annual report disclosure levels also positively correlated with the 
amount of corporate disclosure provided via other media, such as websites (Marston 
& Shrives, 1991, Lang & Lundholm, 1993). 
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The annual reports are commonly divided into two sections: one for statutory 
required financial statements, and other for non-statutory matters (Stanton & Stanton, 
2002). It is observed that content changes have been partly mandatory, partly 
voluntary. Tsang (2001) argued that compared with one or two decades ago, today, 
annual reports are more professional with colourful graphs and diagrams, fancy 
designs and exotic paper. There is growing realization that annual reports have a 
disclosure function, which can serve crucial public relations function. White & 
Hanson (2002) present a justification for the extensive use of annual reports by 
researchers “for no other medium offers the same blend of consistency, accessibility 
and wide applicability. No other medium yields the same access to corporate 
communication with lay audiences” (White & Hanson, 2002, p.455). 
According to Beretta (2007), the annual report in particular is increasingly perceived 
by companies as a communication tool towards stakeholders. In addition to its main 
function of reporting their financial and economic condition, it is also used to 
announce important positive results, to manifest core values, to reassure 
stakeholders in difficult financial times; for stakeholders, it is necessary to make 
sound decisions, and primarily regulators, shareholders, and customers are 
interested in its content (Stanton & Stanton, 2002). With the information disclosed in 
annual report, it allows the solving of the asymmetric information problem between 
principal and agent (Hill & Jones, 1992). Companies are aware of the crucial role 
assumed by disclosure, it could be beneficial but also costly; it requires investment 
and expertise. Thus, the choice is no longer disclosing or not, but strategically 
deciding when, how and what to communicate (Malafronte et al., 2013). 
165 
 
In conducting this study, the researcher will focus on annual reports of the sample 
Islamic banks as a main source in measuring the CSR disclosure. The justifications 
of choosing an annual report as a main dataset in this study are as follows: 
 Annual reports provide a high degree of credibility to information disclosed 
within them (Tilt, 1994). 
 The annual report is a statutory document and produced regularly, and it 
represents what is probably the most important document, which companies 
use in the construction of their own social imagery (Hines, 1988). 
  Annual reports are the most accessible source of information for listed 
companies, in hard copies and electronically (Yusoff & Lehman, 2005). 
 The financial image of a company is critical in terms of how companies are 
seen and judged, the social and environmental factors frequently will produce 
conflict with financial ambitions of the company and its owners, so the 
presentation of the financial information and social and environmental 
information within the same report becomes an important element in 
demonstrating how the company reconciles these matters (Gray et a.l, 1995b, 
p.82). 
5.10 Summary 
This chapter provides literature discussions of CSR disclosure in Islamic banks. 
Based on prior study of CSR disclosure level, its determinants and consequences, 
this study identifies several research gaps to be fulfilled. This chapter also provide a 
brief discussion of CSR media which general used in CSR reporting. In fulfilling the 
research gaps, this study will measure the CSR disclosure level (RQ 1), its 
determinants (RQ 2) and consequences (RQ 3), of GCC Islamic banks by measuring 
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the CSR disclosure level and develops the hypothesis to identify the determinants 
and consequences.  
In summary, the research hypotheses of this study can be classified into two main 
groups, based on research questions and objectives. The first group of hypotheses 
is related to the association between the corporate governance (CG) mechanisms 
and CSR disclosure level (RQ 2 and RO 2). The second group is related to the firm 
value (FV) and CSR disclosure level (RQ 3 and RO 3). 
The first group is the association between CG variables and CSR disclosure level. 
This hypothesis can be divided into four different groups, namely board-related 
variables, SSB-related variables, audit-related variables, and ownership-related 
variables.  
a) Board related variables: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and board size. 
H2: There is positive relationship between CSR disclosure and board gender 
composition. 
H3: There is positive relationship between CSR disclosure and board composition. 
H4: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and board meetings. 
H5: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and CEO duality.  
H6: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and cross-holding 
directorships.  
b) SSB-related variables 
H7: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and SSB size.  
H8: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and SSB cross-
membership.  
c) Audit-related variables 
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H9. There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and AC size.  
H10. There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and AC meetings.  
d) Ownership-related variables 
H11: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and institutional 
ownership. 
H12: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and foreign ownership. 
 
The second group is the association between firm value (FV) and CSR disclosure.  
H13: There is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value (FV).  
The next chapter will provide a discussion of research methodology and method 
used in achieved the RO 1, RO 2, and RO 3, and to answer RQ 1, RQ 2, and RQ 3. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
6.1 Overview 
It is necessary to determine the relevant methodology and methods that will be used 
in order to achieve the research aims, answer the research questions, and to test 
hypotheses, as well as how the data will be collected and how to measure the 
variables (Aryani, 2015). In conducting this study, the researcher verified a suitable 
methodology to ensure its consistency with both the research objectives and 
questions. In order to achieve the objectives and to answer the research questions, 
this section discusses the research philosophy, strategy, approach, methodology, 
and methods used to measure the CSR disclosure level, determinants and 
consequences.  
6.2 Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy can go from the “interpretivism” on one extreme to the 
“positivism” on the other extreme (Collis & Hussey, 2003). The interpretivism 
philosophy emphasises the differences between conducting research among people 
and objects of the natural sciences and, therefore, requires a social scientist to grasp 
the subjective meaning of social action (Bryman, 2004 and Saunders et al, 2009). 
Apart from interpretivism, the research philosophy employed in the current study is 
positivism. The positivism philosophy seeks to adopt a scientific detachment, free 
from the distorting potential opinion and bias, and consequently pursuit objectivity 
(Parsa, 2001). Therefore, under the positivism philosophy, the researcher is likely to 
use an existing theory to develop hypotheses, which would be tested and confirmed 
or rejected (Saunders et al., 2009). 
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6.3 Research Strategies 
There are two main research strategies that are widely employed in social science: 
“quantitative” and “qualitative”. The quantitative strategy emphasises quantification in 
the data collection, using mathematical models that link between a cause and effect 
relationship, and testing the hypotheses of the chosen theories. On the other hand, 
the qualitative strategy emphasises words and interpretation to discover the required 
knowledge, rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data. 
The quantitative strategy is most suited with the positivism philosophy (Crotty, 1998). 
Furthermore, the nature of this research objectives and research questions suggests 
the use of quantitative strategy. This strategy allows the quantification in the 
collection and analysis of data to test and interpret the association between variables 
(independent and dependent variables). It is more likely to answer the research 
questions and, therefore, generalize the results. 
6.4 Research Approach 
There are two main research approaches, namely the “deductive” and “inductive” 
approaches. The deductive approach is to start from a theory (or theories), and then 
the hypotheses are developed based on this theory (or these theories). A research 
strategy is designed to test the hypotheses depending on the collected data 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Unlike the deductive approach, under the inductive 
approach, the data related to the phenomenon is collected and analysed, then a 
theory is built up as a result of the conclusion from data analysis (Bryman & Bell, 
2003). 
For the purpose of the study, the deductive approach is more appropriate. Under this 
approach, research questions are established, then various hypotheses are 
developed based on the existing theory (or theories) and finally statistical techniques 
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are used to test the developed hypotheses, which lead to either accepting or 
rejecting the relationship between variables according to the chosen theory (or 
theories). 
6.5 Research Methodology 
This current study will investigate CSR disclosure and examine the hypothesis of its 
determinants and consequences. The data related to CSR disclosure, its 
determinants, and consequences is collected from annual reports, Bank Scopes and 
data stream databases. This current study used secondary data, namely as annual 
reports. The annual reports are downloaded from the bank‟s website. According to 
Hakim (1982), data that is collected from literature reviews and publications (such as 
journals, newspapers, books, and websites) are categorised as secondary data. He 
stated that there are seven benefits of conducting research using secondary data; 
firstly, the data already exists. Secondly, it is relatively easy to collect by searching 
the Internet, scanning newspapers, or by reading reports published by companies, 
governments, stock exchanges, public databases, or related departments.  Thirdly, 
the researcher does not gather data directly in the field because others have already 
collected it. Fourthly, the researcher can use the data in a variety of forms. Fifthly, it 
is more efficient and less expensive.  Sixthly, data can represent a national or 
international scope. Finally, the data is easy to collect over a long time period and it 
is easy to process with software. In this study, all data collected will be analysed 
using SPSS software, such as measuring the mean of CSR disclosure, and will test 
all the hypotheses. 
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6.6 Research Methods 
Methods, according to Crotty (1998, p. 3), are “the techniques or procedures used to 
gather and analyse data related to some research questions or hypothesis”. This 
research will adopt quantitative research methods in measuring the CSR disclosure 
of Islamic banks in the GCC. The financial report of sample Islamic banks from 2010-
2014 will be analysed using disclosure index and content analysis. There is neither a 
general definition for CSR, nor a certain set of CSR to be disclosed by GCC Islamic 
banks. Therefore, the manual content analysis could be a relevant approach to 
quantify CSR disclosures in sample Islamic banks. This traditional technique is used 
in prior studies (e.g., El-Halaby & Hussainey, 2015; Rahman et al., 2011; Mosaid & 
Boutti, 2012; Khan, 2010; Alotaibi and Hussainey, 2016). It helps to avoid many 
drawbacks of the automated content analysis. These drawbacks include misleading 
results because of using inappropriate/insufficient key words, or using the words in 
isolation of the whole meaning of the sentence, in addition to the limitations related 
to the software used to perform the analysis (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Hassan 
and Marston, 2010). 
CSR disclosure refers to the level of CSR information disclosed in the annual report. 
It is measured by the number of CSR information that is published by banks. To 
measure the CSR disclosure quantity in the study, the un-weighted approach is 
employed to code and measure CSR disclosures over the annual reports. Therefore, 
„1‟ is given for each CSR disclosed in the annual report, and „0‟ if there are no CSR 
disclosure items disclosed in the annual report. Each bank has been given a score of 
quantity, which represents the total number of the CSR disclosure items in the 
annual report. It includes mandatory and voluntary items as stated in AAOIFI, No 7, 
2010. 
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To investigate the determinants of CSR disclosure among the sample Islamic banks, 
annual reports have been used the main resources in collecting data. Whereas in 
measuring the firm value, data stream is used to obtain all relevant data. To test the 
hypotheses and examine the association between the main variables, this current 
study used OLS regression. 
6.7 Sample and Data 
For the purpose of this study, the researcher retrieved Islamic banks‟ annual reports 
from their websites. Similarly, to Farook et al. (2011), in this study, Islamic banks 
refer to commercial banks, service banks, and investments banks. These banks 
operate either as public listed companies, private, or government link companies. In 
this study, no distinction is drawn between the types of the banks because all the 
sample Islamic banks claim to comply with the Shariah. According to the Bankers 
database, from the record updated in June 2015, there are 62 full-fledged licensed 
Islamic banks in GCC. For the sake of consistency in the research sample, the 
researcher excluded Islamic banks‟ subsidiaries and banks, which have not 
published an English version of the annual report. Therefore, the researcher 
excluded 23 banks. Therefore, the final sample of this study consists of 39 Islamic 
banks in the GCC. This represents 63 % of the total sample, and it is in line with the 
minimum size required for multiple regressions (Coakes, 2005; Green, 1991). This 
dataset provides sufficient information of disclosure practices across Islamic banks 
operating in the GCC for the years 2010-2014; it involves 195 observations 
throughout the year.  
The study is conducted from 2010 due to the latest Governance Standards Issued by 
the AAOIFI in 2010; it attempts to measure the CSR disclosure practice among GCC 
Islamic banks after the issuance of that standard. During the conduction of this study, 
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the most recent available annual report produced by sample Islamic banks is 2014, 
so the researcher decided to focus in that time frame. This study also narrowly 
focuses on GCC Islamic banks, due to their active contribution to Islamic banking 
development since 1975 and its positive growth. Furthermore, due to the 
establishment of the AAOIFI in Bahrain, which issued several standards for Islamic 
banks, such as Governance Standard No.7, 2010, which is focus on CSR disclosure. 
It motivates the researcher to investigate whether the AAOIFI influences other GCC 
countries in their CSR disclosure practice. Table 7; provide the sample breakdown 
across countries.  
Table 7: Sample breakdown across countries 
No Countries 
Total Number of Islamic 
Banks 
Sample Islamic 
Banks 
1 Bahrain 27 15 
2 Qatar 9 6 
3 Kuwait 6 3 
4 KSA 6 4 
5 Oman 5 3 
6 UAE 9 8 
 
TOTAL 62 39 
Source: Bank scope Database and Data Stream, June 2015 
 
6.8 Content Analysis 
There are many definitions of content analysis. The most widely accepted definition 
is the one offered by Berelson (1952). Berelson (1952, p.18) defines content analysis 
as a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of 
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the manifest content of communication'. Similarly, Carney (1972: 21) describes it as 
a research technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically 
identifying specified characteristics of messages'. Krippendorff (1980, p.21) 
describes this approach as “a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their context”. According to Gray et al. (1995), contents 
analysis is a method or technique employed to measure objectively, systematically 
and quantitatively the content of communication. Weber (1985), as quoted in 
Hackston and Milne (1996), defined content analysis as a method of codifying the 
text or content of a piece of writing in various groups or categories, depending on the 
selected criteria. 
This concept has been further defined by Guthrie and Abeysekera (2006) as a 
technique for gathering data contained in the annual reports and it involves codifying 
qualitative and quantitative information and pre-defined categories, in order to derive 
patterns in the presentation and reporting of information. Social disclosure can be 
measured in a few different ways; Belkaoui and Kaprik (1999) proposed four 
measurements to be used: a) social disclosure scale by Ernst and Ernst (1973), b) 
Percentage of proposal in the annual report, c) Quality of disclosure in the annual 
report, and d) quantity of disclosure in annual report. 
According to Hussainey (2004), content analysis has many advantages. Firstly, it 
looks directly at texts and, hence, looks at a central aspect of social communication. 
Secondly, it is easy to perform both quantitative and qualitative analysis but, in this 
study, the researcher will focus on quantitative analysis, rather than qualitative 
analysis. Thirdly, it provides valuable historical insights through the analysis of 
textual content for different periods and it is useful for examining trends and patterns 
in documents over time. However, there is no method free from limitations and 
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criticisms; this approach can be extremely time-consuming and expensive 
(Hussainey, 2004), especially when analysing large volumes of textual data. Human 
coders also could make mistakes during their analyses (Kim & Kuljis, 2010). They 
could overlook some important text when handling a large volume of textual data. 
Content analysis also requires researchers to dedicate many hours in labour-
intensive reading processes (Boesso and Kumar, 2007).  
Content analysis has been widely employed in previous CSR research (Gray et al., 
1995) and is the most common method of analysing social and environmental 
reporting, particularly in firms (Milne and Adler, 1999). Although CSR reporting can 
be made through a variety of channels, such as advertising, promotional leaflets, 
company websites, interim reports and press releases, a substantial proportion of 
research has employed the annual report as the main data source of a company‟s 
attitudes toward social reporting. Moreover, in developing countries, other disclosure 
channels have little use (Abu-Baker and Naser, 2000), and the annual reports are 
the best source of information. Content analysis is also selected as a tool to study 
CSR reporting in a number of studies, proving to be a well-established method in this 
type of research (Aribi & Gao, 2010). Content analysis also has a strong foundation 
in the social disclosure literature since 1978 (Ingram, 1978; Ingram & Frazier, 1980; 
Guthrie & Parker, 1989). The method has been widely adopted in prior social 
responsibility disclosures studies (Platonova, 2014; Zainal et al., 2013; Ali Aribi & 
Arun, 2014; Gamerschlag et al., 2010). 
To achieve the research objective, manual content analysis methods have been 
used to record the data. Traditional content analysis via manual reading is generally 
more effective than computerised analysis in identifying certain themes in the texts. 
(Hussainey, 2004 ;El-Halaby & Hussainey, 2015).  
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In performing the manual content analysis procedure, the disclosure index will be 
crosschecked with the annual report to detect the CSR information disclosed by the 
Islamic banks. The annual report will be read line by line, the score (1) will be 
awarded if the banks disclose the CSR information listed in the disclosure index and 
(0) if otherwise. Numerous prior literature studies have employed this technique in 
assessing either the quality or quantity of disclosure in the annual report (e.g., 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; Cooke and Haniffa, 2002). To 
enhance the reliability and validity of the index, the same index is carefully reviewed 
by the researcher and academic experts to ensure it produces the same result. It is 
to ensure that the same coder is consistent over time when coding the same item of 
the indices (stability), the coders produce the same results when coding the same 
item (reproducibility), and ensure its accuracy as well (Beattie and Thomson, 2007). 
6.9 CSR Disclosure Index 
To provide an answer for RQ 1, this study conducts an empirical investigation into 
CSR disclosure level using a comprehensive un-weighted disclosure index. 
According to Beattie et al. (2004, p.126), "disclosure index studies are based on the 
general principles of content analysis – a well-established method in the social 
sciences”. It is supported by Dragomir (2010), disclosure index studies form a part of 
content analysis, “which involves classifying text units into categories” (p.368). Since 
the analysis in this study focused on sections of the text that relate to CSR 
information, it is important for the researcher to develop a disclosure index as a 
'partial type of content analysis' (Beattie et al., 2004). Yusoff et al. (2006, p10) argue 
that “using disclosure index as a part of content analysis is considered a most useful 
technique as a result of its important role, where (a) it is based on the „breadth‟ 
(number of different topics) and „depth‟ (specificity of information provided) and (b) it 
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may avoid elements of subjectivity”. Many studies have used a disclosure index as a 
research method (e.g. Cheung et al., 2010; Hossain et al., 2006; Maali et al., 2006).  
Guthrie and Abeysekera (2006, p.11) state that “a disclosure index is a research 
instrument comprising a series of pre-selected items which, when scored, provide a 
measure that indicates a level of disclosure in the specific context for which the index 
was devised”. It could identify the level of disclosure and particular predefined 
information in the Islamic banks‟ annual report; in this study, it measures CSR 
disclosure scores for Islamic banks. Basically, the main approach that has been 
used in the previous studies was initialised by selecting a group of items that will 
represent the disclosure index, which will then be used to screen the annual report.  
Prior research (e.g., Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; 
Williams and Zinkin, 2010; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006) normally 
developed the disclosure index using several steps. Thus, in conducting this study, 
the researcher implements these steps. First, in measuring the CSR disclosure, the 
items in the disclosure index were develop based on AAOIFI, No. 7, 2010 and 
supported by extensive past literature (e.g., Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2007; Farag et al., 2014; Aribi & Gao, 2012; Hussainey & Elsayed, 2011). The 
purpose of reviewing prior research in constructing the index is to get a better 
understanding and idea on the items constructed in prior CSR disclosure studies. 
 Second, the selection of items to be included in the index is chosen very carefully. 
Then, it is divided based on its category, either mandatory or voluntary, as 
suggested by AAOIFI, No. 7, 2010. The main dimensions of the index consist of four 
main aspects, which cover the issues of social responsibility within organizations, 
social responsibility in its relationship with customers and clients, social responsibility 
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in screening its investments, and social responsibility in its relationship with greater 
society. The testable index, which consists of 11 dimensions, was designed to 
measure the volume of disclosures. The purpose of the dimensions is to determine 
the themes of CSR using the disclosures checklist and the location of the CSR items 
in the annual reports, following the approach used in the study by Mustafa (2004). 
The themes have been clearly identified to ensure that each definition is 
unambiguous and mutually exclusive in order to eliminate overlapping interpretations. 
Table 8 presents the summary of the main and sub- dimensions in measuring CSR 
disclosure practices among the sample Islamic banks in the GCC. 
Table 8: Summary of CSR disclosure dimensions develop based on AAOIFI, 2010 
and prior research. 
Main Dimensions Sub-Dimensions Source 
 
 
Social responsibility within 
organizations 
1. Employee welfare (M) AAOIFI, 2010; Vinnicombe, 
2010; Ullah, 2013; Aribi, 
2009; Taha, 2010 
2. Policy for social 
development and 
environment-based 
investment quotas. (V) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Aribi, 2009; 
Aribi & Gao, 2012 
3. Earning and expenditure 
prohibited by Shariah (M) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Maali et al., 
2006; Aribi, 2009; Aribi & 
Gao, 2012 
 
 
Social responsibility in its 
relationship with customers 
and clients 
4. Par excellence customer 
services (V) 
 
AAOIFI, 2010; Vinnicombe 
2010; Ullah, 2013; Aribi, 
2009; Taha, 2010 
5. Policy for dealing with 
clients (M) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Belal et al., 
2014 
6. Qard-Hassan (benevolent 
loan) (V) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Vinnicombe, 
2010; Ullah, 2013; Aribi, 
2009; Taha, 2010; Haniffa, 
1999 
 7. Micro and small business AAOIFI, 2010; Maali et al., 
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Social Responsibility in 
screening its investments 
and social savings, 
investments and 
development. (V) 
2006; Taha, 2010 
8.Policy for screening clients 
(M) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Maali et al., 
2006; Aribi, 2009; Aribi & 
Gao, 2012 
 
 
Social responsibility in its 
relationship with greater 
society 
 
9. Zakat (M) 
 
AAOIFI, 2010; Vinnicombe, 
2010; Ullah, 2013; Aribi, 
2009; Taha, 2010; Haniffa, 
1999 
10.Charitable activities (V) AAOIFI, 2010; Vinnicombe, 
2010; Ullah, 2013; Aribi, 
2009; Taha, 2010 
11.Waqf (endowment) 
management (V) 
AAOIFI, 2010; Aribi, 2009; 
Aribi & Gao, 2012 
Note: (M) - Mandatory Conduct   (V) - Voluntary/Recommended Conduct 
 
Third, the verification of disclosure index takes place. Some research employs an 
independent external examiner to validate the disclosure index (e.g., Barako et al., 
2006; Hossain et al., 1995; Singhvi and Desai, 1971). They will choose the 
practitioners or experts in the accounting areas to verify the list of the disclosure 
index. In this study, the researcher verifies items constructed in the index by 
consultation with academic experts and researchers who have an accounting 
background and knowledge regarding CSR disclosure. 
Fourth, after validating the index, the researcher has to decide whether they want to 
assign a weighting to the disclosure index or not. In this study, an un-weighted 
disclosure index is used to determine CSR disclosure level. This method has been 
commonly used by previous researchers (e.g., Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Maali et 
al., 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007) in measuring disclosure practices. Thus, the 
researcher adopted this method in measuring the CSR disclosure quantity of Islamic 
banks in the GCC. According to Gray et al. (1992), those who want to employ an un-
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weighted disclosure index have to treat all items in the list as equally important and 
the dichotomous method will be used to score the item. The firm will get a score of 
“1” if they disclosed the item and “0” if they have not disclosed.  
Although the disclosure index is subject to controversy, especially on the subjectivity 
involved from researchers‟ discretionary, one may admit that the disclosure index 
has its own strength (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). The complete disclosure index 
that will be used to screen the annual report can reveal the extent of the disclosure 
quality and quantity (Gray, et al., 1992). The disclosure index is very comprehensive 
and robust in nature because it was created based on many sources including past 
literature and accounting standards, crosschecked against the disclosure items, 
screened to current announcements by standard setters and validated by experts 
(Maali et al., 2006). 
6.10 Unit of Analysis 
The common methods used in content analysis studies to quantify disclosure are 
number of characters, words, sentences, pages, and proportion of CSR disclosure 
volume to total disclosure (Taha, 2010). Previous literature does not provide a 
theoretical justification for the choice of any one of these measures (Rahman et al., 
2011; Street & Bryant, 2000; Farook, 2011; Aribi, 2009; Belal, Abdelsalam and 
Nizamee, 2014). From the researcher‟s knowledge most of prior research uses 
character and words in measuring the CSR information from the annual report. The 
measurement of quantity of disclosure, in terms of words, was justified by 
maintaining that volume of disclosure can thereby be recorded in greater detail 
(Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010).  Zeghal & Ahmed (1990) indicated 
that words are the smallest unit of measurement and can be expected to provide the 
maximum strength to the study in assessing disclosure quantity.  
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In examining the CSR disclosure level, this study uses keywords to find CSR 
information in the annual report, based on CSR dimensions developed using AAOIFI, 
2010 standards. To overcome an ambiguous measurement problem, the researcher 
takes a precautionary measure to enhance the validity and the reliability of the 
analysis. All annual reports have been carefully read line-by-line to find the CSR 
information using keywords related to the items measure. For example, in measuring 
the CSR information regarding Waqf in the annual report, several keywords have 
been used to find that information: Waqf, endowment, endowment management and 
Awqaf. Then the score will be awarded (1) if there is Waqf information presented in 
the annual report and (0) if otherwise. 
In general, in order to explore CSR disclosure practices of Islamic banks in the form 
of an index, a Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Index (CSRDI) score is 
calculated. The quantity of disclosure is measured through the construction of a 
disclosure index. This process consists of the analysis of the content of the 
information. The approach to scoring items is essentially dichotomous in that an item 
in the research instrument scores „1‟ if communicated and „0‟ if it is not (see :Aribi & 
Arun, 2014; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007), and is additive 
and equally weighted to avoid potential scoring bias and scaling problems (Cooke, 
1989). The method used in measuring the CSR disclosure level of the sample 
Islamic banks is as follows:  
 
Where: 
CSRDI = corporate social reporting index score for company i. and for the year t 
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N = number of items in the index 
  j= indicates each item included in the index 
Thus, the value of the index, for each companies i for the year t, is obtained as the 
sum of the scores assigned to each item in Score (j). 
It can be standardized as follows: 
 
6.11 Designing the Research Instrument and Ensuring its Validity 
To design the initial research instrument, many considerations are taken into account. 
First, the research instrument should be relevant to measure the CSR disclosure of 
each dimension. Second, the eleven CSR disclosure dimensions are included within 
the initial checklist. Third, each CSR item is categorised into different themes in 
order to conduct further analyses, such as social responsibility within organizations, 
social responsibility in its relations with customers and clients, social responsibility in 
screening its investments, and social responsibility in its relationship with greater 
society. 
Validity is defined as the extent to which any instrument measures what it is intended 
to measure (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Following prior disclosure studies (Hope, 
2003; Tsalavoutas et al., 2010; Hassan and Marston, 2010), validity is ensured 
through the assessment of content validity. Hence, it is achieved by relying on the 
literature while constructing the instrument so as to make sure that the instrument 
contains relevant and adequate items to measure CSR disclosures. 
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Following previous studies (e.g. Tsalavoutas et al., 2010), after designing the initial 
checklist, it is reviewed independently by the researcher and supervisors in order to 
achieve instrument validity. All suggestions and comments are discussed and 
considered in order to improve the validity of the research instrument.  
6.12 Assessing the Reliability of the Research Instrument: A Pilot Study 
Reliability is the extent to which the instrument produces the same results on 
repeated trials (Hassan and Marston, 2010). Reliability could also be defined as the 
ability of different coders to code the same text in the same way (Weber, 1990). Prior 
research suggests that content analysis might not be as reliable as intended if it is 
conducted only once or only by one person (Neuendorf, 2002; Hussainey et al., 
2003). In addition, it is argued that the reliability of computerized content analysis is 
based on the reliability of the coding schemes, in this case the lists of keywords, 
designed by the researcher (Sydserff & Weetman, 2002). Thus, disclosure measure 
has to be subjected to reliability tests in order to get useful inferences from the 
instrument in research (Beattie et al., 2004). Inter-rater reliability is the most 
frequently reported measure to assess the reliability (Beattie et al., 2004). By 
comparing the results produced by more than one coder: the more the results are 
related, the greater the reliability of the instrument. 
To assess the reliability of the research instrument, a pilot study was conducted. It 
also aimed at checking the variation between firms in CSR reporting using the 
research instrument. The pilot study was conducted on a sample of 15 annual 
reports for the year 2013-2014. This sample was randomly selected from different 
countries to measure the quantity of CSR reporting. This enabled the researcher to 
get an initial idea about the variation between firms in different countries with respect 
to CSR reporting. 
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To improve the reliability, decision rules were produced and used as a reference in 
coding. Then, the researcher and three independent academic experts, who have an 
accounting background and knowledge regarding to CSR disclosure, independently 
coded the annual reports of the pilot study sample using the initial checklist. This 
procedure aimed to ensure the consistency in applying decision rules. Finally, the 
results obtained were checked, and found to be too close. Furthermore, total scores 
will be tested for reliability and validity by using SPSS. If the Cronbach‟s Alpha 
shows more than 70%, it means the measurement is reliable (Aryani, 2015). The 
result, indicated in Table 9, shows that Cronbach‟s alpha is 0.815 (> 0.70), meaning 
the initial checklist and items used in the pilot study have a high reliability. It is 
consistent and can be used more than once or in another research, whereby the 
result will produce a consistent data when those items are used in other research. 
Table 9: Reliability test: Cronbach Alpha Result 
Cronbach‟s 
Alpha 
Cronbach Alpha‟s Based on 
Standardized Items 
 
No of items 
 
0.815 
 
0.705 
 
11 
 
6.13 CSR Disclosure Determinants 
6.13.1 Regression Model 
To measure CSR disclosure determinants for Islamic banks, this study used content 
analysis as a method of coding, which has been widely employed in previous studies 
of corporate disclosure (Abdul Rahman et al., 2010; Maali et al., 2006). To test for an 
association between corporate disclosures levels with CG variables (board, SSB, AC, 
and ownership variables), one comprehensive index that consists of 6 board-related 
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variables, 2 SSB-related variables, 2 AC-related variables, and 2-ownership 
variables have been construct and calculated. The study also adds control variables 
in that index; it consists of 5 firms‟ characteristics variables and 2 country-specific 
variables. The scores for the index are calculated by assigning equal weightings to 
each item of disclosure and the indices were derived by computing the ratio of actual 
scores awarded to the maximum possible score attainable for items that were 
applicable to each Islamic bank. Each item of disclosure was scored without a 
weighting on a dichotomous basis, taking the commonly used approach of giving the 
item a score of one (1) and zero (0) (e.g., Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). To empirically investigate the relationship between CSR disclosure 
and CG-specific characteristics in Islamic banks, the study used the following OLS 
(ordinary least square) regressions to estimate the association between CSRD and 
corporate governance variables, using the same procedure as (Chan et al. 2012). 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is the most commonly used technique in disclosure 
studies (Leventis, 2001) where the dependent variable is the compliance level/CSR 
disclosure score and the independent variables include all the CG variables. 
Therefore, this study uses the following OLS transformed multiple regression models: 
 
Where: 
= is the total CSR disclosure score provided by CSR disclosure index, which 
measures the level of disclosure CSR in the sample Islamic banks i at year t or 
known as the dependent variable  
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.         = the intercept 
β1- β12 = independent variables. CG Variables consists of: B. Size (board size), B. 
Gender (board gender), B. Comp (board composition), B. Meet (board meeting), B. 
Dual (board duality), B. Cross Hold (board cross holding), SSB size, SSB cross 
membership, AC Size (audit committee size), AC Meet (audit committee meeting), 
Ins Own (institutional ownership), and For. Own (foreign ownership) 
β13- β19= control variables. Firms (in this study refers to Islamic banks) and 
country-specific variables consist of: F. Size (firm size), F. Age (firm age), F. 
Profitability (firm profitability), F. Leverage (firm leverage), F. Liquidity (firm liquidity), 
GDP (gross domestic product of the country) and Corruption (the corruption index of 
the country). 
Year dummy variables = Year 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 as a dummy variable. 
e = the error term, the difference between the predicted and observed value of the 
CSR for sample company.  
6.13.2 Dependent Variable (CSRD score) 
In examining the CSR disclosure determinants, this study used CSR disclosure 
score as dependent variable. 
6.13.3 Independent Variables (CG mechanisms) 
To examine the determinants of CSRD, the author collected CG information of the 
banks, consisting of board- and SSB- related variables from the sample banks‟ 
annual reports.  
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6.13.4 Control Variables  
The study uses such firm characteristics as control variables. Firm and country-
specific characteristics variables of the sample Islamic banks have been collected 
from various databases such as DataStream, World Bank, Transparency index 
database and annual reports. Table 10; provide a summary of dependent, 
independent and control variables definition and measurement used to examine 
CSR disclosure determinants. 
Table 10: Dependent, independent and control variables definition and measurement 
Variable Definition Measurement Source 
1. CSRD  Quantity of CSRD score 
by sample banks 
The percentage of 
CSR information 
disclosure by Islamic 
banks 
Annual Report 
1. B. SIZE Board size The total number of 
directors on board 
Annual Report 
2. B. GENDER Gender of BOD A dummy variable 
equals 1 if the all 
boards member of 
the firm is male and 0 
otherwise. 
Annual Report 
3. B. COMP Board composition 
- ratio of exec and non-
exec in the board 
The board 
composition is 
calculated as the 
number of non-
executive directors 
divided by board size 
Annual Report 
4. B. MEET Board meetings The total number of 
board meetings 
during the year 
Annual Report 
5. CEO. DUAL Role of CEO duality A dummy variable 
equals 1 if the 
chairman is the same 
person as the CEO 
of the firm,0 
otherwise 
Annual Report 
6. B. CROSS Cross Holding 
Directorship 
A dummy variable 
equals 1 if the 
Director (regardless 
of executive or non-
executive) sits on 
more than one board, 
0 otherwise. 
Annual Report 
7. SSB SIZE Shariah Supervisory The total number of Annual Report 
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Board size Shariah supervisory 
board committee 
8. SSB CROSS Shariah supervisory 
board cross 
membership 
A dummy variable 
equals 1 if the SSB 
member sits more 
than one board and, 
0 otherwise. 
Annual Report 
9. AC SIZE Audit committee size The total number of 
audit committee 
members. 
Annual Report 
10. AC MEET Audit committee 
meeting 
The total number of 
AC meetings during 
the year 
Annual Report 
11. INS OWN35 Institutional ownership The aggregate 
percentage of shares 
that are held by 
institutional 
shareholders.  
Annual Report 
/DataStream/ 
12.FOR OWN Foreign Ownership The aggregate 
percentage of shares 
that hold by foreign 
shareholders. 
Annual Report 
/DataStream 
13. F. SIZE Firm size The natural logarithm 
of firms‟ total assets. 
 Data stream  
14. F. AGE Firm age The age of the firm Data stream 
15. F. PROFIT Profitability The profitability 
measured by return 
on equity  
Data stream 
16. F.LEVERAGE Leverage The ratio of total 
debt/total equity. 
Data 
stream/Annual 
report 
17. F. LIQUID Liquidity Current 
assets/Current 
liabilities  
Data stream 
18. GDP Growth domestic 
products 
GDP of the sample 
countries 
World Bank 
19. Corruption Corruption rate Corruption rate of the 
sample countries 
Transparency 
index 
 
                                            
35
 In collecting the data for INSOWN and FOROWN, the researcher analyze few source of information in 
measuring the aggregate percentage of shares hold by institutional/foreign shareholders in companies annual 
reports and data stream 
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6.14 CSR Disclosure Consequences 
6.14.1 Dependent Variables:  
To measure CSR disclosure consequences for Islamic banks, empirical studies used 
different proxies in order to measure firm value (FV). Among 95 studies that Margolis 
and Walsh (2001) reviewed, 49 adopted accounting measures, 12 adopted market 
measures, and the rest used a mixed set. The study uses three alternative 
dependent variables associated with firm value (FV) to test the hypothesis, which is 
consistent with several literatures (Sheu et al., 2010; Barontini and Caprio, 2006). 
The three measures have diverse theoretical implications (Hillman and Keim, 2001; 
Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). Selecting three proxies may support the researcher to 
construct the holistic view of the impacts of disclosure on firm value (FV) through 
different proxies. Further discussion of firm value proxies follows. 
6.14.2 MTBV 
In measuring the impact of CSRD to firm value, the current study used several 
indicators, such as market-to-book value of the companies. The market-to-book ratio, 
which is also known as price to book ratio, measures the market value of a company 
relative to its book or accounting value. The market value of the company is its value 
at any point in time, as determined by the financial marketplace. The book value, or 
historical value, is almost always lower than the market value since some assets 
may be off-balance sheet items. The market value and book value of liabilities tend 
to be closer in value than the market value and book value of assets. This is 
because liabilities that are due in one year, or current liabilities, usually retain their 
book value. 
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Other studies used market-to-book value to reflect the market value of the firm 
compared with its book value (e.g., Hassan et al., 2009; Uyar and Kiliç, 2012). 
Additionally, market-to-book ratio is also used in a further analysis so as to check the 
robustness of results (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009). Regarding 
market-to-book ratio (MTBV), it is measured as the ratio of market value of equity to 
book value of equity. This ratio is a good indicator of how a firm is valued by 
investors. If the ratio exceeds 1, it means that the firm is overvalued by investors and 
vice versa (Hassan et al., 2009)36. The market-to-book ratio is used by security 
analysts to determine whether a stock is undervalued or overvalued. If a stock is 
undervalued, the price is expected to rise. If it is overvalued, the price is expected to 
fall. Investors looking for value stocks often look for low market-to-book companies. 
According to Khlif (2015), MTBV can be calculated as follows:  
Market-to-book = Share price of the stock / Book value per share 
In this current study, the data of MTBV of the sample Islamic banks are collected 
from the DataStream database. To empirically investigate the relationship between 
firm value (using MTBV as a proxy) and CSRD in the Islamic banks, the study uses 
the following OLS regressions: 
Model 1: Firm Value (FV) using MTBV as a proxy. 
FV(MTBV)n = α + 𝛽1CSRD+ 𝛽2 B.SIZE n+ 𝛽𝛽3 B.Comp n+ 𝛽𝛽4 CEO Dual n+ 𝛽𝛽5 
F.Size n+ 𝛽6 F.Profit n+ 𝛽7 F.Leverage n+ 𝛽8 C.GDP n+ Year dummy variable+  ɛ  
Where: 
                                            
36
 A logarithm transformation is used by Hassan et.al,(2009) in order to bring the distribution of TQ and MTBV 
more near to normality  
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FV (MTBV) = firm value measured using MTBV as a proxy for the sample Islamic 
banks, also known as the dependent variable. Data gathered from DataStream 
database using data code: MTBV  
.  = the intercept 
β1 = Independent variables (CSR disclosure score of the sample Islamic banks) 
β2 - β8= Control variables (B. Size (board size), B. Comp (board composition), CEO 
Dual (CEO duality), F. Size (refers to Islamic banks size), F. Profit (refer to Islamic 
banks‟ profitability), F. Leverage (refers to Islamic banks leverage) and C. GDP 
(growth domestic product of the sample countries). 
Dummy variable= the study uses year as a dummy variable 
 e = the error term, the difference between the predicted and observed value of the 
MTBV for the sample banks.  
6.14.3 Market Capitalization (WC08001) or MC 
Another variable in measuring firm value is market capitalization (WC08001). Market 
capitalization data of the sample Islamic banks was collected from the Data Stream 
database. In general, market capitalization represents the total dollar market value of 
a company's outstanding shares. Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying a 
company's outstanding shares by the current market price of one share. The 
investment community uses this figure to determine a company's size. As opposed 
to sales or total asset figures, this study uses MC, which is used in the corporate 
disclosure literature (Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). 
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To empirically investigate the relationship between firm value (using WC08001 as a 
proxy) and CSRD in Islamic banks, the study uses the following OLS regressions: 
Model 2: Firm Value (FV) using MC (WC08001) as a proxy. 
FV(WC08001) n = α + 𝛽1CSRD+ 𝛽2 B.SIZE n+ 𝛽𝛽3 B.Comp n+ 𝛽𝛽4 CEO Dual n+ 
𝛽𝛽5 F.Size n+ 𝛽𝛽6 F.Profit n+ 𝛽𝛽7 F.Leverage n+ 𝛽𝛽8 C.GDP n+ Dummy variable+  
ɛ  
Where: 
FV (WC08001) = is the firm value measured using market capitalization (WC08001) 
as a proxy for the sample Islamic banks, also known as the dependent variable. Data 
gathered from Data Stream database using data code: WC08001 
.         = the intercept 
β1 = Independent variables (CSR disclosure score of the sample Islamic banks) 
β2 - β8= Control variables (B. Size (board size), B. Comp (board composition), CEO 
Dual (CEO duality), F. Size (refers to Islamic banks size), F. Profit (refers to Islamic 
banks profitability), F. Leverage (refers to Islamic banks leverage) and C. GDP 
(gross domestic product of the sample countries) 
Dummy variable= the study use year as a dummy variable 
e = the error term, the difference between the predicted and observed value of the 
market capitalization for the sample banks 
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6.14.4 Tobin Q (TQ) 
According to the theoretical framework, a relationship is expected between CSR 
reporting quantity and firm value. Empirical studies used different proxies in order to 
capture investors‟ reactions to the information disclosed. For instance, stock return is 
used in many of previous studies to investigate the effect of released information 
(e.g., Conover and Wallace, 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Bloomfield and Wilks, 2000; 
Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Hussainey and Mouselli, 2010; 
Roychowdhury and Sletten, 2012; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). In addition, Tobin‟s Q is 
also used to measure firm value in some studies (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Laporta et 
al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009; Aggarwal, 2009; Setia-
Atmaja, 2009; Ezat, 2010).  
Following prior studies (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Laporta et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009; Aggarwal, 2009), Tobin‟s Q ratio is 
used as a proxy to measure the dependent variable (firm value) in the main analysis. 
Tobin‟s Q, equal to the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement cost of its 
physical assets (Morck et al., 1988, p. 296), or „the ratio of the market value of 
assets to their replacement value at the end of the most recent fiscal year‟ (La Porta 
et al., 2002, p.1156). This ratio implies the investors‟ perception of the value of a firm 
by reflecting this perception on ratio‟s value. If the ratio is larger than one, it will refer 
to an improvement in that firm value, due to the efficient usage of its resources 
management and vice versa (Hassan et al., 2009). 
Prior empirical studies also used Tobin Q as a proxy in measuring firm value to 
examine the effect of corporate governance on financial performance (Bhagat and 
Black, 2002; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Adopting an approach used in prior 
studies (Khlif, 2015; Alotaibi and Hussainey, 2016), the study also uses Tobin Q as a 
194 
 
proxy for firm value. According to Tjia & Setiawati (2012), Tobin‟s Q ratio can be 
defined as: Tobin‟s Q= (TMV+DEBT)/ TA. TMV is the total market value of the firm, 
comprising the market value of the common and the preferred stocks. DEBT is the 
book value of the firm‟s debt; in this study, the researcher used total firm liabilities 
(WC03351). TA (WC02999) is the book value of total assets. All data gathered from 
DataStream database. To empirically investigate the relationship between firm value 
(using Tobin Q as a proxy) and CSRD in Islamic banks, the study uses the following 
OLS regressions: 
 Model 3: Firm Value (FV) using Tobin Q (TQ) as a proxy. 
FV(TQ)n = α + 𝛽1CSRD+ 𝛽2 B.SIZE n+ 𝛽𝛽3 B.Comp n+ 𝛽𝛽4 CEO Dual n+ 𝛽𝛽5 
F.Size n+ 𝛽𝛽6 F.Profit n+ 𝛽𝛽7 F.Leverage n+ 𝛽𝛽8 C.GDP n+ Dummy variable+  ɛ  
Where: 
FV (TQ) = is the firm value measured using Tobin‟s Q (TQ) as a proxy for the sample 
Islamic banks, also known as a dependent variable. Tobin‟s Q ratio can be defined 
as: Tobin‟s Q= (TMV+DEBT)/ TA. TMV is the total market value of the firm, 
comprising the market value of the common and the preferred stocks. DEBT is the 
book value of the firm‟s debt. In this study, the researcher used total firm liabilities 
(WC03351). TA (WC02999) is the book value of total assets.   
.         = the intercept 
β1 = Independent variables (CSR disclosure score of the sample Islamic banks) 
β2 - β8= Control variables (B. Size (board size), B. Comp (board composition), CEO 
Dual (CEO duality), F. Size (refers to Islamic banks size), F. Profit (refers to Islamic 
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banks‟ profitability), F. Leverage (refer to Islamic banks‟ leverage), and C. GDP 
(growth domestic product of the sample countries). 
Dummy variable = the study uses year as a dummy variable 
e = the error term, the difference between the predicted and observed value of the 
TQ for the sample banks.  
6.14.5 Independent Variables 
In examining the CSR disclosure consequences, this study used CSR disclosure 
score as an independent variable. 
6.14.6 Control Variables 
In addition to the above dependent and independent variables, as well as to avoid 
model misspecification, this study considers additional variables, which might also 
influence firm value (FV). Therefore, this study added variables concerned with CG 
(board size, board composition and CEO duality), firm characteristics (size, 
profitability, leverage), and country specific variables (GDP growth). This study also 
uses year as a dummy variable. Drawing upon agency theory, the broad objective of 
CG mechanisms is to align managers‟ interests with shareholders‟ interests. It is 
predicted that CG mechanisms motivate managers to enhance shareholders‟ value 
(Bruce et al., 2007). Ntim et al. (2012) found that good CG practices enhance firm 
value (FV). Thus, this current study considers several CG mechanisms as control 
variables on firm value (FV) such as: board size, board composition, and CEO 
duality. Table 11 presents summary of the dependent, independent, and control 
variables, their definition and measurement in measuring CSR dislcosure 
consequences. 
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Table 11: A summary of dependent, independent and control variable definitions and 
measurement in measuring CSR disclosure consequences. 
Variables Definition Measurement Source 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
MTBV Market-to-book 
value ratio 
The natural 
logarithm of market 
value of equity to 
book value of 
equity (WC03501) 
ratio. 
 
Data Stream 
MC (WC08001) Firm value based 
on market 
capitalization 
By multiplying a 
company's shares 
outstanding by the 
current market 
price of one share 
 
Data Stream 
(WC08001) 
TQ Tobin Q The natural 
logarithm of: (total 
assets (WC02999) 
+ market value of 
equity - total 
common equity 
(WC03501))/ total 
assets (WC02999) 
  
Data Stream 
 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 1. CSRD CSR disclosure 
level of the sample 
Islamic banks 
The percentage of 
CSR information 
disclosure by 
Islamic banks 
Annual Report 
and Website 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
2. B.Size Board size The total number of 
directors on board 
 
Annual Report 
3.B.Comp Board composition 
- ratio of exec and 
non-exec in the 
board 
The board 
composition is 
calculated as the 
number of non-
executive directors 
divided by board 
size 
 
Annual Report 
4. CEO Dual Role of CEO 
duality 
A dummy variable 
equals 1 if the 
chairman is the 
same person as 
the CEO of the 
firm, 0 if otherwise 
 
Annual Report 
5. F.Size Firm size The natural 
logarithm of Islamic 
 Data stream  
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banks total assets. 
6. F.Profit Profitability The profitability 
measured by return 
on equity of Islamic 
banks  
 
Data stream 
7. Leverage Leverage The ratio of total 
debt / total equity. 
Of Islamic banks 
Data 
stream/Annual 
report 
8. GDP Gross domestic 
products 
GDP of the sample 
countries 
World Bank 
 
6.14.6 Regression Model 
This current study used 5-year data in measuring the association between 
dependent and independent variables. To test the hypothesis, this current study 
applies 3 OLS regressions and the study employs the following regression model. 
The dependent variable is MTBV for model 1. As an alternative proxy for firm value, 
the study also uses the MC (WC08001) as dependent variable for model 2, and 
Tobin Q (TQ) in model 3. Independent variables include the aggregate CSR 
disclosure levels of sample Islamic banks.  
6.15 Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of the research methodology and methods 
used in this study to achieve the research aim. It provides an insight into the whole 
research process, which is imperative for the purpose of ensuring the originality and 
quality of the research. In achieving the main aims of this research, the researcher 
decided to narrowly focus on the quantitative approach. Using manual content 
analysis approach, a disclosure index has been developed to measure the CSR 
disclosure level among the sample Islamic banks. In ensuring the validity of the 
index, the researcher takes precautionary measure in developing the index; all items 
have been checked twice by different coders to make sure the instrument measures 
198 
 
what it is intended to measure. Then, the researcher assesses the reliability of the 
research instrument through conducting a pilot test. The score gathers from the pilot 
test have been checked using SPSS software. The result shows that Cronbach‟s 
alpha is 0.815 (> 0.70). That means the initial checklist and items used in the pilot 
study have a high reliability. It is consistent and can be used more than once or in 
another research whereby the result will produce a consistent data when those items 
are used in other research. 
This chapter also discussed the dependent and independent variables used to 
examine the determinants and consequences of CSR disclosure. The main variables 
used in examining CSR disclosure determinants are narrowly focused on corporate 
governance characteristics. This study used firm value to examine the economic 
impact of CSR disclosure among GCC Islamic banks. To test the hypothesis 
developed in this study, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method has been used to 
examine the relationship between all the variables. The next chapter will provide 
empirical findings of the study and answers for RQ 1, RQ 2 and RQ 3. 
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CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS  
7.1 Overview 
This chapter has five main sections; it will provide a descriptive analysis for CSR 
disclosure, also empirical results of its determinants and consequences. This chapter 
begins with an overview discussion of the chapter, then a descriptive analysis of 
CSR disclosure, an empirical analysis of CSR disclosure determinants and 
consequences. Lastly, a summary of the chapter is presented. 
7.2 CSR Disclosure: A Descriptive Analysis (RQ 1) 
In answering RQ 1, this section provides descriptive statistics of CSR disclosure 
levels among the sample GCC Islamic banks. The importance of this chapter is to 
provide a clear view for the CSR disclosure practice among GCC Islamic banks 
based on the index created using AAOIFI, 2010 guideline. The chapter is based on 
the statistical analysis results of disclosure measurement. This sections will provide 
cross country and cross dimensional analysis of CSR disclosure practice among 
Islamic banks in GCC from 2010-2014. 
7.2.1 Cross country analysis 
Table 12 presents the cross-country analysis of CSR disclosure of the sample GCC 
Islamic banks from 2010 to 2014. It represents details of the sample across the 
countries, 8 Islamic banks from the UAE, 15 from Bahrain, 6 from Qatar, 4 from the 
KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), 3 from Kuwait and Oman. From the analysis, in 
2010, Kuwait had the highest score of CSR disclosure, which is 54.6%, followed by 
UAE (51.1%), Qatar (47%), Bahrain (45.5%), KSA (43.2%) and the lowest is Oman 
(27.3%). Whereas in 2011, the KSA had the highest level of CSR disclosure score 
(50%), followed by Kuwait (45.5%), UAE (43.2%), Qatar (34.9%), Bahrain (34.6%) 
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and Oman (24.2%). From the researcher‟s observations, it shows that Omani Islamic 
banks have the lowest score of CSR disclosure since the first year of the AAOIFI, No. 
7, 2010 was implemented until 2013 (24.2%), when compared to other GCC Islamic 
banks. But since 2013, Omani Islamic banks have shown their concern regarding 
CSR disclosure issue; they have the highest score of CSR disclosure in 2013 (51.5%) 
and 2014 (60.6%) compared to other GCC Islamic banks. For Bahraini Islamic banks, 
who are regulated to be fully compliant with the AAOIFI standards, their CSR 
disclosure score is still lower; their average CSR disclosure score is just around 
30.9% to 45.5%, which is lower than other GCC Islamic banks that are not regulated 
to comply with the AAOIFI. The average CSR disclosure level of the sample Islamic 
banks from 2010 to 2014 is 39.92 %. Based on cross country analysis, this current 
study finds that the level of CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks in GCC 
are not influence by the issuance AAOIFI, no 7. An average of CSR disclosure score 
among sample Islamic banks are relatively lower compared to prior study (such 
as:.Hassan et al,2013;Belal et al,2014; and Farag et al,2014). 
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Table 12: Cross country analysis of CSR disclosure 
YEAR COUNTRY N MEAN CSRD (%) MIN MAX STDEV 
2010 UAE 8 51.1 0.0 1.0 10.8 
  BAHRAIN 15 45.5 0.0 1.0 9.1 
  QATAR 6 47.0 0.0 1.0 12.1 
  KUWAIT 3 54.6 0.0 1.0 0.0 
  KSA 4 43.2 0.0 1.0 4.5 
  OMAN 3 27.3 0.0 1.0 9.1 
       
2011 UAE 8 43.2 0.0 1.0 9.4 
  BAHRAIN 15 34.6 0.0 1.0 13.0 
  QATAR 6 34.9 0.0 1.0 16.7 
  KUWAIT 3 45.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 
  KSA 4 50.0 0.0 1.0 17.4 
  OMAN 3 24.2 0.0 1.0 5.3 
       2012 UAE 8 37.5 0.0 1.0 10.2 
  BAHRAIN 15 30.9 0.0 1.0 9.0 
  QATAR 6 36.4 0.0 1.0 12.9 
  KUWAIT 3 45.5 0.0 1.0 9.1 
  KSA 4 38.6 0.0 1.0 11.4 
  OMAN 3 24.2 0.0 1.0 10.5 
       
2013 UAE 8 45.5 0.0 1.0 6.9 
  BAHRAIN 15 41.2 0.0 1.0 12.3 
  QATAR 6 33.3 0.0 1.0 4.7 
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  KUWAIT 3 45.5 0.0 1.0 15.7 
  KSA 4 45.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 
  OMAN 3 51.5 0.0 1.0 5.2 
       2014 UAE 8 43.2 0.0 1.0 13.5 
  BAHRAIN 15 35.2 0.0 1.0 14.1 
  QATAR 6 30.3 0.0 1.0 13.7 
  KUWAIT 3 33.3 0.0 1.0 5.3 
  KSA 4 52.3 0.0 1.0 13.6 
  OMAN 3 60.6 0.0 1.0 13.9 
Total N: 195 
Mean CSRD: 39.92 % 
Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample Islamic banks in GCC for the years 2010 to 2014. It presents the mean CSRD for each year, 
which is measured by the index developed from AAOIFI, No. 7, 2010 and previous literature (1 if the sample banks disclose required CSR information and 
0 if otherwise). The table also presents the total sample (N) of Islamic banks by countries, mean CSRD across the sample MIN, MAX and STDEV of 
CSRD. 
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7.2.2 Cross dimensional analysis 
Based on 195 observations of sample Islamic banks‟ annual reports and websites 
from 2010-2014, the researcher finds that the social responsibility in the employee 
welfare dimension on average has the highest scores across all the GCC Islamic 
banks, while the social responsibility in late repayment and insolvent clients and 
avoiding onerous terms scores the lowest. The highest average disclosure score of 
the CSR index is EY-employee welfare-related information, which is 64%, followed 
by ZAKAT-Zakat (57%), SME-Micro and small business and social savings, 
investments and development (34.3%), QARD-Qard Hassan (benevolent loan) 
(31.7%), CHARITY-Charitable activities (31%), NSE-Earning and expenditure 
prohibited by Shariah (24.3%), CS-Par excellence customer services (19%), EV-
Internal environmental preservation policy (10%), S.CLIENT-Screening of clients for 
compliance with Islamic principles (7%) and WAQF- Waqf (endowment) 
management (5%). The lowest average disclosure score related to CSR index is late 
repayment and insolvent clients and avoiding onerous terms (2.7%). From the 
observations of the GCC Islamic banks‟ annual reports regarding Zakat information, 
which is one of the main items of CSR in Islam, some of the sample banks did not 
disclose the details of an amount allocated for that purpose, even though it is a 
mandatory requirement according to the AAOIFI (2010). From the researcher 
observations, the sample Islamic banks tend to disclose employee welfare related 
information compared to other themes of disclosure. It may be due to the pressure 
by stakeholder to ensure that the management concern with the employee welfare. 
Table 13 presents the descriptive statistics of the cross-dimensional CSR index 
score across 6 GCC countries and aggregate disclosure that contain all sections in 
their Islamic banks‟ annual report. 
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Table 13: Cross dimensional analysis of CSR disclosure 
  CSR DISCLOSURE DIMENSIONS 
YEAR COUNTRY 1.EY 2.EV 3. NSE 4.CS 5.LP 6.Qard 7.SME 8.S.Client 9.Zakat 10.Charity 11.Waqf ΣCSRD 
2010 UAE 7 1 1 7 0 6 7 3 7 4 2 
51.1 
  BAHRAIN 15 4 3 7 3 4 6 4 11 15 3 
45.5 
  QATAR 6 3 1 4 1 2 0 5 4 5 0 
47.0 
  KUWAIT 3 0 0 3 0 3 2 1 3 3 0 
54.6 
  KSA 4 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 4 4 0 
43.2 
  OMAN 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 1 0 
27.3 
2011 UAE 7 0 3 3 0 4 6 4 7 3 1 3.58 
  BAHRAIN 15 0 7 3 0 7 3 0 12 9 1 5.50 
  QATAR 6 0 2 1 0 3 4 0 5 2 0 2.17 
  KUWAIT 3 0 0 1 0 3 2 0 3 2 1 1.42 
  KSA 4 1 2 1 0 3 3 0 4 3 1 2.08 
  OMAN 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0.92 
2012 UAE 8 1 1 2 0 4 6 0 8 3 0 3.08 
  BAHRAIN 15 2 7 1 1 7 4 0 13 0 1 4.75 
  QATAR 6 0 3 0 0 4 3 0 6 2 0 2.33 
  KUWAIT 3 1 1 1 0 3 2 0 3 1 0 1.42 
  KSA 4 0 1 1 0 1 4 0 4 2 0 1.67 
  OMAN 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0.92 
2013 UAE 7 1 4 4 0 6 7 0 8 3 0 3.67 
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  BAHRAIN 15 5 7 4 1 7 6 0 14 8 1 6.42 
  QATAR 6 2 5 1 0 1 1 0 6 0 0 2.25 
  KUWAIT 3 2 0 1 0 2 2 0 3 2 0 1.50 
  KSA 4 2 1 1 0 0 3 1 4 4 0 1.83 
  OMAN 3 2 1 0 0 3 3 0 3 2 0 1.67 
2014 UAE 8 0 4 2 0 6 4 2 8 4 0 3.25 
  BAHRAIN 15 0 10 1 1 6 7 0 14 3 1 5.58 
  QATAR 6 0 3 0 0 2 3 0 6 0 0 2.00 
  KUWAIT 3 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 3 0 0 1.17 
  KSA 4 2 2 1 0 4 4 0 4 1 1 2.08 
  OMAN 3 1 3 1 0 1 3 1 2 3 2 1.83 
Total N = 195 64.% 10.7% 24.3% 19%0 2.7% 31.7% 34.3% 7% 57% 31% 5% 
 Table 13 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample Islamic banks in the GCC for the years 2010 to 2014. It presents the average level CSRD, which measured by the 
index developed from the AAOIFI 2010 standard and previous literature (1 if the sample banks disclose required CSR information and 0 if otherwise). The table also 
presents the details of the score from each dimension, which was measured in this study; 1) EY -Employee welfare (M) 2) EV-Internal environmental preservation policy (V) 
3) NSE-Earning and expenditure prohibited by Shariah (M) 4) CS-Par excellence customer services (V) 5) LP-Late repayment and insolvent clients and avoiding onerous 
terms (M) 6) Qard-Qard-Hassan (benevolent loan) (V) 7) SME-Micro and small business and social savings, investments and development (V). 8) S.CLIENT-Screening of 
clients for compliance with Islamic principles (M) 9) ZAKAT-Zakat (M) 10) CHARITY-Charitable activities (V) 11)WAQF- Waqf (endowment) management (V)  
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7.2.3 Discussion 
Tables 14 and 15 provide a summary of cross-country and cross-dimensional 
analysis of 195 observations of the GCC Islamic banks between 2010 and 2014. The 
tables provide a clear picture of CSR disclosure practice among the sample Islamic 
banks after the issuance of AAOIFI, No 7, 2010. From the cross-country analysis, it 
shows an improvement of CSR disclosure practice among Omani banks. They have 
the lowest CSR score from 2010 to 2012, but from 2013 to 2014, they are at the top 
compared to the other GCC Islamic banks. For Bahraini banks, that are expected to 
be fully compliant with the AAOIFI as stated by Vinnicombe (2012), they have a low 
level of CSR disclosure compared to Kuwait and Qatar, who are not legally required 
to be fully compliant with the AAOIFI. It is contradictory with findings by Vinnicombe 
(2012) and Sherif El-Halaby (2016), who find that Bahrain have the highest number 
of Islamic banks compliant with the AAOIFI rather than other GCC countries. Based 
on the findings, there is no significant difference of CSR disclosure practice among 
the GCC Islamic banks after issuance of AAOIFI, No. 7, 2010. As a result, it shows 
that the AAOIFI have no influence in CSR disclosure practice among the GCC 
Islamic banks. From the researcher‟s point of view this is maybe due to the lack of 
proactive actions from the AAOIFI towards Islamic banks in the GCC to enhance 
their CSR disclosure practice. Therefore, it is expected that the AAOIFI, as a 
standard setter, can enhance the awareness of CSR disclosure practice among 
other GCC countries in future. It is hoped that proactive action from regulatory body, 
either the AAOIFI or Central Banks in GCC, may improve their CSR disclosure score. 
From the dimensional analysis, it can be seen that the GCC Islamic banks tend to 
disclose employee-related information in their annual report more than other CSR 
information. It consists of information such as: a) provisions of the policy, including 
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targeted disadvantaged groups, b) quotas/targets, and c) achievement for the year 
and the reason for upward and downward revisions in quotas/targets. The least 
information disclosed by the sample GCC Islamic banks regards their policy for 
dealing with clients. According to the AAOIFI (2010), the Islamic banks are 
recommended to disclose such particular information in their annual report as:  
i. Procedure of the IFIs on avoiding the imposition of onerous contractual terms 
on clients who are in a weaker bargaining position relative to the IFIs.  
ii. Ensuring that marketing campaigns and documents are ethically balanced. 
iii. The obligation and rights of both parties (stakeholder and shareholders). 
iv. Process and responsible terms and conditions under which credit is extended 
to clients, including the process by which the client‟s ability to repay and the 
effect on the client‟s financial and overall well-being is assessed. 
v. The remedies available in the event of that one, or both, parties violate their 
contractual terms. 
vi. The SSB‟s opinion on the permissibility of charging late payment charges. 
vii. Late payment charges imposed on clients. 
viii. How the IFIs allocate the late payment charges in their accounts (allocation to 
revenue or charity). 
ix. The conditions under which the IFIs will defer collection of debt from insolvent 
clients. 
Overall, the result shows a low level of disclosure for CSR reporting for the sample 
Islamic banks. The mean CSR disclosure of the sample Islamic banks from 2010-
2014 is 39.92%; it is lower compared to the prior study. But, the findings are in line 
with a finding by Maali et al. (2006), Hassan and Harahap (2010), and Farook et al 
(2011); who also find that the extent of CSR disclosure by Islamic banks falls far 
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short of their expectation (13.3%, 38%, and 16.8% respectively). Based on the 
observations and findings, the researcher agrees with the statement by Maali et al. 
(2006), who indicate that Islamic banks are not completely fulfilling their social role in 
accordance with the prescriptions of Islam as they are expected to be more aware 
on CSR issues in future. According to Gray et al. (1995), to be socially accountable, 
managers are required to provide all financial and non-financial information towards 
their stakeholders. Due the low level of CSR disclosure score, it shows that Islamic 
bank managers are less accountable in performing their duties, they tend to focus on 
disclose several themes of CSR information‟s where ignoring other themes of CSR 
information such as charitable activities and Waqf related information‟s.  
From the agency theory perspectives, Islamic bank managers have to disclose more 
CSR information to convince the stakeholders that they are behaving optimally on 
the stakeholder‟s behalf, their concern on CSR issues and, as a result, it can reduce 
agency cost. From the researcher‟s point of view, this issue still appears since there 
is no pressure from the stakeholders for Islamic banks to be more socially 
accountable. Therefore, stakeholders have to put pressure on Islamic banks to 
enhance their CSR practice towards the benefit of society. It is expected that Islamic 
banks will be more concerned with all CSR-related issues and be more socially 
responsible than conventional banks. 
In summary, this section shows a low level of CSR disclosure practice among the 
GCC Islamic banks from 2010 to 2014. But, what are the determinants in influencing 
the differences in the CSR disclosure practices among the sample GCC Islamic 
banks? This question is the focal point of the discussion in the following sections, to 
examine the determinants of CSR disclosure practice among the GCC Islamic banks. 
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Table 14: Summary of cross-country analysis of CSRD for GCC Islamic Banks (2010-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY 2010(%) Ranks 2011(%) Ranks 2012(%) Ranks 2013(%) Ranks 2014(%) Ranks 
1)UAE 51.1 2 43.2 3 37.5 3 45.5 2 43.2 3 
2)BAHRAIN 45.5 4 34.6 5 30.9 5 41.2 3 35.2 4 
3)QATAR 47.0 3 34.9 4 36.4 4 33.3 4 30.3 6 
4)KUWAIT 54.6 1 45.5 2 45.5 1 45.5 2 33.3 5 
5)KSA 43.2 5 50.0 1 38.6 2 45.5 2 52.3 2 
6)OMAN 27.3 6 24.2 6 24.2 6 51.5 1 60.6 1 
Mean CSRD across 2010-2014:  39.92 % 
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Table 15: Summary of cross-dimensional analysis of CSRD score and percentage for GCC Islamic banks (2010-2014) 
Items 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Score % Score % Score % Score % Score % 
1) EY 38 97.4 38 97.4 39 100 38 97.4 39 100 
2) EV 8 20.5 1 2.5 5 12.8 14 35.9 4 10.2 
3) NSE 5 12.8 14 35.9 13 33.3 18 46.1 23 58.9 
4)CS 25 64.1 10 25.6 6 15.3 11 28.2 5 12.8 
5) LP 4 10.2 1 2.5 1 2.5 1 2.5 1 2.5 
6) Qard 16 41 20 51.2 19 48.7 19 48.7 21 53.8 
7) SME 20 51.2 19 48.7 20 51.2 22 56.4 22 56.4 
8) S.Client 13 33.3 4 10.2 0 0 1 2.5 3 7.6 
9) Zakat 31 79.4 31 79.4 34 87.1 38 97.4 37 94.8 
10) Charity 32 82 21 53.8 10 25.6 19 48.7 11 28.2 
11) Waqf 5 12.8 4 10.2 1 2.5 1 2.5 4 10.2 
1. Employee welfare (M) 2. Policy for social, development and environment based investment quotas (V) 3. Earning and expenditure prohibited by Shariah 
(M) 4. Par excellence customer services (V) 5. Policy for dealing with clients (M) 6. Qard-Hassan (benevolent loan) (V) 7. Micro and small business and social 
savings, investments and development (V) 8. Policy for screening clients (M) 9. Zakat (M) 10.Charitable activities (V) 11.Waqf (endowment) management (V) 
Score (CSR disclosure score of sample Islamic banks) %( Percentage of CSR disclosure score of sample Islamic banks) 
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7.3 CSR Disclosure Determinant: An Empirical Analysis (RQ 2) 
In answering RQ 2, this section will provide descriptive statistics of the dependent 
and control variables. Then, this current study will check the OLS assumptions such 
as normality, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and auto correlation. Last but not 
least, this section will provide an empirical analysis of the CSR disclosure 
determinants. 
7.3.1 Descriptive statistics of dependent and control variables 
Table 16 provides the descriptive statistics for dependent and control variables used 
in this study. It provides the descriptors of CSR disclosure quantity, as well as the 
independent and control variables (B. Size, B. Gender, B. Composition, B. Meeting, 
CEO. Duality, B. CrossHold, SSB Size, SSB Cross, AC Size, AC Meet, Ins Own, For. 
Own, F. Size, F. Age, Liquidity, Leverage, and Profitability). The mean value of CSR 
disclosure quantity (CSRD) is 0.3992, with a minimum and maximum of value of 0.09 
and 0.73, respectively. The standard deviation of CSRD is 0.130. The descriptive 
statistics of the independent variables are as follows. Board size (B. Size) has a 
minimum value of 4 and maximum value of 16; it shows the lowest and highest 
numbers of members on Islamic banks‟ boards. The mean value of B. Size of the 
sample Islamic banks is 9.15.B. Gender has minimum value of 0, a maximum value 
of 1 and a mean value of 0.82. B. Composition has a minimum value of 0.10 and 
maximum value of 0.75; its mean value is 0.75. B. Meeting has a minimum value of 4 
and maximum value of 11; its mean value is 6.46. CEO. Duality, B.Crosshold, and 
SSB Cross have a minimum value of 0 and maximum value of 1; whereas, their 
mean values are 0.18, 0.85 and 0.79 respectively. SSB size has a minimum value of 
3 and maximum value of 6 with its average size as 4.08. AC Size has a mean value 
of 4.12 where its minimum and maximum values are 2 and 7, which is same value as 
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AC Meet. Otherwise AC Meet has a mean value of 5.25. For InsOwn and ForOwn, 
they have mean values of 0.1926 and 0.1852, respectively.  
The descriptive statistics of control variables are as follows. F. Size has a minimum 
value of 1.10 and maximum of 5.84. F.Age has a minimum value of 1 and maximum 
value of 57. Profitability and liquidity has a minimum value of 0.36 and -127.15, its 
maximum values are 84.44 and 24.19. F.Leverage has a mean value of 108.22 and 
min value of 0.04. For country specific characteristics, C. GDP and C. Corrupt have 
mean values of 10.87 and 5.5662, respectively; its minimum and maximum values 
are 10.32, 4.30 and 11.72, 7.70, respectively. 
Table 16: Descriptive Statistics of CSRD Variables 2010-2014 
Variables N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
1.CSRD 195 0.3992 0.13026 0.09 0.73 
2.B.SIZE 195 9.1538 2.24227 4.00 16.00 
3.B.GENDER 195 0.8205 0.38475 0.00 1.00 
4.B.COMP 195 0.3386 0.12557 0.10 0.75 
5.B.MEET 195 6.4564 1.16738 4.00 11.00 
6.CEO.DUALITY 195 0.1795 0.38475 0.00 1.00 
7.B.C.HOLD 195 0.8462 0.36173 0.00 1.00 
8.SSB SIZE 195 4.0769 1.02506 3.00 6.00 
9.SSB CROSS 195 0.7949 0.40483 0.00 1.00 
10.AC SIZE 195 4.1282 1.04486 2.00 7.00 
11.AC MEET 195 5.2564 0.90582 2.00 7.00 
12.INS. OWN 195 0.1926 0.06671 0.11 0.40 
13.FOR.OWN 195 0.1852 0.04811 0.11 0.33 
14.F.SIZE 195 3.5987 1.05947 1.10 5.84 
15.F.AGE 195 17.8000 14.61379 1.00 57.00 
16.F.LIQUID 195 48.8651 22.18020 0.36 84.44 
17.F.PROFIT 195 8.2287 14.12631 -127.15 24.19 
18.F.LEVERAGE 195 110.4239 108.22184 0.04 771.16 
19.C.GDP 195 10.8787 0.48287 10.32 11.72 
20.C.CORRUPT 
195 5.5662 1.03724 4.30 7.70 
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7.3.2 Normality, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation 
This current research is conducted among GCC sample Islamic banks, and consists 
of 195 observations throughout the years 2010 to 2014; it employs a large amount of 
data that can be assumed to have a normal distribution. Therefore, this study used 
the parametric method. In addition, Gujarati and Porter (2009, p. 100) asserted that 
the normality assumption is not crucially needed for large data. Meanwhile, since 
the N of Islamic banks is only 39, it must be tested by normality. This study conducts 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to ensure that the data is normally distributed. The 
result of the normality test for Islamic banks is demonstrated in Table 17. 
Cooke (1998) states that the transformation of data is helpful in many cases: when a 
non-linear relationship exists between dependent and independent variables, in case 
the errors are not nearly to normal distribution, where a problem of 
heteroscedasticity is present, or when the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables is monotonic. Following most disclosure studies (e.g. Li et al, 
2012), control variables are transformed: firm size (F.Size) is transformed using log 
of the original values in order to become more approximate to normal distribution 
(Cooke, 1998; Pallant, 2005; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The researcher adopted 
the method used by Aryani (2015) in conducting a heteroscedasticity test. Based on 
the analysis, the result shows that all variables are more than 0.05 and less than t -
table, which implies that all variables did not have a heterocedasticity problem.  
Furthermore, many procedures are performed to avoid multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. Perfect relationships between those variables would affect 
the reliability of the estimates, and may cause a wide inflation in the standard errors 
for the coefficient (Acock, 2008). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) state that 
multicollinearity among independent variables results is a problem in assessing the 
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importance of each dependent variable in the regression. Therefore, it is necessary 
to compare the total relationship of the independent variables with the dependent 
variable (correlation), and the correlations of the independent variables with each 
other (in the correlation matrix) (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The Pearson 
correlation matrix is the initial tool to detect multicollinearity. It is also used to 
measure the strength and direction of the linear association between any pair of 
variables. Gujarati (2003) indicates that collinearity among the independent variables 
is acceptable if the correlation coefficient (r) is as maximum as 0.80. The Pearson 
correlation matrix indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem in the present study. 
It is clear that all associations among the explanatory variables are below 0.80. 
Finally, it shows that the correlation is positive and statistically significant between 
the proxies that are used to measure CSR reporting quantity. That shows the 
consistency among each group of measures in capturing the required information. 
Each CSR reporting quantity is positively correlated with most of CG attributes (e.g., 
board meeting, board cross holding, audit committee size, and audit committee 
meeting). In contrast, CSR reporting quantity looks to be negatively associated with 
foreign ownership and board duality variables. 
After carrying out each regression, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is calculated. 
This procedure is an additional step to ensure that explanatory variables are not 
extremely correlated. The rule that has been applied is: correlation between 
independent variables is accepted, as long as VIF is still smaller than 10 (Gujarati, 
2003; Acock, 2008). The result is higher than 0.1 and VIF was less than 10, so it has 
no multicollinearity problem. The results also showed that the models are free from 
autocorrelation problems. Due to the data not having a problem with normality, 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation, the data can be processed 
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further in order to answer the research questions and hypotheses. Further 
investigation is needed to get empirical evidence on CSR reporting determinants. 
This investigation should take into account the mutual effects of those determinants. 
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Table 17: Normality testing (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) 
CSRD B.SIZE B.GENDER B.COMP B.MEET B.DUALITY B.C.HOLD SSB SIZE SSB CROSS AC SIZE AC MEET INS. OWN FOR.OWN F.SIZE F.AGE F.LIQUIDITY F.PROFIT F.LEVERAGE C.GDP C.CORRUPT
195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195
Mean 0.3992 9.1538 0.8205 0.3386 6.4564 0.1795 0.8462 4.0769 0.7949 4.1282 5.2564 0.1926 0.1852 3.5987 17.8000 48.8651 8.2287 110.4239 10.8787 5.5662
Std. Deviation
0.13026 2.24227 0.38475 0.12557 1.16738 0.38475 0.36173 1.02506 0.40483 1.04486 0.90582 0.06671 0.04811 1.05947 14.61379 22.18020 14.12631 108.22184 0.48287 1.03724
Absolute 0.136 0.168 0.500 0.122 0.193 0.500 0.511 0.222 0.489 0.241 0.227 0.154 0.276 0.121 0.201 0.148 0.216 0.154 0.229 0.299
Positive 0.136 0.168 0.320 0.122 0.193 0.500 0.335 0.222 0.306 0.241 0.227 0.154 0.276 0.090 0.201 0.084 0.151 0.133 0.229 0.299
Negative -0.134 -0.114 -0.500 -0.070 -0.172 -0.320 -0.511 -0.147 -0.489 -0.169 -0.209 -0.108 -0.124 -0.121 -0.125 -0.148 -0.216 -0.154 -0.124 -0.201
0.136 0.168 0.500 0.122 0.193 0.500 0.511 0.222 0.489 0.241 0.227 0.154 0.276 0.121 0.201 0.148 0.216 0.154 0.229 0.299
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
c
.000
cAsymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
a. Test distribution is Normal.
b. Calculated from data.
c. Lilliefors Significance Correction.
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
N
Normal 
Parameters
a,b
Most Extreme 
Differences
Test Statistic
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7.3.3 Empirical Analysis  
Table 18 presents empirical analysis of CSR disclosure determinants of Islamic 
banks in the GCC. The analysis shows that board size has a positive significant 
impact on the levels of social disclosure reporting (0.042). The level of significance is 
0.05. Therefore, H1 is accepted. It shows that board size has a positive impact on 
the CSR disclosure score of the sample Islamic banks. This result is consistent with 
the studies by Singh et al. (2004), Lakhal (2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), 
Abdel-Fattah et al. (2007), and Laksamana (2008), which also find there to be a 
positive association between disclosure and board composition in their study. It can 
be stated that board size is positively associated with CSR disclosure practice. 
Therefore, organizations with a higher board size do engage to a greater extent in 
CSR disclosure practices and CSR activities, such as charitable activities as stated 
by Williams (2003) and Haniffa & Hudaib (2007). According to Khan (2010), the 
benefit of having a larger board is that it cans improve the company‟s efficiency, 
because they provide a firm with members from different fields of expertise as a 
result increase the CSR score. 
The study finds that there is a negatively significant (0.045) correlation between CEO. 
Duality (H5) with CSR disclosure practice among GCC Islamic banks. With the level 
of significance is 0.05 or at 95%. It is contradictory with the agency theory 
assumptions where CEO duality is seen as detrimental because the agent may 
pursue their self-interest at the expense of the owners. One aspect of corporate 
governance, which has given rise to concern, is the 'dominant personality' 
phenomenon and this was found to be associated with poor disclosure (Forker, 
1992). This phenomenon also includes role duality, which is the occasion when the 
chief executive officer (CEO) or managing director is also the chair of the board. The 
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result is contradictory with the previous literature (Tuggle et al., 2010; Hashim & Devi, 
2008; Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010; Peng et al., 2007) that suggests these two 
roles should be separated in enhancing the disclosure practice. Although the 
separation of roles is suggested, some companies are not prepared to be absolutely 
categorical about dividing the roles (Rahman & Bukair, 2015). The analysis shows 
that CEO duality is negatively significant with CSR disclosure practice among GCC 
Islamic banks. Thus, the assumption, that separating the roles between chair and 
chief executive will enhance the monitoring quality and reduce benefits from 
withholding information, which may consequently result in improved the CSR 
disclosure practice, can be rejected. Therefore, the hypothesis (H5) that there is 
positive association between CEO duality and CSR information disclosures can also 
be rejected. 
The analysis also shows that there is a negatively significant (0.037) relationship 
between AC size and the CSR disclosure practice among GCC Islamic banks. The 
level of significance is 0.05 or at 95%. The findings are contradictory with Mangena 
and Pike (2005), who suggest that larger audit committees give rise to more effective 
monitoring, since it is more likely to involve the essential expertise and views to do 
that. However, mixed results can be obtained from previous studies. Mangena and 
Pike (2005), and Tauringana and Mangena (2009) found no statistically significant 
relationship between the level of disclosure and AC size. Felo et al. (2003), and Li et 
al. (2012) reported a positive relationship between AC size and the quality of 
financial reporting. Therefore, the hypothesis (H9) that there is a positive relationship 
between AC size and CSR reporting quantity can be rejected. 
However, the results also show that there is no association between CSR disclosure 
and other CG variables; it is consistent with the argument by Ho and Wong (2001). 
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Corporate governance mechanisms may be substitutive and may not affect 
disclosure scores. Therefore, the study rejects H2, H3, H4, H5, H7, H8, H10, H11 
and H12. This result also contrasts with the findings by Anderson et al. (2004), which 
stated that directors‟ independence can strengthen the board by monitoring, advising 
and counselling the top management. The result also shows that board composition 
has no significant effect on the level of CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks. 
The analysis also shows that there is no significant relationship between SSB size 
and SSB cross membership with the level of CSR disclosure, as stated by Maali 
(2003); the SSB may see no need to emphasize additional CSR disclosures if the 
bank‟s activities are complying with Islamic laws and principles.  
From the above analysis, it shows that board of director‟s size plays an important 
role in the GCC Islamic banks to enhance the CSR disclosure practice. It is 
consistent with the agency theory, which predicts that larger boards incorporate a 
variety of expertise, resulting in more effectiveness in boards‟ monitoring role, which 
could affect mangers‟ CSR disclosure decisions and the extent of CSR disclosure 
level (Singh et al., 2004). Looking at the coefficients of the control variables (firm and 
country specific characteristics), the analysis shows that only C. GDP has a positive 
relationship with the level of CSR disclosure. It is in line with a study by Olken & 
Pande (2012), who find that there is a positive association between GDP and the 
level of disclosure among countries, while Andres and Vallelado (2009) did not find 
any significant relationship between that variables and disclosure practice. Liquidity, 
leverage and corruption have no significant relationship with CSR disclosure. 
The results summarised in this section have some distinctive theoretical implications, 
either in support of existing theories or in extending the scope of previous works and 
creating additional linkages within the existing literature. Firstly, the analysis provides 
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strong support for the agency theory argument, which suggests that corporations 
with a strong CG mechanism (e.g., higher number of board size) are more likely to 
disclose CSR information to stakeholders (Taylor et al., 2010). The result shows that 
there is a significant positive relationship between CSRD and board size. In 
increasing the CSRD score, Islamic banks may have to increase their board size. 
Second, there is no significant association between board composition and CSRD 
score. Thus, the study cannot prove that stakeholders have the ability to influence 
the way in which corporations conduct themselves, and ultimately influence their 
'licence to operate'. Third, with a low level of disclosure, the outcome is inconsistent 
with legitimacy theory as argued by Guthrie and Parker (1990); firms which operates 
in society, such as Islamic banks, have a social contract where they agree to carry 
out various socially desired actions in return for approval of their objectives, other 
rewards and their ultimate survival. It shows that the CSR issue is still neglected by 
Islamic banks in the GCC. Fourth, the outcomes support the theoretical root of 
accountability for Islamic banks; that accountability to Allah may come before 
stakeholders. This study constructs a comprehensive model for CSR accountability 
that is applicable for Islamic banks and shows the link between the primary 
accountee (Allah), as well as the secondary accountee (stakeholders), with the 
primary accountor (CG) and role of disclosure (CSR) to satisfy this accountability 
.
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Table 18: Regression Coefficients Result 
Variables 
  
Sign 
Standardize 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Expect Actual Beta Tolerance VIF 
1.(Constant) 0 0 0 -1.784 0.076 0 0 
2.B.SIZE + + +0.176 2.049 0.042** 0.584 1.711 
3.B.GENDER + + +0.129 1.571 0.118 0.637 1.570 
4.B.COMP + - -0.032 -0.368 0.713 0.574 1.742 
5.B.MEET + - -0.014 -0.131 0.896 0.401 2.496 
6.CEO.DUAL + - -0.204 -2.021 0.045** 0.424 2.356 
7.B.C.HOLD + - -0.010 -0.124 0.902 0.709 1.411 
8.SSB SIZE + + +0.172 1.364 0.174 0.272 3.681 
9.SSB CROSS + - -0.010 -0.103 0.918 0.439 2.279 
10.AC SIZE + - -0.194 -2.100 0.037** 0.507 1.972 
11.AC MEET + + +0.127 1.449 0.149 0.562 1.780 
12.INS. OWN + + +0.000 0.002 0.999 0.797 1.255 
13.FOR.OWN + - -0.025 -0.337 0.736 0.808 1.237 
14.F.SIZE   -0.073 -0.662 0.509 0.352 2.838 
15.F.AGE   +0.034 0.318 0.751 0.375 2.668 
16.F.LIQUIDITY   +0.149 1.498 0.136 0.438 2.285 
17.F.PROFIT   -0.015 -0.190 0.850 0.694 1.442 
18.F.LEVERAGE   +0.119 1.423 0.156 0.621 1.611 
19.C.GDP   +0.268 2.216 0.028 0.294 3.396 
20.C.CORRUPT   +0.018 0.172 0.864 0.400 2.502 
Y2010   +0.277 3.144 0.002 0.555 1.803 
Y2012   -0.113 -1.345 0.180 0.606 1.651 
Y2013   +0.126 1.427 0.155 0.550 1.820 
Y2014   +0.006 0.070 0.944 0.560 1.786 
Adjusted R 
Square 
0.164 
Std.Error 0.11910 
Sig 0.000 
N 195 
This table presents the regression results for the determinants of CSR disclosure quantity of 
Islamic banks in GCC. All variables are defined as follows: B.Size (board size), B.Gender (board 
gender), B.Bomposition (board composition), B.Meeting (board meeting), B.Duality (board duality), 
B.CrossHold (board cross holding), SSB Size (Shariah supervisory board size), SSB Cross 
(Shariah supervisory board cross membership), AC Size (audit committee size), AC Meet (audit 
committee meeting), InsOwn (Institutional ownership), Man Own (Managerial ownership) F.Size 
(firm size), F.Age (firm age), F.Profitability (return on asset), F.Leverage (firm leverage), F.Liquidity 
(return on equity), C.GDP (gross domestic product) and C.Corupt (level of corruption) *, **, *** 
indicates significance at 10%, 5%, & 1%, respectively.(-) indicates the negative correlations, (+) 
indicates a positive correlation, and (0) indicates  no correlation was found in the regression 
model. Constant is a level of CSRD (dependent variable). 
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7.4 CSR Disclosure Consequences: An Empirical Analysis (RQ 3) 
In answering RQ 3, this section will provide descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in this study, and then check the OLS assumptions, such as normality, 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and autocorrelation. This section will also provide 
an empirical analysis of CSR disclosure consequences. 
7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 21. It shows mean values of the all 
variables used in measuring the consequences of CSR among a sample of 39 
Islamic banks in the GCC from 2010 to 2014, involving 195 observations. It shows 
that, on average, Islamic banks disclose 39.92% of CSR information in the annual 
report. Moreover, the average natural logarithm of market value of equity to book 
value of equity (WC03501) ratio, or MTBV, is 1.5960. Meanwhile, the average 
market capitalization (WC08001) of the sample Islamic banks is 6.3477. Mean Tobin 
Q ratio for GCC Islamic banks is 81.02%. For the control variables, the mean 
number of board size is 9 people, while the average composition between executive 
and non-executive board is 33%. On average, 18 banks have the problem of CEO 
duality. Other control variables are average firm size (3.5987), firm profitability (8.22), 
firm leverage (110.423), and GDP (10.8787). Table 19 provides the descriptive 
statistics of all variables used in this study. 
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
MTBV 195 0.30 6.79 1.5960 1.11883 
WC08001 195 3.92 8.17 6.3477 0.94080 
TOBIN Q 195 0.00 0.93 0.8102 0.14803 
CSRD 195 0.09 0.73 0.3992 0.13026 
B.SIZE 195 4.00 16.00 9.1538 2.24227 
B.COMP 195 0.10 0.75 0.3386 0.12557 
CEO.DUAL 195 0.00 1.00 0.1795 0.38475 
F.SIZE 195 1.10 5.84 3.5987 1.05947 
F.PROFIT 195 -127.15 24.19 8.2287 14.12631 
F.LEVERAGE 195 0.04 771.16 110.4239 108.22184 
C.GDP 195 10.32 11.72 10.8787 0.48287 
Y2010 195 0.00 1.00 0.2000 0.40103 
Y2011 195 0.00 1.00 0.2000 0.40103 
Y2012 195 0.00 1.00 0.2000 0.40103 
Y2013 195 0.00 1.00 0.2000 0.40103 
Y2014 195 0.00 1.00 0.2000 0.40103 
 
7.4.2 Normality, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation 
This research is conducted among the GCC sample Islamic banks, consisting of 195 
observations throughout the years 2010 to 2014; it employs a large amount of data 
that can be assumed to have a normal distribution. Therefore, this study used the 
parametric method. In addition, Gujarati and Porter (2009, p. 100) asserted that the 
normality assumption is not crucial for large data. Meanwhile, since the number of 
Islamic banks is only 39, it must be tested by normality. This study conducts the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to ensure that the data are normally distributed. Based on 
that test, the study finds that all data is normally distributed. The result of the 
normality test for Islamic banks is demonstrated in table 20. 
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Cooke (1998) states that transformation of data is helpful in many cases: when a 
non-linear relationship exists between dependent and independent variables, in case 
of errors that are not nearly to normal distribution, where a problem of 
heteroscedasticity is present, or when the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables is monotonic. Following most disclosure studies (e.g. Li et al., 
2012), control variables are transformed: firm size (F. Size) is transformed using a 
log of the original values in order to become more approximate to normal distribution 
(Cooke, 1998; Pallant, 2005; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The researcher adopted 
the method used by Aryani (2015) in conducting a heteroscedasticity test. Based on 
analysis, the result shows that all variables are more than 0.05 and less than t table, 
which implies that all variables did not have a heteroscedasticity problem.  
Furthermore, many procedures are performed to avoid multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. Perfect relationships between those variables would affect 
the reliability of the estimates and may cause a wide inflation in the standard errors 
for the coefficient (Acock, 2008). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) state that 
multicollinearity among independent variables results in a problem in assessing the 
importance of each dependent variable in the regression. Therefore, it is necessary 
to compare the total relationship of the independent variables with the dependent 
variable (correlation), and the correlations of the independent variables with each 
other (in the correlation matrix) (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  
The Pearson correlation matrix is the initial tool to detect multicollinearity. It is also 
used to measure the strength and direction of the linear association between any 
pair of variables. Gujarati (2003) indicates that collinearity among the independent 
variables is acceptable if the correlation coefficient (r) is at maximum as 0.80. The 
Pearson correlation matrix is illustrated in appendices 3, 4 and 5; it shows that there 
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is no multicollinearity problem in this study. An association among the variables are 
below than 0.80. Finally, the analysis also shows that the correlation is positive and 
statistically significant between the proxies that are used in measuring 
consequences of CSR disclosure. That shows the consistency among each group of 
measures in capturing the required information. There is a significant positive 
correlation between firm size and firm value proxy in all models (MTBV, MC and 
Tobin Q). On the other hand, there is negative significant correlation between firm 
leverage and firm value proxy. 
After carrying out each regression, variance inflation factor (VIF) is calculated. This 
procedure is an additional step to ensure that explanatory variables are not 
extremely correlated. The rule that has been applied is: correlation between 
independent variables is accepted as long as VIF is still smaller than 10 (Gujarati, 
2003; Acock, 2008). The VIF results are higher than 0.1 and less than 10, meaning 
those variables did not have a multicollinearity problem (refer to tables 25, 26 and 
27). The results also showed that the models are free from autocorrelation problems. 
Due to the data not having a problem with normality, heteroscedasticity, 
multicollinearity, and autocorrelation, the data can be processed further in order to 
answer the research questions and hypotheses. Further investigation is needed to 
get empirical evidence on consequences of CSR disclosure in sample Islamic banks. 
This investigation should take into account the mutual effects of those consequences. 
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Table 20: One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
  MTBV WC08001 
TOBIN 
Q CSRD B.SIZE B.COMP CEO.DUAL F.SIZE F.PROFIT F.LEVERAGE C.GDP 
N 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 
Normal 
Parametersa,b 
Mean 1.5960 6.3477 0.8102 0.3992 9.1538 0.3386 0.1795 3.5987 8.2287 110.4239 10.8787 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.11883 0.94080 0.14803 0.13026 2.24227 0.12557 0.38475 1.05947 14.12631 108.22184 0.48287 
Most 
Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute 0.168 0.081 0.265 0.136 0.168 0.122 0.500 0.121 0.216 0.154 0.229 
Positive 0.168 0.081 0.214 0.136 0.168 0.122 0.500 0.090 0.151 0.133 0.229 
Negative -0.123 -0.078 -0.265 -0.134 -0.114 -0.070 -0.320 -0.121 -0.216 -0.154 -0.124 
Test Statistic 0.168 0.081 0.265 0.136 0.168 0.122 0.500 0.121 0.216 0.154 0.229 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000c .003c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
c. Lilliefors Significance Correction. 
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7.4.3 Empirical analysis 
Tables 21, 22 and 23 present an empirical analysis of CSR disclosure consequences 
of Islamic banks in the GCC. The results of the regressions can be interpreted in 
accordance with the main hypotheses developed in this study. The results show a 
negative and significant relationship between firm value and CSR disclosure score. 
This result is consistent with prior research, such as Elliott, Jackson, Peecher and 
White (2014), who show that CSR disclosure is negatively associated with firm value. 
However, according to Klein et al. (2005), firm value rises with greater social 
disclosure and is expected to have a positive impact on the firm value. Previous 
studies (Sheu et al., 2010; Gordon et al., 2010) pointed out that social disclosure has 
an impact on firm value based on signalling theory, but the study finds a 
contradictory effect between CSR disclosure and firm value.  
Using market capitalization as a proxy of measuring firm value, the study finds a 
negative significance between firm value (using market capitalization as proxy) and 
CSRD, a level of 90% (0.090). The results are contradictory with studies by Anam et 
al. (2011), who proved that the extent of disclosure has a significant positive effect 
on the firm value (FV) based on market capitalization. It is in line with a finding of 
other prior studies (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Hassan et al., 2009; Chung et al., 2012), 
which claimed that enhanced disclosure could have adverse effects if it puts the firm 
at a competitive disadvantage with its rivals, or if it makes more noise to the 
investors, which affects negatively on their valuation. Therefore, the existing 
literature does not present strong evidence on the positive association between 
corporate disclosure and firm value. Furthermore, they also find that the direction 
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and magnitude of the relationship is associated with the type of disclosure (Hassan 
et al., 2009) and the proxy that used for firm value (Uyar and Kiliç, 2012).  
Based on the result, it can be claimed that disclosure cannot curtail agency problems 
by decreasing information asymmetry and, as a result, enhance the firm value (FV) 
as argued by Rhodes and Soobaroyen (2010). It is also contradictory with economic 
theory‟s assumption, which argues that increased corporate disclosure has an 
influence on firm value (FV) (Lundholm and Van Winkle, 2006). The result also 
contradicts the signalling theory assumption, as claimed by McDonald and Rundle-
Thiele (2008), who find that the influence of CSR on the corporate profitability 
through creation of intangible assets such as good reputation, trust, and commitment, 
drives the long-term success of the business. Consequently, H1 – which expects that 
there is a significant positive relationship between the quantity of CSR disclosure 
and firm value (FV) of the sample GCC Islamic banks – is rejected. 
With respect to the negative effect of CSRD on firm value, this finding adds to the 
contradictory evidence on the relationship between disclosure and firm value. This 
result is inconsistent with the findings of some studies that build on the agency 
theory framework (e.g., Healy et al., 1999). These studies suggest a positive impact 
of enhanced disclosure upon firm valuation to the reduction in information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. The negative effect of CSRD can 
be explained from different angles. First, consistently with the assertion of Chung et 
al. (2012) that extra information could have a negative effect on firm value, the 
excessive CSR information disclosed might cause extra noise to the investors, which 
negatively affects their valuation of the firm. Second, the negative effect on firm 
value could be driven by the content of CSR information disclosed, and how 
investors perceive it. There is a possibility that CSR information itself raises 
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concerns about firms‟ performance, which leads investors to lower their valuation. In 
that proposition, the more CSR information disclosed, the higher the possibility that 
firm value decrease. In contrast, CSR information could offer positive news to the 
stakeholders but this news might be under their own expectations, or might be 
suspicious because it is very different from information gained from sources other 
than the annual reports. Accordingly, having more CSR information disclosed might 
result in a drop in firm value. Third, stakeholders might misinterpret this practice from 
the firm to disclose more CSR information. They might perceive providing enhanced 
disclosure as a way to mislead them about the firm‟s performance. The investors 
might also consider that company‟s rivals would benefit from this excessive critical 
information, which can affect negatively on their expectation about the firm‟s 
performance and, hence, lower their valuation (Hassan et al., 2009). 
Based on the analysis, the study did not find any significant relation between another 
proxy (MTBV and Tobin Q) in measuring the association between firm value and 
CSRD. The findings are associated with Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016), who  also 
argued that they did not find the same results when using different proxies  (Tobin‟s 
Q or ROA ) when measuring an association between CSR disclosure (quantity and 
quality) and firm value. They suggest that the significance of the impact between 
CSRD and firm value depends on the proxy used in measuring the firm value. 
Consequently, this shortage of statistical significance supports the view that there is 
a conflicting relationship of determining the relationship between CSR disclosure and 
firm value. In addition, there is no agreement in the literature about an ideal measure 
for firm value (Mangena et al., 2012; Albassam, 2014). 
With respect to CG variables in general, the study finds that better governance leads 
to a higher firm value. In particular, board size (B.Size) has a positive and significant 
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effect on firm value, as stated in Model 1. This result is consistent with several 
studies (e.g., Ujunwa, 2012; Coles et al., 2007; Raheja, 2005; Conger et al., 1998). 
Coles et al. (2007) provide evidence that both very large and very small board sizes 
affect firm value positively; he believes that this happens due to business complexity. 
Raheja (2005) supports Coles et al. (2007) by suggesting that there is no optimal 
board size, since board size tends to depend on either advising or monitoring needs, 
and this changes from company to company. It is claimed that the collective 
experience and knowledge of board members is crucial in today‟s complex business 
environment (Conger et al., 1998).  
Moreover, board composition (B.Comp) has shown a weak positive impact on firm 
value, as shown in Model 2, significant at 0.089. This result suggests that outsiders 
provide better monitoring of management (thus, decreasing agency costs) because 
they are independent (Jackling and Johl, 2009; Giraldez & Hurtado, 2014). The 
findings are not associated with Barnard and Rosenstein (1996), Hermalin and 
Weisenbach (2001), De Andres et al. (2005), and Baghat and Black (1998), who find 
that board structure does not show a positive relationship with firm value. On the 
other hand, Colombo and Baglioni (2008) provide evidence from Italy on a positive 
relationship, contradicting prior studies. As with Board size, it is equally accepted 
that there is no ideal Board composition; board structure should be based on 
corporate reality, especially on the company‟s priority between advice (more 
executive) and monitoring (more non-executive) (Harris and Ravis, 2005; Lehn et al., 
2004; Link et al., 2008; Denis and Sarin, 1999). 
CEO duality (CEO Dual) has shown a positive significant effect on firm value, as 
presented in Model 1 and Model 2. This finding can be explained by signalling theory, 
rather than agency theory. Agency theory does not support CEO duality because it 
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limits the board‟s main responsibility of monitoring the CEO. Literature presents 
mixed evidence on the relationship between CEO duality and firm value. Authors, 
such as Faleye (2007), Chen et al. (2008), Vintila and Gherghina (2012), Braun and 
Sharma (2007), Raluca (2013), and Chen, Lin and Yi (2008) found no relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance/firm value.  CEO duality seems to be 
perceived by stakeholders as a signal of effective control and leadership. They might 
consider that CEO duality leads the firm to achieve better performance using his 
technical knowledge. The findings of this current study are in line with a prior studies 
such as; Agrawal and Knoebler (1996), Peng, Zhang and Li (2007), Yang and Zhao 
(2014), and Baptista, Klotze and Campelo de Melo (2008), who also find a positive 
relationship between CEO duality and firm value.  
Finally, the results highlight the relative importance of the CSRD of the banks in 
influencing their firm value. In particular, in firm-specific variables, the result shows 
that firm profitability (F. Profit) is positively associated with firm value, as shown in 
Model 2. It is in line with prior studies, which find a positive and significant 
relationship between firm value and F.Profit (e.g. Setia-Atmaja, 2009). The study 
finds a negative significant relationship between firm size (F.Size) and firm value, it is 
contradictory to a finding by Ezat (2010) and Hassan et al. (2009), who find that 
there is a positive association reported between firm size and firm value (FV). This 
current study finds no significant relationship between firm leverage (F.Leverage) 
and firm value. Therefore, the study cannot support a finding by Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006), who find a positive significant relationship between firm leverage and firm 
value. Lastly, is country GDP (C.GDP); the study finds a negative weak relationship 
between this variable and firm value, significant at 0.090 as shown in Model 2.  
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Referring to Model 3, which uses TQ as a proxy in measuring firm value (FV), the 
study did not find any association between all control variables (CG, F. Size, F. 
Liquidity, F. Leverage, C. GDP) and firm value. Dybvig & Warachka (2015) argued 
that Tobin‟s Q does not measure firm performance and it provides the two new 
measures for the firm value, which are efficiency measure and assesses cost 
discipline. This is also due to the low level of R square (0.075), which shows a very 
weak association effect between variables test in model 3. 
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Table 21: Model 1- MTBV Coefficients Table 
Model 
Sign 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Expecte
d Actual Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 Constant       -1.482 0.140     
CSRD +  0  0.036 0.461 0.645 0.782 1.279 
B.SIZE +   +  0.192 2.619 0.010** 0.893 1.120 
B.COMP +   0  0.006 0.077 0.938 0.923 1.084 
CEO.DUAL +   +  0.238 3.150 0.002*** 0.840 1.190 
F.SIZE +   +  -0.192 -2.166 0.032** 0.608 1.645 
F.PROFIT +   0  0.111 1.400 0.163 0.764 1.309 
F.LEVERA
GE 
-  0  0.073 0.907 0.366 0.730 1.369 
C.GDP 0  0  0.178 1.906 0.058 0.548 1.826 
Y2011 0  0  -0.077 -0.841 0.401 0.571 1.753 
Y2012 0  0  -0.093 -0.990 0.324 0.547 1.828 
Y2013 0  0  -0.028 -0.316 0.752 0.591 1.691 
Y2014 0  0  -0.007 -0.071 0.943 0.560 1.785 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
0.072 
 Std Error 1.077 
 Sig 0.011 
 N 195 
 
This table presents the regression results for the CSR disclosure consequences of Islamic banks in GCC. All variables are defined 
as follows: B.Size (board size), B.Composition (board composition), B.Meeting (board meeting), CEO.Dual (CEO duality), F.Size 
(firm size), F.Profitability (return on asset), F.Leverage (firm leverage) and GDP (gross domestic products). *, **, *** indicates 
significance at 10%, 5%, & 1%, respectively. (-) indicates the negative correlations, (+) indicates a positive correlation and (0) 
indicates no correlation was found in the regression model. Constant is a MTBV (dependent variable). 
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Table 22: Model 2- Market Capitalization (WC08001) Coefficients Table 
Model 
Sign 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Expected  Actual Beta Tolerance VIF 
2 Constant       -5.248 0.000     
CSRD +  -  -0.096 -1.705 0.090* 0.782 1.279 
B.SIZE +   0  -0.026 -0.496 0.621 0.893 1.120 
B.COMP +   +  0.088 1.712 0.089* 0.923 1.084 
CEO.DUAL +   +  0.143 2.651 0.009*** 0.840 1.190 
F.SIZE +   0  -0.030 -0.477 0.634 0.608 1.645 
F.PROFIT +   + 0.202 3.560 0.000*** 0.764 1.309 
F.LEVERAG
E 
-  0  0.020 0.350 0.727 0.730 1.369 
C.GDP 0  +  0.647 9.665 0.000*** 0.548 1.826 
Y2011 0  0  -0.097 -1.474 0.142 0.571 1.753 
Y2012 0  0  -0.137 -2.052 0.042 0.547 1.828 
Y2013 0  0  -0.060 -0.938 0.350 0.591 1.691 
Y2014 0  0  -0.079 -1.186 0.237 0.560 1.785 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
0.524 
 Std Error 0.649 
 Sig 0.00 
 N 195 
 
This table presents the regression results for the CSR disclosure consequences of Islamic banks in the GCC. All variables are defined as 
follows: B.Size (board size), B.Composition (board composition), B.Meeting (board meeting), CEO.Dual (CEO duality), F.Size (firm size), 
F.Profitability (return on asset), F.Leverage (firm leverage) and GDP (gross domestic product). *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, 
& 1%, respectively. (-) indicates the negative correlations, (+) indicates a positive correlation and (0) indicates no correlation was found in 
the regression model. Constant is a WC08001/Market Capitalization (dependent variable). 
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Table 23: Model 3- Tobin Q Coefficients Table 
Model 
Sign 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Expected Actual Beta Tolerance VIF 
3 Constant       1.783 0.076     
CSRD +  0  0.052 0.643 0.521 0.782 1.279 
B.SIZE +   0  0.038 0.501 0.617 0.893 1.120 
B.COMP +   0  -0.020 -0.274 0.785 0.923 1.084 
CEO.DUAL +   0 0.120 1.549 0.123 0.840 1.190 
F.SIZE +   0  0.079 0.865 0.388 0.608 1.645 
F.PROFIT +   0 0.083 1.016 0.311 0.764 1.309 
F.LEVERAGE -  0  0.083 0.998 0.319 0.730 1.369 
C.GDP 0  0 0.034 0.352 0.725 0.548 1.826 
Y2011 0  0  0.125 1.324 0.187 0.571 1.753 
Y2012 0  0  0.127 1.323 0.188 0.547 1.828 
Y2013 0  0  0.141 1.518 0.131 0.591 1.691 
Y2014 0  0  0.180 1.892 0.060 0.560 1.785 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
0.014 
 Std Error 0.14696 
 Sig 0.261 
 N 195 
 
This table presents the regression results for the CSR disclosure consequences of Islamic banks in GCC. All variables are define as follows: 
B.Size (board size), B.Bomposition (board composition), B.Meeting (board meeting), CEO.Dual(CEO duality), F.Size (firm size), ,F.Profitability 
(return on asset) ,F.Leverage (firm leverage) and GDP(growth domestic products) *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, & 1%, 
respectively.(-) indicates the negative correlations, (+) indicates a negative correlations and (0) indicates that‟s is no correlat ion was found in 
the regression model. Constant is a Tobin Q (dependent variable). 
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7.5 Summary 
The aim of this research is to examine the level of CSR disclosure quantity, its 
determinants and consequences among the 39 sample Islamic banks in GCC 
through 195 observations from 2010 to 2014. Based on the analysis, it shows that 
the level of CSRD among the sample GCC Islamic banks is relatively low (39.92%). 
It is consistent with El-Halaby & Hussaney (2015), Hassan et al., (2012), Haniffa & 
Hudaib (2007), and Maali et al. (2006), who also find very low levels of CSR 
disclosures by Islamic banks. 
This current study contributed to existing CSR reporting literature by being the first to 
examine the determinants of CSR disclosure in GCC Islamic banks for the years 
2010-2014 using comprehensive CG variables. The study tests the degree to which 
CG mechanisms (board-related variables, SSB-related variables, AC-related 
variables and Ownership variables) affect Islamic banks‟ decision to disclose their 
CSR information in their annual report. The study used quantitative methods to test 
the research hypotheses. The study developed a comprehensive CSR disclosure 
index, based on previous literature and AAOIFI guidelines, and used manual content 
analysis to find the CSR disclosure information in a sample of 39 Islamic banks; it 
involves 195 annual report observations. OLS regression analysis is also used for 
the empirical analysis. The dependent variable was the total number of CSR 
disclosure quantity score (CSRD), while the independent variables were a set of CG 
mechanisms and the control variables consist of a set of firm characteristics and 
country-specific characteristics variables. 
The empirical analysis shows that the board size is positively significant with CSR 
disclosure practice among GCC Islamic banks. This result is consistent with studies 
by Singh et al. (2004), Lakhal (2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Abdel-Fattah et 
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al. (2007), and Laksamana (2008), which also find a positive association between 
disclosure and board composition in their study. It can be stated that board size is 
positively associated with CSR disclosure practice. Therefore, organizations with a 
larger size of board of directors do engage to a greater extent in CSR disclosure 
practices and CSR activities, such as charitable activities, as stated by Williams 
(2003), and Haniffa & Hudaib (2007). The study also finds that B.CrossHold and AC 
Size are negatively significant with the CSR disclosure practice among GCC Islamic 
banks. On the other hand, the other CG characteristics variables (board composition, 
board gender, board meeting, board duality, board cross holding, SSB size, and SSB 
cross holding) have no significant relationship with the level of total CSR disclosure 
among Islamic banks. It is consistent with the argument by Ho and Wong (2001), 
where corporate governance mechanisms may be substitutive and may not affect 
disclosure score.  
This current study also analyses the impact of CSR disclosure on firm value (FV) 
based on three different proxies, namely market-to-book value (MTBV), market 
capitalization (WC08001) and Tobin‟s Q (TQ). After controlling CG, firm 
characteristics and country specific variables, the research‟s finding confirms the 
significant negative association between disclosure and firm value (FV), based on 
market capitalization proxies, which is consistent with a finding by Chung et al. (2012) 
and Hassan et al., (2009). 
This current study also provides a number of theoretical arguments and a range of 
empirical evidence as to why such an association might arise. The negative link 
between disclosure and firm value (FV) prove the inconsistency of prior findings, 
which build on the agency theory framework. Furthermore, the negative effect of 
CSR disclosure can be explained from different angles. Firstly, in consistence with 
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Chung et al. (2012), extra information could have a negative effect on firm value; the 
excessive CSR information disclosed may cause extra noise to the investors, which 
affects negatively on their valuation of the firm. Secondly, the negative effect on firm 
value could be driven by the content of the CSR information disclosed and how 
investors perceive it. There is a possibility that CSR information itself raises 
concerns about firm performance, which leads investors to lower their valuation. In 
that proposition, the more CSR information disclosed, the higher the possibility that 
the firm value will decrease. In contrast, CSR information could offer positive news to 
the stakeholders, but this news might be under their own expectations or might be 
suspicious because it is very different from information gained from sources other 
than the annual reports. Accordingly, the more CSR information disclosed may result 
in a drop in firm value. Thirdly, stakeholders might misinterpret this practice from the 
firm to disclose more CSR information. They might perceive providing enhanced 
disclosure as a way to mislead them about the firm‟s performance. The investors 
might also consider that the company‟s rivals would benefit from this excessive 
critical information, which can affect negatively on their expectation about firm‟s 
performance and, hence, lower their valuation (Hassan et al., 2009). This result is 
not consistent with finding by Gelb and Zarowin (2002), who find that firms with high 
disclosure are more likely to show a stronger firm value (FV). In addition, the result 
related to CSR disclosure shows an adverse impact of the socially-responsible firm, 
which corresponds with social issues and firm value (FV). This result also does not 
support the idea that Islamic banks can use corporate disclosure to differentiate 
themselves and enhance their competitive advantage through increasing firm value 
(FV) for Islamic banks. 
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The finding of the study provides important implications for investors, managers, 
regulatory bodies, policy makers and Islamic banks. This result tells investors that 
CSRD has a negative effect on market value of their banks, based on market 
capitalization, but proxies used to examine the consequences of CSRD may provide 
different results, as stated by Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016). However, managers 
who engage in good practices of information disclosure recommended continuing 
doing so. For those who refrain themselves from providing information to the 
stakeholders, the results call for more CSR transparency if they want their bank to be 
more valuable in the eye of their stakeholders. Regulatory bodies, such as the 
AAOIFI, are expected to be more proactive guiding Islamic banks toward the best 
practices of disclosures, since banks look for such guidance. They play a motivating 
role in this area of information disclosure. The AAOIFI are also expected to have a 
strong collaboration with countries‟ regulatory bodies in enhancing CSR disclosure 
practice among Islamic banks. 
Based on the analysis, the results have shown that the disclosure of CSR 
information was absent in many annual reports and websites for the selected GCC 
Islamic banks. Therefore, the regulatory bodies and policy makers may identify a 
minimum benchmark for CSR disclosure that is published by each bank either in 
their annual report or website. Furthermore, this finding is important for Islamic banks, 
which may be aware that more CSR disclosure might have a significant impact on 
their firm value. Thus, they are expected to be more aware of CSR disclosure issues, 
rather than focusing only on profit maximization objective. This study, moreover, 
provides a valuable contribution to researchers as it extends the understanding of 
how the CSR disclosures affected the firm value (FV) of GCC Islamic banks from 
2010-2014. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this research is to analytically explore the extent of CSR information 
disclosure practices in Islamic banks by analysing the practices and implementation 
of the AAOIFI guidelines in GCC countries through their annual report and websites. 
To get a clear view of CSR disclosure practice among the sample Islamic banks, this 
study also examines the determinants of CSR information disclosure and its 
consequences. This study is motivated by the limited prior Islamic accounting and 
disclosure studies, as well as the recent interest in the CSS disclosure studies. 
Based on these motivations, three research questions have been addressed as well 
as achieving the research objective. 
This chapter provides the concluding remarks of this thesis. The remainder of this 
chapter is organised as follows: section 8.2 provides a summary of the research, 
Section 8.3 presents a summary of the key findings of the research, Section 8.4 the 
research contributions, and Section 8.5 provides research implications, finally 
Section 8.6 presents the limitation and suggestions for future research.  
8.2 Summary of Research  
Research Question 1(RQ 1) 
To provide an answer to RQ 1, a CSR disclosure index has been developed to 
measure CSR reporting in the annual reports, as well as through websites. Then, the 
research instrument was constructed based upon the AAOIFI, No. 7, 2010 guidance 
for best practice as well as indices suggested by existing research. Manual content 
analysis was used to code the text and to classify the indices disclosed into financial 
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disclosure and non-financial disclosure that contains social factors. After reviewing 
the different databases, central banks, websites, and updated reports, as well as the 
criteria for the selected research sample, the study applied the comprehensive CSR 
index on 39 Islamic banks across 6 GCC countries, which involved 195 observations 
from 2010 to 2014. Descriptive statistics used to outline the disclosure levels for 
Islamic banks, including their CSR categories and compliance with AAOIFI, No. 7, 
2010 governance standards. 
Research Question 2(RQ 2) 
To provide an answer to RQ 2, the study has reviewed the relevant theories that 
explain CG motivations to allow increased corporate disclosure. Consequently, the 
determinants of CSR reporting were proposed, drawing on agency, stakeholder, 
legitimacy, and accountability theories. Concerned with the CG characteristics, the 
main variables tested consist of board-related variables, SSB-related variables, and 
audit- and ownership- related variables. In addition to these main variables, the 
researcher uses firm characteristics and country specific characteristics as control 
variables. Some variables exist in the sample based on the objective and availability 
of data. The researcher checks the OLS assumptions, such as normality, 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation, to ensure that there is no 
problem with the variables tested. In addition to the Pearson correlation matrix, OLS 
regressions models were conducted to assess the significance of the association 
between determinants‟ variables and CSR disclosure scores. 
Research Question 3(RQ 3) 
To provide an answer to RQ 3, the relevant literature was reviewed. Agencies, 
signalling, economic, as well as legitimacy theories were used to explain how CSR 
reporting could affect firm value based on market-based measures, which are 
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consistent with Sheu et al. (2010). Following the example of previous studies, this 
study has controlled for corporate governance, firm characteristics and country GDP. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Laporta et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009; Aggarwal, 2009), Tobin‟s Q ratio (TQ) 
was used as a proxy to measure the dependent variable (firm value) in the main 
analysis. Adopting prior study (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hassan et al., 2009), 
market-to-book ratio (MTBV) was also used in a further analysis so as to check the 
robustness of results. Regarding market-to-book ratio (MTBV), it was measured as 
the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. This ratio is a good 
indicator of how a firm is valued by investors. Moreover, tests were re-estimated 
using MC as a proxy for firm value, based on market-based measures, as used by 
Servaes and Tamayo (2013), in order to check the robustness of the results. Then, 
the researcher checked all the OLS assumptions, such as normality, 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation, to ensure that there is no 
problem with the variable tested. In addition to the Pearson correlation matrix, OLS 
regression models conducted to assess the significance of the association between 
CSRD and firm value. 
8.3 Summary of Research Findings 
Research Question 1(RQ 1) 
This study measured the extent to which the sample GCC Islamic banks comply with 
the AAOIFI, No7, 2010 standards. It provides descriptive information of the CSR 
disclosure level of 195 Islamic banks in the GCC from 2010 to 2014. A 
comprehensive CSR disclosure index, which was developed based on AAOIFI, No 7, 
2010 has been constructed; the annual reports have been used as a main source of 
information in measuring the CSR disclosure score of the sample Islamic banks. 
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Overall, between countries, Oman has the highest CSRD score compared with the 
other GCC countries. The findings of this study also show a low level of CSR 
disclosure score, which is 39.92%; it is lower than the researcher expectation. 
The results related to CSR disclosure levels of Islamic banks with AAOIFI add 
significantly to the disclosure literature by emphasising the importance of widening 
this research scope to pay more attention to variations above the mandated 
requirements (AAOIFI adoption), which provides a minimum amount of information to 
all stakeholders. The results also find that the Bahrain Islamic banks that formally 
implement an accounting standard (AAOIFI) have not significantly improved their 
disclosure; they show inconsistent CSR disclosure scores from 2010 to 2014. The 
analysis shows that the sample Islamic banks tend to disclose employee related 
information, rather than other mandatory information, as stated in the AAOIFI 
standards (such as earning and expenditure prohibited by Shariah, policy for dealing 
with clients, policy for screening clients and Zakat).Based on the cross country and 
cross dimensional anaylsis,it can be conclude that the issuance of AAOIFI 
governance standard no.7 which focus on CSR dislcosure did not improve the CSR 
dislcosure practice among Islamic banks in GCC.The CSR dislcosure score are still 
relatively lower compared to study conducted before the issuance of AAOIFI,no 7 
standard (such as: Maali,2006 and Haniffa,2007). 
Research Question 2(RQ 2) 
The main aim of RQ 2 is to examine the level of CSR dislcosure and its determinants 
among 39 sample Islamic banks in GCC through 195 observations from 2010 to 
2014. This current study contributed to existing CSR reporting literature by being the 
first to examine the determinants of CSR disclosure in GCC Islamic banks for the 
years 2010-2014 using comprehensive CG variables. The study tests the degree to 
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which CG mechanisms (board-related variables, SSB-related variables, AC-related 
variables, and Ownership variables) affect Islamic banks‟ decision to disclose their 
CSR information in their annual report. The study used quantitative methods to test 
the research hypotheses. The researcher developed a comprehensive CSR 
disclosure index based on previous literature and the AAOIFI guideline, and used 
manual content analysis method to find the CSR disclosure information in a sample 
of 39 Islamic banks with 195 annual report observations. OLS regression analysis 
was also used for the empirical analysis. The dependent variable was the total 
number of CSR disclosure quantity score (CSRD), while the independent variables 
were a set of CG mechanisms and control variables consisted of a set of firm 
characteristics and country-specific characteristics variables. 
The empirical analysis shows that the board size is positively significant with CSR 
disclosure practice among GCC Islamic banks. This result is consistent with studies 
by Singh et al. (2004), Lakhal (2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Abdel-Fattah et 
al. (2007), and Laksamana (2008), which also found positive association between 
disclosure and board composition in their study. It can be stated that board size is 
positively associated with CSR disclosure practice. Therefore, organizations with a 
more members on their boards of directors do engage to a greater extent in CSR 
disclosure practices and CSR activities, such as charitable activities, as stated by 
Williams (2003) and Haniffa & Hudaib (2007). The study also finds that CEO. Duality 
and AC Size are negatively significant with the CSRD practice among GCC Islamic 
banks. The other CG characteristics variables (board composition, board gender, 
board meeting, board cross holding, SSB size, and SSB cross holding) have no 
significant relationship with the level of total CSR disclosure among Islamic banks. It 
is consistent with the argument by Ho and Wong (2001) that corporate governance 
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mechanisms may be substitutive and may not affect disclosure scores. Form the 
analysis, it can be concluding that board size have a significant influence in 
enhancing the CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks in GCC. However, the 
banks who have the same person as CEO and chairman (duality) can also influence 
the CSR disclosure practice in Islamic banks. They have the power to influence and 
enhance the CSR disclosure practice in the organization. Where the AC size have 
no significant effect on the CSS disclosure practice, this is may be due to their lack 
of function to influence the board and the management. 
Research Question 3(RQ 3) 
This study aims to examine the impact of CSR disclosure on the value of a firm. It 
also contributes to the disclosure literature by being the first study to measure the 
economic consequences of CSR disclosure for 39 GCC Islamic banks from 2010 to 
2014. In particular, it analysed the impact of the CSR disclosure on firm value (FV) 
based on three different proxies, namely market-to-book value (MTBV), market 
capitalization (WC08001) and Tobin Q (TQ). After controlling CG, firm characteristics, 
and country-specific variables, the finding confirmed the significant negative 
association between disclosure and firm value (FV), based on market capitalization 
proxies, which is consistent with a finding by Chung et al. (2012) and Hassan et al. 
(2009). 
This study provides a number of theoretical arguments and a range of empirical 
evidence as to why such an association might arise. The negative link between 
disclosure and firm value (FV) proves the inconsistency of prior findings, which build 
on the agency theory framework. Furthermore, the negative effect of CSRD can be 
explained from different angles. First, consistently with Chung et al. (2012), extra 
information could have a negative effect on firm value; the excessive CSR 
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information disclosed might cause extra noise to the investors, which affects 
negatively on their valuation of the firm. Secondly, the negative effect on firm value 
could be driven by the content of CSR information disclosed, and how investors 
perceive it. There is a possibility that CSR information itself raises concerns about 
firm performance, which leads investors to lower their valuation. In that proposition, 
the more CSR information is disclosed, the higher the possibility that firm value will 
decrease. In contrast, CSR information could offer positive news to the stakeholders, 
but this news might be under their own expectations, or might be suspicious because 
it is very different from information gained from sources other than the annual reports. 
Accordingly, increasing the amount of CSR information disclosed may result in a 
drop in firm value. Thirdly, stakeholders might misinterpret this practice from the firm 
to disclose more CSR information. They might perceive providing enhanced 
disclosure as a way to mislead them about the firm‟s performance. The investors 
might also consider that a company‟s rivals would benefit from this excessive critical 
information, which can affect negatively on their expectation about the firm‟s 
performance and, hence, lower their valuation (Hassan et al., 2009).  
This result is contradicting with the findings by Gelb and Zarowin (2002), who find 
that firms with high disclosure are more likely to show a stronger firm value (FV). In 
addition, the result related to CSR disclosure shows an adverse impact of the 
socially responsible firm, who corresponds with social issues and firm value (FV). 
This result also does not support the idea that Islamic banks can use corporate 
disclosure to differentiate themselves and enhance their competitive advantage 
through increasing firm value (FV). Using Tobin Q as indicator of firm value, the 
result did not show any significant relationship, this is due the less concern from the 
stakeholder regarding to CSR issue before make a transaction with the bank 
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(products and investment). Therefore; it can be concluding that CSR disclosure did 
not have any significant impact to the firm value. 
8.4 Research Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the literature by answering the three research questions. 
Furthermore, the thesis could add to the methodologies applied in the literature. 
8.4.1 Contribution to knowledge 
This study contributes to the existing disclosure literature as follows:  
 First, the present study provides a clear discussion on CSR from Islamic 
perspectives. It discusses the Islamic ethical principle in promoting CSR 
disclosure practice among Islamic banks, as stated in the Holy Quran. From 
the researcher‟s knowledge, there is limited prior research, which discusses 
the concept of CSR from Islamic perspectives; prior research tends to focus 
on measuring CSR disclosure score. Thus, this study contributes to the 
disclosure literature by providing a clear discussion of CSR disclosure from an 
Islamic perspective. 
 Second, most of prior studies, which investigated CSR disclosure, measure 
using an index develop based on prior research (e.g., Farook et al., 2011), 
while limited research explores AAOIFI governance standards on compliance 
with social disclosure. Therefore, this study contributes to the disclosure 
literature by being the first that develops an index using AAOIFI, No.7, 2010 
and prior research to measure the CSR disclosure practice among sample 
Islamic banks. It then measures the factors behind variances of disclosure 
level. Whereas previous studies tend to adopt prior suggested indices, such 
as Maali et al., (2006) and Haniffa & Hudaib (2007). 
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 Third, previous work has applied manual content analysis to a one-year 
period, or within one country, in addition to limited samples (e.g., Belal et al., 
2014; Sobhani et al., 2009; El-Halaby&Hussainey, 2015). This study contains 
a larger sample size (39 Islamic banks) spread across 6 GCC countries 
between 2010-2014 and involves 195 observations. It provides a better 
picture of CSR disclosure practice among GCC countries. 
 Fourth, the study of AAOFII standards has grown in recent years with 
substantial contributions from scholars, such as Ahmed and Khatun (2013), 
and Hassan and Harahap (2010). It is notable that the focus of most of these 
studies is descriptive in nature, emphasising in particular the compliance level 
with AAOIFI without extending their study to explore the main factors behind 
the disclosure level. This study contributes to the disclosure literature 
exploring the determinants of disclosure concerned with CG for GCC Islamic 
banks. 
 Fifth, the present study explores, using CG mechanism analysis, the 
determinants of CSR disclosure by using firm- and country- specific control 
variables. While prior literature provides mixed empirical evidence for 
disclosure, limited studies examined the CSR disclosure practice in GCC. 
Also, previous literature provides mixed empirical evidence for variables 
related to CG characteristics. There is limited work has examined the 
existence of an in-house SSB and auditing committee, which can potentially 
influence the CSR disclosure practice. This study, therefore, is advanced by 
considering whether or not the CG mechanism and SSB variables have 
diverse impacts on the disclosure practice, rather than investigating 
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associations between single types of variable and disclosure practices (such 
example:Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Hassan et al., 2012). 
 Sixth, there have been few empirical studies investigating the association 
between CSR disclosures and CG variables that contain board, SSB, audit 
and ownership related variables in the Islamic banking sector; this is the first 
study that empirically investigates this association.  
 Seventh, two main methods are applied to examine the association between 
the main variables and test the models: OLS and descriptive statistics, which 
have been used frequently in prior research. This study provides more 
comprehensive CG variables to test its association with CSRD practice. As a 
result, it provides a better picture of CSR disclosure practice in GCC region. 
 Last but not least, there have been limited empirical studies investigating the 
link between disclosure and economic consequences in the banking industry 
(e.g., Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). From the 
researcher‟s knowledge, this is the first study that empirically investigates this 
relationship among Islamic Banks. This study provides a valuable contribution 
to researchers, as it extends the understanding of how the CSR disclosures 
affect the firm value (FV) of GCC Islamic banks from 2010 to 2014. 
8.4.2 Methodological contributions 
 The study provides a methodological contribution by constructing a CSR 
disclosure index using AAOIFI, No. 7, 2010 and supported with prior research. 
The research index contains 11 main dimensions of CSR areas, whereas 
previous studies have covered fewer dimensions (e.g., Abdul Rahman and 
Bukair, 2013; Hassan and Harahap, 2010). The model is a unique and 
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comprehensive means of measuring CSR disclosure. Previous studies tend to 
adopt prior suggested indices (Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2007),while this study constructed disclosure index using AAOIFI,no7,2010. 
Based on the index constructed, 39 GCC Islamic banks‟ annual reports from 
2010-2014 have been reviewed to measure their disclosure levels. 
 The study also introduces a valid and reliable measure of CSR disclosure, as 
well as a model for measuring the firm value of CSR disclosure. This thesis 
has provided evidence that economic consequences for CSR disclosure by 
Islamic banks can be assessed based upon the quantitative characteristics, 
as used by El-Halaby & Hussainey (2015a), Khlif (2015), Uyar & Kiliç (2012), 
and Folorunsho Monsuru & Adetunji Abdulazeez (2014). Adopting previous 
studies that measured the consequences of disclosure, which adopted 
content analysis for annual report based on OLS (e.g., Elzahar et al., 2015; 
Kothari et al., 2009; Hussainey and Walker, 2009), this current study 
contributes to the methodological contributions by checking the OLS 
assumptions, which are normality, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and 
autocorrelation. 
8.5 Implications 
The results summarised in the previous section have some distinctive practical and 
theoretical implications.  
8.5.1Theoretical implications 
The results summarised in the previous section have some distinctive theoretical 
implications either in support of existing theories or in extending the scope of 
previous works, and creating additional linkages within the existing literature.  
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 First, the analysis provides strong support for agency theory arguments, 
which suggest that corporations with strong CG mechanism are more likely to 
disclose CSR information to stakeholders (Taylor et al., 2010). The result 
shows that there is a significant positive relationship between CSRD and 
board size. The results prove that the board size significantly influences the 
CSRD practice in Islamic banks. Therefore, in increasing the CSRD practice, 
Islamic banks may have to increase their board sizes. 
 Second, there is no significant association between board composition and 
CSRD score; the study cannot prove that stakeholders have the ability to 
influence the way in which corporations conduct themselves, and ultimately 
influence their 'licence to operate'. This implies that if a firm dissatisfies a 
relevant stakeholder, this stakeholder cannot apply a pressure on the firm to 
meet their expectations. The result proves that the stakeholder has no 
influence in CSR disclosure practice in Islamic banks; either there is a high 
non-executive board that monitors the banks. 
 Third, with a low level of disclosure, the outcomes are inconsistent with the 
legitimacy theory as argued by Guthrie and Parker (1990). A firm, which 
operates in society, such as Islamic banks, has a social contract where it 
agrees to carry out various socially desired actions in return for approval of its 
objectives, other rewards and its ultimate survival. The result shows that 
Islamic banks are still less concerned with their CSR disclosure practice since 
there is no legitimacy impact to the banks either the CSR information is 
disclosing or not.  
 Fourth, the outcomes support the theoretical root of accountability for Islamic 
banks; accountability to Allah may come before stakeholders. This study 
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constructs a comprehensive model for CSR accountability that is applicable 
for Islamic banks and shows the link between the primary accountee (Allah), 
as well as secondary accountee (stakeholders), and the primary accountor 
(CG) and role of disclosure (CSR) to satisfy this accountability. Based on the 
mean of CSR disclosure scores by GCC Islamic banks, it shows that Islamic 
bank managers are still less accountable to the stakeholder in disclosing their 
CSR information. 
 Fifth, with respect to the negative effect of CSRD on firm value (measure 
using market capitalization proxy), this finding adds to the contradictory 
evidence on the relationship between disclosure and firm value. This result is 
inconsistent with the findings of some studies that build on agency theory 
framework (e.g. Healy et al., 1999). These studies suggest a positive impact 
of enhanced disclosure upon firm valuation to the reduction in information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Based on the findings, it 
shows that CSR disclosure did not give any significant impact to Islamic 
banks‟ value, which is contradictory with the theoretical assumptions 
discussed in this study. This is may be due to the low level of awareness 
among stakeholder regarding to CSR issue before make their investment. It is 
also due to the profit orientation as main objective among investor rather than 
social objective. 
 Last, this research contradicts the theoretical basis for signalling and 
economic theories, which argue that increased discourse has a positive 
impact on a firm‟s value (Gordon et al., 2010; Easley and O‟Hara, 2004). 
However, the result of the study didn‟t find any positive significant relationship 
between CSR and firm value. It also illustrates that non-financial disclosure 
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(such as CSR disclosure) has no superior impact when compared with 
financial disclosure, particularly for ethical institutions, such as Islamic banks. 
8.5.2 Practical implications 
This thesis provides several practical implications, as follows: 
 The total number of sentences in the annual reports varied and there was a 
large gap between the highest and the lowest. Moreover, the annual reports 
were not value relevant for stakeholders. For these reasons, the regulators 
and banks‟ managers should pay more attention to increasing the usefulness 
of disclosure for stakeholders, the completeness of their CSR information, and 
how to deliver information more understandably and readably for stakeholders.  
 The results suggest that the sample Islamic banks varied in the extent to 
which they reported their CSR activities. Some banks used many sentences, 
while some banks reported their CSR in just a few sentences. This indicates 
that banks had a different style in expressing their CSR information in their 
annual reports. Stakeholders may really need to understand this point and 
read annual reports critically, filtering the useful information from the whole 
information in an annual report, in order to minimise risk before making any 
financial decisions. Therefore, it is suggested that Islamic banks can provide a 
specific section in the annual report to provide CSR information. 
 The finding provides important implications for investors, managers, 
regulatory bodies, policy makers and Islamic banks. This result tells investors 
that CSRD has a negative effect on the market value of their banks, based on 
market capitalization proxies. Different proxies may provide different results. 
However, managers who engage in good practices of information disclosure 
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are recommended to continue to do so. For those who refrain themselves 
from providing information to the stakeholders, the results call for more CSR 
transparency if they want their bank to be more valuable in the eye of their 
stakeholders. 
 The results show that the disclosure of CSR information was absent in the 
annual reports for the selected GCC Islamic banks. Therefore, the regulatory 
bodies and policy makers may identify a minimum benchmark for CSR 
disclosure that is published by each bank either in their annual report or on 
the website. Furthermore, this finding is important for Islamic banks, which 
may be aware that more CSR disclosure might have a significant impact on 
their company image. Thus, they are expected to be more aware on CSR 
disclosure issues rather than focusing on profit-maximization objective.  
 For regulators, this study provides some insight related to CSR disclosure. Up 
until now, regulators have not yet monitored the depth of disclosure in terms 
of banks‟ CSR disclosure. It is better to ensure that banks have disclosed their 
CSR information in their annual reports, since the results indicate that CSR 
disclosure in the annual reports was affected by strong CG. This study 
provides evidence that stronger corporate governance is associated with a 
higher level of CSR disclosure. Therefore, regulatory bodies, such as the 
AAOIFI, are expected to be more proactive in guiding Islamic banks toward 
the best practices of disclosure since banks look for such guidance. CG plays 
a motivating role in this area of information disclosure. The AAOIFI are also 
expected to have a strong collaboration with countries‟ regulatory bodies in 
enhancing CSR disclosure practice among Islamic banks. 
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 CSR disclosure scores among the GCC Islamic banks are varied but the trend 
tended to be towards greater transparency. It is recommended that regulators 
enhance the regulations in order to push banks voluntarily and transparently 
to reveal their CSR information. Moreover, the regulators also need to 
consider the disclosure levels within the annual reports for other IFIs (takaful 
or unit-trust company) with regard to the levels of disclosure that are needed 
by stakeholders.  
8.6 Limitations and Suggestion for Future Research 
There is no research without limitation; this study adopts disclosure indices to 
investigate disclosure levels. Therefore, the results are only valid to the extent that 
the disclosure indices used are applicable. The selection of the items included in the 
index involves some degree of judgment and subjectivity. However, the reliability test 
is satisfactory. One potential limitation is the relatively small sample size, which 
involves only 39 GCC Islamic banks, which may limit the application of the findings 
of other IFIs such as Takaful and the Islamic Unit Trust Company. Further study may 
be conducted using a large sample of data. This is a common limitation of labour-
intensive studies, which employ manual content analysis to code the text. In addition, 
the researcher collects CSR data by reading firms‟ annual reports. This has bounded 
the ability to increase sample size for time and effort considerations. Due to the 
availability of data during this research, the data is limited from 2010 to 2014 only; 
further study can use the most recent data in conducting further study.  
There are a limited number of CG variables that have been tested in this current 
study, which is just focused on the board-related, SSB-related variables, AC 
variables and ownership variables. Future research may consider other CG 
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mechanisms (e.g., managerial ownership, number of subsidiaries, and family 
ownership) or other related variables. This current study is limited to Islamic banks 
only; therefore, future research may explore the determinants on CSR disclosure 
among other Islamic institutions, such as Islamic insurance companies (Takaful) and 
Islamic investment companies. This might substantiate the findings from the CSR 
disclosure studies. The study also is limited to discuss the AAOIFI, no. 7, 2010 
compliance among GCC Islamic banks. Further study may be conducted in 
measuring the level of compliance with other AAOIFI governance standards or 
national standards.  
In this current study, the researcher focuses on three measurements/proxies of firm 
value, which are MTBV, market capitalization, and Tobin‟s Q. It would be interesting 
to use other measures for firm value, such as scale efficiency measures, as 
suggested by Dybvig & Warachka (2015). This current study narrowly focuses on 
CSR disclosure consequences among Islamic banks. It would be interesting for 
further study to examine the association between CSR disclosure and firm value for 
other Islamic financial institutions, such as Islamic insurance companies (takaful). 
The study finally suggests that further research could also examine the non-
economic consequences (such example: company image) of CSR disclosure and 
firm value, such as the image and reputation of the banks. 
. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Example of evidence from the Quran and Hadith in promoting CSR 
Source from Quran and 
Hadith 
Values to business 
practice 
Values to CSR 
practice 
-The Holy Prophet said “I will be 
foe to three persons on the day 
of judgment, one of them being 
the one who. When he employs 
apersons that has accomplished 
his duty, does not give him his 
due" (Al Bukhari, No. 2109). 
 
-“No Arab has superiority over a 
non-Arab and no non-Arab has 
any superiority over an Arab; no 
dark person has superiority over 
a white person and no white 
person has superiority over a 
dark person. The criterion of 
honour in the sight of God is 
righteousness and honest living” 
(saying of the prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) (Cited in Ali 
Aribi, Zakaria and Arun, 2014). 
 
-Employee fair treatment, 
equal opportunity and non-
discriminatory behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Responsibility to 
employees. 
-God likes that when someone 
does anything, it must be done 
perfectly well (saying of the 
prophet Muhammad pray and 
peace upon Him) (cited in 
Sallam and Hanafy, 1988). 
 
-Excellence and quality of work -Responsibility to the 
employer. 
-Once he turns back, he moves 
about in the land trying to 
spread disorder in it, and to 
destroy the tillage and the stock; 
and Allah does not like disorder 
(Quran, 2:205). 
 
-“O Children of Adam! Take 
your adornment at every 
mosque: eat and drink, and do 
not be extravagant; Surely He 
does not like the extravagant” 
(Quran 7:31). 
 
-“And do not do mischief on the 
earth, after it has been set in 
order, and invoke Him with fear 
-The importance to protect 
environment. 
-Responsibility to the 
environment. 
258 
 
and hope; Surely, Allah's Mercy 
is (ever) near unto the good-
doers” (Quran, 7:56). 
 
-“If the Final Hour (Al-Qiamah) 
is come, and one of you has a 
palm seeding in his hand and it 
is within his power to plant it, 
then let him do so” (Narrated by 
Ahmed, Hadith No.12689) 
 
-"And O my people, perfect the 
measure and the balance with 
justice and do not make the 
people short of their things, and 
do not go about the earth 
spreading disorder (Qur'an, 11: 
85). 
 
-"He who cheats is not one of 
us” (saying of the Prophet 
Mohamed - pray and peace 
upon Him) (Cited in Keller, 
1994). 
 
-Honesty and transparency in 
conducting business 
transactions. 
-Responsibility to 
customers and clients 
-"... do not outbid one another in 
order to raise the price, don‟t 
enter into a transaction when 
other have already entered into 
that transaction and be as 
brothers one to another” 
(Saying of prophet Mohamed-
PBUH). 
 
-Fairness in contracts 
negotiation 
-Responsibility to 
shareholder and 
stakeholders. 
-The acquisition of knowledge is 
a duty incumbent on every 
Muslim, male and female 
(saying of the prophet 
Muhammad-PBUH) (Sallam and 
Hanafy, 1988) 
 
-Importance of seeking 
knowledge, research and 
development, scientific 
activities, training programme 
-Responsibility for 
personal development 
program/employee/staff. 
-“It is not righteousness that ye 
turn your faces to the East and 
the West; but righteous is he 
who believeth in Allah and the 
Last Day and the angels and 
the Scripture and the prophets; 
and giveth wealth, for love of 
Him, to kinsfolk and to orphans 
and the needy and the wayfarer 
and to those who ask, and to 
set slaves free; and observeth 
proper worship and payeth the 
poor-due. And those who keep 
-Socio economic justice 
towards all level of people. 
-Responsibility to the 
community. 
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their treaty when they make 
one, and the patient in 
tribulation and adversity and 
time of stress. Such are they 
who are sincere. Such are the 
God-fearing” (Quran 2: 177). 
 
-“And if the debtor is in 
straitened circumstances, then 
(let there be) postponement to 
(the time of) ease; and that ye 
remit the debt as almsgiving 
would be better for you if ye did 
not know” (Quran, 2:280). 
 
-Tolerate the debtor when they 
have difficulties to make a 
repayment. 
-Responsibility to 
debtors. 
-“O you who believe, be 
upholders of justice - witnesses 
for Allah, even though against 
(the interest of) your selves or 
the parents, and the kinsmen. 
One may be rich or poor; Allah 
is better caretaker of both.  So 
do not follow desires, lest you 
should swerve. If you twist or 
avoid (the evidence), then, Allah 
is all-aware of what you do”. 
(Quran, 4:135) 
 
-An order to promote social 
justice 
-Responsibility towards 
society 
-“Allah (SWT) says: I will be an 
opponent to three persons on 
the day of judgement: One who 
makes a covenant in My name, 
but he prove treacherous, and 
who sells a free person (as 
slave) and eats the price, and 
one who employs a labourer 
and gets the full work done by 
him but he does not pay him 
wages” (Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol 
3: Hadith No. 2). 
 
-Promoting social justice 
among community. 
-Responsibility to 
employee and 
community 
-O you, who believe, do not 
devour each other‟s property by 
false means, unless it is trade 
conducted with your mutual 
consent. Do not kill one another. 
Indeed, Allah has been Very 
Merciful to you. (Quran, 4: 29) 
 
-Honesty in wealth 
management and business 
trade. 
-Social responsibility in 
conducting and 
managing business 
trade. 
-Anybody who believes in Allah 
and the Day of Judgement 
should not harm his neighbour, 
and anybody who believes in 
Allah and the Day of Judgement 
-Enhance good ethics among 
society. 
-Social responsibility to 
the community. 
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should entertain his guest 
generously, and anybody who 
believes in Allah and the Day of 
Judgement should talk what is 
good or keep quiet (i.e. abstain 
from all kinds of evil and dirty 
talk) (Al-Bukhari, Vol 8, Hadith 
No.47). 
 
-“So, observe taqwa (total 
obedience to Allah in awe of 
Him) as far as you can, and 
listen and obey, and spend (in 
Allah‟s way), it being good for 
you. And those who are saved 
from the greed of their hearts 
are the successful” (Quran 
64:16). 
 
-The Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH) said: “Every Muslim 
must pay sadaqah (charity).” 
Then the Companions asked: 
“What about someone who has 
nothing to give?” The Prophet 
replied: “Then let him do 
something with his two hands 
and benefit himself. That will be 
charity.” The companion asked 
again: “But what if he cannot do 
that?” The Prophet replied: 
“Then he can help someone 
who is needy.” Again the 
companion asked: “What if he 
cannot do that?” The Prophet 
replied: “Then he should enjoin 
the doing of good.” The 
companion asked again: “But 
what if he cannot do that?” The 
Prophet said that: “Then he 
should give respite from evil, for 
that is a form of charity.” (Hadith 
narrated by Al-Bukhari, Hadith, 
No.225). 
 
-Philanthropy -Responsibility to 
employees and the 
community. 
(Source: Adapted from Mohammed (2007), Zakaria (2009), and Zakaria and Arun 
(2014). 
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Appendix 2: Details of CSR Disclosure dimensions develop based on AAOIFI, 2010 
and prior literature. 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND PRESENTATION TREATMENT OPTIONS 
Notes: The mandatory sections are applicable to al IFIs regardless to their legal form, 
country of incorporation or size. The recommended/voluntary sections are only applicable to 
IFIs which have the capacity, financial or otherwise, to carry out or comply with such 
activities. This table develop based on AAOIFI, No 7,2010 
Classifications  Dimensions (Main 
Disclosure Items) 
 
Sub-items 
 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory Disclosure 
Conduct 
1) Disclosure of 
policy for 
screening clients. 
i. Specific provisions of the 
screening policy including 
the benchmark and/or 
criterion utilize to measure 
compliance with Islamic 
law. 
ii. Whether these have been 
approved by SSB (Shariah 
Supervisory Board). 
2) Disclosure policy 
for dealing with 
clients. 
i. Procedure of the IFI on 
avoiding the imposition of 
onerous contractual terms 
on clients who are in a 
weaker bargaining position 
relative to the IFI.  
ii. Ensuring that marketing 
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campaigns and documents 
are ethically balanced. 
iii. The obligation and rights of 
both parties. 
iv. Process and responsible 
terms and conditions under 
which credit is extended to 
client, including the 
process by which the 
client‟s ability to repay and 
the effect on the client‟s 
financial and overall well-
being is assessed. 
v. The remedies available in 
the event of that one or 
both parties violate their 
contractual firms. 
vi. The SSB opinion on the 
permissibility of charging 
late payment charges. 
vii. Late payment charges 
imposed on clients. 
viii. How the IFI allocate the 
late payment, charges in its 
account (allocation to 
revenue or charity). 
ix. The conditions under which 
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the IFI will defer collection 
of debt from insolvent 
clients. 
3) Disclosure of 
earnings and 
expenditure 
prohibited by 
Shariah. 
i. Aggregate description, 
amounts, account 
classification (revenue, 
expense, liability or asset) 
and reason for undertaking 
the types of transactions. 
ii. The SSB‟s verdict on the 
necessity of the 
transactions. 
iii. How the IFI intends to 
dispose of such amounts. 
iv. The IFI strategy to find 
viable permissible 
alternatives, if any, for 
similar impermissible 
transactions in the future. 
4) Disclosure policy 
for employee 
welfare. 
i. Provisions of the policy, 
including targeted 
disadvantaged groups. 
ii. Quotas/target and 
achievement for the year. 
iii. Reason for upward and 
downward revisions in 
quotas/target. 
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5) Disclosure of 
policy of Zakah. 
i. Disclosure should be made 
for Zakah, in the financial 
statements, in accordance 
with the provisions of 
Financial Reporting 
Standards No:1 and No:9  
 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Conduct 
1) Disclosure of 
social, 
development and 
environment 
based investment 
quotas. 
i. The provisions of the policy 
ii. Classes of the investment 
by ultimate 
purpose/beneficiary of 
investments (example: 
orphans, SME 
development, Islamic 
culture, and reduction in 
tree logging, reduction in 
environmental greenhouse 
gases increase in 
recycling, science and 
technology). 
iii. The profitability of such 
investment for the year. 
iv. Quotas/target and 
achievements for the year. 
v. Reason for upward and 
downward revisions in 
quotas/target. 
2) Policy for i. Establishing organization 
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reduction of 
adverse impact on 
the environment. 
wide guideline on efficient 
and minimal usage of non-
renewable resources. 
ii. Initiatives to educate 
employees to efficiently 
use non-renewable 
resources and increase 
use of renewable 
resources. 
iii. Incentives and initiatives to 
find alternatives to non-
renewable resources of 
energy and materials for 
operations (example: e-
mail bank statements 
instead of paper bank 
statements). 
iv. Incentives and initiatives to 
recycle renewable sources 
of materials within the 
organization. 
 
3) Disclosure of the 
policy for par 
excellence 
customer service. 
i. Provisions of the policy 
ii. Measure taken by 
management to top 
developer customer service 
skills 
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iii. Aggregate results of 
customer surveys 
demonstrating overall 
quality of customer service 
and areas of improvement. 
4) Disclosure of 
policy for micro 
and small 
business and 
social savings and 
investments. 
i. Provisions of the policy. 
ii. Features to offer. 
iii. Measures taken by 
management to implement 
the provisions of the policy. 
iv. Quotas/target and 
achievement of the year. 
v. Reasons for upward and 
downward revisions in 
quotas/target. 
 
5) Disclosure of the 
policy for Qard 
Hasan. 
i. Whether there is formal 
scheme operated by the 
bank for depositors, 
shareholders and other 
parties to place their funds 
for the use of Qard Hasan 
borrowers. 
ii. Provisions of the 
policy/scheme including 
conditions for those unable 
to repay the loans. 
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iii. Sources of funding for 
Qard Hasan loans. 
iv. Aggregate purposes for 
which the Qard Hasan 
loans have been made. 
v. Quotas/target to increase 
internal and external Qard 
Hasan funding and 
achievements for the year 
in this regard. 
vi. Reasons for upward and 
downward revisions in 
quotas/target. 
6) Disclosure of 
policy for 
charitable 
activities. 
i. Provisions of the policy. 
ii. Aggregate classes of 
charitable activities by 
ultimate beneficiaries and 
amounts distributed to 
each aggregate class. 
iii. Quotas/targets and 
achievements for the year. 
iv. Reasons for upward and 
downward revisions in 
quotas/target. 
 
7) Disclosure of 
policy for Waqf 
i. Types of Waqf managed by 
IFI. 
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management. ii. Financial and other service 
offered to the Awqaf by the 
IFI. 
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Appendix 3 Model 1-MTBV-Pearson Correlations 
Variables MTBV CSRD B.SIZE B.COMP CEO.DUAL F.SIZE F.PROFIT F.LEVERAGE C.GDP 
MTBV 1                 
CSRD 0.058 1               
B.SIZE 0.140 0.117 1             
B.COMP -0.068 -0.052 -0.111 1           
CEO.DUAL .234** -0.126 -0.092 -0.066 1         
F.SIZE -0.030 .168* -0.076 0.057 .195** 1       
F.PROFIT 0.111 -0.059 -0.052 -0.116 0.107 0.057 1     
F.LEVERAGE -0.054 0.096 -0.048 0.098 -.149* .197** -.388** 1   
C.GDP 0.123 .210** -.217** -0.016 .309** .569** .168* -0.058 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 4: Model 2:-Market Capitalization(WC08001)-Pearson Correlations 
Variables WC08001 CSRD B.SIZE B.COMP CEO.DUAL F.SIZE F.PROFIT F.LEVERAGE C.GDP 
WC08001 1                 
CSRD 0.034 1               
B.SIZE -.210** 0.117 1             
B.COMP 0.039 -0.052 -0.111 1           
CEO.DUAL .365** -0.126 -0.092 -0.066 1         
F.SIZE .369** .168* -0.076 0.057 .195** 1       
F.PROFIT .298** -0.059 -0.052 -0.116 0.107 0.057 1     
F.LEVERAGE -0.121 0.096 -0.048 0.098 -.149* .197** -.388** 1   
C.GDP .688** .210** -.217** -0.016 .309** .569** .168* -0.058 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 5: Model 3: -Tobin Q-Pearson Correlations 
 Variables TOBIN Q CSRD B.SIZE B.COMP CEO.DUAL F.SIZE F.PROFIT F.LEVERAGE C.GDP 
TOBIN Q 1                 
CSRD 0.037 1               
B.SIZE 0.013 0.117 1             
B.COMP -0.028 -0.052 -0.111 1           
CEO.DUAL 0.134 -0.126 -0.092 -0.066 1         
F.SIZE .158* .168* -0.076 0.057 .195** 1       
F.PROFIT 0.102 -0.059 -0.052 -0.116 0.107 0.057 1     
F.LEVERAGE 0.058 0.096 -0.048 0.098 -.149* .197** -.388** 1   
C.GDP 0.137 .210** -.217** -0.016 .309** .569** .168* -0.058 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
272 
 
REFERENCES 
AAOIFI. (2010), corporate social responsibility conduct and disclosure for Islamic 
financialInstitutions (Governance standard No.7). AAOIFI, Bahrain 
AAOIFI. (2015). (Online) available online http://www.aaoifi.com (Last access on 5 
Disember 2015) 
Aaronson, A. & Reeves, J., 2002, “The European Response to Public Demands for 
Global Corporate Responsibility”, Harvard Institute for International Development,  
Abbasi, T. Kausar, A. Ashiq, H. Inam, H. Nasar, H. and Amjad, R. (2012). Corporate 
social Responsibility Disclosure: a comparison between Islamic and Conventional 
Financial Institutions in Bahawalpur Region. Research Journal of Finance and 
Accounting, 3, 51-61 
Abdel-Magid, M. (1981). The theory of Islamic banking: Accounting implications. The 
International Journal of Accounting, 17 (1), 79-102 
Abd-Elsalam, H. (1999). The introduction and application of international accounting 
Standards to Accounting disclosure regulations of a capital market in developing 
country: The case of Egypt. PhD. Herriot-Watt University, UK 
Abdelsalam, O. and Street, D. (2007). Corporate governance and the timeliness of 
corporate internet Reporting by U.K. listed companies. Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 16 (2) 111-130 
Abdjalil, M. Yusoff, R. and Mahmud, R. (2010), Selection factors of customers towards 
Islamic and Conventional Home financing products offered by Malayan banking Berhad: 
a case study in Johor, study presented in the International Conference on Business and 
Economics, Andalas University, Padang, Indonesia 
Abdul Hamid, F. (2004). Corporate social disclosure by banks and finance companies: 
Malaysian evidence. Corporate Ownership and Control, 1(4), 118-130. 
Abdul Rahman, A. (2007). Islamic banking and finance: between ideals and realities. 
Journal of Economics and Management, 15 (2), 123-141 
Abdul Rahman, A. and Bukair, A. (2013). The Influence of the Shariah Supervision 
Board on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure by Islamic Banks of Gulf Co-
Operation Council Countries. Asian Journal of Business and Accounting, 6 (2), 65-105 
Abdul Rahman, A. Hashim, A. and Abu Bakar, F. (2010). Corporate Social Reporting: A 
Preliminary Study of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). Issues in Social and 
Environmental Accounting, 4 (1), 18-39 
273 
 
Abdullah, A. Sidek, R. and Adnan, A. (2012). Perception of Non-Muslim Customers 
towards Islamic Banks in Malaysia. International Journal of Business and Social 
Science, 3 (11), 151-163 
Abhayawansa, S. and Abeysekera, I. (2009). Intellectual capital disclosure from sell-
siden analyst perspective. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 10 (2), 294-306 
Abraham, S. and Cox, P. (2007). Analysing the determinants of narrative risk 
information in UK FTSE 100 Annual reports. The British Accounting Review, 39 (3), 
227-248 
Abu-Tapanjeh, A. (2009). Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: a 
comparative analysis with OECD principles. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 20 (5), 
556-567 
Adams, C. (2004). The Ethical, social and environmental reporting - performance 
portrayal Gap. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 17 (5), 731-757 
Adams, C. Hill, Y. and Roberts, B. (1998). Corporate social reporting practices in 
Western Europe: Legitimation corporate behaviour. The British Accounting Review, 30 
(1), 1–21 
Adnan, M. and Gaffing, M. (1997). The Shariah , IBs and Accounting Concepts and 
Practices Accounting, Commerce and Finance. The Islamic Perspective, International 
Conference, Sydney 
Afifuddin, H. and Siti-Nabiha, A. (2010). Towards Good Accountability: The Role of 
Accounting In Islamic religious organisations. World Academy of Science, Engineering 
and Technology, 66, 1132- 1144 
Agarwal, V. Liao, A. Nash, E. and Taffler, R. (2008). The impact of effective investor 
relations On Market value 
Aggarwal, R. and Yousef, T. (2000). Islamic Banks and Investment Financing. Journal 
of Money Credit and Banking, 32 (1), 93-120 
Agrawal, A., Knoeber, C.R. (1996), , "Firm Performance and mechanisms to control 
agency problems between managers and shareholders", Journal of financial and 
quantitative analysis, vol. 31, pp. 377-397. 
Aguilera, R. and Jackson, G. (2003). The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate 
Governance: Dimensions and Determinants. Acad. of Management Rev, 3 (July), 1-19 
274 
 
Ahmad, Abdel-Rahman Yousri, 2005. Islamic Banking Modes of Finance: Proposals for 
Further Evolution, in Munawar Iqbal and Rodney Wilson (eds.), Islamic Perspectives on 
Wealth Creation. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 32–3. 
Ahmad, K. (2000). Islamic finance and banking: The challenges and prospects. Review 
of Islamic Economics, 9, 57–82 
Ahmad, Khurshid. “The Challenge of Global Capitalism.” In Making Globalization Good: 
The Moral Challenges of Global Capitalism edited by John H. Dunning. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
Ahmad, N. and Haron, S. (2002). Perceptions of Malaysian corporate customers 
towards Islamic Banking Products and services. International Journal of Islamic 
Financial Services, 3 (1), 13-29 
Ahmad, N. and Sulaiman, M. (2004). Environmental disclosures in Malaysian annual 
reports: a legitimacy theory perspective. IJCM, 14, 44-58 
Ahmed, K. and Courtis, K. (1999). Association between Corporate Characteristics on 
Mandatory Disclosure Compliance in Annual Reports: A Meta-Analysis. British 
Accounting Review, 31, 35–61 
Ahmed, K. and Nicholls, D. (1994). The Impact of Non-Financial Company 
Characteristics on Mandatory Disclosure Compliance in Developing Countries: The 
Case of Bangladesh. The International Journal of Accounting, 29, 62–77 
Ahmed, N. & Khatun, M. (2013). The Compliance with Shariah Governance System of 
AAOIFI: A Study on Islamic Banks Bangladesh. Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking 
and Finance, 9 (3), 178-191 
Ahmed, R., & Karim, A. (2001). International accounting harmonization , banking 
regulation and Islamic banks. The International Journal of Accounting, 36, 169–193. 
Ainley, Michael, Ali Mashayekhi, Robert Hicks, Arshadur Rahman and Ali Ravalia, 2007. 
Islamic Finance in the United Kingdom: Regulation and Challenges. London: Financial 
Services Authority. 
Akhigbe and Martin (2006). Valuation impact of Sarbanes–Oxley: Evidence from 
disclosure andgovernance within the financial services industry. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 30, 989–1006 
Akhtaruddin, M. (2005). Corporate Mandatory Disclosure Practices in Bangladesh. 
International Journal of Accounting, 40 (4), 399-422 
275 
 
Akhtaruddin, M. and Hossian, M. (2008). Investment opportunity set, ownership control 
and Voluntary Disclosures in Malaysia. JOAAG, 3 (2), 25-39 
Akhtaruddin, M. Hossain, M. Hossain, M. and Yao, L. (2009). Corporate Governance 
and Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reports of Malaysian listed firms. Journal 
of Applied Management Accounting Research, 7 (1), 1-20 
Aksu, M. and Kosedag, A. (2006), Transparency and disclosure scores and their 
determinants In the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The Authors Journal Compilation, 14 (4), 
277-296 
Al Banna Choiruzzad, S., & Nugroho, B. E. (2013). Indonesia‟s Islamic Economy Project 
and the Islamic Scholars. Procedia Environmental Sciences, 17, 957–966.  
Al-Abdullatif, S. (2007). The application of the AAOIFI accounting standards by the 
Islamic Banking sector in KSA. PhD. Durham University, UK 
Al-Ajmi, M., Al-Mutairi, A., & Al-Duwaila, N. (2015). Corporate Social Disclosure 
Practices in Kuwait. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 7(9), 244–254.  
Al-Akra, M. Eddie, I. and Ali, M. (2010). The association between privatisation and 
voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Jordan. Accounting and Business Research, 40 (1), 
1-44 
Alam, Mehre, 2006. Islamic Finance: Going Strong. Oman Economic Review, June, pp. 
1–8. 
Al-Attas, S. (1996). The Worldview of Islam: An Outline, in. S. S. Al-Attas, Islam and the 
Challenge of Modernity. International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization 
(ISTAC), Kuala Lumpur 
Al-Baluchi, A. (2006). The Impact of AAOIFI Standards and Other Bank Characteristics 
on the Level of Voluntary Disclosure in the Annual Reports of Islamic Banks. PhD. 
School of Management University of Surrey 
Alberti-Alhtaybat, L. Von, Hutaibat, K., & Al-Htaybat, K. (2012). Mapping corporate 
disclosure theories. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, 10(1), 73–94.  
Al-Hawari, M. and Ward, T., (2006). The effect of automated service quality on 
Australian Banks‟ Financial Performance and the mediating role of customer satisfaction. 
Marketing Intelligence and Planning, 24 (2), 127–147 
Al-hazaimeh, A. Palaniappan, R. and Almsafir, M. (2014). The Impact of Corporate 
Governance And Ownership Structure on Voluntary Disclosure in Annual Reports 
276 
 
among Listed Jordanian Companies. Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences, 129 
(May), 341-348 
Anne Elizabeth Mayer. “Islamic Banking and Credit Policies in the Sadat Era: The 
Social Originof Islamic Banking in Egypt,” Arab Law Quarterly 1 no. 1 (1985): 32-50. 
Al-Humedhi, H. (1999). An Analysis of Bureaucratic Accountability in the American 
Public Sector and its Implications for the Saudi Bureaucracy. J. King Saud University, 
11(1), 1-18 
Ali Aribi, Z., & Arun, T. (2014). Corporate Social Responsibility and Islamic Financial 
Institutions (IFIs): Management Perceptions from IFIs in Bahrain. Journal of Business 
Ethics, (Clarkson 1995).  
Ali, J. and Al-Kazemi, A. (2007). Managerial problems in Kuwait. The Journal of 
Management Development, 21 (5), 366- 375 
Ali, S. Shafique, A. Razi, A. and Aslam, U. (2012). Determinants of profitability of 
Islamic banks, A Case Study of Pakistan. Journal of contemporary research in business, 
3 (11), 86-99 
Ali, Z. (2006). Islam: Religion, History, and Civilization (review). Philosophy East and 
West.  
Aljifri, K. (2008). Annual report disclosure in a developing country: The case of UAE. 
Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting, 24, 93–
100 
Allison, P. (1999). Multiple regression: A primer. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press 
Al-Matari, E. Al-Swidi, A. and Fadzil, F., (2014). The Effect of the Internal Audit and Firm 
Performance: A Proposed Research Framework. International Review of Management 
and Marketing, 4 (1), 34-41 
Al-Mehmadi, S. (2004). The external reporting needs of investors in IBs in Saudi Arabia: 
an Exploratory study of full disclosure. PhD. University of Dundee, Dundee 
Almilia, L. (2009). Determining factors of internet financial reporting in Indonesia. 
Account Tax, 1 (1), 87–99 
Al-Mubarak, T., & Osmani, N. M. (2010). Applications of Maqasid al-Shari‟ah and 
Maslahah in Islamic Banking. In International Seminar on Islamic Finance. 
277 
 
Alotaibi, K. and Hussainey, K. (2016). The determinants of CSR disclosure quantity and 
quality: Evidence from non-financial listed firms in Saudi Arabia. International Journal of 
Disclosure and Governance, Forthcoming. 
Al-Raysuni, A. (2005). IMAM AL-SHATIBI‟S, Theory of the Higher Objectives and 
Intents of Islamic Law, the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) 
Alsaeed, K. (2006). The association between firm-specific characteristics and disclosure: 
The Case of Saudi Arabia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(5), 476–496 
Al-Saidi, M., & Al-Shammari, B. (2013). Board composition and bank performance in 
Kuwait: an empirical study. Managerial Auditing Journal, 28(6), 472–494.  
Al-Shiab, M. (2003). Financial consequences of IAS adoption: the case of Jordan. PhD. 
University of Newcastle Upon-Tyne, UK 
Alvarez, G. Burgos, J. and Cespedes, L. (2001). An Analysis of Environmental 
Management, Organizational Context and Performance of Spanish Hotels. Omega, 29 
(6), 457–471 
Alvarez, I. Sanchez, I. and Domınguez, L. (2008). Voluntary and compulsory information 
Disclosed Online: The effect of industry concentration and other explanatory factors. 
Online Information Review, 32 (5), 596-622 
Al-Zuhayli, D. (2003). Al-Fiqh Al-Islami wa Adillatuh (Islamic Jurispudence and Its 
Proofs), Dar Al-Fikr Al-Mouser, Beirut (translated by Mahmoud A. El-Gamal) 
Amin, H., Rahman, A. R. A., Jr, S. L. S., & Hwa, A. M. C. (2011). Determinants of 
customers‟ intention to use Islamic personal financing: The case of Malaysian Islamic 
banks. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research.  
Amran, A., Lee, S. P., & Devi, S. S. (2014). The Influence of Governance Structure and 
Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility Toward Sustainability Reporting Quality. 
Business Strategy and the Environment, 23(4), 217–235.  
Anam, O. Fatima, A. and Majdi, A. (2011). Effects of intellectual capital information 
disclosed In Annual reports on market capitalization: evidence from Bursa Malaysia. 
Journal of Human Resource Costing and Accounting, 15 (2), 85-101 
Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. (2004). Board composition: balancing family influence in 
SandP 500 Firms. Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 49, 209–237 
Anderson, R. and Srinivasan, S. (2003). E-satisfaction and E-loyalty: A Contingency 
Framework. Psychology and Marketing, 20, 123-138 
278 
 
Anderson, R. Reeb, D. (2003a). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence From The Sand P 500. Journal of Finance, LVIII (3), 1301–1328 
Andres, P. and Vallelado, E. (2009). Corporate governance in banking: The role of the 
board of Directors. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 2570–2580 
Anthony, David, 2008. Insurance and Reinsurance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: 
Economic and Industry Risks Exist, but Market Prospects Remain Strong. London: 
Standard & Poors, p. 1. 
Anuar, A. Sulaiman, M. and Ahmad, N. (2009). Some Evidence of Environmental 
Reporting by Shariah Compliant Companies in Malaysia. Journal of Economics and 
Management, 17(2), 177-208 
Aras, G. Aybars, A. and Kutlu, O. (2010). Managing Corporate Performance: 
Investigating the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial 
Performance in Emerging Markets. International Journal of Productivity and 
Performance Management, 59 (3), 229-254 
Arcay, R. and Vazquez, F. (2005). Corporate characteristics, governance rules and the 
extent of Voluntary Disclosure in Spain. Advances in Accounting, 21, 299–331 
Archambault, J. & Archambault, M. (2003). A Multinational Test of Determinants of 
Corporate Disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting, 38 (2), 173–194 
Archambeault, D. DeZoort, T. and Holt, T. (2008). The need for an internal auditor 
report to External Stakeholders to improve governance transparency. Accounting 
Horizons, 22 (4), 375-388 
Archer, S. Karim, R. and Al-Deehani, T. (1998). Financial contracting, governance 
structures And The Accounting regulation of Islamic banks: an analysis in terms of 
agency theory and Transaction cost economics. Journal of Management and 
Governance, 2 (2), 149-170 
Aribi, Z. A. (2009). An Empirical Study of Corporate Social Responsibility and its 
Disclosure in Islamic Financial Institutions. PhD Thesis. Edinburgh Napier University. 
Aribi, Z. A., & Gao, S. S. (2010a). Corporate social responsibility disclosure: a 
comparison between Islamic and conventional financial institutions.  
Aribi, Z. A., & Gao, S. S. (2012). Narrative disclosure of corporate social responsibility in 
Islamic financial institutions. Managerial Auditing Journal, 27(2) 
Arieli, S., Grant, A. M., & Sagiv, L. (2014). Convincing Yourself to Care About Others: 
An Intervention for Enhancing Benevolence Values. Journal of Personality, 82(1),  
279 
 
Ariffin, N. (2005). Enhancing Transparency and Risk Reporting in Islamic Banks. PhD. 
University of Surrey, UK 
Aris, N. A., Othman, R., & Azli, R. M. (2013). Pyramid of Maslahah for Social and 
Economic Welfare : The Case of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. Energy Technology and 
Policy, 3, 457–470. 
Ariss, R. and Sarieddine, Y. (2007). Challenges in implementing capital adequacy 
guidelines to Islamic Banks. Journal of Banking Regulation, 9 (1), 46-59 
Arnold, A. and Matthews, D. (2002). Corporate financial disclosures in the UK, 1920-50: 
The effects of legislative change and managerial discretion. Accounting and Business 
Research, 32 (1), 3-16 
Arvidsson, S. (2010). Communication of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Study of the 
Views of Management Teams in Large Companies. Journal of Business Ethics, 96, 
339–354 
Arvidsson, S. (2011). Disclosure of non-financial information in the annual report: A 
management-team perspective. Journal of Intellectual Capital.  
Aryani, D. N. (2015). The Determinants and Value Relevance Of Risk Disclosure In The 
Indonesian Banking Sector. University of Gloucestershire,UK. 
Ashiq, A. Chen, Y. and Radhakrishnan, S. (2007). Corporate Disclosure by Family Firm. 
Journal Of Accounting and Economics, 44, 238-286 
Asian Development Bank and Islamic Financial Services Board (ADB and IFSB) (2015), 
“Islamic Finance for Asia: Development, Prospects, and Inclusive Growth.” 
Askary, S. and Clarke, F. (1997). Accounting in the Koranic Verses, Accounting, 
Commerce and Finance: The Islamic Perspective International Conference, Sydney 
Asutay, Mehmet. “A Political Economy Approach to Islamic Economics: Systemic 
Understanding for an Alternative Economic System.” Kyoto Journal of Islamic Area 
Studies 1, no. 2 (2007): 3-18. 
Asutay, Mehmet. “GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds and Their Role in the European and 
American Markets.” Equilibri 12, no. 3 (2008): 335-354. 
Ayub, M. (2007). Understanding Islamic Finance, West Sussex, UK: John Wiley and 
Sons 
Babio, M. and Muiño, M. (2005). Corporate characteristics, governance rules and the 
extent of Voluntary disclosure in Spain. Advances in Accounting, 21, 299–331 
280 
 
Baglioni, A. and Colombo, L. (2008), "Managers' Compensation and Misreporting: a 
Costly State Verification Approach", Economic inquiry, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 278. 
Bailey, A. Gramling, A. and Ramamoorti, S. (2003). Research Opportunities in Internal 
Auditing, Altamonte Springs, FL: The IIA Research Foundation 
Baptista, Klotze, Campelo de Melo, “Ceo Duality and Firm performance in Brazil: 
Evidence from 2008”, (2008) 
Barako, G. Hancock, P. and Izan, H. (2006). Factors influencing voluntary corporate 
disclosure By Kenyan companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14 
(2), 107–125 
Barontini, R. and Caprio, L. (2006). The effect of family control on firm value and 
performance: Evidence from Continental Europe. Europe Finance Management, 12 (5), 
689–723 
Basah, M. Y. A. (2012). Corporate social responsibility and natural environmental risk 
management in the context of the banking sector of Malaysia., (April). 
Basah, M., & Yusuf, M. (2013). Islamic Bank and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
European Journal of Business and Management, 5(11), 194–209.  
Bauer, M. (2000). Classical content analysis: A review. In M. W. Bauer and G. Gaskell 
(Eds.), Qualitative researching with text, image, and sound: A practical handbook (131-
151). London: Sage Publication 
Baydoun, N. and Willet, R. (1995). Cultural relevance of western accounting systems to 
Developing Countries. Abacus, 31(1), 67−92 
Baydoun, N. and Willett, R. (1997). Islam and accounting: Ethical issues in the 
presentation of Financial Information. Accounting, Commerce and Finance: The Islamic 
Perspective Journal, 1(1), 1-25 
Baydoun, N. and Willett, R. (2000). Islamic Corporate Reports. Abacus, 36 (1), 71-90 
Baydoun, N. Mamman, A. and Mohmand, A. (1999). The religious context of 
management Practices: The case of Islamic religion. Accounting, Commerce and 
Finance: the Islamic Perspective Journal, 3(1 and 2), 59-79 
Beasley, M. (1996). An empirical analysis between the board of directors' composition 
and Financial Statements Fraud. The Accounting Review, 71, 443–466 
281 
 
Beattie, V. McInnes, W. and Fearnley, S. (2004). A methodology for analysing and 
evaluating Narratives in annual Reports: a comprehensive descriptive profile and 
metrics for disclosure Quality attributes. Accounting Forum, 28 (3), 205–236 
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and O. Merrouche, (2013), “Islamic vs. Conventional 
Banking Business Model, Efficiency and Stability,” Journal of Banking and Finance No. 
37 Vol. 2, pp. 433–47. 
Beeks, W. and Brown, P. (2005). Do better governed Australian firms make more 
informative Disclosures, working study, Lancaster University, Lancaster, available at:  
Beest, F. Braam, G. (2012). An empirical analysis of quality differences between UK 
annual Reports and US 10-K reports. Working study, Radboud University Nijmegen 
Behaviour of Jordanian customers. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 8 (4), 25-35 
Behn, B. Choi, J. and Kang, T. (2008). Audit quality and properties of analyst earnings 
forecasts. The Accounting Review, 83 (2), 327–349 
Belal, A. and Owen, D. (2007). The view of corporate managers on the current state of, 
and Future Prospects for, social reporting in Bangladesh. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 20 (3), 472–494 
Belal, A. R., Abdelsalam, O., & Nizamee, S. S. (2014). Ethical Reporting in Islami Bank 
Bangladesh Limited (1983-2010). Journal of Business Ethics.  
Belal, A., Abdelsalam, O and Nizamee, S. (2014). Ethical Reporting in Islami Bank 
Bangladesh Limited (1983–2010). Journal of Business Ethics  
Beltratti, A. (2005). The complementarity between corporate governance and corporate 
Social Responsibility. Geneva .Studies on Risk and Insurance, 30, 373–386 
Benston, G. (1982). Accounting and corporate accountability. Accounting, organization 
and Society, 7 (2), 87-105 
Berens, G. van Riel, C. and van Rekom, J. (2007). The CSR-quality trade-off: when can 
Corporate Social Responsibility and corporate ability compensate each other. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 74, 233-252 
Bernhardt, K. Donthu, N. and Kennett, P. (2000). A longitudinal analysis of satisfaction 
and Profitability. Journal of Business Research, 47, 161–171 
Besar, A., Abd Sakor, E. Abdul Muthalib, N and Gunawa, A. (2009). The Practice of 
Shariah Review as Undertaken by Islamic Banking Sector in Malaysia. International 
Review of Business Research Studys, 5 (1), 294-306 
282 
 
Best, S. Krueger, B. (2002). New approaches to Assessing Opinion: The Prospects for 
Electronic Mail surveys. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 14, 73-91 
Beyer, A. Cohen, D. Lys, T. and Walther, B. (2010). The financial reporting environment: 
review Of the Recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50 (2-3), 296-
343 
Bhagat, S. and Black, B. (1998), "The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance", Business Lawyer, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 921. 
Bhagat, S. and Black, B., (1999). The uncertain relationship between board composition 
and Firm Value. Business Lawyer, 54, 921–963 
Bhattacharya, U. and Dittmar, A. (2004). Costless Versus Costly Signalling: Theory and 
Evidence, Working study 
Bhatti, M. and Bhatti, I. (2009). Development in legal issues of corporate governance in 
Islamic Finance. Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences, 25, 67-91 
Bhuiyan, A. B., Siwar, C., Islam, A., & Rashid, M. (2012). The approaches of Islamic 
and conventional microfinancing for poverty alleviation and sustainable livelihood. 
American Journal of Applied Sciences, 9(9), 1385–1389.  
Biddle, G. and Saudagaran, S. (1989). The effects of financial disclosure levels on firms' 
choices Among Alternative foreign stock exchange listings. Journal of International 
Financial Management and Accounting, 1, 55−87 
Black, B. Jang, H. and Kim, W. (2006a). Does Corporate Governance Predict Firm‟s 
Market Values? Evidence from Korea. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 22 
(2), 366-413 
Black, T. (1999). Doing quantitative research in the social sciences. An integrated 
approach to research design, measurement and statistics, SAGE Publications, London 
Blomqvist, K. (1997). The many faces of trust‟ Scandinavian. Journal of Management, 
13 (3), 271–286 
Boesso, G. and Kumar, K. (2007) Drivers of corporate voluntary disclosure, a 
framework and empirical evidence from Italy and United States. Accounting, Auditing 
and Accountability Journal, 20 (2), 269-296  
Bokpin, G. (2013). Ownership structure, corporate governance and bank efficiency: an 
Empirical Analysis of panel data from the banking industry in Ghana. Corporate 
Governance: The International Journal of business in society, 13 (3), 274 – 287 
283 
 
Bontis, N. Booker, L. and Serenko, A. (2007). The mediating effect of organizational 
reputation On Customer loyalty and service recommendation in the banking industry. 
Management Decision, 45 (9), 1425–1445 
Boone, A. L., Casares Field, L., Karpoff, J. M. and Raheja, C. G. (2007), "The 
determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis", Journal 
of Financial Economics, vol. 85, no. 1, pp. 66-101. 
Borglund, T. De Geer, H. and Hallvarsson, M. (2009). Vardesapande CSR. Hur foretag 
tar social Anshar, Sweden, Falun: Nordsedts akademiska forlag 
Botosan, C. (1997). Disclosure level of cost of equity capital. The accounting review, 72 
(3), 323-349 
Botosan, C. and Plumlee, M. (2002). A re-examination of disclosure level and the 
expected Cost of Equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 40, 21–40 
Boulding, W. and Kirmani, A. (1993). A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of 
Signalling Theory: Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 20, 111-123 
Bradbury, M. E. (1991). Characteristics of firms and voluntary interim earnings 
disclosure: New Zealand evidence. Pacific Accounting Review, 3, 37–62 
Brammer, S. Brooks, C. and Pavelin, S. (2006). Corporate social performance and 
stock returns: UK Evidence from disaggregate measures. Finance Management, 35 (3), 
97–116  
Branco, M. and Rodrigues, L. (2006). Communication of corporate social responsibility 
by Portuguese banks: A legitimacy theory perspective. Corporate Communications: An 
International Journal, 11 (3), 232 - 248 
Branco, C.M. and Rodrigues, L.L. (2008), „„Social responsibility disclosure: a study of 
proxies for the public visibility of Portuguese banks‟‟, The British Accounting Review, Vol. 
40, pp. 161-81. 
Braun M., Sharma A., Should the CEO Also Be Chair of the Board? An Empirical 
Examination of Family-Controlled Public Firms (2007) Family Business Review 
Brown, T. and Dacin, P. (1997). The company and the product: corporate associations 
and Consumer Product responses. Journal of Marketing, 61 (1), 68–84 
Bruce, A. Skovoroda, R. Fattorusso, J. and Buck, T. (2007). Executive bonus and firm 
Performance in the UK. Long Range Planning, 40, 280-294 
284 
 
Bryman, A. (2004). Social Research Methods, (2nd ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Buhr, N. (1998). Environmental Performance, Legislation and Annual Report Disclosure: 
The Case of Acid Rain and Falconbridge. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, 11 (2), 163-190 
Bukhari, K. Hayat, M. and Ahmed, F. (2013). An evaluation of corporate governance 
practices Of Islamic Banks versus Islamic bank windows of conventional banks: A case 
of Pakistan, Management Research Review, 36 (4), 400 – 416 
Burchell, S. Clubb, C. Hopwood, A. (1985). Accounting in its Social Context: Towards a 
History of Value Added in the United Kingdom. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
10 (4), 381–413 
Burmann, C. Jost-Benz, M. Riley, N. (2009). Towards an identity-based brand equity 
model. Journal of Business Research, 62, 397-397 
Buskirk, A. (2012). Disclosure Frequency and Information Asymmetry. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 38 (4), 411-440 
Callan, S. and Thomas, J. (2009), Corporate Financial Performance and Corporate 
Social Performance: An update and Reinvestigation. Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Environmental Management, 16(2), 61-78 
Camfferman, K. and Cooke, T. (2002). An analysis of disclosure in the annual reports of 
UK and Dutch companies. Journal of International Accounting, Research, 1, 3–30 
Campbell, D. (2000). Legitimacy theory or managerial reality construction? Corporate 
social disclosure in Marks and Spencer plc corporate reports, 1969‐1997. Accounting 
Forum, 24 (1), 80‐100 
Carcello, J. Hermanson, D. and Raghunandan, K. (2005). Changes in internal auditing 
during The Time of the major U.S. accounting scandals. International Journal of 
Auditing, 9 (2), 117–27 
Carroll, A. and Buchholtz, A. (2009). Business and Society: Ethics and Stakeholder 
Management. 7th ed. Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning  
Castaneda, J. (2011). Relationship between customer satisfaction and loyalty on the 
internet. Journal of Business Psychology, 26, 371-83 
Cebeci, I. (2012). Integrating the social maslaha into Islamic finance. Accounting 
Research Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Vol. 25, 19.  
285 
 
Cerbioni, F. and Parbonetti, A. (2007). Exploring the effects of corporate governance on 
Intellectual Capital disclosure: an analysis of European biotechnology companies. 
European Accounting Review, 16 (4), 791-826 Corporate Ownership and Control, 11(4), 
58- 80 
Chakrabarty, A. (2006). Barking up the wrong tree – factors influencing customer 
Satisfaction in Retail banking in the UK. International Journal of Applied Marketing, 1 (1),  
Chan, L., Chen, T.-Y., Janakiraman, S., & Radhakrishnan, S. (2012). Reexamining the 
Relationship Between Audit and Nonaudit Fees: Dealing With Weak Instruments in 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance,  
Chanie, S. and Tohme, N. (2009), “Is CEO duality always negative? An exploration of 
CEO duality and ownership structure in the Arab IPO context”, Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 123–141. 
Chapple, W. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Asia: A Seven-Country 
Study of CSR Web Site Reporting. Business & Society.  
Chapra, M. (2000b). Why has Islam Prohibited Interest: Rationale behind the Prohibition 
Of Interest? Review of Islam Economic, 9, 5-20 
Chapra, M. Umer, 1985. Towards a Just Monetary System. Leicester: Islamic 
Foundation, p. 130. 
Chapra, M. Umer. Islam and the Economic Challenge. Leicester: The Islamic 
Foundation, 1992. 
Chapra, M. Umer. The Future of Economics: An Islamic Perspective. Leicester: The 
Islamic Foundation, 2000. 
Chapra, M., (2000a). The Future of: An Islamic Perspective, Leicester: The Islamic 
Foundation 
Chapra, M., Ahmed, H. (2002) Corporate Governance in IFIs, Islamic Development 
Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute, Periodical Document No. 6 
Chapra, U. (1995). Islam and the Economic Challenge, Islamic Economics Series - 17 
Chapra, U. (1996). What is Islamic Economics, IDB Prize Winner‟s Lecture Series, No.9, 
Jeddah: Islamic Development Bank 
Chau, G. and Gray, S. (2002). Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure 
in Hong Kong and Singapore. The International Journal of Accounting, 37, 247–265 
286 
 
Chau, G. and Leung, P. (2006). The impact of board composition and family ownership 
on Audit Committee formation: Evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 15 (1), 1-15 
Chavent, M. Ding, Y. Fu, L. Stolowy, H. and Wang, H. (2006). Disclosure and 
Determinants Studies: An Extension Using the Divisive Clustering Method. European 
Accounting Review, 15 (2), 181–218 
Chen C., Lin., and Yi B., CEO Duality and Firm Performance – An Endogenous Issue 
(2008) Corporate Ownership & Control /Volume 6, Issue 1, Fall 2008 
Chen, C. and Jaggi, B. (2000). Association between independent non-executive 
directors, Family Control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, 19, 285-310 
Chen, J. and Roberts, R. (2010). Toward a More Coherent Understanding of the 
organization Society Relationship: A Theoretical Consideration for Social and 
Environmental Accounting Research. Journal of business ethics, 97 (4) 651-665 
Chen, R. (1975). Social and financial stewardship. The Accounting Review, 61 (1), 1-21 
Cheng, C. and Courtenay, S. (2006). Board composition, regulatory regime and 
voluntary Disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting, 41, 262–289 
Cheung, Y. Jiang, P. and Tan, W. (2010). A Transparency Disclosure Index Measuring 
Disclosures: Chinese Listed Companies. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 29, 
259-280 
Chi, M. and Gursoy, D. (2009). Employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction, and 
financial Performance: An empirical examination. International Journal of Hospitality 
Management, 28 (2), 245-253 
Chik, M. (2011). Shariah Audit; Shariah Perspective, in: AIBIM, IIUM, ISRA and MTA 
(Eds.) International Shariah Audit Conference, Kuala Lumpur 
Chow, C. and Wong-Boren, A. (1987). Voluntary Financial Disclosure by Mexican 
Corporations.The Accounting Review, 62, 533–541 
Christopher, N. and Maali, B. (2007). Twenty Five Years of Islamic Accounting 
Research: Silver Jubilee Review, Study submitted to the 5th Asia Pacific 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference, Auckland 
Ciancanelli, P. and Gonzalez, J. (2000). Corporate Governance in Banking: A 
Conceptual Framework, Social Science Research Network, Electronic  
287 
 
Čihák, Martin and Heiko Hesse, (2010), “Islamic banks and financial stability: an 
empirical analysis”, Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 38 No.2, pp. 95–113. 
Clark, T. (2004). Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of 
Corporate Governance, London and New York: Routledge 
Clarke, T. (1998). The Stakeholder Corporation: A Business Philosophy for the 
Information Age. Long Range Planning, 31 (2), 182-194 
Clarkson, M. (1995). A stakeholder framework for analysing and evaluating corporate 
social Performance. Academy of Management Review, 20, 92–117 
Clarkson, P. Guedes, J. and Thompson, R. (1996). On the diversification, observability, 
and Measurement of estimation risk. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31 
(1), 69-84 
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D. and Naveen, L. (2007), "Boards: Does one size fit all", Journal 
of Financial Economics, vol. 87, no. 2, pp. 329-356. 
Collett, P. and Hrasky, S. (2005. Voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices 
by Listed Australian companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13 (2), 
188–196 
Collier, P. (2008). Stakeholder accountability: A field study of the implementation of a 
Governance Improvement plan. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 21 (7), 
933–954 
Cong, Y. and Freedman, M. (2011). Martin Freedman Corporate governance and 
Environmental Performance and disclosures incorporating. Advances in International 
Accounting, 27, 223–232 
Conger, M. J. and Peck, S. I. (1998), "Board size and corporate performance: evidence 
from European countries", European Journal of Finance, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 291-304. 
Cooke, E. (1989). Disclosure in the Corporate Annual Reports of Swedish Companies. 
Accounting and Business Research, 19 (74), 113-24 
Cooke, E. (1991). An Assessment of Voluntary Disclosure in the Annual Reports of 
Japanese Corporations. The International Journal of Accounting, 26,174–189 
Cooke, T. and Wallace, R. (1990). Financial Disclosure Regulation and Its Environment: 
A Review and Further Analysis. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 9, 79-110 
Cormier, D. Ledoux, M. and Magnan, M. (2011). The informational contribution of social 
and Environmental disclosures for investors. Management Decision, 49 (8), 1276–1304 
288 
 
Cormier, D. Magnan, M. and Van Velthoven, B. (2005). Environmental Disclosure 
Quality in Large German Economic Incentives, Public Pressures or Institutional 
Conditions. European Accounting Review, 14 (1), 3-39 
Cormier, D., Aerts, W., Ledoux, M. J., & Magnan, M. (2010). Web-based disclosure 
about value creation processes: A monitoring perspective. Abacus, 46(3), 320–347.  
Cowana, S. and Deegan, C. (2011). Corporate disclosure reactions to Australia‟s first 
national Emission reporting scheme. Accounting and Finance, 51,409-436 
Craig, R. and Diga, J. (1998). Corporate accounting disclosure in ASEAN. Journal of 
International Financial Management and Accounting, 9 (3), 246–274 
Curado, C. Henriques, L. and Bontis, N. (2011). Intellectual capital disclosure payback. 
Management Decision, 49 (7), 1080-1098 
Dahya, J. Lonie, A. and Power, M. (1996). The case for separating the roles of 
chairman and CEO: An analysis of stock market and accounting data. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 4 (2), 52-68 
Daily, C.M and Dollinger, M.J (1992) “ An empirical examination of ownership structure 
in family and professionally managed firms”, Family Business Review, 5 (2), 117-136 
Daske, H. Hail, L. Leuz, C. and Verdi, R. (2013). Adopting a label: heterogeneity in the 
economic Consequences around IAS/IFRS adoptions. Journal of Accounting Research, 
51(3), 495–547 
Datar, S. Feltham, G. and Hughes, J. (1991). The role of auditor and auditor quality in 
valuing New Issues. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14, 3–49 
Davidson, W. Jiraporn, P. Kim, Y. and Nemec, C. (2004). Earnings Management 
Following 
De Andres, P., Azofra, V. and Lopez, F., M. C. (2005), "Corporate Boards in OECD 
countries: Size, composition, functioning and effectiveness", Corporate Governance: An 
international review, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 197-210. 
Debreceny, R. and Rahman, A. (2005). Firm-specific determinants of continuous 
corporate Disclosures. The International Journal of Accounting, 40, 249– 278 
Deegan, C. (2002). The Legitimising Effect of Social and Environmental Disclosures: A 
Theoretical Foundation. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 15 (3), 282-
311 
289 
 
Deegan, C. and Underman, J. (2006). Financial accounting theory, European edition, 
McGraw- Hill Education 
Deegan, C. Rankin, M. and Tobin, J. (2002). An examination of the corporate social and 
Environmental disclosures of BHP from 1983-1997. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 15(3), 312-343 
Denis, D. J. and Sarin, A. (1999), "Ownership and board structures in publicly traded 
corporations", Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 187-223. 
Dhaliwal, D. (1980). Improving the quality of corporate financial disclosure. Accounting 
and Business Research, 10(40), 385-392 
Dhaliwal, D. Li, Z. Tsang, A. and Yang, Y. (2011). Voluntary nonfinancial disclosure and 
the cost Of equity capital: The initiation of corporate social responsibility reporting. The 
Accounting Review, 86, 59-100 
Dick, A. and Basu, K. (1994). Customer loyalty: Towards an integrated conceptual 
framework. J. Acad.Market. Sci, 22, 99–113 
Ding, Y. Hope, O. Jeanjean, T. and Stolowy, H. (2007). Differences between domestic 
Accounting Standards and IAS: measurement, determinants and implications. Journal 
of Accounting and Public Policy, 26, 1–38 
Dobler, M. Lajili, K. and Zéghal, D. (2011). Attributes of Corporate Risk Disclosure: And 
International Investigation in the Manufacturing Sector. Journal of International 
Accounting Research, 10 (2), 1–22 
Dogan, M., Elitas, B.L., Agca, V., Ogel, S. (2013), "The impact of CEO Duality on Fim 
Performance: Evidence from Turkey", International Journal of Business and Social 
Science vol. 4, no. 2,. 
Donaldson, T. and Preston, L. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence and implications. Academy of Management Review, 20, 65-91 
Dong, M. and Stettler, A. (2011). Estimating firm-level and country-level effects in cross- 
Sectional Analyses: an application of hierarchical modelling in corporate disclosure, The 
International Journal of Accounting, 46 (3), 271–303 
Dong, Y. Fu, R. Gao F. and Ni, C. (2015). Determinants and Economic Consequences 
of Nonfinancial Disclosure Quality, Forthcoming, European Accounting Review 
Donnely, R. and Mulcahy, M. (2008). Board structure, ownership, and voluntary 
disclosure in Ireland. Corporate Governance, 16 (5), 416–429 
290 
 
Doupnik, T. and Salter, S. (1995). External environment, culture and accounting 
practice: a Preliminary test of a general model of international accounting development. 
International Journal of Accounting, 30 (3), 189-206 
Drumwright, M. (1996). Company advertising with a social dimension: the role of non- 
Academic Criteria. J. Market, 60 (4), 71-86 
Dusuki, A. and Abdullah, N. (2007). Why do Malaysian customers patronise Islamic 
banks? International Journal of Bank Marketing, 25 (3), 142-160 
Dusuki, W. (2008). What Does Islam Say about Corporate Social Responsibility? 
International Association for Islamic Economics, Review of Islamic Economics, 28 (1), 
2-28 
Easley, D. and O‟Hara, M. (2004). Information and the cost of capital. Journal of 
Finance, 59 (4), 1553-1583 
Echchabi, A., Olaniyi, O., (2012), Malaysian consumers' preferences for Islamic banking 
Attributes. International Journal of Social Economics, 39 (11), 859-874 
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1996b). Too close for comfort? The impact of official aid on 
Nongovernmental organizations. World Development, 24 (6), 961–973 
Ehikioya, B.I. (2009), “Corporate governance structure and firm performance in 
developing economies: evidence from Nigeria”, Corporate Governance, Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 
231-243. 
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S. and Wells, M. T. (1998), "Larger board size and decreasing 
firm value in small firms", Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 35-54. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of 
Management Review, 14, 57–74 
El Gamal, Mahmood, 2006. Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 26–45. 
Elewa, Ahmed A., 2008. UAE to Issue New Law on Islamic Finance Activities. Gulf 
News, 9 April. 
El-Gazzar, S. (1998). Pre disclosure information and institutional ownership: A cross-
sectional examination of market revaluations during earnings announcement periods. 
The Accounting Review, 73 (1), 119–129 
El-Halaby&Hussainey. (2015a). The determinants of social accountability 
dislcosure:Evidence from Islamic banks around the world. IJB Journal. 
291 
 
Ellen, P. Web, D. and Mohr, L. (2006). Building corporate associations: Consumer 
attributions For Corporate social responsibility programs. Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 34 (2), 147–157 
Elshandidy, T. Fraser, I. and Hussainey, K. (2013). Aggregated, Voluntary, and 
Mandatory Risk Disclosure Incentives: Evidence from UK FTSE All-share Companies. 
International Review of Financial Analysis, 30, 320-333 
Elzahar, H. (2013). Determinants and Consequences of Key Performance Indicator (KPI) 
Reporting by UK Non-financial Firms. PhD. University of Sterling, UK 
Elzahar, H. and Hussainey, K. (2012). Determinants of narrative risk disclosures in UK 
interim Reports. The Journal of Risk Finance, 13 (2), 133-147 
Elzahar, H. Hussainey, K. Mazzi, F. and Tsalavoutas, I. (2015). Economic 
consequences of Key Performance Indicators‟ disclosure quality, International Review 
of Financial Analysis 
Emdadul Haq, M. (2010). Orientation of accountability in Islam, The Daily Star 
Eng, L. and Mak, Y. (2003). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure, Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 22, 325–346 
Epstein, M. and Pava, M. (1993). The Shareholder‟s Use of Corporate Annual Reports, 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
Ernst and Young (2015) World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2014–15. 
Erol, C., Kaynak, E. and El-Bdour, R. (2007). Conventional and Islamic banks: 
patronage 
Ezat, A. (2010). The key determinants of the voluntary adoption of corporate internet 
Reporting and its consequences on firm value: Evidence from Egypt. PhD. University of 
Plymouth, UK 
Falgi, I. (2009). Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia: A Stakeholder Perspective. 
PhD. University of Dundee, UK 
Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy, 88, 288–307 
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26 (2), 301–325 
Fan, P. and Wong, T. (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of 
Accounting Earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23,401–425 
292 
 
Farag, H., Mallin, C., & Ow-Yong, K. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and 
financial performance in Islamic banks. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.  
Farook, S. (2008). Social Responsibility for Islamic Financial Institutions: Laying Down a 
Framework. Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, 4 (1), 61-82 
Farook, S., Hassan, M. K., & Lanis, R. (2011). Determinants of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Dislcosure: The Case of Islmaic Banks. Journal of Islamic Accounting 
and Business Research, 114–141. 
Fawcett, J. and Downs, F. (1986). The Relationship of Theory and Research, Norwalk, 
Connecticut: Appleton-Century-Crofts 
Fekete, S. Matis, D. and Lukács, J. (2008). Factors influencing the extent of corporate 
Compliance with IFRS, the case of Hungarian listed companies 
Fields, M.A. and Keys, P.Y. (2003), „„The emergence of corporate governance fromWall 
St to Main St: outside directors, board diversity, earnings management, and managerial 
incentives to bear risk‟‟, The Financial Review,Vol. 38, pp. 1-24. 
Firth, M. (1979). The impact of size, stock market listing, and auditors on voluntary 
Disclosure in Corporate annual reports. Accounting and Business Research, autumn, 9 
(36), 273–280 
Fisher, R. Oyelere, P. and Laswad, F. (2004). Corporate Reporting on the Internet: 
Audit Issues and Content Analysis of Practices. Managerial Auditing Journal, 19 (3), 
412-439 
Folorunsho Monsuru, A., & Adetunji Abdulazeez, A. (2014). The effects of corporate 
social responsibility activity disclosure on corporate profitability: Empirical evidence from 
Nigerian commercial banks. IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance, 2(6), 17–25.  
Fowler, F. (2002). Survey Research Methods, 3rd edition, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA 
Francis, J. Nanda, D. and Olsson, P. (2008). Voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and 
cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 46, 53–99 
Freeman, R. (1994). The politics of stakeholder theory: Some future directions. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 4, 409-421 
Fukukawa, K. Balmer, J. and Gray, E. (2007). Mapping the interface between corporate 
identity, Ethics and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 76 (1), 1–
5 
293 
 
Gadziala, M. (2005). Integrating auditing and compliance disciplines within the risk 
Management Framework. Speech at Compliance ‟05 USA, November 30.  
Gait, A. and Worthington, A. (2008). An empirical survey of individual consumer, 
business firm, And financial institution attitudes towards Islamic methods of finance. Intl. 
J. of Soc. Econ, 35 (11), 783-808 
Galani, D. Alexandridis, A. & Stavropoulos, A. (2011). The association between the 
firms characteristics and corporate mandatory disclosure the case of Greece. World 
Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, 53, 1048-1054 
Gambling, T. and Karim, A. (1986). Islam and social accounting. Journal of Business 
Finance And Accounting, 13 (1), 39−50 
Gamerschlag, R., Möller, K., & Verbeeten, F. (2010). Determinants of voluntary CSR 
disclosure: Empirical evidence from Germany. Review of Managerial Science, 5(2-3), 
233–262.  
Garay, U. González, M. Guzmánc, A. and Trujillo, M. (2013). Internet-based corporate 
Disclosure and market value: Evidence from Latin America. Emerging Markets Review, 
17, 150–168 
Gelb, D. and Zarowin, P. (2002). Corporate Disclosure Policy and the in formativeness 
of Stock Prices. Review of Accounting Research, 7(1), 33–52 
Gelbard, E., M. Hussain, R. Maino, Y. Mu, and E. Yehoue (2014), “Islamic Finance in 
Sub- Saharan Africa: Status and Prospects,” IMF Working Paper 14/149 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund). 
Gerrard, P. and Cunningham, J. (1997). Islamic Banking: a Study in Singapore. 
International Journal of Bank Marketing, 15 (6), 204 - 216 
Ghafour, P. K. Abdul, 2008. Shoura Council OKs Mortgage Law. Arab News, 3 July 
2008. 
Ghazali, N. and Weetman, P. (2006). Perpetuating traditional influences: Voluntary 
disclosure In Malaysia. Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation, 15 (2), 
226 – 248 
Gill, A. and Marthur, N (2011), "Board Size, CEO duality and the value of Canadian 
Manufacturing firms", Journal of Applied Finance and Banking, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 1-13. 
Giraldez, P. and Hurtado JM. (2014), "Do independent Directors protect shareholder 
value", Business Ethics: A European Review, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 91-107. 
294 
 
Gisbert, A. and Navallas, B. (2013). The association between voluntary disclosure and 
Corporate Governance in the Presence of severe agency conflicts. Advances in 
Accounting, 29 (2), 286-298 
Glynn, J. (1985). Value for money auditing, an International review and comparison. 
Financial Accountability and management, 1 (2), 113-128 
Golob, U. and Barllett, J. (2007). Communicating about corporate social responsibility: A 
Comparative study of CSR reporting in Australia and Slovenia. Public Relations Review, 
33, 1–9 
Gompers, P. Ishii, J. and Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (1), 107–155 
Goodwin, J., Kamran, A., and Heaney, R. (2008). The Effects of international financial 
reporting standards on the accounts and accounting quality of Australian firms: A 
retrospective study. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 4 (2), 89-119 
Gordon, L. Loeb, M. and Sohail, T. (2010). Market value of voluntary disclosures 
concerning Information security. MIS Quarterly, 34 (3), 567-940 
Governance. In C. Crouch, and C. MacLean (Eds.), the responsible corporation in a 
global Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Grais, W. and Pellegrini M. (2006). Corporate Governance and Shariah compliance in 
Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Study 40-54 
Gramling, A. Marletta, M. and Church, B. (2004). The role of the internal audit function 
in Corporate governance: A synthesis of the extant internal audit literature and 
directions for Future research. Journal of Accounting Literature, 23, 194–244 
Gray, R. (1992). Accounting and environmentalism: An exploration of the challenge of 
gently Accounting for accountability, transparency and sustainability. Accounting 
Organizations and Society, 17 (5), 399-425 
Gray, R. Javad, P. and Sinclair, S. (2001). Social and Environmental Disclosure and 
Corporate Characteristics: A research note. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 28(3and4), 327–356 
Gray, R. Kouhy, R. and Lavers, S. (1995a). Corporate social and environmental 
reporting: a Review of the literature and a longitudinal study of UK disclosure. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 8 (2), 47-77 
295 
 
Gray, R. Owen, D. and Adams, C. (1996). Accounting and Accountability: Changes and 
Challenges In Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting, London: Prentice Hall. 
Gray, R. Owen, D. and Adams, C. (2009). Some theories for social accounting: a review 
essay And a tentative pedagogic categorisation of theorisations around social 
accounting. Advances in Environmental Accounting and Management, 4, 1-54 
Gray, S. Meek, G. and Roberts, B. (1995). International capital market pressures and 
voluntary Annual report disclosures by US and UK multinationals. Journal of 
International Financial Management and Accounting, 6 (1), 43-68 
Greenfield, M. (2004). In the Name of Corporate Social Responsibility. Business 
Horizons, 47 (1), 19-28 
Gugler, P. and Shi, J. (2009). Corporate Social Responsibility for Developing Country 
Multinational Corporations: Lost War in Pertaining Global Competitiveness? Journal of 
Business Ethics, 87, 3–24 
Gul, F. and Leung, S. (2004). Board leadership, outside directors‟ expertise and 
voluntary Corporate Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(5), 351-379 
Gulf Times. “Assets of GCC Islamic Banks Seen Up 35-40%.” February 8, 2009.  
Gundlach, G. and Murphy, P. (1993). Ethical and legal foundations of relational 
marketing Exchanges. Journal of Marketing, 57 (1), 35-46 
Gustafsson, A. Johnson, M. and Roos, I. (2005). The effects of customer satisfaction, 
Relationship Commitment dimensions, and triggers on customer retention. Journal of 
Marketing, 69, 210-218 
Guthrie, E. and Parker, L. (1989). Corporate social reporting: a rebuttal of legitimacy 
theory. Accounting and Business Research, 9 (76), 343-352  
Guthrie, J and Abeysekera, I. (2006). Content analysis of social, environmental 
reporting: What is new? Journal of Human Resource Costing and Accounting, 10 (2), 
114-126 
Guthrie, J. Petty, R. Yongvanich, K. and Ricceri, F. (2004). Using content analysis as a 
research method to inquire into intellectual capital reporting. Journal of Intellectual 
Capital, 5 (2), 282 – 293 
Haat, M. Abdul Rahman, R. and Mahenthiran, S. (2008). Corporate Governance, 
Transparency And Performance of Malaysian Companies. Managerial Auditing Journal, 
33 (8), 744-778 
296 
 
Hafij, U. (2013). Compliance of AAOIFI Guidelines in General Presentation and 
Disclosure in The Financial Statements of Islamic Banks in Bangladesh. International 
Journal of Social Science Research, 1 (2), 111-123 
Hagendorff, J. Collins, M. and Keasey, K. (2007). Bank governance and acquisition 
performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15, 957–68 
Hamat, M. (1994). Accounting Standards for Islamic Banks, Accounting Issues in 
Islamic Banking, London: Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance 
Hameed, S. (2001). Islamic accounting – accounting for the new millennium. Study 
Presented at the Asia Pacific Conference– Accounting in the New Millennium 
Hameed, S. and Yahya, A. (2003). The Future of Islamic Corporate Reporting: Lessons 
from Alternative Western Accounting Report, International Conference on Quality 
Financial Reporting and Corporate Governance, Malaysia 
Hameed, S. Wirman, A. Alrazi, B. Nazli, M. and Pramono, N. (2006). Alternative 
disclosure and Performance measures for Islamic banks, International Islamic 
University Malaysia.  
Han, S. Kang, T. and Yoo, K. (2012). Governance Role of Auditors and Legal 
Environment: Evidence from Corporate Disclosure Transparency. European Accounting 
Review, 21 (1), 29–50 
Haniffa, M. (2002). Social responsibility disclosure: an Islamic perspective. IMAR 
Journal, 1 (2), 128-146 
Haniffa, M. and Cooke, E. (2002). Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in 
Malaysian Corporations. Abacus, 38, 317–349 
Haniffa, M. and Hudaib, M. (2001). A Conceptual Framework for Islamic Accounting: 
The Shariah Paradigm. Paper presented at the Accounting, Commerce and Finance: 
The Islamic Perspective International Conference IV, New Zealand, Unpublished article. 
Haniffa, M. and Hudaib, M. (2002). A Theoretical Framework for the Development of the 
Islamic Perspective of Accounting. Accounting and Commerce and Finance: The 
Islamic Perspective Journal, 6 (1/2), 1-71 
Haniffa, M. and Hudaib, M. (2004). Disclosure practices of Islamic financial institutions: 
an Exploratory study. Working Study No. 04/32, Bradford School of Management 
Haniffa, R. (1999a). Vol: II-Culture,Corporate Governance and Dislcosure in Malaysia 
Corporations. Exeter University. 
297 
 
Haniffa, R. (1999b). Vol:I-Culture, Corporate Governance And Disclosure In Malaysian 
Corporations. PhD Thesis. Exeter University. 
Haniffa, R. and Cooke, E. (2005). The impact of culture and governance on corporate 
social Reporting. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24 (5), 391-430 
Haniffa, R. Hudaib, M. (2007). Exploring the ethical identity of Islamic banks via 
Communication In annual reports. Journal of Business Ethics, 76, 97-116 
Hany El Zahar. (2013). Determinants and Consequences of Key Performance Indicator 
( KPI ) Reporting by UK Non-financial Firms. Stirling University,UK. 
Harjoto, M. and Jo, H. (2011). Corporate governance and CSR. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 100 (1), 45–67 
Harris, M. and Raviv, A. (2005), "A Theory of Board Control and Size", Review of 
Financial Studies, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 1797-1831. 
Hasan, A. and Siti-Nabiha, A. (2010). Towards Good Accountability: The Role of 
Accounting in Islamic Religious Organisations. World Academy of Science, Engineering 
and Technology, 42, 1119-1125 
Hasan, M. and Dridi, J., (2011), “The Effects of the Global Crisis on Islamic and 
Conventional Banks: A Comparative Study,” Journal of International Commerce, 
Economics and Policy, Vol. 2, No. 2, December 2011. 
Hasan, R. (2002). Tax Evasion Charges against Cement Company, the Daily Star 
Hasan, Z. (2008). Corporate governance of Islamic financial institutions, Study 
presented at The Conference on Malaysian Study of Islam, Lamperter, UK 
Hasan, Z. (2011). Shariah Governance In Islamic Financial Institutions In Malaysia,GCC 
Countries and The UK. Durham University.United Kingdom. 
Hasan, Zubair. “Islamic Banking at the Crossroads: Theory versus Practice.” InIslamic 
Perspectives on Wealth Creation edited by M. Iqbal and R. Wilson.Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2005. 
Hashim, H. A., & Devi, S. S. (2008). Board independence, CEO duality and accrual 
management: Malaysian evidence. Asian Journal of Business and Accounting, 1(1), 27–
46. 
Hassan, A. (2009). Risk management practices of Islamic banks of Brunei Darussalam. 
The Journal of Risk Finance, 10 (1), 23-37 
298 
 
Hassan, A. and Harahap, S. (2010). Exploring corporate social responsibility disclosure: 
the Case of Islamic banks. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance 
and Management, 3 (3), 203- 227 
Hassan, A., & Harahap, S. S. (2010). Exploring corporate social responsibility 
disclosure: the case of Islamic banks. International Journal of Islamic and Middle 
Eastern Finance and Management, 3(3), 203–227.  
Hassan, K. and Lewis, M. (2007). Handbook of Islamic Banking, UK, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 
Hassan, M. T., Kausar, A., Ashiq, H., Inam, H., Nasar, H., Amjad, R., & Lodhi, M. A. 
(2012). Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (A Comparison between Islamic and 
Conventional Financial Institutions in Bahawalpur Region). International Journal of 
Learning and Development, 2(1), 628–642.  
Hassan, N. Yusoff, H. and Yatim, N. (2012). Disclosing social responsibility information 
via the Internet: A study on companies in Malaysia. International Journal of Arts and 
Commerce, 1, 83-96 
Hassan, O. and Marston, C. (2010). Disclosure Measurement in the Empirical 
Accounting Literature - A Review Article. SSRN library 
Hassan, O. Romilly, P. Giorgioni, G. and Power, D. (2009). The value relevance of 
disclosure: Evidence from the emerging capital market of Egypt. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 44 (1), 79-102 
Hassan, O., & Marston, C. (2010). Disclosure Measurement in the Empirical Accounting 
Literature : A Review Article. Economics and Finance Working Paper Series, No 10-
18(10).  
Hawashe, A. (2014). An evaluation of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Commercial Banks: empirical evidence from Libya. Ph.D. School of the Built 
Environment, College of Science and Technology University of Salford, Salford, UK 
He, H. Li, Y. and Harris, L. (2012). Social identity perspective on brand loyalty. Journal 
of Business Research, 65, 648–657 
Healy, P. & Palepu, K. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the 
capital Markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 31, 405–440 
Healy, P. Hutton, A. and Palepu, K. (1999). Stock performance and intermediation 
changes Surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 16 (3), 485-520 
299 
 
Hegazy, I. (1995). An Empirical Comparative Study between Islamic and Commercial 
Banks‟ Selection Criteria in Egypt. International Journal of Contemporary Management, 
5 (3), 46-61 
Hermalin, B. E. and Weisbach, M. S. (2001), "The Effects of Board Composition and 
Direct Incentives on Firm Performance", Financial Management, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 101. 
Hess, D. (2007). Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of 
Achieving Corporate Accountability through Transparency. Business Ethics Quarterly, 
17 (3), 453-476. 
Hesse, H., A. Jobst, and J. Sole, (2008), “Trends and Challenges in Islamic Finance,” 
World Economics, No. 9 Vol. 2, pp. 175–93. 
Hidalgo, l. Garcia-Meca, E. & Martinez, I. (2011). Corporate Governance and 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure. Journal of Business Ethics, 100, 483-495 
Hidayat, S. (2010). Bahraini Islamic Finance Outlook 2010: A Mixed Picture. Islamic 
Finance News, 7 (46), 13-14 
Hill, C. W. L., & Jones, T. M. (1992). Stakeholder-Agency Theory. Journal of 
Management Studies, 29(2), 131–154.  
Hillman, A. & Keim, G. (2001). Shareholder value, stakeholder management and social 
issues: What‟s the bottom line? Strategic Management Journal, 22 (2), 125-139 
Hodgdon, C. Tondkar, R. Adhikari, A. and Harless, D. (2009). Compliance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards and auditor choice: New evidence on the 
importance of the statutory audit. The International Journal of Accounting, 44 (1), 33–55 
Hodge, F. (2001). Hyperlinking unaudited information to audited financial statements: 
Effects on Investor judgments. The Accounting Review, 76 (4), 675–91 
Hodgson, A. & Stevenson-Clarke, P. (2000). Accounting variables and stock returns: 
The Impact of leverage. Pacific Accounting Review, 12 (2), 37-64 
Holder-Webb, L. Cohen, J. Nath, L. and Wood, D. (2009). The supply of corporate 
social Responsibility disclosures among U.S. firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 84 (4), 
497–527 
Holmstrom, B. and Kaplan, S. (2003). The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What‟s 
Right And what‟s wrong? National Bureau of Economic Research, Study, No. 9613 
Holt, T. and DeZoort, T. (2007). The Effects of Internal Audit Report Disclosure on 
Investor Confidence and Decisions,  
300 
 
Holthausen, R. and Leftwich, R. (1983). The economic consequences of accounting 
choice: Implications of costly contracting and monitoring. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 5 (2), 77-117 
Hope, O. (2003). Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and 
Analysts' Forecast Accuracy: An International Study. Journal of Accounting Research, 
41(2), 235–272 
Hope, O. (2003). Firm-level disclosures and the relative roles of culture and legal origin. 
Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 14, 218-248 
Hopwood, A. (2009). Accounting and the environment. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 34, 433–439 
Hosmer, L. (1994). Strategic planning as if ethics mattered. Strategic Management 
Journal, 15, 20–32 
Hossain, M. & Taylor, P. (2007). The empirical evidence of the voluntary information 
disclosure In the annual reports of banking companies: the case of Bangladesh. 
Corporate Ownership and Control, 4 (3), 111-125. 
Hossain, M. (2008). The Extent of Disclosure in Annual Reports of Banking Companies : 
The Case of India, 23(4), 659–680. 
Hossain, M. and Hammami, H. (2009). Voluntary Disclosure in the Annual Reports of 
An Emerging Country: The case of Qatar. Advances in Accounting; Incorporating 
International Advances in Accounting, 25, 255-265 
Hossain, M. Islam, K. and Andrew, J. (2006). Corporate Social and environmental 
disclosure in Developing countries: evidence from Bangladesh. The Asian pacific 
conference on International Accounting Issues, Hawaii 
Hossain, M. Perrera, H. and Rahman, A. (1995). Voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of New Zealand companies. Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, 6 (1), 69–85 
Hossain, M. Tan, M. and Adams, M. (1994). Voluntary Disclosure in an Emerging 
Capital Market: Some Empirical Evidence from Companies Listed on Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange. The International Journal of Accounting, 29 (4), 334–351 
Huang, P. and Zhang, Y. (2008). Does enhanced disclosure really reduce agency costs? 
Evidence From the value of corporate cash holdings and dividends. Working Study 
301 
 
Huang, P., & Zhang, Y. (2012). Does Enhanced Disclosure Really Reduce Agency 
Costs? Evidence from the Diversion of Corporate Resources. The Accounting Review, 
87(1), 199–229 
Huang, X. . & W. (2015). Corporate social responsibility research in accounting. Journal 
of Accounting Literature, 1–16. 
Hughes, P. (1986). Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8 (2), 119-142 
Humber, J. (2002). Beyond Stockholders and Stakeholders: A Plea for Corporate Moral 
Autonomy. Journal of Business Ethics, 36 (3), 207-221 
Hussain, Darawati, 2008. Structure and Execution of Shariah Compliant Private Equity 
Transactions, in Chezard Ameer (ed.), Islamic Alternative Investments: A Guide to 
Managing and Investing Shariah Compliant Private Equity, Real Estate and Hedge 
Funds. London: Private Equity International, pp. 47–50. 
Hussain, S. and Mallin, C. (2003). The Dynamics of Corporate Governance in Bahrain: 
Structure, Responsibilities and Operation of Corporate boards. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 11(3), 249-262 
Hussainey, Elsayed, M. A. R. (2011). Factors Affecting Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosure In Egypt. Corporate Ownership and Control, (July,2011). 
Hussainey, K. (2004). A Study Of The Ability Of (Partially) Automated Disclosure Scores 
To Explain The Information Content Of Annual Report Narratives For Future Earnings. 
University of Manchester. 
Hussainey, K. and Al-Najjar, B. (2011). Future-oriented narrative reporting: 
Determinates and Use. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 12 (2), 123–138 
Hussainey, K. and Mouselli, S. (2010). Disclosure quality and stock returns in the UK. 
Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 11 (2), 154-174 
Hussainey, K. and Walker, M. (2009). The effects of voluntary disclosure and dividend 
Propensity on prices leading earnings. Accounting and Business Research, 39 (1), 37-
55 
Hussainey, K. Schleicher, T. and Walker, M. (2003). Undertaking large-scale disclosure 
studies When AIMR-FAF ratings are not available: The case of prices leading earnings. 
Accounting and Business Research, 33 (4), 275-294 
IASB. (2015). The conceptual framework for financial reporting 
302 
 
Ibrahim, D., & RuziahGhazali, D. (2014). Zakah as an Islamic Micro-Financing 
Mechanism to Productive Zakah Recipients. Asian Economic and Financial Review, 
4(1), 117-125., 4(1), 117–125.  
Ibrahim, W. Ismail, A. and Zarabia, W. (2011). Disclosure, Risk and Performance in 
Islamic Banking: A Panel Data Analysis. International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 72, 100-114 
Ibrahim, Z. (2011). Earnings Quality(EQ),Islamic Social Dislcosure(ISCR) And 
Association Between EQ&ISCR: Empirical Evidence From Malaysian Public Listed 
Companies. PhD Thesis. University of Stratclyde,Glasgow. 
Ijaz, A. and Ali, A. (2013). Assessing Service Attitude: Service Quality Measures Taken 
by Islamic Banks in Pakistan 
Inchausti, G. (1997). The Influence of Company Characteristics and Accounting 
Regulation On Information Disclosed by Spanish Firms. The European Accounting 
Review, 6, 45–68 
Ingram, R. and Frazier, K. (1980). Environmental performance and corporate disclosure. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 18 (2), 614-622 
Iqbal, Munawar and Philip Molyneux. Thirty Years of Islamic Banking: History, 
Performance and Prospects. London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005. 
Iqbal, Z. and Mirakhor, A. (2007). An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and 
Practice, John Wiley and Sons, Pte. Ltd 
Islamic Financial Services Board, (2013), Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability 
Report, (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IFSB). 
Islamic Financial Services Board, (2014a), Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability 
Report, (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IFSB). 
Islamic Financial Services Board, (2014b), “Strengthening the Financial Safety Net: The 
Role of Shari‟ah-Compliant Lender-of-Last-Resort (SLOLR) Facilities as an Emergency 
Financing Facility,” IFSB Working Paper, (Malaysia: IFSB). 
Islamic Financial Services Board, Islamic Development Bank, and Islamic Research and 
Training Institute (IFSB, IsDB, and IRTI), (2014). Islamic Financial Services Industry 
Development: Ten-Year Framework and Strategies. A Mid-Term Review.  
Jackling, B. and Johl, S (2009), "Board Size and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
India´s Top Companies", Corporate Governance: An international review, vol. 17, no. 4, 
pp. 492-509. 
303 
 
Jafar, A. (2005). Women, Islam, and the State in Pakistan. Gender Issues, 22(1), 35–55.  
Jagadeesan, R., Jeffrey, A., Pitcher, C., & Riely, J. (2009). Towards a theory of 
accountability and audit. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries 
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5789 
LNCS, pp. 152–167).  
Jamali, D. Safieddine, A. and Rabbath, M. (2008). Corporate governance and corporate 
social Responsibility synergies and interrelationships. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 16, 443-459 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, H. (1976). The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360 
Jiao, Y. (2011). Corporate disclosure, market valuation, and firm performance. Financial 
Management, 40 (13), 647-676 
Jizi, M. Salama, A. Dixon, R. & Stratling, R. (2014). Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: Evidence from the US Banking Sector. 
Journal of business ethics, 125, 601–615 
Jo, H. and Harjoto, M. (2011). Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Impact of 
Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 103, 351–383 
Jo, K. and Kim, Y. (2007). Disclosure frequency and earnings management. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 84, 561-590 
Journal, M. A., & Birkbeck, B. A. (2016). How to Measure Annual Report Narratives 
Disclosure ? Empirical Evidence from Forward- Looking Information in the UK Prior the 
Financial Crisis, (December 2015). 
Junker, L., (2005). Equity Carveouts, Agency Costs and Firm Value, Wiesbaden: 
Deutscher Universitaets-Verlag 
K. Lewis (eds.), Handbook of Islamic Banking. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p. 197. 
Kam, V. (1990). Accounting theory, New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons Kamla, R. and 
Rammal, H. (2013). Social reporting by Islamic banks: does social justice matter. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 26 (6), 911-945 
Kamali, M. (1989). Sources, Nature and Objectives of Shariah . Islamic Quarterly, 6, 
215-235 
Kamali, M. (2007). Law as the Way of God, In Vincent Cornell. Voices of Islam, 5, 149–
75 
304 
 
Kamla, R. (2007). Critically Appreciating Social Accounting and Reporting in the Arab 
Middle East: A Postcolonial Perspective. Advances in International Accounting, 20, 105-
177 
Kamla, R. (2009). Critical Insights into Contemporary Islamic Accounting. Critical 
Perspectives On Accounting, 20 (8), 921-932 
Kansal, M., Joshi, M., & Batra, G. S. (2014). Determinants of corporate social 
responsibility disclosures: Evidence from India. Advances in Accounting, 30(1), 217–
229.  
Karagiorgos, T. (2010). Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance: An 
Empirical Analysis on Greek Companies. European Research Studies, 13 (4), 85-110 
Karim, A. & Tomkins, C. (1987). The Shariah and its implications for Islamic financial 
analysis: An Opportunity to study interactions among society, organization, and 
accounting. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 4 (1), 101-15 
Karim, A. (1995). The nature and rational of a conceptual framework for financial 
reporting By Islamic banks. Accounting and Business Research, 25 (100), 285-300 
Karreman, J. DE Jong, M. Ieee, M & Hofmans, S. (2014). The Effects of Different Parts 
of the Annual Report on Potential Investors‟ Attitudes towards the Company and on the 
Corporate Reputation. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL 
COMMUNICATION, 57, (2), 78-97 
Kaya, U. and Yayla, H. (2007). Remembering Thirty-five Years of Social Accounting: A 
Review of the Literature and the Practice. International Conference on Accounting and 
Auditing. Edirne-Turkiye 
Kayed, R. and Hassan, M. (2011). The global financial crisis and Islamic finance, 
Thunderbird International Business Review, 3, 551-564 
Kaynak, E. and Harcar, T. (2004). American consumers‟ attitudes towards commercial 
banks, a Comparison of local and national bank customers by use of geo-demographic 
Segmentation. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 23 (1), 73-89 
Khan, A. Muttakin, M. and Siddiqui, J. (2013). Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Social Responsibility Disclosures: Evidence from an Emerging Economy. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 114, 207–223 
Khan, F. (2010a). How “Islamic” is Islamic Banking? Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 76(3), 805–820.  
305 
 
Khan, Fahim, M. and Mario Porzio, (2010), Islamic Banking and Finance in the 
European Union: A Challenge (U.K., Edward Elgar Publishing Limited). 
Khlif, H. (2015). Corporate social and environmental disclosure and corporate 
performance: Evidence from South Africa and Morocco. Journal of Accounting in 
Emerging Economies, 5(1), 51–69.  
Khlifi, F. and Bouri, A. (2010). Corporate disclosure and firm characteristics: a puzzling 
Relationship. Journal of Accounting- Business and Management, 17(1), 62-89 
Kidder, L. and Judd, C. (1986). Foundations of behavioural research. 3rd ed. Holt, 
Rinehart And Winston, New York 
Kiel, G. C. and Nicholson, G. J. (2003), "Board Composition and Corporate 
Performance: how the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate 
governance", Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 189-
205 
Kim, I., & Kuljis, J. (2010). Applying content analysis to web based content. Journal of 
Computing and Information Technology, 18(4), 369–375.  
Kim, L. and Mahoney, J. (2005). Property rights theory, truncation costs theory, and 
agency Theory: An organisational economics approach to strategic management. 
Managerial and decision Economic, 26, 223-242 
Kim, O. and Verrecchia, R. (1994). Market liquidity and volume around earnings 
Announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, 41–67 
Klapper, L. and Love, I. (2002). Corporate Governance, Investor Protection and 
Performance in Emerging market. World Bank development research group, research 
working Study, No 2818 
Klein, P. Shapiro, D. and Young, J. (2005). Corporate governance, family ownership 
and firm Value: the Canadian evidence. Corporate Governance, 13 (6), 769-84 
Kock, N. (2011). Using Warp PLS in e-collaboration studies: Descriptive statistics, 
settings, And key analysis results. International Journal of e-Collaboration, 7 (2) 1–18 
Kolk, A. and Pinkse, J. (2010). The Integration of Corporate Governance in Corporate 
Social Responsibility Disclosures. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Management, 17 (1), 150-26 
Kothari, S. Li, X. and Short, J. (2009). The effect of disclosures by management, 
analysts, and Financial press on cost of capital, return volatility, and analyst forecasts: a 
study using Content Analysis. The Accounting Review, 84 (5), 1639-1670 
306 
 
Kreinath, J. (2011). The Anthropology of Islam as a Religion.  
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Reliability in Content Analysis: Some Common Misconceptions 
and Recommendations. Human Communication Research, 30 (3), 411-433 
Kumar, N., & Singh, J. P. (2013). "Effect of board size and promoter ownership on firm 
value: some empirical findings from India". Corporate Governance: The international 
journal of business in society, 13(1), 88-98. 
Kuran T. (2004). Islam and mammon: the economic predicaments of Islamism. 
Princeton University Press 
Laine, M. (2009). Ensuring legitimacy through rhetorical changes? Longitudinal 
interpretations of the environmental disclosure of a leading Finnish chemical company. 
Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal, 22 (7), 1029-1054 
Laksmana, I. (2008). Corporate board governance and voluntary disclosure of executive 
Compensation practices. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25 (4), 47–82 
Lambert, R. Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R. (2007). Accounting Information, Disclosure, 
and the Cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 45 (2), 385–420 
Lateh, N. Ismail, S. and Ariffin, M. (2009). Customers‟ Perceptions on the Objectives, 
Characteristics and Selection Criteria of Islamic Bank in Thailand, Gadjah Mada. 
International Journal of Business, 11(2), 167-189 
Lawrence, A. (2013). Individual investors and financial disclosure. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 56(1), 130–147.  
Lehn, K. M., Patro, S. and Zhao, M. (2009), "Determinants of the Size and Composition 
of US Corporate Boards: 1935-2000", Financial Management (Blackwell Publishing 
Limited), vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 747-780. 
Lerner, J. and Tetlock, P. (1999). Accounting for the effects on accountability. 
Psychological Bulletin, 125 (2), 255-275 
Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R. (2000). The economic consequences of increased 
disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 38, 91−124 
Leuz, C. and Wysocki, P. (2008). Economic consequences of financial reporting and 
disclosure Regulation: a review and suggestions for future research. Resource 
document, Social Science  
307 
 
Lev, B. Petrovits, C. and Radhakrishnan, S. (2010). Is doing good (good) for you? How 
Corporate Charitable contributions enhance revenue growth. Strategic Management 
Journal, 31 (2), 182–200 
Leventis, S. (2001). Voluntary disclosure in a European Emerging capital market: the 
Case of The Athens stock exchange. Ph.D. Strathclyde University, UK 
Levesque, T. and McDougall, G. (1996). Determinants of customer satisfaction in retail 
banking. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 14 (7), 12–20 
Lewis, M. (2001). Islam and accounting. Accounting Forum, 25 (2), 103-27 
Lewis, M. (2006). Accountability and Islam. Study presented at the fourth international 
Conference on Accounting and finance in transition, Adelaide, Australia 
Lewis, M. Algaoud, L. (2001). Islamic Banking, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 
Lewis, M. K. (2005). Islamic Corporate Governance, 9(1), 5–29. 
Lewis, Mervyn K. and Latifa M. Algaoud, 2001. Islamic Banking. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, pp. 110–11.  
Li, J. Pike, R. and Haniffa, R. (2008). Intellectual Capital Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance Structure in UK Firms, Accounting and Business Research, 38 (2), 137-
159 
Liang, J. Lin, M. and Chin, C. (2012). Does foreign institutional ownership motivate firms 
in an Emerging market to increase voluntary disclosure, Evidence from Taiwan. Rev 
Quant Finan Acc, 39, 55–76 
Lim, S. Matolcsy, Z. and Chow, D. (2007). The association between board composition 
and Different types of voluntary disclosure. The European Accounting Review, 16 (3), 
555–583 
Linsley, P. and Shrives, P. (2006). Examining risk reporting in UK public companies. 
Journal of Risk Finance, 6 (4), 292-305 
Lipunga, A. M. (2014). Web-based corporate social responsibility information disclosure 
by Malawian commercial banks. Journal of Business and Management, 16(4), 8–15. 
Lopes, T. and Rodriguez, L. (2007). Accounting for financial instruments: An analysis of 
the Determinants of disclosure in the Portuguese stock exchange. International Journal 
of Accounting, 42, 25–56 
Lorsch, J., and MacIver, E. (1989). Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America‟s 
Corporate Boards. Harvard Business School, Press 
308 
 
Lourenco, I. Branco, M. Curto, J. and Eugenio, T. (2012). How does the market value 
corporate Sustainability performance? Journal of Business Ethics, 108 (4), 417–428 
Lozano, J. (2005). Towards the relational corporation: from managing stakeholder 
Relationships to Building stakeholder relationships (waiting for Copernicus), Corporate 
Governance: The International journal of business in society, 5 (2), 60–77 
Lu, Y. and Abeysekera, I. (2014). Stakeholders' power, corporate characteristics, and 
social and Environmental disclosure: evidence from China. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 64, 426-436 
Lundholm, R. and Van Winkle, R. (2006). Motives for disclosure and non-disclosure: a 
Framework and review of the evidence. Accounting and Business Research, 36, 43-48 
Luo, X. and Bhattacharya, C. (2006). Corporate social responsibility, customer 
satisfaction, and Market value. Journal of Market, 70 (4), 1–18 
Maali, B. and Napier, C. (2010). Accounting, religion and organizational culture: the 
creation of Jordan Islamic Bank. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 
1 (2), 92-113 
Maali, B. Casson, P. and Napier, C. (2006). Social reporting by Islamic banks. Abacus, 
42 (2), 266-290 
Maali, B., Casson, P., & Napier, C. (2006). Social Reporting by Islamic Banks.  
Macnamara, J. (2006). Media Content Analysis, Uses, Benefits and Best Practice 
Methodology 
Mak, Y. and Kusnadi, Y. (2005), "Size Really Matters: Further Evidence on the Negative 
Relationship Between Board Size and Firm Value", SSRN Working Paper Series, . 
Malafronte, I., Porzio, C., & Starita, M. G. (2013). Disclosure Practices and Financial 
Crisis: Empirical Evidences in the European Insurance Industry. The British Accounting 
Review 
Mallin, C. (2010). Corporate Governance. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Mallin, C. and Michelon, G. (2011). Board Reputation Attributes and Corporate Social 
Performance: An Empirical Investigation of the US Best Corporate Citizens. Accounting 
and Business Research, 41 (2), 119-144 
Mallinb, C. Faraga, H. and Ow-Yonga, K. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and 
financial Performance in Islamic banks. Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organization, 103, 21-38 
309 
 
Mangena, M. and Pike, R. (2005). The effect of audit committee shareholding, financial 
Expertise and size on interim financial disclosures. Accounting and Business Research, 
35 (4), 327-439 
Mangena, M. and Tauringana, V. (2007). Disclosure, corporate governance and foreign 
share Ownership on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting, 18 (2), 53-85 
Margolis, J. and Walsh, J. (2001). People and Profits, the Search for a Link between a 
Companies Social and Financial Performance, (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates¸ 
Mahwah, NJ) 
Marshall, A. and Weetman, P. (2007). Modelling transparency in disclosure: the case of 
foreign Exchange risk management. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 34 
(5-16), 705-39 
Marston, C. and Polei, A. (2004). Corporate reporting on the internet by German 
companies. International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, 5, 285–311 
Marston, C. and Shrives, P. (1991). The use of disclosure indices in accounting 
research: A Review Article. British Accounting Review, 23 (3), 195 – 210 
Maurer, Bill. “Re-formatting the Economy: Islamic Banking and Finance in World 
Politics.” In Islam in World Politics edited by Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns. New 
York: Routledge, 2005. 
McDonald, L. and Rundle-Thiele, R. (2008). Corporate social responsibility and bank 
customer Satisfaction: a research agenda. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 26 
(3), 170-182 
McKernan, J. and MacLullich, K. (2004). Accounting, love and justice, Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability Journal, 17 (3), 327-360 
McKinnon, J. and Dalimunthe, L. (1993). Voluntary disclosure of segment information by 
Australian diversified companies. Accounting and Finance, 33 (1), 33–50 
McNally, G. M., Eng, L. H. and Hasseldine, C. R. (1982) Corporate financial reporting in 
New Zealand: An analysis of user preference, corporate characteristics and disclosure 
Practices. Accounting and Business Research, 13 (49), 11-20 
McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the 
Firm Perspective. Academy of Management Review, 26 (1), 117-127 
310 
 
Meek, G. Roberts, C. and Gray, S. (1995). Factors influencing voluntary annual report 
disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental European multinational corporations. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 26, 555–573 
Mehmet Asutay. (2012). Conceptualising and locating the social failure of Islamic 
finance: aspirations of Islamic moral economy vs the realities of Islamic finance. Asian 
and African Studies, 44(August), 93–113. 
Mercer, M. (2004). How do investors assess the credibility of management disclosures? 
Accounting Horizons, 18 (3), 185–196 
Messner, M. (2009). The Limits of Accountability. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1429348 
Meyer, J. and Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as 
myth and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363 
Milne, M. and Adler, R. (1999). Exploring the Reliability of Social and Environmental 
Disclosures Content Analysis. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 12, 237- 
256 
Mirakhor, Abbas. “Hopes for the Future of Islamic Finance.” Lecture delivered at the 
„Documentation in Islamic Finance Conference‟ organized by the Institute of Islamic 
Banking and Insurance (London) and IRTI-Islamic Development Bank, July 17-18, 2002, 
London.  
Mirza, M. and Baydoun, N. (1999). Do Islamic Societies Need Their Own Accounting 
and Reporting Standards. Journal of the Academy of Business Administration, 4 (2), 39-
45 
Mishra, C. and McConaughy, D. (1999). Founding family control and capital structure: 
the risk Of Loss of control and the aversion to debt. Entrepreneurship: Theory and 
Practice, 23 (4), 53-64 
Mitchell, J. Chia, C. and Loh, A. (1995). Voluntary disclosure of segment information: 
further Australian evidence. Accounting and Finance, 35 (2), 1-16 
Mithas, S. Krishnan, M. and Fornell, C. (2005). Why do customer relationship 
management Applications affect customer satisfaction? Journal of Marketing, 69 (4), 
201–209 
Mohammad, M. O., & Shahwan, S. (2013). The Objective of Islamic Economic and 
Islamic Banking in Light of Maqasid Al-Shariah: A Critical Review. Middle-East Journal 
of Scientific Research, 13  
311 
 
Mohammed, J. (2007). Corporate social responsibility in Islam. PhD. Auckland 
University of Technology, Auckland 
Morris, R. (1987). Signalling, agency theory and accounting policy choice. Accounting 
and Business Research, 18 (69), 47-56 
Morsing, M., & Perrini, F. (2009). CSR in SMEs: do SMEs matter for the CSR agenda? 
Business Ethics: A European Review, 18(1), 1–6.  
Moumen, N., Ben Othman, H., & Hussainey, K. (2015). The value relevance of risk 
disclosure in annual reports: Evidence from MENA emerging markets. Research in 
International Business and Finance, 34, 177–204.  
Mulgan, R. (1997). Accountability and contracting out. Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 56 (4), 106-117 
Murray, A. Sinclair, D. Power, D. and Gray, R. (2006). Do financial markets care about 
social And Environmental disclosure? : Further evidence and exploration from the UK, 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 19 (2), 228-55 
Muttakin, M. B., & Khan, A. (2014). Determinants of corporate social disclosure: 
Empirical evidence from Bangladesh. Advances in Accounting, 30(1), 168–175.  
Muwazir, M. Muhamad, R. and Noordin, K. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosure: A Tawhidic Approach. Journal of Syariah, 14 (1), 125-142 
Nachmias, C. and Nachmias, D. (1996). Research methods in Social Science, 4th ed, 
London, Edward Arnold 
Nadzri, F. (2006). Roles and impacts of accounting and auditing organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) in dealing with the accounting and disclosure of Zakat 
and interest (Riba), PhD. AUT University 
Naser, K. Al-Hussaini, A. Al-Kwari, D. and Nuseibeh, R. (2006). Determinants of 
Corporate Social Disclosure in Developing Countries: Case of Qatar. Advances in 
International Accounting, 19, 1-23 
Naser, K. Khatib, K. and Karbhari, Y. (2002). Empirical evidence on the depth of 
corporate Disclosure in developing countries: The case of Jordan. International Journal 
of Commerce and Management, 12, 122–155 
Nekhilia, M. Boubakerb, S. and Lakhal, F. (2012). Ownership Structure, Voluntary 
RandD Disclosure and Market Value of Firms: The French Case. International journal of 
business, 17 (2), 126-140 
312 
 
Nelling, E. and Webb, E. (2009). Corporate social responsibility and financial 
performance: the „Virtuous circle‟ revisited. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, 32 (2), 197-209 
Nemec, R. (2010). Integration of corporate social responsibility into loyalty programs in 
the Tourism industry. Tourism and Hospitality Management, 16 (1), 101–108 
Neuendorf, A. (2002). The content analysis Guidebook. California: Sage Publications, 
Inc 
Neuman, W. (2000). Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches, 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon 
Ng, J., & Rusticus, T. O. (2011). Banks‟ Survival During the Financial Crisis: The Role of 
Financial Reporting Transparency. SSRN eLibrary. 
Nina Karina Karim,Mukhtaruddin,Tauifq MArwah,Abukosim, Y.S., 2013. The Quality of 
Voluntary CSR Disclosure on The Firm Value of Service Companies Listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. International Conference on Accounting and Finance, 3, pp.39–48. 
Noor, Osama, 2008. Takaful in UAE: Making Its Presence Felt. Middle East Insurance 
Review, June, p. 28. 
Norli Ali, Jamaliah Said, Normah Omar, R. A. R. and R. O. (2012). Financial Reporting 
Disclosure: Evidence from Malaysian Non Profit Organizations. British Journal of 
Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 4(March). 
Norusis, M. (2008). SPSS 16, Statistical procedures companion. Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall 
Nu, S., Htay, N., & Salman, S. A. (2014). Proposed Best Practices of Financial 
Information Disclosure for Zakat Institutions : A Case Study of Malaysia. World Appied 
Science Journal, 30(37), 288–294.  
Nyazee, I. (2000). Islamic jurisprudence: Usul Al-Fiqh. Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamic 
Research Institute 
Oh, W., Chang, Y., & Martynov, A. (2011). The effect of ownership structure on 
corporate social responsibility: Empirical evidence from korea. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 104(2), 283–297.  
Okumus, H. (2005). Interest-free banking in Turkey: a study of customer satisfaction 
and Bank Selection criteria. Journal of Economic Cooperation, 26 (4), 51-86 
313 
 
Oliveira J. Rodrigues, L. and Craig, R. (2013). Technical Note: Company Risk-related 
Disclosures In a Code Law Country: A Synopsis. Australasian Accounting, Business 
and Finance Journal, 7 (1), 123-130 
Oliver, C. (1997). Satisfaction: A behavioural perspective on the consumer. New York: 
McGraw Hill Opwis, F. (2005). Maslaha in Contemporary Legal Theory. Islamic Law and 
Society, 12 (2), 182-223 
Oliver, C. (1997). Sustainable competitive advantage: combining institutional and 
resource Based Views. Strategic Management Journal, 18 (9), 697-713 
Olken, B. a., & Pande, R. (2012). Corruption in Developing Countries. Annual Review of 
Economics, 4(1), 479–509.  
Orlitzky, M. Schmidt, F. and Rynes, S. (2003). Corporate Social and Financial 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Organization Studies, 24, 403–441 
Othman, A. and Owen, L. (2002). The multi dimensionality of carter model to measure 
Customer Service quality in Islamic banking industry: A study in Kuwait finance house. 
International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, 3 (4), 1–12 
Othman, R. Md-Thani, A. and Ghani, E. (2009). Determinants of Islamic Social 
Reporting Among Top Shariah -Approved Companies in Bursa Malaysia, Research. 
Journal of International Studies, 12, 4-20 
Ousama, A. A. (2010). Factors Influencing Voluntary Disclosure : Empirical Evidence 
from Shariah Approved Companies, 9(1), 85–103. 
Ousama, A. and Fatima, H. (2010). Voluntary disclosure by Shariah approved 
companies: an Exploratory study. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, 8 (1), 
35 – 49 
Owusu-Ansah, S. (1998). The Impact of Corporate Attributes on the Extent of 
Mandatory Disclosure and Reporting by Listed Companies in Zimbabwe. The 
International Journal of Accounting, 33, 605–631 
Park, B. Il, & Ghauri, P. N. (2014). Determinants influencing CSR practices in small and 
medium sized MNE subsidiaries: A stakeholder perspective. Journal of World Business.  
Parker, L. (2005). Social and Environmental Accountability Research: A View from the 
Commentary Box. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 18 (6), 842-860 
Patelli, L. and Prencipe, A. (2007). The relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
Independent Directors in the presence of a dominant shareholder. The European 
Accounting Review, 16 (1), 5–33 
314 
 
Patton, J. and Zelenka, I. (1997). An empirical analysis of the determinants of the extent 
of Disclosure in annual reports of joint stock companies in the Czech Republic. The 
European Accounting Review, 6 (4), 605–626 Easnell, K.  
Peng, M. W., Zhang, S., & Li, X. (2007). CEO Duality and Firm Performance during 
China‟s Institutional Transitions. Management and Organization Review, 3(2), 205–225.  
Peng, Zhang, Li “CEO Duality and Firm Performance during China‟s Institutional 
Transitions”,(2007), Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 323-339. 
Perez, A. García de los Salmones, M. and Rodríguez del Bosque, I. (2012). The effect 
of Corporate Associations on consumer behaviour. European Journal of Marketing, 47 
(1), 218–238 
Pincus, K. Rusbarsky, M. and Wong, J. (1989). Voluntary formation of corporate audit 
Committees among NASDAQ firms. Journal of accounting and public policy, 8 (4), 239-
323 
Pirch, J. Gupta, S. and Grau, S. (2007). A framework for understanding corporate social 
Responsibility programs as a continuum: an exploratory study. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 70, 125-140 
Platonova, E. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility from an Islamic Moral Economy 
Perspective : A Literature Survey. Afro EUrasian Studies, 2(Issues 1&2,Spring and Fall 
2013), 272–297. 
Platonova, E. (2014). Corporate Analysis of CSR Dislcosure and Its Impact on FInancial 
Performance in the GCC Islamic Banks. Durham University,UK. 
Plumlee, M. Brown, D. and Marshall, S., (2009). Voluntary environmental disclosure 
quality And Firm value: roles of venue and industry type, working study, University of 
Utah and Portland State University.  
Pok, Y. and Al Sheik (2011), " Board structure and firm performance: Evidence from 
emerging market Saudi Arabia ", Working Paper 
Pope, P. and Young, S. (2005). Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do 
Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 32 (7and8), 1311-1346 
Pornupatham, S. (2006). An Empirical Examination of Earnings Management, Audit 
Quality and Corporate Governance in Thailand: Perceptions of Auditors and Audit 
Committee Members. PhD. Cardiff Business School, UK 
315 
 
Porter, B. Simon, J. and Hatherly, D. (2008). Principles of External Auditing. 3rd ed. 
Wiley 
Potenza, M. N. (2013). Neurobiology of gambling behaviors. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology.  
Quran (2015). (Online) Quran is available on the http://quran.com/ (the last access was 
on 25 December 2015) 
Raffournier, B. (1995). The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed 
Companies. The European Accounting Review, 4 (2), 261-280 
Raheja, C. G. (2005), "Determinants of board size and composition: a theory of 
corporate boards", Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 283-
306. 
Rahman, A. (2007). Islamic banking and finance: between ideals and realities. IIUM 
Journal of Economics and Management, 15 (2), 123-141 
Rahman, A. A. (2010). Corporate Social Reporting : A Preliminary Study of Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad ( BIMB ). Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting, 4(1), 18–39. 
Rahman, A. A., & Bukair, A. A. (2013). The Influence of the Shariah Supervision Board 
on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure by Islamic Banks of Gulf Co-Operation 
Council Countries. Asian Journal of Business and Accounting, 6(2), 65–104. 
Rahman, A. A., & Bukair, A. A. (2015). The effect of the board of directors 
Characteristics on CSR Dislcosure by Islamic Banks. Asian Journal of Business and 
Accounting, 6(2), 65–104.  
Rahman, A. Perera, H. and Ganesh, S. (2002). Accounting practices harmony, 
accounting Regulation and firm characteristics. Abacus, 38, 46–77 
Rahman, H. Zain, M. and Al-Haj, Y. (2011). CSR disclosures and its determinants: 
Evidence From Malaysian government link companies. Social Responsibility Journal, 7 
(2), 181–201 
Rajab, B. and Handley-Schachler, M. (2009). Corporate risk disclosure by UK firms: 
trends and Determinants. World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and 
Sustainable Development, 5 (3), 224-43 
Raluca, “Does CEO Duality Really Affect Corporate Performance?” 2013, International 
Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management Sciences, January 2013, 
Vol. 2, No. 1 
316 
 
Ramdani, D., & Witteloostuijn, A. Van. (2010). The impact of board independence and 
CEO duality on firm performance: A quantile regression analysis for Indonesia, Malaysia, 
South Korea and Thailand. British Journal of Management, 21(3), 607–627.  
Rashid, M. Abdeljawad. I. and Ngalim, S. (2013). Customer-centric corporate social 
Responsibility: A framework for Islamic banks on ethical efficiency. Management 
Research Review, 36 (4), 359-378 
Reverte, C. (2009). Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Ratings 
by Spanish Listed Firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 88 (2), 351-366 
Rhodes, M. and Soobaroyen, T. (2010). Information asymmetry and socially responsible 
Investment. Journal of Business Ethics, 95, 145–150 
Richardson, A. and Welker, M. (2001). Social disclosure, financial disclosure and the 
cost of Equity Capital. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 26 (7), 597-616 
Riley, M. Wood, R. Clark, M. Wilkie, E. and Szivas, E. (2000). Researching and Writing 
Dissertations in Business and Management, Thomson Learning 
Robb, S. Single, W. and Zarzeski, M. (2001). Nonfinancial Disclosures across Anglo-
American Countries. Journal of International Accounting, 10 (1), 71–83 
Roberts, R. (1992). Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: An 
Application of Stakeholder Theory. Accounting, Organisations and Society, 17 (6), 595-
612 
Roman, R. Hayibor, S. and Agle, R. (1999). The relationship between social and 
financial Performance. Business and Society, 38 (1), 109–125 
Rosenstein, S. and Wyatt, J. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and 
shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 26, 175–191 
Rosly, S. and Bakar, M. (2003). Performance of Islamic and Mainstream Banks in 
Malaysia. International Journal of Social Economics, 30 (12), 1249-1265 
Rosly, Saiful Azhar, 2005. Critical Issues in Islamic Banking and Financial Markets, 
Bloomington, IN: Author House, pp. 181–5. 
Rosmaini, S., Mohd, B., Kamil, M., & Ibrahim, B. (2009). Business Reporting on the 
Internet : Development of a Disclosure Quality Index, 8(1), 55–79. 
Ross, S. (1977). The determination of financial structure: the incentive-signalling 
approach, Bell. Journal of Economics, 8 (1), 23-40 
317 
 
Rourke, D. O. (2004). Opportunities and Obstacles for Corporate Social Responsibility 
Reporting In Developing Countries. World. 
Saeed, Abdullah, 1999. Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba 
and its Contemporary Interpretation. Leiden: Brill, p. 14. 
Safieddine, A. (2009). Islamic financial institutions and corporate governance: new 
insights For Agency theory. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17 (2), 
142-58 
Safieddine, A. (2009). Islamic Financial Institutions and Corporate Governance: New 
Insights for Agency Theory. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(2), 
142–158.  
Sahih Bukhari, (2015). [Online] Available at: http://sunnah.com/bukhari, (last access 
was on 24 June 2015) 
Said, Z. Yuserrie, H. and Haron, H. (2009). The relationship between corporate social 
Responsibility Disclosure and corporate governance characteristics in Malaysian Public 
listed companies. Social Responsibility Journal, 5 (2), 212–226 
Sakib, N. (2015). Conformity Level of AAOIFI Accounting Standards by Six Islamic 
Banks of Bangladesh. European Journal Of Business and Management, 7(3), 16–23. 
Saleem, Nadia, 2008. Plans for Gulf Monetary Union on Track. Gulf News, 22 
September. 
Samaha, K. and Dahawy, K. (2010). Factors influencing corporate disclosure 
transparency in The Active share trading firms: An explanatory study. Research in 
Accounting in Emerging Economies, 10, 87–118 
Samaha, K. and Dahawy, K. (2011). An empirical analysis of corporate governance 
structures And Voluntary corporate disclosure in volatile capital markets: The Egyptian 
Experience. International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, 
7, 61-93 
Samaha, K. Dahawy, K. Hussainey, K. and Stapleton, P. (2012). The Extent of 
Corporate Governance Disclosure and Its Determinants in a Developing Market: The 
Case of Egypt. Advances in Accounting, 28 (1), 168-178 
Samaha, K. Khlif, H. and Hussainey, K. (2015). The Impact of Board Characteristics 
and Audit Committee on Voluntary Disclosure: A Meta-Analysis. Forthcoming, Journal 
of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation (JIAAT), ISSN: 1061-9518, Imprint: 
Elsevier – USA 
318 
 
Samuel, V. Stewart, J. (2009). Sustainable Accountability. Master thesis. The Victoria 
University of Wellington 
Santema, S. Hoekert, M. Van De Rejt, J. and Van Oijen, A. (2005). Strategy disclosure 
in annual Reports across Europe: A study on differences between five countries. 
European Business Review, 17 (4), 352- 366 
Sarea, A. and Hanefah, M. (2013). The need of accounting standards for Islamic 
financial Institutions: evidence from AAOIFI. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business 
Research, 4 (1), 64- 76 
Sarea, A. M., & Hanefah, M. M. (2013). Adoption of AAOIFI accounting standards by 
Islamic banks of Bahrain. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, 11(2), 131–
142.  
Sarkar, J. and Sarkar, S. (2012). Corporate Governance in India. Sage Publications, 
New Delhi Sarantakos, S. (1994). Social Research. 4th ed. London: Sage 
Satkunasegaran, E. (2003). Corporate Governance and the Protection of Customers of 
Islamic Banks. International Islamic Banking Conference in Prato, Italy 
Sauer, J. (2002). Metaphysics and economy – the problem of interest. International 
Journal of Social Economics, 29 (1/2), 97-118 
Saunders, M. Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2007). Research methods for business 
students. (4th Ed), Harlow: Pearson Education 
Schadewitz, H. and Blevins, D. (1998). Major determinants of interim disclosures in an 
Emerging Market. American Business Review, 16 (1), 41-55 
Schleicher, T. Hussainey, K. and Walker, M. (2007). Loss firms' annual report narratives 
and Share Price anticipation of earnings. The British Accounting Review, 39 (2), 153-
171 
Scholtens, B. (2008). Corporate social responsibility in the international banking industry. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 86 (2), 159–175 
Schwaiger, M. (2004). Components and parameters of corporate reputation– an 
empirical Study. Schmalenbach Business Review, 56, 46–71 
Schwartz, M. and Carroll, A. (2003). Corporate social responsibility: a three-domain 
approach. Business ethics quarterly, 13 (4), 503- 530 
Sekaran, U. Bougie, R. (2010). Research methods for business: A skill building 
approaches (5th ed). Chichester: John Willey and Sons Ltd 
319 
 
Sen, S. Bhattacharya, C. and Korschun, D. (2006). The role of corporate social 
responsibility in Strengthening multiple stakeholder relationships: A field experiment. 
Academy of Marketing Science, 34 (2), 158-166 
Servaes, H. and Tamayo, A. (2013). The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on 
Firm Value: The Role of Customer Awareness. Management science, 59 (5), 1045–
1061 
Setiyono and Tarazi (2014). Disclosure, ownership structure and bank risk: Evidence 
from Asia.  
Shahin, A. and Zairi, M. (2007). Corporate governance as a critical element for driving 
Excellence In corporate social responsibility. International Journal of Quality and 
Reliability Management, 24, 753-770 
Sharma, N. (2014). Extent of corporate governance disclosure by banks and finance 
companies listed on Nepal Stock Exchange. Advances in Accounting, incorporating 
Advances in International Accounting, 30, 425–439 
Sherif El-Halaby & Khaled Hussaney. (2015). The Determinants of Social accountability 
dislcosure:Evidence from Islamic banks around the world. 
Sherif El-Halaby, K. H. (2016). Determinants of compliance with AAOIFI standards by 
Islamic banks. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and 
Management, Vol. 9 Iss. 
Sheu, H. Chung, H. and Liu, C. (2010). Comprehensive Disclosure of Compensation 
and Firm Value: The Case of Policy Reforms in an Emerging Market. Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, 37, 1115–1144 
Shocker, A. and Sethi, S. (1974). An approach to incorporating social preferences in 
developing Corporate action strategies, The UnsTableGround: Corporate Social Policy 
in a Dynamic Society, Wiley, New York, NY 
Siddiqi, M. (1995). Islamic Economics and Finance. Encyclopaedia of Islamic bank and 
Insurance (Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance, London), 1–9 
Siddiqi, M. (2005). Tawhid: The Concept and the Process, in Readings in the Concept 
and Methodology of Islamic Economics, Aidit Ghazali and Syed Omar (Eds.) Cert 
Publications 
Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah, 1985. Partnership and Profit Sharing in Islamic Law. 
Leicester: Islamic Foundation, pp. 9–18. 
320 
 
Silverman, D. (1993). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text 
and Interaction, London: Sage 
Simpson, G. and Kohers, T. (2002). The Link between Corporate Social and Financial 
Performance: Evidence from the Banking Industry. Journal of Business Ethics, 35, 97–
109 
Singh, M. Mathur, I. and Gleason, K. (2004). Governance and performance implications 
of Diversification strategies: evidence from large US firms. Financial Review, 39, 489-
526 
Siwar, C., & Hossain, M. T. (2009). An analysis of Islamic CSR concept and the 
opinions of Malaysian managers. Management of Environmental Quality: An 
International Journal.  
Skaife, A. Collins, D. and LaFond, R. (2006). The effects of corporate governance on 
firms‟ Credit Ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42, 203–243 
Sobhani, F. Amran, A. and Zainuddin, Y. (2009). Revisiting the practices of corporate 
social and Environmental disclosure in Bangladesh. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, 16, 167-183 
Soderlund, M. (2006). Measuring customer loyalty with multi-item scales: a case for 
caution. International Journal of Service Industry Management, 17 (1), 76-98 
Soderstrom, N. and Sun, K. (2007). IFRS adoption and accounting quality: A review. 
The European Accounting Review, 16(4), 675–702 
Solomon, J. (2010). Corporate Governance and Accountability, 2nd ed, Hoboken, NJ, 
Wiley, Chichester, UK 
Spero, L. (1979). The Extent and Causes of Voluntary Disclosure of Financial 
Information in Three European Capital Markets: An Exploratory Study. PhD. Harvard 
University 
Stanton, P., & Stanton, J. (2002). Corporate annual reports: research perspectives used. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15(4), 478–500.  
Sternberg, E. (1997). The Defects of Stakeholder Theory. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 5 (1), 3-10 
Stevens, J. (2002). Applied Multivariate Statistics for the Social Sciences, Routledge, 
New York 
321 
 
Street, D. and Bryant, S. (2000). Disclosure level and compliance with IASs: A 
comparison of Companies with and without U.S. listings and fillings. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 35(3), 305–329 
Street, D. Gray, S. and Bryant, S. (1999). Acceptance and observance of International 
Accounting Standards: An empirical study of companies claiming to comply with IASs. 
The International Journal of Accounting, 34 (1), 11–48 
Street, D. L., & Bryant, S. M. (2000). Disclosure Level and Compliance with IASs: A 
Comparison of Companies With and Without U.S. Listings and Filings. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 35(3), 305–329. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0020-7063(00)00060-1 
Sulaiman, M. (1998). The Usefulness of the Current Value Balance Sheet and the Value 
Added Statement to Muslims: Some Evidence from Malaysia. Accounting, Commerce 
and Finance: The Islamic Perspective Journal, 2 (2), 24-66 
Sulaiman, M. and Willet, R. (2003). Using the Hofstede-Gray framework to argue 
normatively For An extension of Islamic Corporate Reports. Malaysian Accounting 
Review, 2 (1), 1-39 
Ta, H. and Har, K. (2000). A study of bank selection decisions in Singapore using the 
analytical Hierarchical process. International journal of Bank Marketing, 18(4), 170-180 
Taha, H. N. (2010). Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: An Examination of 
Framework of Determinants and Consequences. Durham Thesis, Durham University. 
Taliyang, S. M., & Jusop, M. (2011). Intellectual Capital Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance Structure: Evidence in Malaysia. International Journal of Business and 
Management, 6(12), 109–118 
Tarca, A. (2004). International convergence of accounting practices: Choosing between 
IASAnd US GAAP. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 
15(1), 60–91 
Taylor, G. Tower, G. and Neilson, J. (2010). Corporate communication of financial risk. 
Accounting and Finance, 50, 417-446 
Teoh, H. and Thong, G. (1984). Another look at corporate social responsibility and 
reporting: An Empirical study in a developing country. Accounting, Organisations and 
Society, 9 (2), 189-206 
The Banker. Top 500 Islamic Financial Institutions. Supplement, November 2009. 
Thompson, P., & Zakaria, Z. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in 
Malaysia. Journal of Corporate Citizenship, (13), 125–136.  
322 
 
Thorp, Philip, 2008. The Importance of Being Regulated, in The Report: Qatar. Oxford 
Business Group, pp. 88–9. 
Tilt, C. (1994). The Influence of External Pressure Groups on Corporate Social 
Disclosure: Some Empirical Evidence. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 
7 (4), 47-72 
Tower, G. Hancock, P. and Taplin, R. (1999). A regional study of listed companies' 
compliance With international accounting standards. Accounting Forum, 23(3), 293–305 
Trabelsi, S., Labelle, R., & Dumontier, P. (2008). Incremental Voluntary Disclosure on 
Corporate Websites, Determinants and Consequences. Journal of Contemporary 
Accounting & Economics, 4(2), 120–155.  
Tricker, R.I. (1984), Corporate Governance – Practices, Procedures and Powers in 
British Companies and their Boards of Directors, Gower Publishing, Aldershot 
Tsalavoutas, I. (2011). Transition to IFRS and compliance with mandatory disclosure 
Requirements: What is the signal? Advances in Accounting, 27(2), 390–405 
Tsalavoutas, I. and Dionysiou, D. (2011). Value Relevance of IFRS Mandatory 
Disclosure Requirements. Journal of Applied Accounting Research,  
Tsamenyi, M. Enninful-Adu, E. and Onumah, J. (2007). Disclosure and corporate 
governance in Developing countries: evidence from Ghana. Managerial Auditing Journal, 
22 (3), 319-334 
Tuggle, C. S., Sirmon, D. G., Reutzel, C. R., & Bierman, L. (2010). Commanding board 
of director attention: Investigating how organizational performance and CEO duality 
affect board members‟ attention to monitoring. Strategic Management Journal, 31(9), 
946–968. http://doi.org/10.1002/smj.847 
Turban, D. and Greening, D. (1997). Corporate social performance and organizational 
Attractiveness to prospective employees. Academy of Management Journal, 40 (3), 
658-672 
Tyler, K. and Stanley, E. (1999). UK bank-corporate relationships: Large corporate‟ 
Expectations of Service. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 17(4), 158–170 
Ujunwa, A. (2012). "Board characteristics and the financial performance of Nigerian 
quoted firms". Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, 
12(5), 656-674. 
323 
 
Ullah, M. H. (2013). Compliance of AAOIFI Guidelines in General Presentation and 
Disclosure in the Financial Statements of Islamic Banks in Bangladesh. International 
Journal of Social Science Research, 111–123.  
Ullah, S. and Jamali, D. (2010). Institutional investors and corporate social responsibility: 
the Role of Islamic financial institutions. International Review of Business Research 
Study, 6 (1), 619-630 
Unerman, J. (2000). Methodological issues: reflections on quantification in corporate 
social reporting content analysis. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 13 
(5), 667‐680 
Uyar, A. and Kiliç, M. (2012). Value relevance of voluntary disclosure: evidence from 
Turkish Firms. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 13 (3), 363-376 
Uyar, A., & Kiliç, M. (2012). Value relevance of voluntary disclosure: evidence from 
Turkish firms. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 13(3), 363–376.  
Vafaei, A. Taylor, D. and Ahmed, K. (2011). The value relevance of intellectual capital 
Disclosures. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 12 (3), 407-429 
Vandemele, S. Vergauwen, P. and Michiels, A. (2009). Management risk reporting 
practices and Their Determinants: a study of Belgian listed firms.  
Verrecchia, R. (1983). Discretionary  Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
5, 179-194 
Vinnicombe, T. (2010). AAOIFI reporting standards: Measuring compliance. Advances 
in Accounting,incorporarting Advances in International Accounting, 26(1), 55–65.  
Vinnicombe, T. (2012). A study of compliance with AAOIFI accounting standards by 
Islamic banks in Bahrain. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 3(2), 
78–98.  
Vintila, G., Gherghina, S.C. (2012), "An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship 
between Corporate Governance Mechanisms, CEO Characteristics and Listed 
Companies Performance", International Business Research, vol. 5, no. 10, pp. 175-191. 
Visser, H. (2009). Islamic Finance: Principles and Practice Cheltenham. Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 
Vlachos, C. (2001). An empirical investigation of the financial disclosure practices of 
Cypriot And Greek Companies. PhD. Middlesex University, UK 
324 
 
Vogel, D. (2005). Is There a Market for Virtue? The Business Case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility. California Management Review, 47(4), 19–45 
Vogel, Frank E. and Samuel L. Hayes III. Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and 
Return. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998. 
Volkov, N. and Smith, G. (2015). Corporate diversification and firm value during 
economic Downturns. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 55, 160–175 
Wallace, R. and Naser, K. (1995). Firm-Specific Determinants of Comprehensiveness of 
Mandatory Disclosure in the Corporate Annual Reports of Firms on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 14, 311– 368 
Wallace, R. Naser, K. and Mora, A. (1994). The relationship between the 
comprehensiveness Of Corporate annual reports and firm characteristics in Spain. 
Accounting and Business Research, 25, 41–53 
Wan Amalina Wan Abdullah, M. P. and J. S. (2009). Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Practices of Islamic banks: the Case of Islamic banks in the Southeast Asian and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council region. 
Wang, J. Song, L. and Yao, S. (2013). The determinants of corporate social 
responsibility Disclosure: evidence from China. The Journal of Applied Business 
Research, 29 (6), 1833-1848 
Wang, K. Sewon, O. and Claiborne, C. (2008). Determinants and consequences of 
voluntary Disclosure in an emerging market: evidence from China. Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 17 (1), 14-30 
Wang, M. and Hussainey, K. (2013). Voluntary forward-looking statements driven by 
corporate Governance and their value relevance. Journal of accounting and public 
policy, 32 (3), 26-49 
Wang, Q. Wong, J. and Xiac, L. (2008). State ownership, the institutional environment, 
and Auditor Choice: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 461, 
112–134 
Wang, Y. Chen, Y. and Wang, J. (2015). Management earnings forecasts and analyst 
forecasts: Evidence from mandatory disclosure. China Journal of Accounting Research, 
8, 133–146 
Warde, I. (2013). Islamic Finance in the Global Economy. CFA Institute Middle East 
Investment Conference, Dubai 
325 
 
Warde, Ibrahim, 2000. Islamic Finance in the Global Economy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, pp. 73–4. 
Weber, R. (1990). Basic Content Analysis. 2nd ed. Newbury Park, California: Sage 
Weir, C. and Laing, D. (2001). Governance structures, director independence and 
corporate Performance in the UK. European Business Review, 13(2), 86-94 
Williams, G. and Zinkin, J. (2010). Islam and CSR: A Study of the Compatibility between 
the Tenets of Islam and the UN Global Compact. Journal of Business Ethics, 91(4), 
519-533 
Williams, G., & Zinkin, J. (2009). Islam and CSR: A Study of the Compatibility Between 
the Tenets of Islam and the UN Global Compact. Journal of Business Ethics, 91(4), 
519–533 
Williamson, O. (1984). Corporate Governance. The Yale Law Journal, 93 (7), 1197–
1230 
Wilson, R. (1995). Marketing strategies for Islamic financial products. New Horizon, 39, 
7-9 
Wilson, R. (1997). Islamic finance and ethical investment. International Journal of Social 
Economics, 24 (11), 25-42 
Wilson, Rodney, 1987. Financial Development in the Arab Gulf: The Eastern Bank 
Experience, 1917–1950. Business History, 29 (2), pp. 178–98. 
Wilson, Rodney, 2002. Arab Government Responses to Islamic Finance: The Cases of 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Mediterranean Politics, 7 (3), pp. 143–63. 
Wilson, Rodney, 2004. Screening Criteria for Islamic Equity Funds, in Sohail Jaffer 
(ed.),Islamic Asset Management: Forming the Future of Shariah Compliant Investment 
Strategies. London: Euromoney Books, pp. 35–45. 
Wilson, Rodney, 2006. Islam et Capitalisme Reconsidérés. Maghreb-Machrek, 187, 
pp.29–44. 
Wilson, Rodney, 2007. Concerns and Misconceptions in the Provision of Takaful, in 
Sohail Jaffer (ed.), Islamic Insurance: Trends, Opportunities and the Future of Takaful. 
London: Euromoney Books, pp. 72–86. 
Wilson, Rodney, 2008, “Innovation in Structuring of Sukuk Securities,” Humanomics No. 
24 Vol. 3, pp. 170–81. 
326 
 
Wisskirchen, C. Vater, D. Wright, T. Backer, P. and Detrick, C. (2006). The customer-
led Bank: Converting customers from defectors into fans. Strategic and Leadership, 34 
(2), 10-20 
Wolfe, R. (1991). The use of Content analysis to Assess Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 12, 281-307 
Woodward, D. Edwards, P. and Birkin, F. (1996). Organizational legitimacy and 
Stakeholder Information Provision. British Journal of Management, 7(4), 329-347 World 
Bank (2015).  
Wright, D. K., & Hinson, M. D. (2012). Examining How Social and Emerging Media 
Have Been Used in Public Relations Between 2006 and 2012 : A Longitudinal Analysis 
Chair in Pubic Relations. 
Xiao, H. and Yuan, J. (2007). Ownership structure, board composition and corporate 
voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from listed companies in China. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 22 (6), 604 – 619 
Xiao, Z. He, Y. and Chow, W. (2004). The Determinants and Characteristics of 
Voluntary Internet- Based Disclosures by Listed Chinese Companies. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 23, 191–225 
Xie, B. Davidson, W. and Dadalt, P. (2003). Earnings management and corporate 
governance: The Roles of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 9, 295-316 
Yang, T., Zhao, S., (2013) “CEO Duality and Firm Performance: Evidence from an 
Exogenous Shock to the Competitive Environment”, Journal of Banking and Finance 
online 24 April 2014 
Yavas, U. and Yasin, M. (2001). Enhancing organizational performance in banks: a 
systematic Approach. Journal of Services Marketing, 15 (6), 444-53 
Yekini, S. (2009). Financail instruments disclosure: the role of accounting standards. 
PhD. The University of Leicester, UK 
Yermack, D. (1998), "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of 
directors", Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 185-211. 
Young, Arthur, 1983. Saudi Arabia: The Making of a Financial Giant. New York: New 
York University Press, pp. 61–3. 
327 
 
Yusoff, H. Lehman, G. and Nasir, N. (2006). Environmental engagements through the 
lens of disclosure practices: A Malaysian story. Asian Review of Accounting, 14 (1/2), 
122- 148 
Zaher, T. and Hassan, M. (2001). A comparative literature survey of Islamic finance and 
Banking. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 10, 155-99 
Zahra, S.A. and Stanton,W.W. (1988), „„The implications of Board of Directors – 
composition on corporate strategy and performance‟‟, International Journal of 
Management, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 229-36. 
Zaid, O. (2000). Were Islamic record precursors to accounting books based on the 
Italian Method? The Accounting Historians Journal, 27 (1), 73-90 
Zainal, D., Zulkifli, N., & Saleh, Z. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in 
Malaysia : A Comparison Between Shariah and Non-Shariah Approved Firms. Middle-
East Journal of Scientific Research, 15(7), 1035–1046.  
Zaini, N. (2007). An exploratory study on the understanding of AAOIFI accounting 
standards For Investment in Islamic bonds: The case of Malaysian‟s accounting 
academics. Master thesis. International Islamic University Malaysia 
Zakaria and Arun, T. G. (2014). Corporate Social Responsibility in Islamic Financial 
Institutions(IFI): A Managemnet Insight. Journal of Business Ethics, (ISSN 0167-4544). 
Zalata, A., & Roberts, C. (2016). Internal Corporate Governance and Classification 
Shifting Practices: An Analysis of U.K. Corporate Behavior. Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing & Finance.  
Zarzeski, M. (1996). Spontaneous harmonization effects of culture and market forces on 
Accounting disclosure practices. Accounting Horizons, 10, 18-3 
 
